THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. EXEQUIEL ANGELES Y KU, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

People versus Angeles

The Case

This is a criminal case brought by the People of the Philippines against Exequiel Angeles y Ku, a patrolman of the Manila Police Department, arising from a shooting incident at the Melrose Kitchenette in Malate, Manila on the evening of June 23, 1969. The accused was charged in seven separate informations for murder, frustrated murder, and attempted murder, all qualified by treachery and attended by evident premeditation, for the deaths of three persons and the wounding of four others. This case matters because it tests the sufficiency of eyewitness identification against a police officer who interposed the defense of alibi, and it affirms the settled rule that positive identification by credible witnesses prevails over mere denial and alibi.

Procedural History

The seven cases were jointly tried before the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila, by agreement of the parties, as they arose from the same incident. The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt in all seven offenses charged, imposing the death penalty for the three counts of murder, indeterminate penalties for the frustrated murder and attempted murder charges, and awarding damages to the victims and their heirs. The accused appealed to the Supreme Court, contesting the trial court's finding that he was sufficiently identified as one of the assailants.

Facts

On the evening of June 23, 1969, a shooting incident occurred at the Melrose Kitchenette in San Andres, Malate, Manila. Three persons were killed: Rosita Garcia, Conrado Dungca, and Herminigildo Sebastian. Four others were wounded: Jose Caraon Jr. and Fructuoso Abayon suffered wounds, while Edilberto Aquino and Saturnino Melida were seriously injured. A co-accused, William Limson, had previously been charged, convicted, and sentenced for the same offenses, and his conviction had become final and executory.

The prosecution presented eyewitnesses who positively identified the accused Angeles as one of three assailants who fired shots inside the restaurant. Rosario Vergara de Ablola, the restaurant manager, testified that she saw the accused inside the Melrose Kitchenette firing at the direction of table 6. Lydia Romero, the night cashier, testified that she saw the accused standing behind William Limson during the shooting, and that she could not be mistaken about his face because she had stared at him and had previously met him. Another witness, Consolacion Ramos, testified that she saw the accused peeping inside the restaurant about two hours before the incident, and that three days later she saw him near the Playboy Theater and he ran away upon seeing her.

The defense presented the defense of alibi. The accused and his witnesses claimed that on the night in question, he was at a billiard hall, then at the house of a friend, then at Norva's Kitchenette, and later at Kaggie in Mabini, drinking and singing. They claimed they only passed by the Melrose Kitchenette at around 10 p.m., after the shooting had already occurred. The accused denied any participation in the shooting and claimed he was merely placed in a police line-up and ordered to surrender his firearms.

Issues

• Whether or not the accused was sufficiently identified as one of the assailants in the shooting incident based on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
• Whether or not the defense of alibi interposed by the accused should prevail over the positive identification made by the eyewitnesses.

Applicable Provisions

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as it then stood, defined the crime of murder. The provision states:

Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity. 2. With evident premeditation. 3. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.

This provision bears on the case because the accused was charged with murder qualified by treachery and aggravated by evident premeditation for the deaths of the three victims.

Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines the stages of execution of a felony. The provision states:

Consummated felonies as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable. A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator; it is attempted when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly or by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

This provision bears on the case because the accused was charged with frustrated murder for the wounds inflicted on Edilberto Aquino and Saturnino Melida, whose injuries could have caused their deaths without medical attendance, and with attempted murder for the wounds inflicted on Jose Caraon Jr. and Fructuoso Abayon, whose injuries would not immediately cause death.

Ruling

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the accused in all seven cases. On the first issue, the Court held that the accused was sufficiently identified as one of the assailants. The Court found that the testimonies of Rosario Vergara de Ablola and Lydia Romero positively identified the accused as one of the three who fired shots inside the Melrose Kitchenette. The trial court observed that their testimonies were given in a very spontaneous, natural, consistent, and reasonable manner, which are all earmarks of truth. The Court also noted that no evidence existed of any evil or bad motive on the part of the witnesses to falsely testify against the accused.

On the second issue, the Court held that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification made by credible witnesses. The Court stated that alibi is inherently weak and cannot overcome the positive testimony of eyewitnesses who had no motive to falsely testify. The Court also noted the corroborating circumstances: the accused was seen peeping inside the restaurant about two hours before the incident, and he ran away when he saw a witness three days after the shooting.

Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. It cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by credible witnesses who have no motive to testify falsely against him.

Doctrine

Positive identification by credible eyewitnesses prevails over the defense of alibi and denial. For alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. The trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses, having observed their demeanor on the stand, is entitled to great weight and respect on appeal. The mere fact that witnesses did not immediately come forward to identify the accused does not impair their credibility when they offer a reasonable explanation for their delay, such as fear of a police officer accused of the crime.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and two counts of attempted murder, with all the penalties and damages imposed by the trial court.

Remember This

Memorize this single line: positive identification by credible witnesses, absent any motive to falsely testify, prevails over alibi and denial. Examiners like to use this case to test the weight given to eyewitness identification against police officers and the strict requirements for the defense of alibi to prosper.