G.R. No. L-15044. May 30, 1960
[WITH RESOLUTION OF JULY 14, 1960]
BARRERA, J.:
Case No. 34566), in which it was ordered to refund to plaintiff Belman
Compañia Incorporada the amounts of P273.41 and P172.87, with legal
interest from the date the complaint was filed until fully paid, and
the amount of P250.00 as attorney’s fees, and to pay costs, defendant
Central Bank of the Philippines interposed this appeal.
Two issues both legal, are presented in this appeal; (a) whether the action has already prescribed, and (b)
whether defendant Central Bank can be compelled to make the refund
after the amounts involved had already been turned over to the National
Treasury of the Government. We take up only the first question because
it is decisive.
On April 26, 1951 and May 4, 1951, plaintiff
paid to the Philippine National Bank its obligations for foreign
exchange obtained under Credits Nos. 43729 (PNB I/B 36747) and 41347
(PNB I/B 37605), respectively. On the same dates, defendant Central
Bank collected from plaintiff, as exchange tax,[1]
the amounts of P273.41 (CBP O. R. No. 002801 dated April 26, (1951) and
P172.87 (CBP O. R. No. 002928 dated May 4, 1951) Plaintiff paid said
amounts to defendant, under protest.
On November 8, 1951,
plaintiff requested defendant to refund to it both amounts, but
defendant refused to do so. Plaintiff reiterated said request for the
refund of P273.41 on September 2, 1957, and of P172.87 on October 7,
1957; and for both amounts, on December 2, 1957. Defendant, however,
likewise refused to comply with plaintiff’s request[2].
Plaintiff, therefore, on December 20, 1957, filed with the above-mentioned court a complaint praying, inter alia,
that defendant’s Monetary Board Resolution No. 286, series of 1951, be
declared null and void, and that defendant be ordered to refund to
plaintiff said amounts of P273.41 and P172.87 it paid as exchange tax.
On January 3, 1958, defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds
that (1) the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action; (2) the complaint states no cause of action; and (3) the cause
of action, if any, is barred by the statute of limitations. On January
10, 1958, plaintiff filed an opposition to said motion, to which,
defendant filed a reply on January 17, 1958.
On April 7,
1958, the court issued an order holding in abeyance its resolution on
defendant’s motion to dismiss, until after the parties shall have
presented their evidence.
On April 11, 1958, defendant filed its answer reiterating as defenses, the grounds alleged in its motion to dismiss.
After the issues have been joined and due hearing had, the lower court
rendered a, decision which, in pertinent part, reads:
* * * * * * *
“Defendant’s
collection of the Exchange Tax on April 26, 1951 and May 4, 1951, when
plaintiff paid its obligations under Credits Nos. 43729 and No. 41347
is erroneous and without any legal basis because the plaintiff on these
dates did not purchase any foreign exchange from the Bank but merely
liquidated its existing accounts under the Credits. The sale of foreign
exchange in the present case took place at the moment when the
applications for Letters of Credit were approved and given due course
that is, on May 29, 1950 and January 2, 1951, at which time, Republic
Act 601 imposing a tax on the sale of Foreign Exchange was not, as yet,
in existence.* * * * * * *
“Under
these circumstances, and considering the fact that the amount of
P273.41 under Official Receipt No. 002801 was collected by the
defendant seven (7) days (April 26, 1951) before Resolution No. 286 was
approved on May 3, 1951, the conclusion is inescapable that Central
Bank Resolution No. 286 is null and void not only because it has not
been published as required by law in the Official Gazette, but as
admitted by the defendant itself under oath in par. XV of Exhibit ‘B’,
the same is erroneous interpretation of Section 1 of Republic Act 601.“The
present suit is directed against the Central Bank, a corporation duly
authorized by its Charter to sue and be sued. Resolution No. 286 was
issued by the Central Bank and the defendant cannot now be permitted to
claim exemption from the consequences of an illegal resolution of its
own making.“There is nothing to the contention that
plaintiff’s action has prescribed, because no vested or acquired rights
can arise from acts or omissions which are against the law or which
infringe upon the rights of others. (Art. 2254, New Civil Code).“In
View of the Foregoing Considerations, this Court hereby renders
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant declaring
Central Bank Resolution No. 286 illegal and void ab initio.
Defendant is hereby ordered to return to the plaintiff the sums of
P273.41 and P172.87 with legal interests thereon from the date of the
filing of the complaint until fully paid and the amount of P250.00 as
attorney’s fees. Defendant shall pay the costs.”
Defendant-appellant urges in this appeal that the lower court erred in
not dismissing plaintiff-appellee’s complaint on the ground that it has
prescribed.
The contention is correct. It is to be noted
that the excise tax law (Rep. Act No. 601, contain no provision
regarding the period within which a taxpayer must bring his action to
recover an excise tax erroneously or illegally collected. Accordingly,
Articles 18 and 1149 of the New Civil Code, should be applied in order
to determine said period. The articles referred to, respectively,
provide:
“Art. 18. In
matters which cure governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws,
their deficiency shall be governed by the provisions of this Code.” (Emphasis supplied.).“Art. 1149. All
other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws
must be brought within five years from the time the right of action
accrues.” (Id.)
