SPS. RENANTE & MARGIE JUAREZ, PETITIONERS, VS. EMELIE Y. CABIGON, RESPONDENT.
INGLES, G. T., J.:
This a petition filed under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to review the Decision1 dated 12 November 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Br. 29, Toledo City in Civil Case No. T-2503 (Civil Case No. 1136), the fallo of which reads,
“WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Toledo City dated April 12, 2012 is affirmed in toto.
With costs against defendant-appellants.
Upon finality of this Decision, return the record of this case to the court a quo for the execution of the Decision.
SO ORDERED.”
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
On 16 December 2010, Emelie Y. Cabigon filed a complaint[2] for “Enforcement of Amicable Settlement, Attorney’s Fees and Damages” against the Sps. Renante Juarez & Margie Juarez docketed as Civil Case No. 1136 with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Toledo City.
In the complaint, Emelie Y. Cabigon alleged in the main that Margie Juarez borrowed money from her in the amount of P400,000.00 and which was used for the benefit and advantage of the Sps. Juarez and their family. Margie Juarez failed to pay her obligation prompting her to bring the matter before the Office of the Barangay Chairman of Poblacion, Toledo City for conciliation and mediation proceedings. On 10 March 2010, the parties agreed to settle amicably.[3] The full text of the amicable settlement denominated as “Malinawon nga Kasabutan” reads,
“Kami, magsusumbong/mga magsusumbong ug Sinumbong/mga Sinumbong sa Kaso nga nahitala sa itaas, nagkanayon dinhi sa paghusay sa nagsunog nga paagi:
Nagkasinabot ug nagkauyon sila Mrs. Margie Juarez ug Mrs. Emelie Cabigon mahitungod sa kwarta nga nagamit ni Margie Juarez ngadto kang Emelie Cabigon nga nagkantidad ug P400,00.00 nga iyang bayran pinaagi sa data data ug tag P30.000.00 matag bulan every 30th of the month, ug magsugod siya karong bulan sa Mayo 2010 hangtud sa pagkaimpas, ug kini iyang pagaimpason sa bulan sa December 2010. Ug sa panahon nga siya makapalta sa pagbayad and total amount iyang pagabayran ug full payment sa pagkasunod bulan.
Kini among pagapirmahan alang sa kalig-onan sa atubangan sa imbistigador.
Ug magbugkos sa among kaugalingon ligdong ug tiunay nga sa mga kundisyon sa kasabutan sa itaas.
Gikauyonan niining ika- 10th nga adlaw sa March 2010.
Magsusumbong/Mga Magsusumbong
Sgd. EMELIE CABIGONSinumbong/Mga Sinumbong
Sgd. MARGIE JIMENEZPAGMATUOD
Ako nagamatuod nga ang nag-unang malinawon nga kasabutan gawasnong gikauyonan ug nahimo sa kaugalingong kabubut-on sa masig ka bahin human nako pasabta sila sa kinaiya sa nga sangputan sa maong kasabutan.
Sgd.Hon. MANUEL D. BARCENAS
Barangay Captain
In their Answer,[4] Sps. Juarez alleged that the controversy arose from the two (2) checks issued to Margie Juarez by two of her customers, and which checks she transacted with Emelie Cabigon for discounting. One check was for P110,000.00 and the other was for P135,000.00. From this transaction, Emelie Cabigon earned P4,700.00 which is two percent (2%) of the total amount of the the two (2) checks. The checks bounced. Margie Juarez, upon request by Emelie Cabigon and believing that she would be paid by her customers, issued a check for P235,000.00. But the customers who Margie Juarez was expecting to pay her have already left the country. Margie Juarez then made arrangement with Emelie Cabigon to have her obligation converted to a loan obligation payable in installment. Margie Juarez has already paid a total of P94,000.00. However, upon learning that Renante Juarez was not able to go abroad to work as contract worker, Emelie Cabigon filed a complaint before the barangay. It was at that stage that the subject amicable settlement “Malinawon na Kasulatan” was executed.
