JEREMIAS MONTEJO, PETITIONER VS. HON. DOMINGO CABANGON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE, CAR AND SOLEDAD NERONA, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Agrarian Relations (in CAR Case No. 47-Z-60) dated November
29, 1960, which, in part, reads:

“The petitioner Jeremias Montejo filed a case
praying that the respondents be directed to retain his as their tenant
on the land-holding in question described in the petition. He further
seeks that a judgment be rendered fixing the legal amount of rental for
the use and occupation of the landholding to six (6) cavans of palay
per annum, and that because he has paid an excess rental, he desires
that he be reimbursed 27 cavans which constituted the excess of the
amount of rental provided for by law. He alleges in his petition that
the contract of tenancy is one of leasehold system which has started
six (6) agricultural years ago, beginning with crop year 1954-1955
paying as rental the amount of 15 cavans, which he yearly delivered to
the respondents. Some’ time on April 2, 1960, after the petitioner has
delivered the rental for the recent agricultural crop, the respondents
served verbal notice to him that he surrender the landholding to the
former. He is capable of tilling the landholding in question, which is
second class riceland producing 25 cavans of palay for three
consecutive agricultural years preceding 1957-1958; 30 cavans for
agricultural year 1957-1958; 28 cavans for crop year 1958-1959 and 26
cavans cavans for 1959-1960. He alleges that six (6) cavans of palay
will be enough as rental consideration annually, instead of fifteen
(15) cavans. On the other hand, the respondents in their answer alleged
that the petitioner is not tenant at all of theirs, nor on the
landholding. They alleged that the petitioner never delivered to them
any rental consideration for the use of the landholding in question,
for he is not their tenant, but one Dionisio Merced, by name, who
succeeded their former tenant Amado Malay, beginning the crop year
1956-1957. The rental consideration for the use of the land which
Dionisio Merced agreed to pay them with, was 15 cavans of palay every
agricultural year. Their contract of leasehold tenancy with Dionisio
Merced was to terminate after the agricultural year 1959-1960, for they
wanted to till and cultivate the land by themselves.

“The
issue nrthe instant case narrows down to one proposition, and that is,
whether the petitioner is the tenant of the respondents on the parcel
of land in question; if in the affirmative, then the second issue will
be the reduction of the rental consideration.* * *

Then the trial court proceeded to analyze the evidence presented by
both of the parties and, after evaluating the same, it observed that
“the testimony of Jeremias Montejo is unnatural” and that his other
testimony that “he consistently delivered annually to Soledad Norona
the rental consideration when as a matter of truth this Soledad resided
in Manila” …”influences the Court to decline to believe him
(Montejo)”. As a result, the trial court ruled:

“WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered dismissing
the petition in the instant cases thus, finding that the petitioner
(Montejo) is no tenant of the respondents, nor on the landholding, but
Dionisio or Patricio Merced who may, if he so desires, remain as tenant
in the same landholding.”

Notified of this decision, petitioner, without taking any further
steps in the trial court, directly filed the present petition for
review on certiorari in this Court. The herein respondents, in their
answer, now urge the dismissal of the appeal, on the ground that the
same has not been perfected as required by law and the applicable rules.

The case has been submitted for decision on the petition and the
answer filed, the parties having filed no brief nor memorandum in lieu
of oral argument.

The petition should be dismissed. Section 13 of Republic Act No. 1267, as amended by Republic. Act No. 1409 (Sec. 8),^[1] and Section 1, Rule 44, of the Rules of Court, respectively, provide:

“SEC. 13. Review by the Supreme Court.—Appeal
may be taken from an order or decision of the Court of Agrarian
Relations promulgated under the provisions of this Act and review of
such order or decision may be obtained in the Supreme Court by filing
in such court within fifteen days from receipt of notice of such order
or decision a written petition- praying that it be modified or set
aside in whole or in part. The review by the court shall be limited to
questions of law, and findings of fact when the decision is not
supported by substantial evidence.”

“SECTION 1. How to perfect an appeal.—An
appeal by certiorari from an award, order or decision of the Court of
Industrial Relations, shall be perfected by filing with said court a
notice of appeal and with the Supreme Court a petition, for certiorari
against the adverse party within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
award, order or decision appealed from.” (This rule applies to appeals
from the Court of Agrarian Relations, per Resolution dated January 5,
1966, Supreme Court.)”

It appears on record that the decision in question was rendered on
November 29, 1960, of which petitioner was notified on December 15,
1960. From said decision, petitioner filed no notice of appeal in the
court below, as required under the above-quoted provision of the Rules
of Court, in order to perfect an appeal, but immediately and directly
presented his petition for review in this Court. As a consequence, no
appeal from said decision has been perfected. His failure to do so,
rendered said decision final and executory, and deprived this Court of
jurisdiction to entertain the present petition for review. As we had
occasion to say in a previous similar case^[2]

“From the above facts, it is quite evident that, as
pointed out by respondent Pineda, petitioners had failed to perfect
their appeal in accordance with law, first, by not filing the necessary
notice of appeal with the Agrarian Court, and second, by filing this
petition for certiorari beyond fifteen days from their receipt of copy
of the Court’s decision. * * * Needless to say, perfection of an appeal
in the manner and within the period laid down by law is not only
mandatory but jurisdictional, and failure to perfect an appeal as
legally required has the effect of rendering final and executory the
judgment of the court below and deprives the appellate court of
jurisdiction to entertain the appeal (Miranda vs. Guanzon, et al., 92
Phil., 163 48 Off. Gaz. No. 10, 4359; Garganta, et al., vs. C. A. 105
Phil., 412).”

Additionally, it may be stated that petitioner’s failure to file
with the court below a motion for reconsideration of its decision in
question, precluded him from questioning before us the findings of
respondent Judge. (See Tabiolo, 2 Caisip, et al. vs. Judge Cabangon,
et al., 109 Phil. 150. et al. vs. Marquez, G. R. JJOi L-7035, prom.
March 25, 1955.)^[3]

Even if we wish to consider the present petition as a special civil
action for certrioari, still it will be of no avail, as it fails to
satisfy the requirements of Section 1, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court.
No question of jurisdiction nor grave abuse of discretion is raised in
the present petition, but merely, an alleged “grogs error in holding
that it is not petitioner but Dionisio Merced who is tenant of the
landholding in question; that this finding is not substantially
supported by the evidence adduced in the case.” (See paragraph 6 of the
petition) And, certiorari will not lie where appeal is an adequate
remedy, even if the period for appeal has already elapsed (Yucuanseh
Drug Co. vs. Yu Siu tek, 101 Phil., 409.

Wherefore, the petition ifhereby dismissed, for lack of
jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the same. Petitioner being a
pauper, no cost will be taxed. So ordered.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Paredes, Dizon, and Regala, JJ., concur.

^[1] Effective September 9, 1955.

^[2]
Caisip, et al. vs. Judge Cabangon, et al., 109 Phil. 150.

^[3] See also Nicolas et al. vs.
Castillo, et al., 97 Phil., 336, citing: Herrera vs. Barretto, 25 Phil.
245; Uy Chu vs. Imperial, 44 Phil.,. 27, and other cases.