It is not disputed that under the doctrine laid down in the cases of Philippine National Bank vs. Zulueta, 101 Phil., 1071; 55 Off. Gaz. (2) 222; Philippine National Bank vs. Union Books, Incorporated, 101 Phil., 1084; and Philippine National Bank vs. Arrozal, 103 Phil., 213; 54 Off. Gaz. (21) 5698,[3]
said amounts of P273.41 and P172.87, were erroneously or illegally
collected by defendant from plaintiff inasmuch as the latter had
applied for the letters of credit (Nos. 41347 and 43729) with the PNB,
on May 29, 1950 and December 28, 1950, long before the enactment of
Republic Act No. 601 on March 28, 1951, imposing the excise tax on the
purchase on foreign exchange. Pursuant to Article 1149 of the New Civil
Code above-quoted, plaintiff’s right of action to reCover the
aforementioned amounts should have prescribed on April 26, 1956 (as to
the P273.41) and May 4, 1956 (as to the P172.87).
However,
it appears that on November 8, 1951, plaintiff requested defendant, in
writing, to refund to it said amounts. Pursuant to Article 1155 of the
New Civil Code,[4] the
five-year period is interrupted and should start to be counted again
from November 8, 1951. Thus computed, the right of action should expire
on November 11, 1956. Since the complaint was filed only on December
20, 1957, the action is clearly barred. It is true that other
extrajudicial written requests or demands were made on September 2,
1957 and October 7, 1957, and lastly on December 2, 1957, but all of
these came after the period had already prescribed, as stated, on
November 11, 1956.
Article 2254 of the new Civil Code which
provides that “No vested or acquired right can arise from acts or
omissions which are against the law or which infringe upon the rights
of others”, and which was cited by the lower court as authority for its
conclusion that plaintiff’s action has not prescribed, is inapplicable.
This article is among the transitional provisions of the New Civil
Code. It must be read in relation to, and within the context of Article
2252 which speaks of “Changes made and new provisions and rules laid
down by this Code which may prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the old legislation” which changes shall have
no retroactive effect. The second paragraph of Article 2252 reads:
“For the determination of the applicable law in
cases which are not specified elsewhere in this Code, the following
articles shall be observed:”
And, one of these “following articles”, is Article 2254 cited by the lower court.
Here in the instant case, all the pertinent facts occurred after the
effectivity of the New Civil Code. There is, therefore, no reason to
apply Article 2254, especially so, when no vested or acquired right is
being here asserted by defendant Central Bank, the only question being,
whether the right of plaintiff to bring the action had already
prescribed.
In view of the conclusion at which we have
arrived, we find no necessity in taking up the other questions raised
in this appeal.
Wherefore the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, with costs against the appellee. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., on leave, took no part.
[1] Pursuant to its Monetary Board Resolution No. 286, series of 1951.
[2]
All said requests for refund, were in writing.[3] See also Belman compania Incorporada vs. Central Bank 104 Phil., 877; 55 Off. Gaz. (33) 6665.
[4]
“Art. 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are
filed before the court, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by
the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt
by the debtor.
R E S O L U T I O N
July 14, 1960
BARRERA, J.:
In the decision of this Court promulgated May 30, 1960, we held that
plaintiff-appellee’s action for the refund of payments made on April 26
and May 4, 1951 for exchange tax, filed and instituted on December 20,
1957, had already prescribed and, consequently, we reversed the lower
court’s decision directing the refund, with costs against the appellee.
Plaintiff-appellee has filed a motion for, reconsideration urging that
his action was still timely because, it is argued, the period of
prescription applicable to the case is ten (10) years from date of
payment. To support this contention, Article 1144, paragraph (2) is
cited, which provides:
“Article 1144.—The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:
(1) * * *;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;”
Since, it is claimed, the payment here was made by reason of a mistake
in the interpretation of Republic Act 601, the obligation to return
arises by virtue of Article 2155, in relation to Article 2154 of the
New Civil Code and is, therefore, one created by law.
Movant-appellee is partly correct. However, Articles 2154 and 2155
relied upon, specifically refer to obligations of the nature of solutio indebiti
which are expressly classified as quasi-contracts under Section 2,
Chapter 1 of Title XVII of the New Civil Code. Consequently, the law
regarding prescription applicable to the action herein involved is not
Article 1144-(2) cited by movant, but Article 1145(2) of the New Civil
Code providing:
“Article 1145.—The following actions must be commenced within six years:
(1) * * *;
(2) Upon a quasi-contract.”
In this case, the first payment was made on April 26, 1951.
Extrajudicial written demand for refund was made on November 8, 1951
(after a lapse of 6 months and 12 days). The demand was denied November
14, 1951. The second demand was on September 2, 1957, or after a lapse
of 5 years, 9 months and 18 days from November 14, 1951. Granting the
interruption provided in Article 1155,[1]
the period or prescription that had elapse totals to 6 years and 4
months. Consequently, the complaint filed on December 20, 1957 is
clearly barred.
The second payment was made on May 4, 1951.
From said date to November 8, 1951, when the first demand was made, 6
months and 4 days had elapsed. From November 14, 1951 (date of denial
of the demand) to October 7, 1957 when the second demand on this
payment was made, 5 years, 10 months and 23 days had elapsed. Adding up
the two periods will sum up to 6 years, 4 months and 27 days. Again,
the complaint based on the second payment is beyond the six (6) years
provided for the prescription of this kind of action.
The
plea is made that inasmuch as the collection of the Exchange tax by the
defendant was clearly illegal or erroneous, movant should not be made
to pay the costs for filing the case for the refund of the payments
made. This would be true if the action was timely instituted before it
was barred by the statute of limitations. But if, as in this case,
plaintiff files its claim after it has already been lost and;
therefore, had no longer any enforceable cause of action against the
defendant, certainly the latter is entitled to have his costs.
For the reasons above set forth, the motion for reconsideration is denied. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
[1]
“Art. 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are
filed before the Court, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by
the creditors, and when there is any written, acknowledgment of the
debt by the debtor.”