REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. IRINEO V. MENDOZA, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH III, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MASBATE, THE LAND REGISTRA­TION COMMISSIONER, E…

This is a petition for certiorari
and mandamus to annul – (1) the order issued on January 17, 1979 by
respondent Judge Irineo V. Mendoza of the Court of First Instance
of Masbate, Branch III, dismissing the petitioner’s appeal in LRC Case No.
301-III entitled Robert Arevalo, Applicant versus Republic of the Philippines,
Oppositor, (2) the decree of registration issued by the respondent Land
Registration Commissioner in the same case and (3) the Certificate of Title
issued by the respondent Registrar of Deeds of Masbate pursuant to the decree
of registration and to compel the respondent judge to give due course to
petitioner’s appeal in said LRC Case No. 301-III.

On January 28, 1978,
private respondent Robert Arevalo filed with the Court of First Instance of
Masbate an application for registration of title to six (6) parcels of land, designated as Lots
Nos. 1 to 6 in Plan Psu-05-001980. The lots have an aggregate area of 121.5599
hectares.

On May 2, 1978, the
Solicitor-General filed by mail his notice of appearance. Said notice of
appearance reads:

“G r e e t i n g s :

“Please enter the appearance of the Solicitor General as
counsel for the Government in the above-entitled case, and cause all notices
of hearings, orders, resolutions, decisions and other processes to be served
upon him at the Office of the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Manila.

“The Provincial Fiscal of Masbate has been authorized to
appear in this case and therefore should also be fur­nished notices of
hearings, orders, reso­lutions, decisions, processes. However, as the
Solicitor General retains super­vision and control of the representation in
this case and has to approve withdrawal of the case, non-appeal, or other
actions which appear to compromise the interests of the Government, only
notices of orders, resolutions, and decisions served on him will bind the party
represented.

“Adverse parties are likewise requested to furnish both the
Solicitor General and the Fiscal with copies of their pleadings and
motions.” (Original Record, p. 38. Emphasis Supplied)

On July 5, 1978, the
Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development repre­sented
by the Solicitor General through the office of the Provincial Fiscal of Masbate
filed by mail oppositions to the application for registration.

On July 20, 1978, a general order of default was declared by respondent judge against the
whole world with the exception of the Director of Lands and the Director of the
Bureau of Forest Development.

On September 4, 1978, the
respondent judge rendered a decision confirming private respondent Robert Arevalo’s imperfect title to the six parcels of land and ordering the
registration thereof. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, a decision is hereby rendered that the parcels of
land, Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, described, bounded and plotted on Plan
Psu-05-001980 (Exhibit ‘F’) and its accompanying technical descriptions
(Exhibits ‘G’, ‘G-1’, ‘G-2’, ‘G-3’, ‘G-4’ and ‘G-5’), respectively, be
REGISTERED and the title CONFIRMED, pursuant to Section 38 of Act No. 496 in
the name of the applicant, Robert Arevalo,
of legal age, Filipino, married to Josephine Bayot and resident of 24
Alphine St., Merville Park, Parañaque, Metro Manila, subject to such
encumbrances as are stated under Section 39 of the same Act as maybe subsisting
and that should the need arises, the applicant shall cede in favor of the
government so much portion as may be needed for a road right-of-way
purposes.”

On September 8, 1978, the
Provincial Fiscal of Masbate received a copy of the decision but did not
furnish a copy thereof to the Solicitor General. It was only on November 6,
1978 that the Solicitor General received a copy of the decision.

On October 13, 1978,
private respondent Robert Arevalo filed a motion for the issuance of a decree
on the ground that the decision had already become final and executory, thirty
(30) days having elapsed from the service of the decision to the parties and no
appeal having been interposed by any one. The motion was granted by the
respondent judge on October 18, 1978.

On December 5, 1978,
petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General filed by
mail its notice of appeal and record of appeal, setting the latter for hearing
on December 15, 1978.

On January 9, 1979,
private respondent Robert Arevalo filed a motion to dismiss appeal on the
ground that the decision in this case has already become final and that said
decision has already been executed with the issuance of the decree in favor of
the applicant. Arevalo added that title was already issued in his name, and
registered with the Registrar of Deeds of Masbate as of November 29, 1978.

