MARCELINO BELAMIDE, ALFREDO BELAMIDE (DECEASED AND HEREIN SUBSTITUTED BY HIS CHILDREN RODOLFO, REYNALDO, LILIAN AND ALFREDO, JR., ALL SURNAMED BELAMIDE), JOSE BELAMIDE, ANTONIO …

This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the
Court of Appeals (4th Division) promulgated on June 9, 1971, affirming the
amended decision of the Court of First Instance of Cavite
City the dispositive portion of which reads:

“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby
adjudicates the parcel of land described in Plan Psu-18949 situated in the poblacion of Silang, Cavite, in favor of the applicants (Marcelino
Belamide, of legal age, Filipino, married to Patrocinio de Castro, and resident of Silang,
Cavite; Alfredo Belamide,
of legal age, Filipino, married to Anita Velez, and resident of Silang, Cavite; Jose Belamide, of legal age, Filipino, married to Elisea Quiamzon, and resident of Silang Cavite; Antonio Belamide, of legal age, Filipino, single, and resident of Silang, Cavite; Maria Belamide, Filipino, of legal age, married to Sofronio Bayla, and resident of Silang, Cavite; Leonisa Belamide, of legal age,
married to Fulgencio Reyes, and resident of Silang, Cavite; and Salud Belamide, of legal age,
Filipino, married to Conrado Menchavez,
and resident of Silang, Cavite)
and the oppositors (Bienvenido
Montoya, Gregorio Montoya and Francisco Montoya, Filipinos, of legal age,
married and residents of Silang, Cavite)
in the following proportions:

“Three-fourths (3/4) undivided share belongs to the
applicants, and one-fourth (1/4) undivided share belongs to the oppositors.

“Once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding
decree of registra­tion be issued upon proof that the corresponding estate and
inheritance taxes have been paid, or certificate of tax exemption has been
issued.”

Petitioners herein were the applicants for the registration of
the parcel of land involved in this case. 
The private respondents were the oppositors
allowed on Motion for a New Trial, to file an opposition even after a decision
has already been rendered by then Judge Felix V. Makasiar,
after hearing, following the issuance of a general default order.  (pars. 1-3, Petition).

From the amended decision rendered after the new trial, both
parties appealed to the Court of Appeals which found the essential facts as
narrated in the deci­sion appealed thereto as duly established by the evidence,
and quoted the same approvingly as follows:

“The next question that presents itself is when and by whom
was the land in question acquired.  The oppositors allege that the acquisition was made during the
first marriage of Vicenta Montoya to Martin Montoya,
whereas the applicants maintain that such land was acquired during the marriage
(second marriage) of Vicenta Montoya to Jose Velardo.  Both
contentions are not supported by any document. 
However, the fact that Susana Velardo Belamide sold a portion of the land in question (Exh. 6) to the Municipality of Silang,
Cavite (for widening of the street) on May 1933
without the intervention of, or opposition from, Hilarion
Montoya who died on December 2, 1955 (Exh. 3),
coupled with the fact that Susana Velardo Belamide has possession of the property since the death of
her mother (Vicenta Montoya) in 1931 after she sold
the same to the herein applicants on July 20, 1951 (Exh.
B), convince the Court that said property was acquired during the coverture of Jose Velardo and Vicenta Montoya. 
Consequently, upon the death of Jose Velardo
in 1888, the one-half (1/2) undivided portion of the property passed by
inheritance to Susana Velardo Belamide
and the other one-half (1/2) undivided portion went to Vicenta
Montoya as her share of the conjugal estate. 
Upon the death of the latter on February 28,1931, her undivided one-half
(1/2) share of the property should be divided equally between Susana Velardo Belamide and Hilarion Montoya, that is, each is entitled to one-fourth
(1/4) undivided share.  Hence, Susana Velardo Belamide’s share is three-fourths
(3/4) while Hilarion Montoya’s share passed by
inheritance to his children, the herein oppositor.  For this reason, the sale made by Susana Velardo Belamide in favor of the
applicants (Exh. B) is null and void only with
respect to the one-fourth (1/4) undivided portion of the property (the share of
the herein oppositors) who did not consent to the
sale).”

As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals affirmed the amended
decision of the Court of First Instance, this time rendered by Hon. Jose P.
Alejandro, and denied a Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners
herein on June 29, 1971 (Annex E to Petition), as well as a Motion for a New
Trial (Annex F to Petition).  The ground
for the Motion for New Trial was that Exhibit 8 of the oppositors
(private respondents herein) which was allegedly relied upon by both the Court
of First Instance and the Court of Appeals is a falsified document.  As recited in the petition, par. 12 thereof
(p. 8, Rollo), the falsification consists of the
following:

“According to the official records of the Civil Registrar of Silang, Cavite,
the name of the father of Hilarion Montoya in the
marriage column is in blank.  But
according to Exhibit 8, the name of the father of Hilarion
Montoya is Martin Montoya.  Thus,
while the official record of the civil registrar shows that oppositors‘
father, Hilarion, had an unknown father, thru
falsification, Hilarion’s father was made to
appear in Exhibit 8 as Martin Montoya.  The latter falsely became husband of Vicenta Montoya, thereby enabling private respondents to
inherit 1/4 of the land in dispute from Vicenta
Montoya.”

