G.R. No. L-38413. August 27, 1987
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. CRISANTO BADERES Y MAPISA ALIAS “BOY”, ENRIQUE MISION Y CATANGHAL ALIAS “HENRY MISION”, ENRICO PIÑACATE Y GALANG ALIAS “RICO P…
FERNAN, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision dated February 19, 1974 of
the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XXVI, Pasig, Rizal, finding the defendant-appellant Crisanto
Baderes y Mapisa* guilty of the crime of rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the
complaining victim in the sum of Five Thousand Pesos [P5,000.00] by way of exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.
The appeal rests on the issue of credibility as the story of the
complaining witness, 13-year-old Irene Añonuevo that she was raped was
contradicted by the defendant-appellant, 17-year-old Crisanto Baderes, who
strongly asserted that the former being his sweetheart willingly copulated with
him.
The prosecution’s evidence is as follows:
“On April
19, 1973, Irene Anonuevo, a 13-year-old student
residing at Ilaya Baranca, Mandaluyong, Rizal, was watching the passion play at Barrio Pineda, Pasig,
Rizal [t.s.n., pp. 5-6, May 25,
1973]. At about midnight, when the passion play ended,
Irene noticed that her companion, Evelyn Alcantara, was not with her
anymore. She started looking for Evelyn and when she was not able to find her, she decided to go home. While walking along a road at Purok No. 4 in
Barrio Pineda, Pasig,
Rizal, she became apprehensive since she was alone and she had a long way to
reach her house. She then decided to go
to the house of one ‘Aling
Ata’ her mother’s ‘kumare’ residing in the ‘same barrio of Pineda
[t.s.n., pp. 6-7, id.].
“On her way to the house of ‘Aling
Ata’, however, a person suddenly pulled her arm and poked a sharp object at
Irene‘s right side. The person, whom she later recognized as appellant Crisanto Baderes, told
Irene: ‘Pag ikaw ay lalaban, lalagyan
kita ng gripo sa tagiliran (t.s.n., pp. 7-9, id.]’. Apprehensive of her safety, Irene did not make any
outcry. Under continued threats she was
taken to an alley and brought to a house in the same Purok No. 4, Barrio Pineda. Upon reaching the door of the house, the appellant called out
‘Henry, open the door, I have somebody with me’ [t.s.n., pp. 9-10, id.] When
the door was opened, she was taken inside the house where she saw three companions of the accused whom she did not initially recognize
but when the light in the room was put on, she identified them as Henry Mision, Omy and Rico
Galang. Irene was brought inside a room where she was immediately made to lie down on the cement
floor. [t.s.n., pp.10-12, id.]
“Appellant took off his clothes while his three companions held Irene by her
shoulder and legs, at the same time stripping her of her clothes. She was lying on the floor with a sharp bladed instrument poked at
her side. While she was in such a helpless position, the appellant placed himself on top of Irene. Appellant, with the help of his companions,
started kissing Irene and fondling her breast.
“After sometime, appellant was able to have carnal knowledge
of Irene who, because of the pain that she felt, cried and became pale [t.s.n.,
pp. 12-18, id.]. Thereafter, the
appellant and his companions threatened Irene not to make any complaint to anyone
[t.s.n., p. 19, id.] At about 4 o’clock
in the morning, Irene was led out of
the house. On their way out,
appellant repeated his threats that she would be harmed if she reports the
matters to the authorities [t.s.n., pp. 20-21, id.]
“Immediately upon her arrival at her house, however, Irene
reported the incident to her brother, and later on the same day, she was taken
to the NBI where she wars examined
by Dr. Salvador, a medico-legal officer of the NBI. [t.s.n., pp. 21-22, id.] Results of the
examination disclose the following:
‘Normally developed, fairly nourished, conscious, coherent,
cooperative, ambulatory subject.
‘Breasts, fully developed, hemispherical and soft.
Arcolae (sic) brown, 3.0 cm. in diameter. Nipples, dark
brown, protruding, 6.0 cm. in diameter.
‘No evident sign of
extra-genital physical injury noted on the body of the subject.