The Sps. Juarez further alleged that it was Emelie Cabigon who “suggested” that the payment already made by Margie Juarez be considered as interest and that the amicable settlement should be executed, or else, Margie Juarez would be facing a criminal complaint for estafa. Margie Juarez signed the amicable settlement but this does not make the said settlement altogether valid since in every contract existing laws are deemed incorporated therein. They pointed out that the balance of Margie Juarez’s obligation is only P141,000.00, that is, P235,000.00 (principal obligation) less P94,000.00 (payment made) but in the amicable settlement it ballooned to P400,000.00. This is unconscionable, against public policy, order, customs, and morals. By operation of law, the amicable settlement cannot be made as basis of a judicial action it being illegal per se. In fine, the said amicable settlement produced no legal effect.
The MTCC translated the pertinent portion of the subject amicable settlement as follows:
“Mrs. Margie Juarez and Mrs. Emelie Cabigon agreed and settle the issue relating to the money that was borrowed by Margie Juarez from Emilie Cabigon which is to be paid by installment at P30,000.00 per [30th ] day of the month and she will start paying in the month of May 2010. And in case of default in any installment the total amount will become due and demandable in the succeeding month.”[5]
The MTCC did not believe the version of the Sps. Jaurez, and accordingly, directed the enforcement of the amicable settlement executed between Emelie Cabigon and Margie Juarez.
THE RULING[6] OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against defendants directing the enforcement of the Amicable Settlement denominated “Malinawong Kasabutan”, thereby holding defendants liable to plaintiff the amount of P400,000.00 provided for therein.
All other claims and counterclaims are ordered DISMISSED.
Costs against defendants.
SO DECIDED.”[7]
In ruling in favor of Emelie Cabigon, the MTCC ratiocinated, that,
“What defendants presented was nothing but defendant Margie Juarez’ own testimony, which is naturally self-serving she being herself one of the defendants. Not a single soul was ever presented to corroborate her assertions. True, she presented documentary exhibits, but the evidentiary value of these exhibits does not rise independently of her own testimony but depends precariously upon it. Take for instance her claim that the original transaction was for the discounting of two (2) checks worth a total of P235,000.00. An examination of Exh. “1”, the check for P110,000.00 payable to defendant (the other check was not marked as evidence and was never presented) does not shown any indication at all that plaintiff had in whatever manner ever possessed it. So the claim of defendant that such check was part of the consideration for the original settlement is not at all made more likely by the presentation of the check. If at all the presentation of the check only shows that defendant had possession of it, which is not unusual given the fact that she is its payee.
Another illustration why the corroborative value of her documents is insubstantial is that it only means that she has two (2) checks for a total amount of P235,000.00. Whether indeed these two (2) checks for P235,000.00 were the only ones subject of the original transaction as defendant Margie Juarez insists and not more for a higher amount is shown riskily only by her own testimony. It must be remembered that such is very material, for a higher amount would mean that the alleged interest is not as high as she claims it is and might render the subject transaction not usurious.
The alleged payments of defendants shown in Exh. “2” allegedly acknowledged by one Marife Rodriguez, who, so the defendant Margie Juarez claims, is the secretary of plaintiff, is also as good only as the said defendant’s own credibility as a witness.
Another thing that weighs heavily against the testimony of defendant Margie Juarez is the utter incredulity of her claim. Here she was, a wily businesswoman who earns by the hundreds of thousands for every single transaction, as shown by the checks she claims were issued to her by the person who contracted her services, and yet so dim-witted to agree to a transaction so blatantly unfavorable to her. Imagine, for an indebtedness that stood only at a measly P191,000.00 she agreed to pay P400,000.00. Can she therefore blame the Court, or anyone, for that matter, if it does not believe her?
