ROAN I. LIBARIOS, PETITIONER, VS. JUDGE ROSARITO F. DABALOS, RESPONDENT.

This is an administrative complaint filed by Roan I. Libarios for
and on behalf of his client Mariano Corvera, Jr. against respondent Judge
Rosarito F. Dabalos, for grave ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion,
gross misconduct and partiality, relative to Criminal Case No. 3464. The antecedent facts of the case are as
follows:

On 10 March 1988, former Mayor Mariano Corvera, Sr. was shot by
Pablo Macapas inside the courtroom of respondent Judge Dabalos, after a hearing
in a frustrated murder case against said Pablo Macapas. Corvera, Sr. was the private complainant in
the aforesaid criminal case, while Mayor Tranquilino Calo, Jr. was appearing as
counsel of Macapas. As a result of the
killing of Corvera Sr., a formal charge of murder (I.S. No. 88-138) was filed
with the City Fiscal’s Office of Butuan City against Pablo Macapas, Mayor
Tranqui­lino Calo, Jr., and his driver-bodyguard Belarmino Allocod, and (2)
other “John Does”. Macapas
was a bodyguard of respondent Calo,
Jr.

On 22 June 1988, Investigating Fiscal Macario Balansag issued a
resolution, finding a prima
facie case for murder against the respondents in I.S. No. 88-138.^[1]

On 29 June 1988, the information was signed by the Investigating
Fiscal; however, a motion for reconsideration of the resolution was filed by
respondent Calo, Jr., which delayed the filing of the Information against Calo,
Jr. and his co-respondents.

On 21 July 1988, respondents in I.S. No. 88-138 filed with the
RTC Butuan City a petition for prohibition with prayer for preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order, to enjoin the Investigating
Fiscal from acting on their afore-mentioned motion for reconsideration. Then Executive Judge Vicente Hidalgo issued
a TRO, directing the Investigating Fiscal to refrain from acting on the said
motion for reconsideration and from further proceeding with the preliminary
investigation of the murder charge against respondent Calo, Jr. and his
co-respondents. However the TRO expired
after the lapse of twenty (20) days, without a preliminary injunction being
issued.

Before the motion for reconsideration could be resolved,
Investigating Fiscal Balansag was himself gunned down in cold blood while on
his way to his office. Based on the
investigation conducted by the NBI linking the death of Fiscal Balansag to the
killing of Corvera, Sr., another formal complaint for murder was filed against
Calo, Jr. and four (4) others.

On 14 September 1988, Acting City Fiscal Brocoy resolved the
pending motion for reconsideration, affirming the 22 June 1988 resolution
finding a prima facie
case for murder against the respondents in I.S. No. 88-138.

On 29 September 1988, the information earlier signed by
Investigating Fiscal Balansag, carrying a NO BAIL recom­mendation, was filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Branch IV, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 3464. On 14 October 1988, upon
motion of the prosecution and with the approval of the court, the information
was withdrawn for being fatally defective in form, the same having been signed
by Fiscal Balansag who was already
dead at the time of the filing of said information.

On 29 November 1988, a new
information signed by Acting Fiscal Brocoy carrying also a NO BAIL
recommendation, was filed with the court without the necessary supporting
affidavits and papers. The case was
erroneously assigned to Branch IV of the RTC of Butuan City, where the original
information prior to its withdrawal was assigned. The accused filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or Opposition to the
Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest Without Bail, and in the alternative, accused
sought the fixing of bail for their temporary release.^[2] Said
motion was set for hearing on 15 December 1988.

Upon motion of the prosecution, the case was scheduled for raffle
on 7 December 1988. On said scheduled
date for raffle, accused Calo, Jr. and his counsel personally filed an
opposition to the holding of the raffle on the ground of lack of notice to the
parties.

On 6 and 8 December 1988, Corvera, Jr. and his counsel together
with their sympathizers staged a rally demanding the immediate arrest of the
accused in Criminal Case No. 3464. After their rally in the afternoon of 8 December 1988, they personally
went to see respondent judge in his chamber to reiterate their demand.

After said meeting between Corvera, Jr., et al. and respondent
judge, the latter issued an order of 8 December 1988^[3] in
his capacity as Executive Judge, directing the raffle of the case with due
notice to the parties. Without
conducting any prior hearing, in the
same order of 8 December 1988, respondent judge directed the issuance of a
warrant of arrest against the accused, fixing at the same time the bail for
accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod at P50,000.00 each; however, no bail was
recommended for the temporary release of accused Macapas. Respondent judge fixed bail for the
temporary release of accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod on the ground that they were
not charged as co-principals by
cooperation or inducement, and that the evidence of guilt against them was
merely circumstantial.