‘Pubic hairs, fully grown and moderate. Labia majora gaping postetiorly. Labia minora, coaptated. Fourchette, tense. Vestibular mucosa, pinkish, hymen, moderately wide, with
contused hymenal edges from 5:00 o’clock
and 7:00 o’clock
positions and a deep, fresh laceration at 9:00
o’clock position, corresponding to the face of a watch, edges raw and bleeds on slight
manipulations. Hymenal orifice,
originally annular and admits a tube 2.8 cm. in diameter with moderate
resistance. Regosities (sic), prominent
and vaginal walls, tight.’ **
“After the examination at the NBI, Irene and her brother,
Romeo, proceeded to Metrocom South Sector where her statement was taken by
constabulary authorities. The PC,
however, referred Irene to Pasig,
Police Department where, upon investigation, she gave another statement
reiterating her statement given to the PC.
[t.s.n., pp. 7-8, June 4,
1973]”.[1]
The defense’s evidence, on the other hand, is as follows:
“On April 19, 1973, at about 11:00 o’clock in the evening,
defendant-appellant Crisanto Baderes, nicknamed ‘Boy Tepuvet’, 17 years old, single, and a laborer by
occupation, with his friend Raymundo Castillo, nicknamed ‘Raymund’, 20 years
old, also single, were watching the ‘sinakulo’ or passion play in the
vernacular, in Barrio Pineda, Pasig, Rizal.
[TSN, July 31, 1973,
pp. 12-14; TSN, July
12, 1993, pp. 95-97]
“Defendant-appellant felt a tap on his shoulder and turning
back, he saw the
complainant Irene Anonuevo, 13 years of age, single and student, who inquired from him whether he had seen Evelyn
Alcantara and her companions. After telling the complainant that he
had not seen Evelyn, Irene requested him to take her home.
Defendant-appellant and Raymund agreed and as they were heading towards
Ilaya, Barrio Barangka, Mandaluyong, Rizal, where Irene lives, they passed by
the basketball court, also in Barrio Pineda, and saw another friend, Rosendo
Laron, nicknamed ‘Boyet’, 20 years old and single who joined their group. [TSN of July 13, 1973, pp. 14-18 and pp. 2-7; TSN of July 12, 1973, pp. 97-101]
“While their group was nearing the Republic Flour Mills,
the siren signalling ‘curfew’ blew
and they were afraid to proceed for fear of being apprehended for violating the
‘curfew’. Raymund begged off and told his companions that he was
separating from the group
to go home. But as he looked back
shortly thereafter he saw that his companions had also turned back and so their group headed back to
Pineda. When they reached a dead-end
street called ‘Putol’, Raymund separated from the group and went home. Shortly thereafter, Rosendo Laron also
separated from his companions and went home.
(TSN of July 12, 1973,
pp. 100-104; TSN of July 13,
1973, pp. 7-10 and pp. 19-10]
“Defendant-appellant,
who had been courting the
complainant even before that occasion, pressed his courtship even while their
group was taking Irene home. Irene, on
the other hand, had a soft spot for the defendant-appellant. She had once confided to her friend and
gangmate, Evelyn Alcantara, that she had a crush’ on the defendant-appellant. The latter’s courtship was thus requitted. (TSN of July 13, 1973, pp. 20-21; TSN of July 12, 1973, pp. 53-54]
“Thus, the two found themselves alone in the dead of the
night and in a deserted place. They went
to the ‘bundok’ which is an
uninhabited place filled with cogon grass where women questionable character
used to be brought and they decided to spend the night there. They embraced and kissed each other, and
finally made love. There end on that
occasion, by the defendant-appellant’s own admission: ‘nakuha
ko po ang kanyang pagkababae’. [TSN of July 13, 1973, pp. 21-23]
“At about 2:00
o’clock in the morning they left the place. Irene had asked the defendant-appellant to
take her to his home if he really loved her.
