MELQUIADES RAAGAS AND ADELA LAUDIANO RAAGAS, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, VS. OCTAVIO TRAYA, MRS. OCTAVIO TRAYA AND BIENVENIDO CANCILLER, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

The complaint
filed on April 1, 1960 with the Court of
First Instance of Leyte
(civil case 2749) by the spous­es
Melquiades Raagas and Adele
Laudiano Raagas against Octavio Traya, his wife, and Bienvenido Canciller, alleges in
essence that on or about
April 9, 1958, while the latter was
“recklessly” driving a truck owned by his co-defendants, along the public highway in MacArthur, Leyte, the said vehicle ran over the plaintiffs’
three-year old son Regino, causing his
instantaneous death.  The
plaintiffs ask for actual damages in the sum of P10,000, moral, nominal and corrective damages in a sum
to be determined by the court, P1,000 as attorney’s
fees, P1,000 for expenses of litigation, plus
costs.

In their answer with counterclaim for moral and ac­tual damages and attorney’s fees,
filed on April 22, the defendants specifically deny that Canciller
was “driving recklessly” at the time of the mishap, and assert that
the truck “was fully loaded and was running at a very low speed and on the
right side of the road”; that it was the child who “rushed from an
unseen position and bumped the truck so that he was hit by the left rear tire
of the said truck and died”, and consequently the defendants are not to
blame for the accident which was “entirely attributable to an unforeseen
event” or due to the fault of the child and negligence of his parents; that the
defendants-spouses have exercised due diligence in the selection and supervi­sion
of their driver Canciller, whom they hired in 1946
only after a thorough study of his background as a truck driver; and that each
time they allowed him to drive it was only after a check of his physical
condition and the mechanical fitness of the truck assigned to him.

On May 4 the plaintiffs’ moved for a judgment on the pleadings,
upon the claim that the defendants’ answer not only “failed to tender an
issue” but as well “admitted ma­terial allegations” of the
complaint.  This motion was set for hearing on June 18.  On the previous day, however, the clerk of
court received a telegram from the defendants’ counsel, requesting for
postponement of the hearing to July 2 on the ground that he was sick of influenza.  The lower court denied
the request for lack of “proper notice to the adverse party” and
considered the case submitted for decision upon the filing of the plaintiffs’
memorandum.

On June 24 it rendered a judgment
on the pleadings, con­demning the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay
“to the plaintiffs the sum of P10,000 for the death of their child Regino Laudiano Raagas, P2,000 for moral damages, P1,000 actual damages,
P1,000 for attorney’s fees, and the costs.”

The court reasoned that the denial in the answer of the charge of
reckless driving “did not affect the plaintiffs’ positive allegation in their complaint that the
truck * * * did not have a current year registration plate * * * for the year 1958
when the accident occurred,” that “this failure * * * has the
effect of admitting hypothetically that they operated * * * the said car
without proper license * * * when the accident occurred,” and that “unless
there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at
the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation (article 2185
new Civil Code).” The court went on to conclude that under the cir­cumstances
a judgment on the pleadings was “irremediably pro per and fitting.”

The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified
the case to this Court because the issues raised are purely of law.

Section 10 of Rule 35 of
the old Rules of Court^[1]
authorized a judgment on the pleadings “where an answer fails to tender an
issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading.”

The vital issue, therefore, to which the other issues are
subsidiary or interstitial, is whether the court a quo acted
correctly when it rendered judgment on the pleadings.  It is our view that the court erred.

The plaintiffs’ claim for actual, moral, nominal and cor­rective damages, was controverted by the averment in the answer to the effect that the defendants “have no knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations” as to such damages, “the truth of the matter being that the death of Regino Raagas was occasioned by
an unforeseen event and/or by the fault of the small boy Regino
Raagas or his parents.” Such averment has the
effect of tendering a valid issue.  We so
held in Philippine National Bank vs. Lacson, L-9419, May 29, 1957 and
in Benavides vs. Alabastro, L- 19762, Dec. 23, 1964.  In Abubakar
Tan vs. Tian
Ho, L-18820, December
29, 1962 and Lim Giok vs. Bataan Cigar and
Cigarette Factory,
L-15861, April 16, 1960, we held
that even if the allegations regarding the
amount of damages in the complaint are not specifically
denied in the answer, such damages are not deemed admitted.  In Tomassi vs. Villa-Abrille, L-7047, August 21, 1958, Suntay
Tanjangco
vs. Jovellanos, et al, L-12332, June 30, 1960, and Delfin
vs. Court of Agrarian Relations, et al, L–23348, March 14, 1967,
1967A PHILD 453, we declared in no uncertain terms that actual damages
must be proved, and that a court cannot rely on “specu­lation, conjecture
or guesswork” as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend on actual proof that damages had been suffered and on evidence of the
actual amount.  Finally, in Malonzo vs. Galang, et
al, L–13851, July 27, 1960, we reaf­firmed the rule that
although an allegation is not
necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, “it is, nevertheless, essential that the
claimant satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis of the damage
and its causal relation to defendant’s acts.”

The preceding disquisition points up the inescapable need of a
full-blown trial on the merits at which the par­ties will be afforded every
opportunity to present evidence in support
of their respective contentions and defenses.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment on the pleadings of June 24, 1960, is set aside, and this
case is hereby remanded to the court of origin for trial on the merits.  No pronouncement as to costs.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles, and
Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Now section 1 of Rule 19 of the new Rules of Court.