On 14 December 1988, a petition
for certiorari was filed by herein complainant with the Court of
Appeals, assailing the 8 December 1988 order of respondent judge, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 16383. In response to
the urgency of the petition, a resolution dated 20 December 1988 was issued by
the Court of Appeals restraining the execution and implementation of the
assailed order, pending the resolution of the petition on the merits. However, on 26 December 1988, respondent judge
and Calo, Jr. informed the Court of Appeals that accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod
had already put up their respective bail bonds of P50,000.00 as of 9 December
1988 and that both have been released, thus rendering the primary objective of
the CA temporary restraining order moot and academic.

On 31 January 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision^[4]
setting aside the questioned 8 December 1988 order as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The
warrants of arrest as well as the bail bonds filed by the accused in said
Criminal Case No. 3464 were declared void and without force and effect; the
court of origin was ordered to immediately issue and serve new warrants of
arrest upon the accused. To determine
whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, the trial
court was ordered to conduct a hearing and thus resolve the motion for fixing
the bail for the temporary release of the two (2) accused, Calo, Jr. and
Allocod. The decision of the Court of
Appeals became final and executory on 23 February 1989.^[5]

In the administrative complaint at bar, complainant claims that
the act of respondent judge in granting bail to the accused Calo, Jr. and
Allocod without a hearing, is tantamount to gross ignorance and willful,
malicious and blatant disregard of the provisions of Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, which require a hearing before an accused charged
with a capital offense can be granted bail. The impartiality of respondent judge in issuing the questioned warrants
of arrest but allowing bail is also questioned on the ground of his “close
association” with the accused Calo, Jr.

In his defense, respondent judge argues that Sec. 5 of Rule 114
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which requires a hearing of an application
for admission to bail, filed by any person who is in custody for the commission
of a capital offense, is applicable
only to cases where the accused is already in custody, but neither of the three
(3) accused in Criminal Case No. 3464 was being detained at the time their
application for bail was acted upon by respondent judge. In his capacity as Executive Judge,
respondent judge claims that he merely followed the precedents set by his
predeces­sors, in issuing warrants of arrest before the raffle of a case in
order to avoid delay in the arrest of the accused.

In addition, respondent judge denied the allegation that he was a
law partner of accused Calo, Jr., claiming that he was a mere employee in the
business of said accused, and that he appeared with accused Calo, Jr. as
co-counsel in a case, but not as an associate. To justify his finding that the evidence of
guilt is circumstantial against accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod, respondent judge
stated that –

“Herein respondent has some doubts whether accused Tranquilino
O. Calo, Jr. could have done the acts of giving a revolver to accused Pablo
Macapas outside the courtroom and pushed Pablo Macapas into the courtroom to
shoot Mariano Corvera, Sr., which acts were allegedly done in the presence of
witness (sic) Pacifico Largonita and Fernando Casinao, who by their own
admissions, are security personnel and companions of the late Mayor
Corvera. These acts being attributed to
accused Calo as the brain behind the killing do not appear to be a natural
conduct of man. These are stupid acts
and accused Calo does not impress herein respondent as having that kind
of mental intelligence. Respondent has
known accused Tran­quilino O. Calo, Jr. as a law practitioner and as a person
for about twenty years already. Respon­dent
finds accused Calo to be of above-average intelligence. Thus, when respondent reviewed the findings
of the investigating fiscal regarding the statements of P. Largonita and F.
Casinao, respon­dent entertained some serious doubts. Questions cropped up in respondent’s mind. Respondent asked himself the questions that
if he were the master-­mind, would he give, in the presence of some
individuals, the gun to the gunman only at the vicinity where the intended victim
was to be shot moments before the appointed time of the killing and pushed the
gunman to the place where the victim was? Respondent’s answer was that he would not behave in such manner,
otherwise he would appear to be an inept mastermind and the gunman was
reluctant that the latter had to be pushed to execute the plan.”^[6]

While it does not form part of the record of the case at bar, the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 16383 is quite
enlightening. That decision, as already
mentioned, declared as null and void the warrants of arrest issued by
respondent judge as well as the bail fixed by him for the temporary release of the accused, all accomplished
without a hearing. The Court of Appeals
said:

“It is conventional wisdom in legal circles that the
determination as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong in a capital
offense rests upon the sound judgment and discretion of the court which can
only be exercised and reached after due or summary hearing. (People vs. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522; Ocampo vs. Bernabe, 77 Phil.
55). In that hearing, the fiscal must
be notified and given the opportunity to present his evidence. If the court grants bail without affording
such opportunity to the prosecution, due process is seriously violated. (People vs. San Diego, supra; Mendoza
vs. CFI of Quezon, 51 SCRA 373). And even where the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition
to the application to grant and fix bail, the Court may ask the prosecution
‘questions to ascertain the strength of the state’s evidence or judge the
adequacy of the amount of bail.’ (Herras
Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756, 789).

x x x                                    x x x                               x x x