True, plaintiff could have presented herself on rebuttal to deny said claims if defendant Margie Juarez’ claims were untrue. But can you blame a party if he finds no need to present additional evidence after he realizes that the evidence of his adversary were not enough to belie the presumption he enjoys? Besides, during the trial the plaintiff was in a hurry because she was to leave for abroad where she intended to stay for a while. Under the circumstances, the Court believes the failure of the plaintiff to present herself on rebuttal does not mean much and can be excused.
In retrospect, the Court believes the evidence presented by the defendants, for lack of corroboration and improbability, are not enough to debunk the very strong presumption that plaintiff has in her favor. Even if defendants’ claims were true, which cannot totally be discounted, defendant Margie Juarez only had herself to blame for inanely entering into such a glaringly disadvantageous settlement. She cannot expect the Court to come to her rescue every time she makes a bad bargain, especially the starkly foolish ones. Caveat emptor, so the Latin maxim goes. Buyers beware.
Another issue raised by defendants is whether the defendant husband Renante Juarez should be made liable also for the debt contracted solely by defendant wife Margie Juarez. Defendants contend that the former should not have been joined in the suit in the first place citing Art. 131(8) of the Civil Code providing that the joinder of the husband in all suits against the wife is not mandatory in cases where it is incidental to the business the wife is engaged in. The provision however makes it mandatory in all cases subject to the exceptions enumerated therein. Nothing in the provision however prohibits such joinder. In such a case, the joinder, because it is not mandatory, is left to the discretion of plaintiff.
But the law in force now is no longer the Civil Code because its pertinent provisions have been repealed by the provisions of the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209). Under the latter law, the matter of joinder is no longer provided for. The apparent reason is because, under the previous law, the husband was, subject to some exceptions, the legal administrator of the conjugal partnership and his joinder was necessary to bind the conjugal partnership assets in the suit. Such is no longer the case under the new law for the administration is, again subject to exceptions, already jointly exercised by both spouses, so the joinder is no longer necessary to bind the conjugal assets, which is not governed by the absolute community. What is patently clear is that under Art. 94 of the new law, the absolute community is liable for:
‘x x x x’
The absolute community therefore is liable for any amount that may be adjudged against the defendant wife in this suit under the provision quoted above even it is an obligation contracted by one spouse only. The consent of the other can be presumed by the fact that the wife freely engaged in her business and the other spouse’s failure to come to court and contest such liability. Nowhere in their Answer did the defendant husband make such assertion of said defense. Even if such consent were inexistent, still the common property is liable to the extent that the family may have have been benefited. Being a charge to the absolute community, the better rule is to adjudge the obligation against both spouses in line with the avowed objective of the Rules to simplify matters and avoid multiplicity of suits.”[8]
Dissatisfied, the Sps. Juarez appealed the MTCC decision to the Regional Trial Court.
The Regional Trial Court affirmed the MTCC decision.
THE RULING[9] OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
“x x x. This Court finds no reversible error in the subject Decision of the court a quo. Defendant-appellant Margie Juarez is an educated person and a contractor by profession. This Court does not believe that she was misled or forced to sign the “Malinawon nga Kasabutan” where her indebtedness was fixed at P400,000.00. As to how that indebtedness was incurred and how did it reach that amount is immaterial. Besides, as found by the court a quo the claim of defendant-appellant Margie that the two checks that bounced were the only cause of her obligation to plaintiff-appellee but charged with exorbitant interest was not supported by competent evidence. As already stated, the said ‘Malinawon Nga Kasabutan” constituted as a contract between them and it became final and executory and is tantamount to a final judgment of the court not having been judicially repudiated within ten days from date of execution.”[10]
Hence, this recourse, where the Sps. Juarez (petitioner-spouses hereinafter) allege that:
“The MTCC & RTC decisions are contrary to law and jurisprudence (Cuaton vs. Salud, G.R. No. 158382, January 27, 2004, as well as the evidence presented (List of Payments made by Juarez, Exh. “2”) and in violation of Arts. 113, 1358. 1405, 1956 and 1345, and Art. 1346 about Simulation of Contracts; also Art. 1370, all of the Civil Code. Plaintiff’s business being illegal she cannot invoke affirmative remedies, if both parties are in pari delicto, Art. 1411.
