ANTONIO ROJE I. MACASINAG, PETITIONER, VS. HON. CECILYN E. BURGOS-VILLAVERT, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 89, QUEZON CITY AND MA. LUISA F. MARTINEZ, RESPONDENTS.

Macasinag versus Burgos-Villavert

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari brought by Antonio Roje Macasinag against Judge Cecilyn Burgos-Villavert of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89, and against Ma. Luisa Martinez. Macasinag asks the Supreme Court to annul three orders of the trial court that refused to correct a single letter in his name as written in a final and executory decision declaring his marriage void, and that likewise refused to allow his appeal from those refusals. The case matters because it tests the iron rule of immutability of final judgments against its recognized exception for the correction of clerical errors, and because it clarifies that certiorari, not appeal, is the proper remedy when a court denies a motion to correct such an error.

Procedural History

On July 4, 1997, Ma. Luisa Martinez filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of the psychological incapacity of Antonio Roje Macasinag. Macasinag did not participate in the proceedings. On December 13, 1999, Judge Elsa de Guzman rendered a decision granting the petition, and that decision became final and executory on February 25, 2011.

On January 18, 2012, Macasinag filed a motion for correction of clerical error in the decision, asking that his middle initial be corrected from J to I. The trial court, through Judge Burgos-Villavert, denied the motion on June 18, 2012. Macasinag moved for reconsideration and supplemented it with a copy of his certificate of birth; the trial court denied both on October 9, 2012. Macasinag then filed a notice of appeal, which the trial court also denied on November 28, 2012, ruling that no appeal may be taken from an order denying relief from judgment. Macasinag went directly to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Court gave due course to the petition in the interest of substantial justice.

Facts

Ma. Luisa Martinez sought the annulment of her marriage to Antonio Roje Macasinag on the ground of psychological incapacity. The petition, and two amended petitions, carried his name in the caption as Antonio Roje J. Macasinag, and the marriage contract presented in evidence bore a name that appeared to be Antonio Roje J. Macasinag. Macasinag took no part in the case. The trial court granted the annulment in December 1999, and the decision became final and executory in February 2011.

Nearly a year after finality, Macasinag discovered that the decision recorded his middle initial as J when it should be I, standing for Ilo, the name of his mother Elena Ilo. He filed a motion to correct the clerical error, invoking a judgment nunc pro tunc, meaning a judgment entered now for then to reflect what the record actually shows. The trial court refused, reasoning that the name in the marriage contract and in the petitions was the same J, so no clerical error had been committed.

Macasinag sought reconsideration and supplemented it with his certificate of birth showing his mother's name as Elena Ilo, and with his children's birth certificates showing his middle initial as I. He conceded that a simple inadvertence in the caption of the petition had carried the wrong initial into the decision. The trial court still refused, and when he filed a notice of appeal, it refused that too, holding that no appeal lies from an order denying relief from judgment.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to correct the clerical error in the final and executory decision.
• Whether or not certiorari is the proper remedy, given that the trial court denied the notice of appeal and that appeal and certiorari are generally mutually exclusive.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1, paragraph (a) of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Section 1. Subject of appeal. — An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable. No appeal may be taken from: (a) An order denying a motion for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment.

This provision is the basis for the trial court's refusal to entertain the notice of appeal, and the Court cites it to explain why ordinary appeal was not available to Macasinag.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled that the trial court overstepped the bounds of its jurisdiction. A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. But the Court recognized exceptions: the correction of clerical errors; nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party; void judgments; and circumstances that arise after finality rendering execution unjust and inequitable. The Court found that what Macasinag sought was the rectification of a mere clerical error that would not substantially change the final judgment. His certificate of birth, his children's birth certificates, and the illegible entry in the marriage contract all showed that his middle initial is I. The Court held that a judgment that has acquired finality may no longer be modified except to correct clerical errors or mistakes, and that clarification after final judgment is allowed when what is involved is a clerical error rather than a correction of an erroneous judgment or dispositive portion.

On the second issue, the Court held that certiorari was the proper remedy. The denial of the motion to correct the clerical error, and of the motion to reconsider that denial, involved an exercise of a wide degree of judicial discretion not correctible by ordinary appeal. Appeal would be inadequate, slow, and would not promptly relieve Macasinag of the injurious effects of the orders. The Rules themselves proscribe an appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration. With no appeal nor any other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy available, certiorari lies. Although appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive, and Macasinag had initially availed of appeal, the Court disregarded technicality in the interest of substantial justice and gave due course to the petition.

Doctrine

A final and executory judgment is immutable and unalterable and may not be modified in any respect, even by the court that rendered it or by the Supreme Court. The recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors, nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and circumstances arising after finality that render execution unjust and inequitable. A clerical error in a final judgment, such as a wrong middle initial, may be corrected by clarification even after finality, because it does not involve a correction of an erroneous judgment or of the dispositive portion. The denial of a motion to correct a clerical error in a final judgment is not correctible by ordinary appeal, since no appeal lies from an order denying relief from judgment; certiorari is the proper remedy where there is no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy.

Disposition

The petition was granted; the orders of June 18, 2012 and October 9, 2012 were set aside, and a new order issued directing the correction of the petitioner's name from Antonio Roje J. Macasinag to Antonio Roje I. Macasinag in the December 13, 1999 decision.

Remember This

Memorize the line: a final judgment is immutable, except to correct clerical errors, nunc pro tunc entries causing no prejudice, void judgments, and supervening circumstances rendering execution unjust. Examiners use this case to test the clerical error exception to immutability and the rule that certiorari, not appeal, is the remedy against a denial of a motion to correct such an error.