It is the denial of the Motion for New Trial by the Court of
Appeals which petitioners allege to be in grave abuse of discretion, and their
allegation that the Court of First Instance, as a land registration court, has
no jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of Vicenta
Montoya and partition the property by adjudicating 1/4 pro-indiviso
to private respondents as children of Hilarion
Montoya, allegedly an unacknowledged natural child of Vicenta
Montoya, and that as a consequence, the Court of Appeals, likewise, is without
jurisdiction, or acted in grave abuse of discretion, in affirming the decision
of the lower court, that petitioners came to this Court with the present
petition.

1.  There can be no grave
abuse of discretion by the Court of Appeals in denying petitioners’ Motion for
New Trial.  The document alleged to be
falsified (Exh. 8) was presented in the trial in the
lower court.  Petitioners should have
attacked the same as falsified with competent evidence, which could have been
presented, if they had exercised due diligence in obtaining said evidence,
which is Annex “A”^[1]
to the Motion for New Trial (Annex F to Petition).^[2]
It is, therefore, not a newly discovered evidence that could justify a new
trial (Rule 37 [1-b], Rules of Court).

The new evidence would neither change the result as found by the
decision.  It might prove that Hilarion Montoya was registered at birth without his father
having been given, but from the testimony of Marcelino
Belamide, one of the applicants (now petitioners), Vicenta Montoya was married twice, although he did not know
the first husband.  Likewise, in the
opposition of private respondents (pp. 30-31, Record on Appeal)^[3],
it is there alleged that the land originally belonged to the spouses Martin
Montoya and Vicenta Montoya.  This allegation was never contradicted.  The document sought to be presented by
petitioners, as stated in their Motion for New Trial in the Court of Appeals, cannot
effectively destroy this allegation, first, because the marriage between Martin
Montoya and Vicenta Montoya could have taken place
after the birth of Hilarion Montoya who was thus
legitimized, and second, Martin Montoya and Vicenta
Montoya evidently lived together as husband and wife, and are, therefore,
presumed to have been legally married (Section 5, par. [bb] Rule 131, Rules of
Court).  This Court held that a man and a
woman who are living under the same roof are presumed to be legitimate spouses (Que Quay vs. Collector of Customs, 33 Phil. 128), and in
the instant case, no less than one of the herein petitioners, Marcelino Belamide, testified
that Vicenta Montoya married twice.  The records suggest no other husband by the
first marriage than Martin Montoya, who then could have been the father of Hilarion Montoya who, undisputedly, is the son of Vicenta Montoya.

With the law and the evidence showing with reasonable sufficiency
that Hilarion Montoya from whom private respondents
would derive hereditary rights over the land in question, is the legitimate son
of Vicenta Montoya, the adjudication of said land by
the lower court, as specified in its decision, is in accordance with law.

2. The jurisdiction of the lower court as a land registration
court to adjudicate the land for purposes of registration cannot, as
petitioners try to do, be questioned. 
The applicants and oppositors both claim
rights to the land by virtue of their relationship to the original owner, the
late Vicenta Montoya. 
The Court is thus necessarily impelled to determine the truth of their
alleged relationship, and on the basis thereof, to adjudicate the land to them
as the law has prescribed to be their successional
rights.  The law does not require the
heirs to go to the probate court first before applying for the registration of
the land, for a declaration of heirship.  This would be a very cumbersome procedure,
unnecessarily expensive and unreasonably inconvenient, clearly averse to the
rule against multiplicity of suits.

Furthermore, petitioners should not now be heard to complain
after they have themselves gone to the lower court to have their title to the
land registered in their names without having had a previous declaration of
their heirship by the probate court.  In filing their opposition to the application,
private respondents merely went to the same court invoking its jurisdiction in
exactly the same fashion as did the petitioners.  In effect, there was unanimity among the
parties in consenting to, or acquiescing in, the exercise of the jurisdiction
of the land registration court, no matter whether same is a limited one.  With this premise, and with the full
opportunity given both parties to air their sides with the presentation of all
evidence as they may desire in support thereof, as fully as could be done in
the ordinary court with general jurisdiction, the decision of the lower court,
sitting as a land court, supported as it is with suf­ficient evidence, may no
longer be questioned on jurisdictional grounds. 
(See Martin Aglipay vs. Hon. Isabelo delos Reyes, Jr., G. R.
No. L-12776, March 23, 1960; Franco vs. Monte de Piedad
and Savings Bank, L-17610, April 22, 1963, 7 SCRA
660; City of Tarlac vs. Tarlac
Development Corporation, L-24557, July 31, 1968, 24 SCRA
466; City of Manila vs. Manila Lodge No. 761, L-24469, July 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 466; City of Manila vs. Army and Navy Club of Manila,
L-24481, 24 SCRA 466; Demetrio
Manalo vs. Hon. Herminio C.
Mariano, et. al., L-33850, January 22,
1976, 69 SCRA, 80.)

For all the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby
dismissed for lack of merit.  Costs
against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Santos*, Guerrero, and Melencio-Herrera,
JJ., concur.

Makasiar and Fernandez, JJ., took no part.

^[1]
p. 69, Rollo.

^[2]
p. 66, Rollo.

^[3]
p. 20, Rollo.

* Designated to
sit with the First Division.