The ‘Malinawon Nga Kasabutan’ which clearly falls under Art. 1409 is void & inexistent which the MTCC & RTC decisions miserably failed to see.”
THE ARGUMENTS
The Petitioners’
That, the subject amicable settlement is void ab initio on the following reasons,
One, the settlement does not mention of any interest.
Two, the settlement does not contain the true intention of the parties.
Three, petitioner Margie Juarez was forced to sign the settlement for fear that a case for estafa would be filed against her. Elsewise stated, intimidation vitiated her consent.
Four, the settlement is inexistent and void for being contrary to morals and public policy.
Five, the settlement is founded upon another cause, that is, the interest imposed on the remaining obligation and which was not expressly agreed upon, hence, inexistent and unlawful.
Six, respondent Cabigon did not come to court with clean hands because the true intention of the parties was concealed.
On these considerations, Article 1412 of the Civil Code is applicable. In conclusion, Article 1370 of the Civil Code provides that “if the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail over the former.”
THE RESPONDENT’S
The subject settlement executed before the barangay has become a final judgment after the petitioner-spouses failed to repudiate the same within the period provided by law. To raise evidentiary matters at this stage is not within the province of a petition for review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
If the petitioner-spouses really believe that petitioner Margie Juarez was misled or forced to sign the subject settlement then their recourse should have been via Rule 38 of the Rules.
What is more, the subject amicable settlement is valid and enforceable under the Local Government Code, specifically Sections 416, 417 and 418 thereof.
THE ISSUE
At the core of the controversy is the issue of whether the subject amicable settlement is valid, thus, enforceable against the petitioner-spouses.
OUR RULING
The petition lacks merit.
What we have before us is the amicable settlement denominated as “Malinawon nga Kasabutan” entered into by the respondent and petitioner Margie Juarez before the barangay, the translation of the pertinent portion, reads,
“Mrs. Margie Juarez and Mrs. Emelie Cabigon agreed and settle the issue relating to the money that was borrowed by Margie Juarez from Emilie Cabigon which is to be paid by installment at P30,000.00 per [30th ] day of the month and she will start paying in the month of May 2010. And in case of default in any installment the total amount will become due and demandable in the succeeding month.”[11]
The petitioner-spouses insist that the said settlement is void ab initio primarily on the following grounds: (1) usurious hidden interest; and (2) does not reflect the true intention of the parties, hence, has no force and effect. On the other hand, the respondent insists that it has the effect of res judicata as the same was reached after the conciliation proceedings before the barangay.
To start off. Instructive on the matter re: amicable settlements executed before the barangay is the case of Chavez v. Trillana,[12] viz –
Indeed, the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides that an amicable settlement reached after barangay conciliation proceedings has the force and effect of a final judgment of a court if not repudiated or a petition to nullify the same is filed before the proper city or municipal court within ten (10) days from its date. It further provides that the settlement may be enforced by execution by the lupong tagapamayapa within six (6) months from its date, or by action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond the six-month period. This special provision follows the general precept enunciated in Article 2037 of the Civil Code, viz.:
A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.
Thus, we have held that a compromise agreement which is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs is a valid contract which is the law between the parties themselves. It has upon them the effect and authority of res judicata even if not judicially approved, and cannot be lightly set aside or disturbed except for vices of consent and forgery.
After a judicious consideration of the arguments and contentions of the parties, we find the subject amicable settlement valid and enforceable.
Re: amicable settlement has the force and
effect of law between the parties
As explained in Central Cement Corp. v. Mines Adjudication Board, etc.,[13] thus –
Article 2028 of the Civil Code spells out the nature of a compromise as a contrac
t whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. Parties to a compromise are motivated by the hope of gaining, balanced by the dangers of losing. It contemplates mutual concessions and mutual gains to avoid the expenses of litigation, or, when litigation has already begun, to end it because of the uncertainty of the result.
