PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND GEORGE LITTON, SR., PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE FLORELIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME, IN HER CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANC…

Time has left its mark on this case.  Except for the alleged adulteress, the other dramatis
personae have long since died. 
But the legal question presented for resolution must still be
addressed.  Should the prosecution in a
criminal complaint for adultery be allowed to introduce additional evidence
even after it has rested its case and both defendants have submitted their
respective demurrers to evidence or motions to dismiss.  Respondent Judge Castro-Bartolome
ruled in the negative and the State and both the aggrieved husband have gone up
to this Court on a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with preliminary injunction seeking the invalidation of the assailed Orders of
August 11, 1976 and October 12, 1976 denying their motion to reopen the trial.

The antecedent facts are undisputed.

In a complaint dated January 23, 1973 filed before the then Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV (Makati), presided by respondent Judge Castro-Bartolome, petitioner George Litton Sr. charged Leonor Sochayseng and Rogelio Paz
with adultery.^[1]

After the prosecution rested its case, respondents Sochayseng and Paz filed their respective demurrer to
evidence (motions to dismiss) substantially raising similar grounds for the
dismissal of the adultery charge:

1.  That the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the existence of marriage between Litton, Sr. and Sochayseng during the alleged period of commission of
adultery;

2.  That assuming arguendo
that said marriage did in fact exist and that both respondents committed acts
of adultery during coverture, petitioner Litton, Sr.
has condoned and pardoned the adulterous acts of his wife and Paz.^[2]

On June 23, 1976, or nine (9) months after the prosecution rested
its case and before respondent Judge could resolve the motions to dismiss
submitted by Sochayseng and Paz, the private
prosecutor (Atty. Estanislao Fernandez) filed a
motion to reopen the case for the purpose of presenting the following
additional evidence:

“1.  A certified xerox
copy of the Marriage Contract between George Litton, Sr., complainant herein,
and his accused-wife, Leonor Trinidad Sochayseng, dated August
28, 1959 at Binan, Laguna.  x x x ;

“2.  A certified and duly authenticated xerox copy of the Marriage Certificate attesting to the
marriage of George Litton, Sr., complainant herein, and the accused Leonor Sochayseng, celebrated on
October 20, 1962 before the Justice of the Peace of Las Vegas, Nevada (USA) x x x ;

“3.  A xerox copy of the
affidavit of the accused Leonor S. Litton in the
support case filed by her against George Litton, Sr., Civil Case No. 16795 of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, dated October 11,
1972 wherein said Leonor S. Litton stated, under
oath, among others, that she and the defendant (George Litton, Sr.) were
married on October 20, 1962 as per marriage certificate x x
x.”^[3]

Atty. Fernandez, who replaced Atty. Dakila
Castro as private prosecutor, justified the move, thus:

“These documents were not presented by the private prosecutor Dakila F. Castro at the close of the evidence of the
prosecution in his belief that he had sufficiently proven the marriage between
complaining witness George Litton, Sr. and the accused Leonor
Trinidad Sochayseng, with the testimony, among
others, of said George Litton, Sr., about said marriages.  Granting that said opinion of Atty. Castro is
erroneous, in the highest interest of justice, we are presenting this motion to
enable us to present the above-mentioned documents to conclusively prove the
fact of marriage between the complaining witness, George Litton, Sr. and the
accused Leonor Sochayseng.”^[4]

In the Order dated August
11, 1976, respondent Judge Castro-Bartolome
denied the motion to reopen trial, stating that:

“The Rules of Court do not provide for any reopening of
criminal case, but provide in Rule 121 for new trial, wherein at any time
before judgment, ‘the court may on motion of the defendant, or on its own
motion with the consent of the defendant, grant a new trial.’ Section 2 thereof
provides the grounds therefor:

“’(a)  That the errors of law or irregularities have
been committed during the trial prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
defendant;

“’(b)  That new and material evidence has been
discovered which the defendant could not with reasonable diligence have
discovered and produced at the trial, and which if introduced and admitted,
would probably change the judgment.  x x x.’

“Nowhere is it provided that it may be granted upon motion of
the prosecution.  Whatever caption the
prosecution may give to the action it seeks to be granted, whether reopening or
new trial, there is no specific provision of the Rules to back it, and is
probably why the decisions cited by the prosecution are rife that the court motu proprio may,
for its own clarification, allow the introduction of evidence to prove juris­diction,
which would not be prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused.”^[5]

An urgent motion for reconsideration by petitioner was similarly
rejected in the Order of October 12,
1976.  Hence, the present
recourse assailing respondent Judge for gravely abusing her discretion in
refusing to reopen trial.  On November
23, 1976, this Court issued a temporary restraining order dated November 22,
1976 barring respondent Judge from resolving the motions to dismiss filed by
the two accused in the Litton case.

