REYNALDO LAUCHENGCO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JOSE P. ALEJANDRO, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XXVI; HON. CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, AND CLARITA LAUCH…

There is no novelty to the question raised in this certiorari
and prohibition proceeding as to whether or not upon a criminal case being
provisionally dismissed at the instance of the provincial fiscal with the
conformity of the accused, now petitioner Reynaldo Lauchengco,
after he had been arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and after the initial
presentation of the evidence for the prosecution,^[1]
it could thereafter be, as in the order now assailed,^[2]
revived and reinstated without the filing of a new information.

When asked to comment, the respondent City Fiscal Jose B. Flaminiano of Manila
relied on People v. Consulta^[3]
as well as Solis v. People^[4]
to show that no abuse of discretion was committed by the court in ordering such
revival without the need for any new information.  As if conscious of the persuasive character
of such a defense, petitioner sought to file a reply to such comment.  He submitted a three-page pleading where­in
by a rather constricted interpretation of the earlier case of Solis v. Agloro,^[5] of which the above-cited case of
Solis v. People is an aftermath, he would attempt to negate the force of the
above comment of respondent City Fiscal. 
It cannot be said therefore that the reply is impressed with plausibility,
not even of a deceptive character.  There
is however this paragraph in such reply: 
“That this present petition was purposely presented before this
Honorable Supreme Court to settle once and for all the confusions in the
various city courts of the country regarding provisional dismissal of the case
and then revival of the same in court.”^[6] Accordingly, this Court resolved to
consider the comment as answer and to render a decision on the merits.

On the above facts, and considering the authoritative doctrines, this
petition for certiorari and prohibition should be dismissed.

1. Solis v. Agloro speaks
categorically.  In the language of the
opinion:  “Neither was there a
violation of the constitutional right of petitioners against being put in
jeopardy of punishment.  In the order
provisionally dismissing the case, it was explicitly made clear that defense
counsel announced ‘the readiness of the accused to give their express confirmity to the provisional dismissal of [their] case.’
More than that, it was there­in stated that respondent Judge ‘called for the
accused and asked them singly and individually, whether they are willing to
have this case dismissed with their express conformity, explaining to them that
such dismissal will mean possible revival of this case against them, to which
each answered in the affirmative.’ Accordingly, it was set forth in the dispositive portion that the case ‘is hereby ordered
dismissed with the express conformity of the accused Cenon
C. Solis, Delfin Solis and Bonifacio
Solis y Lualhati alias Pacio,
with cost de oficio.’ There being such a provisional
dismissal, there is no merit to the contention that a revival of the case would
amount to a disregard of the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy.”^[7]
When, therefore, the later case of Solis v. People was filed, this Court, in
the decision, pointed out that the ground alleged by the very accused was the
“need for a new information, which would likewise require that another
preliminary investigation be undertaken, with the intimation that otherwise
there would be a denial of procedural due process.”^[8]
The ruling was square and to the point, namely, “that this second attempt
to prevent the continuation of the prosecution of petitioners is likewise
doomed to futility.”^[9]
It was then categorically set forth that this second petition “is clearly
devoid of merit.”^[10]
Respondent Fiscal could thus vigorously assert that no new information was
necessary.

2. An attempt was, however, made by petitioner to minimize the
weight of this authoritative precedent by saying that the only settled question
is one of double jeopardy.  To bolster
such an approach, he invoked People v. Court of First Instance of Quezon.^[11]
Again there was a failure on his part to appreciate the true significance of
the ruling.  As was pointed out in the
last paragraph of the opinion, there was a dismissal definitive in character as
the information failed to charge an offense. 
Necessarily, the proper course is not a petition for certiorari
“but the refiling of a valid information,”^[12]
the previous one being fatally definitive. 
Petitioner did not even attempt, as he  
was devoid of justification, to show that the information in this case
suffers from any defect.  What is quite
obvious is that there is neither a constitutional right violated nor a
procedural rule disregarded in the revival of the case as ordered by respondent
Judge Jose P. Alejandro.  Not only was
there no grave abuse of discretion, but the absence of any abuse.  In the ultimate analysis, to grant the plea
of petitioner would be to prefer form to substance.

3. With the resolution of
this petition, it should be clear to all and sundry that the provisional
dismissal of a criminal case does not call for the filing of a new information
if, as in this case, the parties are clearly made aware, in such order of
provisional dismissal, that it is lacking the impress of finality and therefore
could be revived and reinstated.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of
merit.  No costs.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino,
Concepcion, Jr., and
Santos, JJ., concur.

Abad Santos, J., abstains.

^[1]
Petition, pars. 3 and 4.

^[2]
Ibid, par. 7, and Annex
E.

^[3]
L-41251, March 31, 1976, 70
SCRA 277.

^[4]
L-42485, July 31, 1978.

^[5]
L-39254, June 20, 1975, 64
SCRA 370.

^[6]
Reply, par. 4.

^[7]
64 SCRA 370, 376-377.  To support such a
view, Jaca v. Blanco, 86 Phil. 452 (1950);
People v. Romero, 89 Phil. 672 (1951); Co Te Hue v. Encarnacion, 94 Phil. 258 (1954); and Republic v. Agoncillo, L-27257, August
31, 1971, 40 SCRA 579 were cited.

^[8]
Solis v. People, L-42485, July
31, 1978.

^[9]
Ibid, 2.

^[10]
Ibid, 3.

^[11]
L-41045, November 28, 1975,
68 SCRA 305.

^[12]
Ibid, 307.