But home to the defendant-appellant at that time was the residence of his friend Henry Mision at Barrio
Pineda where he had been sleeping for more than a month before. [ TSN of July 13,
1973, pp. 23-25]
“On reaching the Mision residence, they found the door
closed. Leaving the complainant there
the defendant?appellant passed through the back door of the house close to the river. Once inside the house, he woke up Henry
because he could not switch on the light due to some mechanical detect. Henry woke up and put on the light. He saw defendant-appellant who told him that
he had a girl companion with him and requested that they be allowed to spend
the night there. [TSN of July 13, 1973, pp. 25-29; TSN of July 25, 1973, pp. 11-13]
“At first
Henry Mision refused. ‘I told
them to leave because my parents might get angry.’ However, defendant-appellant told him that he
had already ‘nagalaw’ (had already had sexual intercourse with) the
complainant. Thinking that the two had eloped. Henry relented and
allowed them to stay in his father’s office. [TSN of July 25, 1973, pp. 13-16]
“Defendant-appellant borrowed the mat on which Henry Mision
and his cousins Omy [Romeo Yumo] and Rico [Enrico Pinacate] were sleeping. So Henry woke up his cousins and took away
the mat and gave it to the defendant-appellant.
Defendant-appellant and the complainant proceeded to the office of
Henry’s father. After closing the door,
the tight inside the said office was put out. Henry and his two
cousins, in turn,
continued to sleep on the sofa. [TSN of July 13, 1973, pp. 28-29;
TSN of July 25, 1973,
pp. 17-18]
“Inside the office, defendant-appellant spread the mat on
the floor and Irene lay down on it. Defendant-appellant
took off his polo shirt and lay down beside her. Then they embraced each other and ‘because of
the length of time that we were close together, something happened again’ and
defendant-appellant ‘was able
to get her womanhood again’. Of course,
before these things happened defendant-appellant ‘promised her (the
complainant) that I would marry her.’ [TSN of July 13, 1973, pp. 29-32]
“Defendant-appellant and the complainant stayed in the said
place until four o’clock
the following morning because ‘that was my first opportunity to be able to take her home . . .
because the curfew ends on that hour’.
He woke up Henry Mision
and told him that they were leaving.
After they left, Henry went back to sleep. [TSN of July 13, 1973, pp. 32-33; TSN of July 15, 1973, pp. 19-20]
“From the Mision residence, they walked towards Barangka, Mandaluyong, Rizal, passing by many houses. There were already people awake and stores open by that time. No outcry was ever made by the complainant; at no instance did she attempt to escape of flee. [TSN of July
13, 1973, pp.
33-35]
“When they reached the place close
to Irene’s home, at complainant’s behest defendant-appellant left her. However defendant-appellant was assured by
Irene that she would go back to Pineda sometime that day. True enough,
defendant-appellant saw her again in Pineda at about seven o’clock in the morning watching the
‘penitensiya’ [flaggelation] (sic). [TSN of July
13, 1973, pp. 35-36]
“At about 9:00 o’clock
in the morning of that day, complainant
came to the house of Evelyn Alacantara and told her: “INANO AKO NI BOY’ in
the ‘bundok’. Evelyn asked her who is
that ‘Boy’ and the complainant answered:
“Boy titigan mo ako’, whom she understood to be the
defendant-appellant. Complainant never
told Evelyn that she was forced or
raped by ‘Boy’. In fact Evelyn’s
impression that this thing happened with complainant’s consent for ‘Boy’, as told by the complainant
herself to her, is ‘her
crush’, meaning that ‘she likes him’. [TSN of July 12, 1973, pp. 49-54]” [2]
The lower court sustained the prosecution’s theory citing the
following reasons:
a] Said theory is properly corroborated and
confirmed by the physical facts and other circumstances;
b] Complainant’s testimony in court is
substantially the same as the written statement she has given to the police;
c] Her testimony is strongly sustained and
fortified by the findings of Dr. Nieto Salvador, NBI Medico Legal Officer; and,
d] There appears to be no improper motive for
the complainant to testify falsely against the appellant and his co-accused.
