ANTONIO TORRIJOS, PETITIONER, VS. GUILLERMO CRISOLOGO, ANASTACIO CRISOLOGO AND THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

This is an appeal by way of certiorari against the amended decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 23707-R, Torrijos vs. Crisologo, et al.,
confirming the registration of a certain parcel of land in the name of Antonio
Torrijos subject to the right of Guillermo Crisologo and Anastacio Crisologo to
repurchase the same within thirty days from the date the decision becomes final.
The original decision of said Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Abra ordering the registration of the land subject of the
proceedings and overruling the petition of the oppositors to said
registration.

According to the findings of the Court of Appeals, the land subject of the
registration proceedings was sold to petitioner Antonio Torrijos by the
Crisologos for the sum of P3,050.00 on April 26, 1940, the sale including the
land and a house standing thereon. The vendors reserved the right to repurchase
the land and the house within three years from the date of the sale. The vendee
was expressly authorized to make improvements on the house and to construct a
fence on the land. The deed of sale a retro was registered in accordance
with Act No. 3344. On July 27, 1948 the Crisologos and their mother filed an
action against Torrijos to compel the latter to re-sell the property to the
plaintiffs. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 170 of the Court of First
Instance of Abra. The court of first instance in its judgment recognized the
right of the Crisologos to repurchase the property within a fixed period of
sixty days for the total sum of P25,913.95. On appeal to the Court of Appeals,
the latter modified the decision, ordering the reduction of the price of the
property by P6,000. Both parties appealed to the Supreme Court by petitions for
certiorari. That filed by Torrijos was dismissed on February 7, 1956 and that
filed by the Crisologos on March 15, 1956.

In the original decision of the Court of Appeals said Court found that on May
12, 1956 Guillermo Crisologo sent a letter to Torrijos offering to repurchase
the property, which, in part, reads as follows:

“In connection with the above entitled civil case, this is to inform you that
we are ready to comply with the Court’s order dated March 5, 1956, and received
by us on March 12, 1956, requiring us to reimburse to you the amount of
P19,313.95 on or before May 12, 1956. When we went to you this morning to tender
said reimbursement amount, we were surprised to find out that you were not in
and only Mrs. Torrijos was in the house. Mrs. Torrijos informed us that she was
not in a position to accept the redemption money. She further informed us that
it might take sometime before you could comply with your part of the obligation
of vacating the premises. However, to comply with the deadline set by the Court
on our part, we have today deposited with the Clerk of Court an initial amount
of P2,000.00 under Official Receipt No. C-7424743. As soon as you shall have
vacated the premises, please notify us accordingly so that we can deliver to you
the full repurchase amount. Please do this at your earliest possible time, in
order to forestall any question that might arise in the future, such as rents
for your use of the premises after today’s formal tender which has been made by
us.”

The answer thereto of the spouses Torrijos and Gerona is also quoted in the
decision and reads as follows:

“Replying to your letter dated May 12, 1956, permit us to state.

“1. That we deny your statement that you were tendering to us the full amount
of repurchase price of the house and lot in question on May 12, 1956. In fact
the only amount you had on the day is Two Thousand P2,000.00) pesos.

“2. That we deny your claim that the Supreme Court gave you until May 12,
1956, to make a repurchase. We have not received any resolution to that
effect.

“3. That the period of sixty (60) days within which to make a repurchase has
already expired.”

In the original decision of the Court of Appeals said Court makes the
following finding:

“It seems that appellants believed that the consignment to or deposit of the
repurchase price with the clerk of court (the receipt of which amount was
refused by appellee or his wife) was necessary to suspend the running of the
period for repurchase. So, if appellants really had in their possession the
repurchase price of P19,313.95 ready to be delivered to appellee, there was no
plausible reason for them to have deposited only P2,000.00. Indeed, this
unexplained circumstance strengthens the belief that, as testified to by
appellee, appellants offered to pay only P2,000.00 with the promise to pay the
huge balance in an undetermined future—which offer was justly and legally
rejected by appellee.”

In consequence said Court, in the original decision, declared that it found
no reversible error in the judgment appealed from and affirmed the same.

But in the amended decision the Court of Appeals reversed its previous stand
and declared that as a bona fide offer to repurchase was made within
the redemption period, which offer was flatly refused on the ground that the
period has already expired, the vendor’s right of action is preserved, thus:

“In view of the above mentioned ground for the refusal to reconvey, it
becomes immaterial whether or not on May 12, 1956, appellants tendered the whole
amount of P19,313.95 to appellee’s wife, as testified to by Dr. Carlos Bañes,
teacher Lea Alzate and appellant Guillermo Crisologo; or only P2,000.00 as
appellee deduced from the fact that this was the only amount consigned to and
deposited with the Clerk of Court. Under our laws and jurisprudence, when a
bona fide offer to repurchase made within the redemption period is flatly
refused by the vendee a retro on the erroneous ground that the period
had already expired, the vendor’s right of action is preserved (Lafont vs.
Pascasio, 5 Phil. 391; Villegas vs. Capistrano, 9 Phil. 416; Fructo vs. Fuentes,
15 Phil. 362; Retes vs. Suelto, 20 Phil. 394). Under this circumstance, article
1518 of the old Civil Code (art. 1616 of the new), which provides for the
payment of the repurchase price to the vendee, is not applicable. * *
*”

