PATERNO BELCIÑA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY, REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, PETER GARRUCHO OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, CASIMERO NA…

Belciña versus Philippine Tourism Authority

The Case

This is a case about a deed of donation of an unregistered parcel of land in Dalaguete, Cebu, executed by Paterno Belciña in favor of the Philippine Tourism Authority, now the Tourism Infrastructure and Enterprise Zone Authority. The donor later sued to declare the donation void, claiming that his consent had been vitiated by intimidation and that the donee had breached the conditions of the gift. His sister intervened, claiming a share of the property as a co-owner. The case matters because it gathers in one decision the rules on the perfection of donations of immovable property, the prescriptive periods for annulment and for revocation, and the proper remedy of a co-owner whose consent to a disposition was never secured.

Procedural History

The donor filed his complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Donation, Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Damages before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26 of Argao, Cebu. His sister filed a complaint in intervention, which the trial court admitted. In its decision of October 28, 2009, the trial court dismissed both the complaint and the complaint in intervention on the grounds of prescription and insufficiency of evidence. The plaintiff and the intervenor timely filed their notice of appeal. The appeal was elevated to the Supreme Court, which decided the case through its Third Division, with Justice Hernando writing the opinion.

Facts

On July 27, 1980, Paterno Belciña executed a Deed of Donation over an unregistered parcel of land containing 22,143 square meters in Dakung Balas, Dalaguete, Cebu, in favor of the Philippine Tourism Authority. The deed obliged the donee to establish a public beach open to the general public free of charge, and it reserved to the donor, his heirs and successors in interest, the exclusive right to use, enjoy and appropriate the fruits and products of the coconut trees and other improvements on the property. On August 11, 1980, the donee accepted the donation through the then Minister of Tourism.

Almost ten years later, on July 16, 1990, the donor sued. He alleged that his consent had been vitiated by intimidation, claiming that a certain Mr. Fonacier, said to be a crony of former President Marcos, had threatened that the government employment of his children would be endangered if he refused to part with the property. He also alleged that the donee never communicated its acceptance to him, and that it breached the conditions of the donation by collecting fees from users of its facilities and by allowing unauthorized persons to harvest the young coconuts. The donee denied the intimidation and invoked prescription. The intervenor, the donor's sister, claimed that she was a co-owner of one half of the property, which remained declared in the name of their father, and that the donation was void as to her share because she never consented to it.

The records showed that the donee began collecting fees for the use of its facilities on August 25, 1981. The donor, however, was allowed free entry to the property and free use of the beach cottages, and the donee even sought his prior consent before selling the coconut trees.

Issues

• Whether or not the donation was perfected, considering the claim that the donee's acceptance was never communicated to the donor.
• Whether or not the action to annul the donation on the ground of vitiated consent had already prescribed.
• Whether or not the deed conveyed a mere usufruct and whether the action to revoke the donation for breach of its conditions had prescribed.
• Whether or not the intervenor's action for annulment of the donation and reconveyance of her alleged share was the proper remedy.

Applicable Provisions

Article 725 of the Civil Code defines a donation:

Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it.

This is the starting point of the Court's analysis of whether a perfected donation existed.

Article 749 of the Civil Code governs the form of donations of immovable property:

In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it is necessary that it be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor. If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.

This provision supplies the requisites of a valid donation of real property that the Court applied to the deed.

Article 734 of the Civil Code fixes the moment of perfection:

The donation is perfected from the moment that the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee.

This is the rule the Court used to reject the claim that the donation was never perfected.

Article 764 of the Civil Code governs revocation for breach of condition:

The donation may be revoked at the instance of the donor for failure of the donee to comply with any of the conditions which may have been imposed upon him.

This is the basis of the Court's ruling that the action to revoke had prescribed.

Article 493 of the Civil Code defines the rights of a co-owner:

Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

This is the provision the Court used to show that the donation of the donor's undivided share was valid and made the donee a co-owner.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the donation was duly perfected. The acceptance appeared in the same Deed of Donation, and paragraph eight of the deed expressly stated that the donee accepts the gift and that the donor acknowledges due notification of such acceptance. The Court held that it is only where the deed of donation fails to show the acceptance and the donor's cognizance thereof that the donation is null and void. The donor therefore could not deny that he was notified.

On the second issue, the Court held that the action to annul the donation on the ground of vitiated consent had prescribed. The trial court had reckoned the four-year period from February 24, 1986, when former President Marcos left the country, and the complaint was filed only on July 16, 1990. Since the Court had already found that the donation was perfected, the premise of the appellants' argument on prescription failed.

On the third issue, the Court held that the deed conveyed a donation and not a mere usufruct. The donor was motivated by liberality and generosity, the donation was to take effect immediately, and the naked title passed to the donee while the donor reserved usufructuary rights over the coconut trees. The Court then held that the action to revoke had prescribed, because the donee began collecting fees on August 25, 1981, and the donor had four years from that date, or until August 26, 1985, to sue. He filed only on July 16, 1990.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that the intervenor's complaint was an improper remedy. Even assuming a co-ownership between the intervenor and the donor, the donor's donation of his share was valid under Article 493. It substituted the donee in the enjoyment of that share and made the donee a co-owner. A disposition of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the others is not void; only the rights of the disposing co-owner are transferred. The proper recourse of the intervenor is an action for partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, not an action for annulment or reconveyance.

Doctrine

A donation of immovable property must be made in a public instrument, and the acceptance may be made in the same deed or in a separate public document. The donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance. Where the deed itself manifests the acceptance and the donor's acknowledgment of notification, the donation is valid and the donor cannot later deny notice.

The action to annul a donation on the ground of vitiated consent prescribes in four years from the time the defect of consent ceases. The action to revoke a donation for non-compliance with a condition also prescribes in four years from the non-compliance.

A co-owner has full ownership of his undivided share and may alienate it. A disposition of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the others is not void; it transfers only the rights of the disposing co-owner, and the transferee becomes a co-owner. The remedy of the other co-owners is not annulment or reconveyance but partition under Rule 69.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the appeals and affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court dismissing both the complaint and the complaint in intervention.

Remember This

The one line to memorize is that a donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the donee's acceptance, and a co-owner's disposition of the entire property is not void but affects only his undivided share. Examiners use this case for the requisites of a valid donation of real property, the four-year prescriptive periods for annulment and revocation, and the rule that the proper remedy of a co-owner is partition, not reconveyance.