HARRY STUART SCOTT, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE AMADO G. INCIONG, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND WHITE EAGLE OVERSEAS OIL CO., INC., RESPONDENTS.

Scott versus Inciong

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Harry Stuart Scott against the Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission, Amado G. Inciong, and against White Eagle Overseas Oil Co., Inc. Scott had won an award of separation, termination and overtime pay from a labor arbitrator, and he asked the Supreme Court to strike down the Chairman's order directing a hearing officer to hear the case again on the merits and to prepare a decision within twenty days. He argued that the award had long become final and that reopening it was a capricious exercise of power amounting to a denial of due process. The case matters because it fixes the boundaries of judicial review over labor tribunals and reminds the Bar that finality is measured by the rules on appeal, not by the winner's convenience.

Procedural History

Scott filed a complaint for separation, termination and overtime pay with the National Labor Relations Commission Unit, Regional Office Number Four, in Manila. The case was assigned to Attorney Jose Placido, who acted as arbitrator after mediation failed. On March 28, 1974, the arbitrator rendered a decision awarding Scott 462,241 pesos and 96 centavos. White Eagle received a copy on April 3, 1974, and on April 5, 1974 filed a verified urgent petition with the Commission. On April 23, 1974, White Eagle filed a very urgent motion to restrain execution and to have the case heard on the merits. Chairman Inciong ordered a preliminary hearing before Attorney Roy Senares, and Scott, who had already moved for execution, objected. On June 17, 1974, without waiting for the result of that preliminary hearing, Chairman Inciong issued a handwritten order directing Attorney Senares to conduct a hearing on the merits, to finish the hearing, and to prepare a decision within twenty days. Scott then went directly to the Supreme Court by certiorari and prohibition, and the Court dismissed the petition.

Facts

Scott was the complainant in a labor case against White Eagle. After mediation failed, the arbitrator received the parties' memoranda, although White Eagle was unable to present its memorandum after its motion for extension was allegedly filed late and denied. On March 28, 1974, the arbitrator awarded Scott 462,241 pesos and 96 centavos. White Eagle received a copy on April 3, 1974.

Two days later, on April 5, 1974, White Eagle filed a verified urgent petition with the Commission, asking that the arbitrator be restrained, that the proceedings before him be declared nugatory, or that any award be set aside on the ground that the proceeding was conducted in a highly irregular manner. In that petition White Eagle narrated that it had been told a hearing set for March 23, 1974 would be reset to March 29, 1974, yet a hearing was supposedly held on March 23, a Saturday, at which Scott testified and presented documentary evidence, without White Eagle being present. On April 23, 1974, White Eagle filed a very urgent motion to enjoin execution and to be heard on the merits.

Chairman Inciong first ordered a preliminary hearing on that motion before Attorney Senares. Then, on June 17, 1974, without waiting for the result of that preliminary hearing, he issued the handwritten order now challenged, directing a hearing on the merits and a decision within twenty days. Scott insisted the award had become final and executory, and he omitted any mention of the April 5 urgent petition in his reply. White Eagle disputed finality, and Chairman Inciong, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that the award was not yet final and that Scott had failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

Issues

• Whether or not the Supreme Court may review, by certiorari and prohibition, the acts of the National Labor Relations Commission and its Chairman despite the absence of a statutory right of appeal.
• Whether or not the arbitrator's award had already become final and executory when Chairman Inciong issued the challenged order, such that the order amounted to grave abuse of discretion and a denial of due process.
• Whether or not Scott failed to exhaust plain, speedy and adequate administrative remedies, barring the writs of certiorari and prohibition.
• Whether or not Scott's omission of the April 5 urgent petition from his pleadings warranted the stricture that he deliberately attempted to mislead the Court.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2 of the applicable regulations on appeals to the Commission provides:

An appeal may be brought to the Commission within ten days upon receipt of the award by the aggrieved party.

This is the yardstick the Court used to test whether the award had become final when White Eagle filed its urgent petition two days after receiving it.

Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as invoked by the respondents, provides:

One of the requisites for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and prohibition is that there should be no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, available to the petitioner.

This is the procedural obstacle the Court examined when it held that the challenged order could still be corrected administratively.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that it has jurisdiction. The contention that review of labor awards is confined to the executive department ignores the corrective power of the Supreme Court by certiorari, which is available whenever a jurisdictional issue is raised or there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Court quoted with approval the rule that judicial review is proper in case of lack of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion, error of law, fraud or collusion, and that it is part of the system of checks and balances.

On the second issue, the Court held that the award had not become final. White Eagle received the decision on April 3, 1974 and filed its verified urgent petition on April 5, 1974, well within the ten-day period fixed by the regulations. The Court asked how the award could in law be considered final and executory when barely twenty-four hours had elapsed. It added that, from the due process angle, it was White Eagle that could conceivably complain, given the recital of a hearing held on a Saturday after assurances of resetting, a recital Scott never denied. The due process guarantee of justice and fairness, the Court said, is not to be whittled down or emasculated, and Chairman Inciong's order requiring an inquiry into the merits was a fitting response to his mandate, not the product of arbitrariness or caprice.

On the third issue, the Court held that the writs could not be granted because there was a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The challenged order was susceptible to correction by the Secretary of Labor and, in the final analysis, by the President. The Court stressed that there should be an insistence on the exhaustion of administrative remedies, and that prohibition is available only if there is no remedy by appeal.

On the fourth issue, the Court found no proof of a condemnable effort to misrepresent the facts. At most, the omission was an error of judgment by counsel. Still, the Court advised counsel to set forth all pleadings filed with the lower court or administrative agency, and to resolve any doubt against non-inclusion, because it is the appraisal of the judiciary, not the conclusion of counsel, that is decisive.

Doctrine

First, labor tribunals exercising quasi-judicial power remain subject to judicial review on questions of law and jurisdiction, and certiorari lies for lack of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion, error of law, fraud or collusion, even where no statute provides for review.

Second, an award of a labor arbitrator does not become final while the period to appeal to the Commission, ten days from receipt by the aggrieved party, has not lapsed. A timely verified petition asserting the very grounds allowed by the governing decree may be treated as an appeal, and the award cannot be considered final and executory.

Third, the writs of certiorari and prohibition require the absence of appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where the challenged order may still be corrected by the Secretary of Labor and ultimately by the President, the petition must fail for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Fourth, due process is not a one-way guarantee. A party who was denied a genuine opportunity to be heard is entitled to a reinvestigation, and an order directing a hearing on the merits serves rather than defeats the due process guarantee of justice and fairness.

Disposition

The petition for certiorari and prohibition was dismissed, with costs against Scott, so White Eagle and Chairman Inciong prevailed and the hearing on the merits was allowed to proceed.

Remember This

Memorize this line: an award is not final while the ten-day period to appeal to the Commission has not lapsed, and a timely verified petition on the grounds allowed by the decree may be treated as an appeal. Examiners use this case on the finality of labor awards, on certiorari as the corrective writ over quasi-judicial agencies, and on the exhaustion of administrative remedies before the Secretary of Labor and the President.