PEOPLE’S SURETY & INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER, HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (FOURTH DIVISION) AND RAFAEL V. GUZMAN, RESPONDENTS.

Original petition for certiorari and
prohibition.

On December 29, 1960, Rosario Yulo
filed with the Court of Ap­peals a petition – docketed as CA-G. R. No. 28671-R
– for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with preliminary injunction,
against the Court of First Instance of Manila, the Sheriff of Manila and Rafael
V. Guzman.  As prayed for, the appellate
Court issued said writ on January 7, 1961, upon a bond, in the sum of P2,000.00, subscribed by Yulo, as
principal, and the People’s Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., as surety, to
answer for such damages as Guzman may sustain by reason of the injunction,
should the Court finally decide that Yulo was not
entitled thereto.

During the pendency of said case, or on
July 17, 1961, Guzman filed a “Manifestation” claiming P50,000.00 from Yulo, as damages allegedly sustained on
account of the issuance of said writ of preliminary injunction, and praying
that the same be dissolved.  After
receiving evidence on said claim, without notice to the People’s Surety
& Insurance Co., Inc., hereinafter referred to as the Surety, the Court of
Appeals rendered, on February 5, 1962, a decision dismissing the petition,
dissolving the injunction, and holding Yulo and
the Surety, solidarily liable in the sum of P2,000.00 for the actual damages suffered by Guzman, in
addition to sentencing Yulo to pay P1,000.00 to
Guzman, by way of attorney’s fees.  No
appeal having been taken therefrom, said decision
became final on May 30, 1962. 
Subsequently, the appellate Court issued the corresponding writ of
execution against Yulo.

Sometime later, the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied;
whereupon Guzman filed an urgent ex parte
motion for an alias writ of execution against Yulo
and the Surety.  The latter objected to
the motion and prayed for its denial, or, at least, that action thereon be held
in abeyance, pending disposition of case G. R. No. L-20857 of the Supreme
Court, in which Yulo sought to annul, inter alia, the aforementioned de­cision of the Court of
Appeals, dated February 5, 1962 (which case was dismissed on March 13,
1963).  This notwithstanding, on March
25, 1963, the Court of Appeals passed a resolution granting said urgent ex
parte motion of Guzman, for the issuance of an
alias writ of execution against Yulo and the
Surety.  On the same date, said writ
was issued.

Soon thereafter, or on or about April 18, 1963, the surety filed
a motion for reconsideration of the order of March 25, 1963, upon the ground
that the Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of execution against the
Surety, because the same had not been notified of Guzman’s claim for damages or
given its day in Court, before the entry of final judgment in CA-G. R. No. 28671-R.  On
May 29, 1963, said appellate Court passed a resolution suspending its judgment,
dated February 5, 1962, and its resolution of March 25, 1963, insofar as the
Surety is concerned, and ordering Guzman to file an application for damages,
with notice to the Surety, within 20 days from notice, and directing that the
case be set for hearing “after the issues are joined.”

Hence, on June 11, 1963, Guzman filed said application or claim
for damages against the Surety.  The
latter objected thereto, inserting that the decision in the case had long
become final and executory and that, in fact, entry
of judgment had been made on May 30, 1962. 
Despite this objection, the Court passed, on July 5, 1963, a resolution
setting the case of hearing on August 2, 1963. 
Accordingly, on July 31, 1963, the Surety filed with this Court the
present action for certiorari and prohibition, contending that the Court of
Appeals had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction:  1) in allowing a writ of execution to be is­sued
against the Surety upon a judgment rendered without notice thereto; 2) in
passing the resolution of May 29, 1963, authorizing Guzman to file an
application for an award for damages against the Surety; and, 3) in approving
the resolution of July 5, 1963 setting for hearing the claim for damages
against the Surety.

The latter, likewise, prayed, in its petition herein, for a writ
of preliminary injunction, which we did not issue, despite the fact that we
gave due course to the petition.  On
January 13, 1964, the Surety filed a motion for the issuance of said writ, upon
the ground that, on September 18, 1963, the Court of Appeals had passed another
resolu­tion, in CA-G. R. No. 28671-R, rendering judgment against the movant (Surety) “on the bond posted by it for the
amount of P2,000 in favor of respondent Rafael V.
Guzman,” and that, on December 23, 1963, the corresponding writ of
execution of this resolution had been issued.