It should be noted that the judgment entered in the previous case, whereby
the Crisologos were allowed to repurchase the property for the sum of P19,313.95
and within the period of 60 days, definitely settled by judicial declaration the
respective rights of the parties. Their relationship is not that of a vendor and
a vendee under the terms of a private agreement equivocal in nature. In order to
enforce their right to redeem the Crisologos were obliged to effect the
repurchase, not only by offering the full amount of P19,313.95 but also by doing
so within a period of 60 days. To this effect is the holding of an early case
decided by this Court, that of Angao vs. Clavano, 17 Phil. 152, 1956, thus:

” ‘The vendor cannot exercise the right of redemption without returning to
the vendee the price of the sale.’

“So that it is not sufficient for the vendor to intimate or to state to the
vendee that the former desires to redeem the thing sold, but he must immediately
thereupon offer to repay the price, and, should the vendee refuse to accept the
amount of the price thus offered, it must be placed on deposit, for if these
conditions are not complied with, as in the present case, the provisions of
article 1509 of the Civil Code become applicable, wherein it is provided that
‘if the vendor should not comply with the provisions of article 1518, the vendee
shall irrevocably acquire the ownership of the thing sold.”

There is nothing in the law nor in the decisions of this Court which would
allow the vendor to offer less than the full price fixed in the judgment. Our
study of the precedents on the subject leads to the conclusion that the law
contemplates that the vendor return or tender nothing less than the full amount
of the redemption price. (Villegas vs. Capistrano, 9 Phil. 416; Fructo vs.
Fuentes, 15 Phil. 362: Angao vs. Clavano, supra; Rosales vs. Reyes, et
al., 25 Phil. 495.)

“When a person having the right under a contract of pacto de retro
makes a bona fide offer to repurchase, in accordance with the agreement and
tenders the necessary amount of money, he has done all the law requires
of him to preserve his right and to entitle him to the possession of the
property.” (Rosales vs. Reyes, et al., supra.) (Italics
supplied.)

In the case at bar, the vendors, respondents herein, signified their desire
to redeem the property, but there is no sufficient evidence that they had
the full amount of the repurchase price and offered to return said full
amount to effect the redemption. To such effect is the finding of the Court
of Appeals (supra). If respondents, indeed, had the full amount with
which to redeem the property, they should have deposited said full amount of the
redemption price (P19,313.95). That they deposited only P2,000 as a token of
their willingness to redeem the property, creates grave doubts that they
actually had the necessary amount.

We have examined the cases cited by the Court of Appeals to support its
ruling that the denial of Torrijos to allow the redemption of the property
preserved the right of the Crisologos to redeem and we find that in all of them
there is mention of a contract with a clause for redemption, but in none of them
were the rights of the parties previously determined by a final judgment of a
court, authorizing the redemptioner to effect redemption within a certain period
of time and for a definite sum. In all the cases cited, the only issue was
whether or not the right of redemption existed. In the case at bar the right had
been judicially declared to exist, but made subject to be exercised within a
definite period of 60 days and for a fixed amount. The cases cited cannot,
therefore, be applicable to the case at bar.

Viewed from the general principles of the law on obligations and contracts,
the effect of the previous judgment was to definitely fix the relations of the
petitioner and the respondents as that if creditor and debtors, respectively, in
the amount and within the period fixed in the judgment. If, as claimed by the
respondents and found by the Court of Appeals, the creditor refused to allow the
redemption, then Article 1256 of the Civil Code should govern their rights and
obligations, thus:

“ART. 1256. If the creditor to whom tender of payment has been made refuses
without just cause to accept it, the debtor shall be released from
responsibility by the consignation of the thing or sum due.”

The effect of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in its amended decision
is to settle a matter already settled by judicial pronouncement in a manner
that wholly nullifies the former judgment. Whereas the former judgment
granted the Crisologos the right to redeem within 60 days from March, 1956, the
Court of Appeals now says that the Crisologos will have again 30 days from the
time our judgment becomes final, because Torrijos refused to allow redemption.
The absurdity of the above ruling of the Court of Appeals, that the denial of
the right to redeem extends the period of redemption, can be seen from the fact
that a final judgment fixing the date to redeem at 60 days from March,
1956 has been set aside and the date of redemption fixed at six years later,
i.e., 30 days from September, 1962, the date of this decision. Following the
reasoning of the Court of Appeals, if the Crisologos would, on September 30,
1962, after judgment fixing redemption within 30 days from September, 1962,
again offer to redeem and the offer is again refused by Torrijos, the Crisologos
would again have a right to bring a third suit because Torrijos’ refusal to
accept the offer suspended the period of redemption. And so on indefinitely.

The only remedy to prevent such an absurd situation is to declare, as we now
hold, that as Torrijos refused to permit the redemption, the Crisologos should
have deposited or consigned the full amount of the price with the Court, as
provided in Article 1256 of the Civil Code.

Wherefore, the amended decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby set aside
and its original decision affirmed. With costs against respondents So
ordered.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J. B. L., and
Dizon, JJ., concur.