In the petition at bar, private respondents argue that since they
are no longer in custody of the law, the respondent court having granted and
fixed their bail which they did forthwith post, the hearing to determine
whether or not their guilt is strong is no longer necessary. The argument sounds but casuistic because in
Our judgment the respondent court acted deliberately with precipitate haste and
with grave abuse of discretion, when on December 8, 1988 it issued the order
granting and fixing the bail without any hearing at all, even as private
respondents themselves had requested their motion to be heard on December 15,
1988 yet, when respondent court in the same order directed the issuance
of warrants of arrest against private respondents, the act was nothing more
than a superfluous and useless ceremony because with the grant of bail the
accused could and did effectively secure their freedom at once without even
seeing a copy of the warrant of arrest itself. As a matter of fact, there is nothing in they records before Us to show
that warrants of arrest were actually issued against private respondents.”^[7]

Respondent judge was declared by the Court of Appeals to have
acted with grave abuse of discretion in fixing the bail of the accused without
a hearing. Generally, a judge cannot be
held liable to account or answer criminally, civilly or administratively, for
an erroneous judgment or decision rendered by him in good faith.^[8]
However, good faith may be negated by the circumstances on record.

In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge
done in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even
though such acts may be erroneous. But,
while judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of
occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, yet, it is highly imperative that
they should be conversant with basic legal principles.^[9]

In every case, a judge should endeavor diligently to ascertain
the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan or personal interests,
public opinion or fear of criticism.^[10] Respondent
judge should not have allowed himself to be swayed into issuing an order fixing
bail for the temporary release of the accused charged with murder, without a
hearing, which is contrary to established principles of law. A judge owes it to the public and the
administration of justice to know the law he is supposed to apply to a given
controversy. He is called upon to
exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural
rules. There will be faith in the
administration of justice only if there be a belief on the part of litigants
that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of a deficiency in
their grasp of legal principles.^[11]

The fact that the complainant and his sympathizers had staged a
rally demanding the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused is not
a sufficient excuse for the unjustified haste of respondent judge’s act of
fixing bail without a hearing.

It has been an established legal principle or rule that in cases
where a person is accused of a capital
offense, the trial court must conduct a hearing in a summary proceeding, to
allow the prosecution an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all evidence it may desire to produce
to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, before
resolving the issue of bail for the temporary release of the accused. Failure to conduct a hearing before fixing
bail in the instant case amounted to a violation of due process.^[12]
Irrespective of respondent judge’s opinion that the evidence of guilt against
herein accused is not strong, the law and settled jurisprudence demanded that a
hearing be conducted before bail was fixed for the temporary release of accused
Calo, Jr. and Allocod, if bail was at all justified. Respondent judge’s disregard of an established rule of law by
depriving the prosecution of the opportunity to prove that the evidence of
guilt against the accused was strong, amounted
to gross ignorance of the law, which is subject to disciplinary action.

Furthermore, considering that respondent judge had a close
association with respondent Calo, Jr. as a former employee of the said accused,
prudence and regard for his position as judge demanded that he should have
refrained from fixing the bail of said accused and from concluding that the
evidence against him was merely “circumstantial”, in order to avoid
any doubt as to his judicial impartiality. Respondent judge should have waited for the raffle of the case and
allowed the judge to whom the case was actually raffled to resolve the issue of
fixing the bail of said accused, if he was bailable. A judge should not only render a just, correct and impartial
decision but should do so in a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to
his fairness, impartiality and integrity.^[13]

ACCORDINGLY, respondent judge is hereby imposed a
FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) and WARNED to exercise more care and
diligence in the performance of his duties as a judge, and that the same or
similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,
Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Sarmiento, Grino-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Gancayco, J., on leave.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 74-98

^[2]
Rollo, pp. 18-19

^[3]
Rollo, pp. 20-24

^[4]
Penned by Associate Justice Segundino G. Chua, with the concurrence of
Associate Justices Serafin E. Camilon and Justo P. Torres, Jr.

^[5]
Entry of Judgment was made on 3 May 1989

^[6]
Rollo, pp. 60-61, Comment of Respondent Judge

^[7]
31 January 1989 Decision of the Court of Appeals

^[8]
Padilla vs. Dizon, A.C. No. 3086, 23 February 1988, 158 SCRA 127

^[9]
Abad vs. Bleza, A.C. No. 227-RTJ, 13 October 1986, 145 SCRA 1

^[10]
Canon 3, Rule 3.02, Code of Judicial Ethics

^[11]
Daplas vs. Raquiza, A.C. No. 1129–MJ, 21 August 1980, 99 SCRA 141

^[12]
People vs. Sola, G.R. Nos. 56158-64,
17 March 1981, 103 SCRA 393

^[13]
Martinez vs. Gironella, G.R. No. 37655, 22 July 1975, 6 SCRA 245