The physical facts adverted to by the lower court as
corroborative of the prosecution’s theory is undoubtedly the medico-legal
findings of Dr. Nieto Salvador. Upon
closer scrutiny, however, We find that said findings do not support nor confirm
the charge that rape was committed by the appellant against the complainant. The hymenal lacerations reported therein and
the conclusion that “she could have had sexual intercourse with a man on
or about the alleged date of commission” do not establish rape as the same
findings and conclusion are likewise consistent with the defense’s theory that
coitus took place with the consent of the complainant. Rather than substantiate the prosecution’s
theory of rape, the finding that there were no evident signs of extragenital
injuries, on the other hand, tends to lend more credence to appellant’s claim
of the absence of a struggle or the lack of physical force employed, and to
negate the complainant’s testimony that when she “tried to move, he
[appellant] slapped me.”[3]
Moreover, the finding that complainant was a “conscious, coherent,
cooperative and ambulatory subject” completely runs counter to the usual
condition observed of recent rape victims, who by reason of the trauma just
experienced, are in shock, incoherent and nervous.
Aside from the medical report which We do not find to be
corroborative of the prosecution’s theory, no other evidence or circumstances
were presented by the prosecution to substantiate complainant’s
testimony. The other four witnesses for
the prosecution, namely, Dr. Nieto Salvador, medico-legal officer of the NBI,
Romeo Añonuevo, the brother of the complainant, and Sgt. Montefalcon and Pat.
Galang of the Pasig Police Department, did not and could not have any personal
knowledge of the perpetration of the offense imputed to the appellant.
Following then the well-settled rule that in order that the
defendant may be convicted upon the testimony of the complainant alone, such
testimony must bear the stamp of absolute truth and candor[4]
and must be impeccable and ring true throughout,[5]
an examination of complainant’s testimony is imperative.
Complainant testified that when the passion play ended, and she
could not find her companion, Evelyn Alcantara, she decided to walk home
alone. She, however, changed her mind
and decided to spend the night in the house of Aling Ata, a ‘kumare’ of her
mother for fear that she might be overtaken by the curfew.[6]
Is it credible that a 13 year-old girl would walk her way home
from Barrio Pineda, Pasig to
Barangka, Mandaluyong at close to midnight
alone? Is it also believable that she would have the courage to spend the night
in the house of another when by her own admission she had not slept in other
people’s houses before?[7]
On the other hand, appellant’s defense that complainant asked him
to take her home, which he did in the company of his friends, does not only
appear credible but is supported by the corroborative testimonies of Raymundo
Castillo and Rosendo Laron, which testimonies were not refuted by the
prosecution.
According to the complainant, as she was on her way to Aling Ata’s house, the appellant came out of the
dark, pulled her hair and stuck a pointed sharp object to the side of her body
close to the waist and told her “lalagyan kita ng gripo sa tagiliran”
if she resisted.[8]
Her written statements to the police,[9]
however, give a materially different account of this incident, particularly as
regards the appellant’s coming out of the dark while she was on her way to
Aling Ata’s house:
“T
– Kung iyong natatandaan isalaysay mo nga sa pagsisiyasat na ito ang buong
pangyayari.
S – x x x habang ako po ay naroron sa tapat
ng bahay ni Aling Ata at hahakbang na lamang sa baytang papataas ng hagdanan ay
mayroon pong taong biglang lumusot na tao sa ilalim nito [hagdanan] at
nilapitan po ako at bigla po akong hinawakan sa aking buhok at tinutokan po ng
patalim sa aking tagiliran x x x.”
The defendant must have been waiting for complainant in Aling
Ata’s place if we were to believe her testimony. But nobody knew, including the appellant,
that she would change her mind and instead of going home would decide to spend
the night at Aling Ata’s
house. More so because complainant
testified that prior to the incident, she had not talked to nor seen the
appellant.
According to the complainant, she was raped in one of the rooms of the
residence of Conrado Mision [father of Enrique Mision], the appellant helped by
his three co-accused Enrique Mision, Enrico Piñacate and Romeo Yumo.
It was established during
the trial that appellant was staying in said house only for a few months because its owner had taken pity on him.[10]
In this light, is it
believable that the defendant-appellant would have the audacity of using said house
for his criminal purpose? What reason could have impelled the three co-accused
[who are cousins] to help the appellant in his dastardly act at the spur of the
moment particularly since earlier that night, appellant was not with them. Also, did appellant not consider the
possibility that Enrique Mision’s parents might wake up in the course of the
attack?
