ESTEFANIA VDA. DE MIRANDA, SOLEDAD MIRANDA, PERFECTA MIRANDA, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. MACAPANTON ABBAS, PRE­SIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF DAVAO; THE PROVIN­…

Estefania Vda. de Miranda versus Judge Abbas

The Case

This is a special civil action for certiorari brought by the widow and children of a deceased defendant, Sebastian Miranda, against the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao. The petitioners ask the Supreme Court to annul all the proceedings in a land case that the trial court decided against their predecessor. The case matters to a reviewee because it settles two procedural rules that examiners love: when a trial court may receive the plaintiff's evidence ex parte after the defendant's counsel fails to appear, and whether a writ of execution issued after the judgment debtor has died, but before entry of judgment, is void. The Court answers both questions against the petitioners and teaches that the death of a party does not by itself nullify execution against his heirs.

Procedural History

The action began in the Court of First Instance of Davao, where the Manoba heirs sued Sebastian Miranda to recover a parcel of land and its improvements. After many postponements, the case was heard on September 30, 1960, with only the plaintiffs' counsel present. The trial court allowed the plaintiffs to present evidence ex parte and, on December 21, 1960, rendered judgment for the plaintiffs, ordering Miranda to vacate the land, deliver possession, and pay damages and costs. Miranda's counsel received a copy of the decision on January 20, 1961, and filed a motion for reconsideration on February 3, which the court denied. Miranda died on February 21, 1961. On July 17, 1961, the court ordered the issuance of a writ of execution; the writ issued on August 11, 1961, and entry of judgment followed on August 16, 1961. On August 30, 1961, the court ruled that the writ could be enforced against the heirs and denied a petition for relief from judgment. No appeal was taken. Instead, almost seven months later, on April 3, 1962, the heirs filed this petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, praying that all proceedings below be annulled.

Facts

On October 15, 1956, the Manoba heirs of Campa-an, a Manobo, sued Sebastian Miranda in the Court of First Instance of Davao. They claimed to be the absolute co-owners of a parcel of land of a little more than nine hectares in Malita, Davao, covered by a certificate of title issued in 1937 in the name of the Heirs of Campa-an. They alleged that Miranda, through gross misrepresentations and deceit, obtained their papers in 1936 and secured a certificate of title in his own name without their knowledge and consent. Miranda answered that he had taken possession in 1938 after acquiring the land at an auction sale conducted by the provincial treasurer of Davao on May 13, 1938, and that he had owned and possessed it continuously since then.

The case suffered seventeen postponements over almost four years. It was finally set for hearing on September 30, 1960, with both counsel duly notified. On that date, the plaintiffs' counsel appeared, but neither Miranda nor his counsel did. The plaintiffs prayed to present evidence ex parte. The trial judge granted the prayer only after verifying that the defendant's counsel had been duly notified and after waiting about two hours for him to appear. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiffs on December 21, 1960.

Miranda's counsel received the decision on January 20, 1961, and moved for reconsideration on February 3; the motion was denied. Miranda died on February 21, 1961, leaving his wife Estefania and their children as heirs. On July 26, 1961, his counsel informed the court of the death and submitted the matter to the court's discretion. The court ordered execution on July 17, 1961, and the writ issued on August 11, 1961, served on the widow, who refused to sign but received a copy. Entry of judgment was made on August 16, 1961. On August 30, 1961, the court held that the writ could be enforced against the heirs and denied relief from judgment. The heirs did not appeal; they filed this petition for certiorari instead.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in allowing the plaintiffs to present their evidence ex parte on September 30, 1960, without reserving to the defendant Miranda the right to present evidence at a later date.
• Whether or not, under Section 7 of Rule 39 of the old Rules of Court, the order directing the issuance of a writ of execution was proper and legal although entry of judgment was made after the death of the defendant Miranda.

Applicable Provisions

Section 7 of Rule 39 of the old Rules of Court, as quoted in the decision, provides:

Where a party dies after the entry of judgment or order, execution thereon may issue, or one already issued may be enforced against his executor or administrator or successor-in-interest if the judgment be for recovery of real property.

This provision governs the second issue: whether execution may run against the heirs when the judgment debtor dies before entry of judgment.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that there was no grave abuse of discretion. Although trial had been postponed ten times at the plaintiffs' instance and once at the defendant's, it had also been postponed six times at the instance of both counsel, for seventeen postponements in all, granted without objection. Absent evidence to the contrary, the Court presumed that the trial court correctly exercised its discretion on each postponement. On the hearing date, the defendant's counsel had been duly notified and did not ask for postponement; the judge waited two hours and verified the notice before allowing the plaintiffs' evidence ex parte. The Court stressed that the matter of continuances is ever addressed to the sound discretion of the court and will not be disturbed on review save upon a patent and manifest abuse, which was not shown. Nor was the defendant declared in default; the court simply rendered judgment on the evidence presented. The Court added that the failure of the defendant to be present at the hearing has the effect of depriving him of his right to present evidence.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the petitioners' syllogism that because Miranda died before, not after, entry of judgment, the writ was void. Section 7 of Rule 39 merely indicates against whom a writ is to be enforced when the losing party dies after entry of judgment; nothing in it, or in the entire Rule 39, intimates that a writ issued after a party dies before entry of judgment is a nullity. The writ may yet be enforced against his executor or administrator, if there be any, or his successor-in-interest. Here judgment was rendered on December 21, 1960, two months before Miranda's death; neither he nor his heirs appealed, so execution issued as a matter of course. The death was first communicated to the court on July 26, 1961, after the decision had become final, and the record showed no executor or administrator appointed. That the writ issued five days before entry of judgment was physically made was, in the Court's words, a non-prejudicial error.

Doctrine

First, the granting or denial of continuances rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on review absent a patent and manifest abuse of discretion. When the defendant's counsel, duly notified, fails to appear and does not ask for postponement, the court may allow the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte, and such failure deprives the defendant of his right to present evidence.

Second, under Section 7 of Rule 39, the death of a party after judgment but before entry of judgment does not nullify a writ of execution. The provision merely identifies against whom execution is enforced — the executor, administrator, or successor-in-interest — and does not make a writ issued after such death a nullity. Execution may be enforced against the heirs where no executor or administrator has been appointed, and issuance of the writ before the physical entry of judgment is a non-prejudicial error.

Disposition

The petition was denied, and the Court upheld the judgment and the writ of execution against the heirs of Sebastian Miranda, with no pronouncement as to costs.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: the death of the judgment debtor before entry of judgment does not void the writ, for Section 7 of Rule 39 only tells us against whom execution is enforced, namely the executor, administrator, or successor-in-interest. Examiners use this case to test the limits of a trial court's discretion over postponements and the rule on execution against the heirs of a deceased party.