Preliminarily, it must be stressed that there is no specific
provision in the Rules of Court governing motions to reopen a case for the
reception of evidence after a case has been submitted for decision but before
judgment.  Judicial action is controlled
by no other rule than that of the paramount interests of justice and rests
entirely on the sound discretion of the trial court.  Its grant or denial by said court in the
exercise of that discretion will not be reversed on appeal unless a clear abuse
thereof is shown.^[6]

Additional jurisprudence is to the effect that:

“x x x It
is within the discretion of the court whether or not to admit further evidence
after the party offering the evidence has rested, and this discretion will not
be reviewed except where it has clearly been abused.  (64 C. J. 160).  More, it is within the sound discretion of
the court whether or not it will allow the case to be reopened for the further
introduction of evidence after a motion or request for a non-suit, or a
demurrer to the evidence; and the case may be reopened after the court has
announced its intention as to its ruling on the request, motion or demurrer, or
has granted it or has denied the same, or after the motion had been granted, if
the order had not been written, or entered upon the minutes or signed.  (64 C. J., 164).

“In this jurisdiction this rule has been followed.  After the parties have produced their
respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence only,
but, it has been held, the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of
justice, may permit them to offer evidence upon their original case, and its
ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of
discretion appears.  (Siuliong
& Co. vs. Ylagan, 43 Phil. 393; U.S.
vs. Alviar, 36 Phil. 804).  So, generally, additional evidence is allowed
when it is newly discovered, or where it has been omitted through inadvertence
or mistake, or where the purpose of the evidence is to correct evidence
previously offered.” (I Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 2d ed.,
545; 64 C. J., 160-163, cited in Alegre vs. Reyes, ibid,
pp. 232-233; Agulto vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No.
52728, January 17, 1990, 181 SCRA 80).

Under the factual milieu of the case at bar, we find that
respondent Judge correctly rejected petitioner’s motion to reopen the
trial.  Even the so-called paramount
interests of justice cannot free petitioner from his self-imposed
predicament.  His counsel took a big
gamble in not presenting the certificates attesting to the fact of marriage
between petitioner and Leonor Sochayseng
on the erroneous belief that said marriage had been amply established by the
testimony of the aggrieved husband. 
Petitioner’s counsel realized his folly when private respondents
understandably moved for the quashal of the complaint
on the material ground that coverture was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt.

As wisely observed by respondent Judge in her August 11, 1976 denial order:

“x x x If
the prosecution can be allowed to rectify a mistake pointed out in a demurrer
to the evidence, what will be the court’s reason to deny him a second or a
third or a fourth reopening ad nauseam to rectify succeeding
mistakes should the first reopening not serve the purpose?  It is obvious that a reopening of the case to
allow the intro­duction of additional evidence would be prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the accused.”^[7]

Moreover, records show that petitioner had already consumed a
great deal of the court’s time, or about three (3) years and five (5) months,
and presented eight (8) witnesses, and that it was only after nine (9) months
from the date private respondents filed their separate demurrer to evidence
that Litton’s private prosecutor underwent a change of heart, or to be more
accurate, a change of strategy in order to salvage what appeared to be a weak
case for George Litton, Sr.

The question may be asked: 
what would prevent the prosecution from switching lawyers everytime it wants to upgrade its evidence in the guise of
additional documents or new witnesses to be introduced.  And in the meantime, the fundamental right of
the accused to a speedy trial is gravely imperilled.  It is rather unfortunate that for more than
ten (10) years, this case has remained unresolved because of a procedural
impasse, which has placed the rights of the affected parties in a state of
suspended animation.  It is imperative
that proceedings in the main be resumed in the lower court with the least
delay.

All considered, we hold that there was no abuse of discretion on
the part of respondent Judge to warrant the corrective writ of certiorari.

WHEREFORE, the questioned orders of August 11, 1976 and October 12, 1976 denying the motion to reopen trial in
Criminal Case No. 7394 are hereby AFFIRMED. 
Respondent trial court is directed to give priority to the final
resolution of this case.  This decision
is immediately executory.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr., and
Romero, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Criminal Case No. 7394.

^[2]
Annexes B and C, Rollo, pp. 26-35, 35-79.

^[3] Rollo, pp. 227-228.

^[4] Rollo, pp. 228-229.

^[5]
Annex M, Rollo, pp. 275-276.

^[6] Alegre v. Reyes, G.R. No. 56923, May 9, 1988, 161
SCRA 226, 231, citing Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1979 Ed., Vol. 2,
pp. 212-213.

^[7] Rollo, p. 276.