With complainant’s
testimony defying the rational limits of human experience, the faith and
credence lent to it by the trial court is evidently erroneous.
Complainant’s conduct
after the alleged rape likewise casts doubts on the veracity of her
claim that appellant forcibly had
carnal knowledge of her. It was
established during the trial that at 7:00 o’clock in the morning of the day after the rape was allegedly
committed, complainant was already at Barrio Pineda watching the penitensiya. At about 9:00 o’clock in the morning, she went to Evelyn
Alcantara’s house where she admitted to the latter that “inano siya ni
Boy.” At about 6:15 o’clock in the evening, she was at the NBI for the
medical examination, which findings indicated that she was coherent, cooperative
and ambulatory unlike the usual incoherent, shocked and nervous newly rape
victims.
The ruling of this Court in the case of U.S. vs. Flores, 26 Phil. 268, finds apt application in this case particularly
since the evidence of guilt of the appellant consisted wholly in the testimony
of the complaining witness. Thus:
“The evidence as to the guilt of the accused . . . consists
wholly and exclusively on the testimony of the complaining witness and while we
have frequently held that the uncorroborated testimony of the woman may be
sufficient under certain
circumstances to warrant a conviction, yet from the nature of the charge and
the ease with which it can be made and the difficulty which surrounds the
accused in disapproving it where the point at issue is as to whether the cohabitation
was had with or without the use of force or threats, it is imperative that such testimony should
be scrutinized with the
greatest caution. In all such cases, the
conduct of the woman immediately following
the alleged
assault is of the utmost
importance as tending to establish
the truth and falsity of the charge. Indeed,
it may well be doubted whether
a conviction of the offense of rape
should even be sustained from the uncorroborated
testimony of the woman
unless the court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
that her conduct at the time when the alleged rape was committed
and immediately thereafter was such as might be reasonably expected from her under all the circumstances of
the case.” [Underscoring supplied]
The lower court attached great significance to the fact that the
complainant’s testimony in court is substantially the same as her written statement
to the police. But it is not unusual
that when a person gives a statement to the police, he reads or is apprised of
the same before taking the witness stand and his court testimony would be along
the same vein as the written statement.
The “spontaneity” of the complainant’s testimony noted by the
lower court is belied by the fact that her statement was taken in the Pasig
Police Department at 9:00 o’clock in
the evening of April 21, 1973,
almost two days after the alleged incident happened. As rightly contended by the appellant, the
true test should not be whether a court testimony of a witness is substantially
the same as his written statement to the police, but whether such testimony and
statement are credible and consistent with the established facts of the case
and consistent with the realities of human experience. We have earlier seen that complainant’s
testimony did not measure up to these standards.
The trial court gave full credence to the complainant’s testimony
on the ground that no improper motive has been established by the defense to
explain why she should testify falsely against the appellant and his
co-accused. In so concluding, the court a
quo obviously
overlooked the testimony of the defense witness, Evelyn Alcantara, thus:
“Q: How about the parents of Irene Anonuevo?
A:
The parents of Irene Anonuevo called me
to their house and when I went upstairs, they were already discussing this
complaint and they asked me who did that thing to Irene and I told them that I
know Iyo but I did not know whatever happened to her. Iyo [complainant’s
brother] told me that they will make it
a rape case and
they will include me in the case.”[11]
To our mind, this statement speaks eloquently of the reason
behind the charge of rape against appellant.
It must be remembered that complainant was only 13 years old at the time
of the commission of the alleged crime.
To a girl of this age and her family, it would appear more of a “face-saving” for her to admit having
been raped rather than to admit having sexual intercourse with a man of her own
free will. She would appear to be a victim rather than a willing partner,
thereby gaining sympathy instead of contempt from the public, as indeed, she
was able to convince the lower court that she was a brave and courageous girl
for exposing the rape purportedly committed against her.