At the outset, it should be noted that, while case CA-G. R. No.
28671-R was pending decision in the Court of Appeals, sometime in 1961, Guzman
had filed therein a claim for damages against Yulo;
that notice of such claim was not furnished the Surety; and that neither had
the latter been notified of the hearing for the reception of evidence on said
claim.  Since the decision of the Court
of Appeals on February 5, 1962, holding the Surety liable under the bond in
question was ren­dered without notice thereto, said decision is null and void
as regards the Surety, for lack of due process.

Precisely, because of this fact, on May 29, 1963, the Court of
Appeals, suspended its aforementioned decision, as well as its resolu­tion of
March 25, 1963 (granting Guzman’s motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution, not only against Yulo, but, also, against
the Surety) and, ordered Guzman to “make an application for damages,”
against the Surety, upon the theory that, as long as notice and an opportunity
to be heard are given thereto, Guzman’s claim for damages could still be
entertained by the Court of Appeals.  It
should be noted, however, that in Del Rosario v. Nava (95 Phil., 637), this
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Reyes, J. B. L., held:

“It will be seen that the rulings above quoted are silent on
the question now before us, that is to say, the time within which the
application and notice to the surety should be filed in those cases where a
judgment for damages has already been rendered against the plaintiff as
principal of the attachment bond.  Upon
mature consideration, we have reach­ed the conclusion that under the terms of
section 20 of Rule 59, the application for damages and the no­tice to the
sureties should be filed in the trial court by the party damnified
by the wrongful or improper attachment either ‘before the trial’ or, at the
latest, ‘before entry of the final judgment,’ which means not later than the
date when the judgment becomes final and executory
(sec. 2, Rule 35).  Only in this way could
the award against the sureties be ‘included in the final judgment’ as required
by the first part of section 20 of Rule 59. 
The rule plainly calls for only one judgment for damages against the
attaching party and his sureties; which is explained by the fact that the
attachment bond is a solidary obligation.  Since a judicial bondsman has no right to
demand the exhaus­tion of the property of the principal debtor (as express­ly
provided by article 2084 of the new Civil Code, and article 856 of the old one),
there is no justification for the entering of separate judgments against
them.  With a single judgment against
principal and sureties, the prevailing party may choose, at his discretion, to
enforce the award of damages against whomsoever he considers in a better
situation to pay it.

x        x          x          x

“In view of the foregoing, we hold that while the prevailing
party may apply for an award of damages against the surety even after an award
has been already obtained against the principal, as ruled in Visayan Surety Insurance Corp. v. Pascual,
G. R. No. L-3694, still the application and notice against the surety must be
made before judgment against the principal becomes final and executory, so that all awards for damages may be included
in the final judgment.  Wherefore, the
court below committed no error in refusing to entertain the ap­pellant Nava’s
application for an award of damages against the appellee
surety Company ten months after the award against the principal obligor had
become final.”

Inasmuch as this view has been reiterated in subsequent cases,^[1]
it is now well settled that a court has no jurisdiction to entertain any
proceeding seeking to hold a surety liable upon its bond, where the surety has
not been given notice of the proceedings for damages against the principal and
the judgment holding the latter liable has already become final.  The reason for the rule is obvious.  Indeed, to allow such proceeding would, in
effect, divest said judgment of the character of finality it had already
acquired.  Moreover, the rule has for its
purpose to avoid multiplicity of suits, by including in said judgment the award
for damages incurred by reason of the improper issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.  Such
inclusion is not possible where – as in the case at bar – the decision has
become final and entry of judgment has already been made.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Ap­peals of
February 5, 1962, and the orders of said Court dated March 25, May 29 and July
5, 1963, are hereby annulled, insofar as the Surety is concerned, and
respondents herein are perpetually restrained from enforcing, executing and/or
carrying into ef­fect said decision and orders, as regards the Sure­ty, with
costs against respondent Rafael V. Guzman.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, and
Ruiz Castro, JJ.,
concur.

^[1]
Visayan Surety & Insurance Co. v. Lacson, et al., 96 Phil. 878; Visayan
Surety & Insurance Co. v. De Aquino, et
al., 96 Phil. 900; Port Motors Inc. v. Raposas,
100 Phil. 732; Alliance Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. v. Edmundo S. Piccio, L-9950, July
31, 1959; Manila Under­writers Insurance Co., Inc. v. Hon. Bienvenido Tan, etc., et al., L-12256, April 29, 1960; De Guia, et al. v. Alto Surety & Ins. Co., Inc., L-18647, February 28,
1963; and Luneta Motor Co. v. Antonio
Menendez, et al., L-16880, April 30, 1963.