On January 17, 1979, the
respondent judge issued an order dismissing the Republic’s appeal for having
been filed out of time. The lower court stated that while it is true that the
power and/or right to withdraw opposition, to appeal or not to appeal, and other actions which appear to compromise
the interests of the government remained with the Solicitor General, yet the
said right should be exercised within the period prescribed by law from the
time the authorized representative received the order and/or decision being
appealed.

The only issue before us
is whether the thirty-day period to appeal should be counted from the service of the decision upon the fiscal or from the time it was received by the
Solicitor General.

The petitioner relies on
our ruling in Republic v.
Hon. Wenceslao M. Polo (89 SCRA 33), where we held that the
thirty-day appeal period should be counted from the time the Solicitor General
received a copy of the decision because the service of the decision upon the
City Fiscal did not operate as a service upon the Solicitor General.

On the other hand, the
private respondent relies on our ruling in Republic v. Director of Lands (71 SCRA 426)
where we held that service upon the provincial fiscal is binding upon
the Republic.

We agree with the
petitioner.

Republic v. Polo (89 SCRA 33) states catego­rically
that the thirty-day period should be counted from the date the Solicitor
General received a copy of the decision because the service of the
decision upon the city fiscal did
not operate as a service upon
the Solicitor General. We stated:

“The issue is whether the thirty-day period should be reckoned
from the service of the decision
upon the fiscal or from the time
it was served upon the Solicitor General.

“We hold that the thirty-day period should be counted from the
date when the Solicitor General received a copy of the decision because the
service of the decision upon the city fiscal
did not operate as a service upon the Solicitor General.

“It should be clarified that, although the Solicitor General
requested the city fiscal to represent him in the trial court, he,
nevertheless, made his own separate appearance as counsel for the State. In
that ‘notice of appearance’, he expressly requested that he should be served in Manila with all notices of
hearings, orders, resolutions, decisions and other processes’ and that such service is distinct from the service of notices and other papers on the
city fiscal.

“The Solicitor General
also indicated in his ‘notice of appearance’ that he ‘retains supervision and
control of the representation in this case and has to approve withdrawal
of the case, non-appeal, or other actions which appear to compromise the interests of the Government’ and that ‘only
notices of orders, resolutions and decisions served on him will bind‘ the Government.

“The Solicitor General
in requesting the city fiscal to
represent him at the hearings called the attention of that official to Circular
No. 41 of the Secretary of Justice dated November 28, 1973 wherein provincial
and city fiscals were advised that, in cases where they represent the Solicitor
General, ‘service on the Solicitor General shall be the basis’ ‘for
the purpose of finality of the decision‘.

“In this case, it is obvious that, strictly speaking, the city
fiscal did not directly represent the Government. He was merely a surrogate of
the Solicitor General whose office, ‘as the
law office of the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines’, is the entity that is empowered to ‘represent the Government in all land registration and related proceedings’
(Sec. 1[e], Presidential Decree No. 478).

“The trial court in disallowing the Government’s appeal relied
on the ruling that the service
of the decision in a land registration case on the fiscal is necessarily a
service on the Solicitor General (Republic v. Reyes, L-35545, June 18,
1976, 71 SCRA 426, 436-437).

“That ruling is not applicable to this case because in the Reyes
case the fiscal, as representative of the Solicitor General, was authorized not
only to attend hearings but also to file pleadings for the Government. In the instant case, the city fiscal’s authority was
confined to attending the hearings. The Office of the Solicitor General was the
one that filed the pleadings and motions in the lower court.

“The Solicitor General in his petition herein observed that it
was the ruling in the Reyes case that prompted his office ‘to revise
completely the letter of authority to fiscals representing’ him by making it
clear that it is the service of the decision on the Solicitor General that
would bind the Government.”

The Reyes case is no longer the law on the issue before us
apart from the fact that it is not appli­cable to the instant petition because
it has a different factual setting. The appeal was perfected on time and should
be given due course.

WHEREFORE, the trial court’s order disallowing the
petitioner’s appeal is reversed and set aside. The respondent court is directed to certify the appeal and transmit the
records to the appellate court (the record on appeal having been eliminated
under Section 18 of the Court’s Interim Rules And Guidelines dated January 11,
1983). The decree of registration and the certificate of title issued in this
case are ordered cancelled for having been prematurely issued. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, and Relova, JJ., concur.