The lower court gravely
erred in disregarding the testimonies of the defense witnesses, particularly
that of Evelyn Alcantara. That Evelyn
Alcantara is a close friend, confidante and gangmate of complainant was
established during the trial.[12] Complainant shared secrets with her as
proved by the fact that complainant need only say “Boy titigan mo
ako” for Evelyn to understand whom she meant. Alcantara’s testimony that on April 19,
1973, she and the complainant went to Barrio Pineda to watch the passion play
but were not able to do so because they met Pio and Reny who took them for a
tricycle ride, then to a place called “salakot” and finally to an
isolated place called “bundok” where they separated from each other
was not refuted during the trial.
Furthermore, Alcantara’s testimony that on April 20, 1973 at 9:00 A.M.,
complainant went to her house where she told her “inano ako ni Boy”,
not raped by Boy, was not refuted.[13]
It was admitted by the complainant herself that her mother tried
to prevail upon Alcantara to testify in her favor.[14]
In fact, Alcantara was not only “requested” to testify for the
prosecution, but was threatened by the complainant’s brother that they would
make it appear that it was a case of rape and that she will be implicated.[15]
In spite of these persuasions and threats, Alcantara gave her statement of
what she knew to the police.[16]
The lower court did not explain in what manner Alcantara’s
testimony is biased in favor of the defense.
It must be noted that she was even among the witnesses named for the
prosecution both in the original and amended complaints. If there was any party which Alcantara would
favor, it should have been the prosecution as the complainant is admittedly
her close friend. Her testimony, in this
light, assumes a ring of truth and candor.
In fine, an examination of the testimonies of the defense
witnesses and the appellant show that they closely corroborate and interlock
with each other in the principal and material aspects that it would be
difficult to consign them to mere coincidence or as the result of deliberate
fabrication.
We find that the crime of rape has not been established by clear
and convincing evidence in this case.
The testimony of the complainant lacks the ring of truth and
credibility. It has also not been
corroborated by the facts and testimonies on record.
Conviction cannot be sustained on the weakness of the defense’s
evidence, but must rely on the strength of the evidence presented by the
prosecution. The burden of proof is upon
the prosecution and until such burden is sufficiently met, the accused is
protected by the constitutional right of presumption of innocence.
“The crime of rape is of such nature that it can only be
established by clear and positive evidence and cannot be made to depend upon
inference or dubious circumstantial evidence”.[17]
“Where the only evidence was that of the alleged injured party and there was
doubt as to whether the act was done against the will of the complainant,
judgment of conviction must be reversed”.[18] “As a general rule, a judgment
of conviction for rape cannot be based on the lone uncorroborated testimony of
the offended woman, unless said testimony be clear, positive and convincing or
supported by other facts and strong circumstantial evidence of record.”[19]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is
hereby reversed and the defendant-appellant Crisanto Baderes y Mapisa is acquitted of the crime of rape. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin, and
Cortes, JJ., concur.
* Appellant’s co-accused were
tried separately as they surrendered to the Pasig Police Department only on the
last day of the trial of appellant Baderes.
(Decision, p. 12, Rollo)
** Likewise appearing on the
medico-legal report is the conclusion that “She could have had sexual
intercourse with man on or about the alleged date of commission.” [This
portion was not quoted by the Solicitor General in his Brief]
[1]
Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee, pp. 2-5
[2]
Brief for the Defendant-Appellant, pp. 65-68, Rollo
[3]
t.s.n., p. 19, May 25, 1973
[4]
People vs. Nebres, 58 Phil. 903
[5]
People vs. Delfinado, 61 Phil. 694
[6]
t.s.n., pp. 9 & 43, May 25, 1973
[7]
t.s.n., pp. 51-53, May 25, 1973
[8]
t.s.n., pp. 7-9, May 25, 1973
[9]
Exhs. C & C-1
[10]
t.s.n., pp. 16-17, July 25, 1973
[11]
t.s.n., July 12, 1973, pp. 55-56
[12]
t.s.n., pp. 35-37, July 12, 1973
[13]
t.s.n., pp. 49-54, July 12, 1973
[14]
t.s.n., pp. 30-31, May 25, 1973
[15]
t.s.n., pp. 55-56, July 12, 1973
[16]
Exhibit I
[17]
People vs. Forten, 97 Phil. 983
[18]
U.S. vs. Paz, 9 Phil. 738
[19]
People vs. Delfinado, supra