MELENCIO PAGKATIPUNAN, DOMINGO CRUZ, ET. AL., PETITIONERS, VS. MUNICIPAL JUDGE ATILANO C. BAUTISTA, LEONOR DE LOS ANGELES, ET. AL., RESPONDENTS.

In an ejectment case filed on July 27, 1964 in the Municipal Court
of San Mateo, Rizal, docketed as Civil Case No. 47,
the defendants therein, after filing their answer dated September 16, 1964, filed on September 19, 1964, a motion for trial with
assessors under Rule 32 of the Rules of Court (p. 15, Record).  The Motion was denied in an order dated October 12, 1964 (pp. 16 & 17,
Record), and a motion for reconsideration was also denied on November 9, 1964 (Exh.
“G”, p. 73, Record).

On November 27, 1964, the same defendant filed with the Court of
First Instance of Rizal on November 27, 1964, a
petition, with the Municipal Judge made as one of the respondents, with prayer
for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction to restrain said judge from holding trials on the merits
without the aid of assessors in the aforesaid Civil Case No. 47, thereby
submitting for review the order of the respondent municipal judge denying the motion
for trial with the aid of assessors.

The case was submitted for decision on the pleadings, after a
motion to dismiss filed with the answer of the respondents was denied by the
court, in its order dated March 2, 1965
(pp. 57-59, Record).  Reiterating its
reasons contained in said order of March
2, 1965, the court a quo rendered
its decision on May 18, 1965,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1.    granting the
petition;

2.    declaring as null
and void the orders dated October 12,
1964 and November 9, 1964
of the respondent municipal judge;

3.    directing the said
respondent municipal judge to appoint assessors in accordance with the
provisions of Sections 57 to 62, inclusive, of Act No. 190, and enjoining said
respondent municipal judge or his successor from proceeding with the trial of
Civil Case No. 47 without the assist­ance of assessors.” (p. 84, Record)

Appealing the decision direct to this Court, appellants filed
their brief on November 2, 1965,
and the case was submitted for
decision on January 20, 1966,
without appellee’s brief.

The only issue raised in this appeal is whether trial with the
aid of assessors as provided under Rule 32 of the Revised Rules of Court is
applicable in cases filed with and tried before the Municipal Court.  In the resolution of this issue the question
also arises whether Sections 57?62 of Act 190 otherwise known as the Code
of Civil Proce­dure, have already been abrogated by the Rules of Court of 1940
and the present Revised Rules of Court.  For it is mainly on the basis of these provisions that the court a
quo sustained the position of the appellees, citing the case of Primicias
vs. Ocampo, et al., G.R.
No. L-6120, June 30, 1953,
49 Off. Gaz. 2230.

The ratio decidendi of
the appealed judgment is that the aforecited sections
57-62 of Act 190 afford a right which is substantive in character, and is, therefore,
beyond the rule-making power of the Supreme Court to repeal or modify.  To the same effect is the ruling in Colegio de San Jose
vs. Sison, 56 Phil. 344, where this Court made the
following pronouncements:

“An examination of the provisions of Section 58 will show that
the right thus granted to the parties to be judged by assessors is absolute, and that the duty imposed upon the justice of the peace is
likewise mandatory. Once the petition in writing has
been filed by any of the parties, it is the duty of the justice of the peace to
grant it, and to proceed to the selection of the assessors in the manner pre­scribed.  The petitioner argues that in denying the
private respondents’ petition for assessors, the justice of the peace did not
err inasmuch as he had not been supplied by the municipal council of Liang with the list mentioned in section 57.  We are of the opinion that the reason given
by the justice of the peace was neither good nor tenable, and did not exempt
him from his imperative duty to grant the petition and to
provide for the selection of the two assessors to which the aforesaid
respondents were entitled.  Under the
circum­stances, it was his duty to require the municipal council of Liang to supply him with
the list required by the law, which, according to the complaint filed in the
present proceeding, was at once prepared by said municipal council and
furnished to the justice of the peace.  The
respondents could not be deprived of a substantial right granted them by law.  According to section 63 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the assessors thus appointed
shall, after qualifying, sit at the hearings and advise the justice of the
peace in the determination of all questions of facts as well as of law, and in
case of their dissent as to the merits of the action, they are required by law
to certify in writing their dissent, giving the reasons therefor,
and such dissent shall be taken into account by the Court of First Instance in
case of appeal.  All these provisions
necessarily lead to the conclusion that the intervention of the assessors is not an empty formality, which may be
disregarded without violating either the letter or the spirit of the law.  It is another security given by the law to
the litigants, and as such, it is a substantial right of which they cannot be
deprived without violating all the proceedings.  Were
we to agree that for one reason or another the trial by assessors may be done
away with, the same line of reasoning would force us to admit that the parties
litigant may be deprived of their right to be represented by counsel, to appear
and be present at all the hearings, and so on, to the extent of omitting the
trial in a civil case, and thus set at naught the essential rights granted by
the law to the parties, with the consequent nullity of all the
proceedings.” (Underscoring supplied)

With the ruling in Colegio de San
Jose vs. Sison, explicitly
applying to a justice of the peace court, there should be no doubt as to the
right of trial with the aid of assessors in municipal courts.  Hence, to argue, as appel­lants do, that the
ruling in Primicias vs. Ocampo
is not in point because it involves trial with assessors in the City of Manila,
does not advance their case.

Neither will the contention of appellants that Rule 32 which
speaks of rights of parties to have assessors applies only to the Court of
First Instance, not to Muni­cipal Courts, fortify appellant’s position, simply
because Rule 32 is not one of those expressly made applicable by Section 19,
Rule 5, Rules of Court to inferior courts. 
On good and solid authority, We adopt the
proposition that the enumeration in the aforecited
section 19 of Rule 5, is not exclusive. 
Thus, to quote Chief Justice Moran:

“In other words, the enumeration in the above provision of the
several rules appli­cable in inferior courts is not all inclusive and exclusive, otherwise justices of the peace may disregard the rules on civil actions,
splitting causes of action (Rule 2), parties to civil actions (Rule 3),
etc.  Other rules like Rule 25 on
Interrogatories to Parties, Rule 27 on Production or Inspection of documents or
things, Rule 28 on Physical and Mental Examination of Persons, and the appendix
of forms are declared appli­cable in inferior courts.” (I Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court, 1963 edition, p. 211) (p. 37, Record).

Flowing from the
substantive character of the right to trial with assessors, as held expressly in at least three cases (Primicias vs. Ocampo, supra,
Colegio de San Jose vs. Sison, supra;
Barberi vs. Concepcion, 40
Phil. 320), is the mandatory duty of
the municipal court to appoint assessors when properly and seasonably
requested.  The alleged fact that no list
of assessors has been previously prepared, nor appropriation for their
compensation made, is no impediment to granting the request; otherwise, a substantial
right could easily be negated, which cannot be countenanced, specially in the
light of the specific ruling that all proceedings taken by the inferior courts
after denial of the right of any of the parties to a trial with the aid of
assessors, are null and void (Colegio de San Jose vs.
Sison, supra).

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed,
without special pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and Melencio-Herrera,
JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., (Chairman), no part.