As a contract, a compromise agreement must comply with the following basic elements: (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and (3) cause of the obligation which is established.
In this instance, all the elements are present.
For one. Based on the subject amicable settlement, there is no doubt that there was meeting of the minds between the respondent and petitioner Margie Juarez when they executed the subject amicable settlement whereby petitioner Margie Juarez undertook to pay the respondent the amount of P400,000.00, payable in monthly installment of P30,000.00. Now that the respondent is seeking to enforce the subject amicable settlement, the petitioner-spouses are alleging petitioner Margie Juarez’ consent was obtained thru intimidation.
We are not persuaded.
So basic is the rule that allegation of force, intimidation, undue influence, or violence must be substantiated with clear, convincing evidence. Allegation without anything more to it is simply, and will always remain to be, an allegation. And whoever alleges it is burdened to prove the same. The petitioner-spouses in this case contritely failed to substantiate with sufficient evidence their claim that petitioner Margie Juarez was intimidated upon to sign the subject amicable settlement.
Too, the petitioner-spouses should not forget that the subject amicable settlement was executed and signed after the conclusion of the barangay conciliation proceedings and within the presence of the barangay chairperson. Under the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, petitioner Margie Juarez had ten (10) days from the date of the subject amicable settlement within which to repudiate the same by filing a petition therefor before the appropriate municipal trial court. But she did not; for reasons only known to her.
What is more, petitioner Margie Juarez is a businesswoman. Based on her allegations, her business may not be considered small-time as it would involve payments of not less than a hundred thousand pesos. As a businesswoman, it is unlikely that petitioner Margie Juarez would just sign any document without apprising herself of its contents and its consequences upon signing it.
As correctly observed by the RTC, viz –
“x x x. Defendant-appellant Margie Juarez is an educated person and a contractor by profession. This Court does not believe that she was misled or forced to sign the “Malinawon nga Kasabutan” where her indebtedness was fixed at P400,000.00. As to how that indebtedness was incurred and how did it reach that amount is immaterial. Besides, as found by the court a quo the claim of defendant-appellant Margie that the two checks that bounced were the only cause of her obligation to plaintiff-appellee but charged with exorbitant interest was not supported by competent evidence. As already stated, the said ‘Malinawon Nga Kasabutan” constituted as a contract between them and it became final and executory and is tantamount to a final judgment of the court not having been judicially repudiated within ten days from date of execution.”
The presumption that any person “is presumed to take ordinary care of his concerns; that the private transaction was fair and regular; that the ordinary course of business has been followed; and that [x x x] intended the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act”,[14] though, admits of an exception, that is, “when one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a language not understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former.”[15] This exception is not applicable in the present case.
Nevertheless, granting arguendo that the respondent really made such threat to petitioner Margie Juarez, the same is not the intimidation referred to by law. Thus –
“For intimidation to vitiate consent, the following requisites must be present: (1) that the intimidation caused the consent to be given; (2) that the threatened act be unjust or unlawful; (3) that the threat be real or serious, there being evident disproportion between the evil and the resistance which all men can offer, leading to the choice of doing the act which is forced on the person to do as the lesser evil; and (4) that it produces a well-grounded fear from the fact that the person from whom it comes has the necessary means or ability to inflict the threatened injury to his person or property.”[16]
Applying the foregoing to the case before us, the filing of a estafa case is not considered unjust or unlawful as it is just one of the reliefs available to the respondent in order to collect petitioner Margie Juarez’ debt which according to the latter was initially secured by the two (2) checks issued by her customers that bounced and then by a personal check. If petitioner Margie Juarez’ refusal to sign the subject amicable settlement would result to the filing of a case against her, would it not be more beneficial to her since she would have the opportunity to prove her claim that her obligation with the respondent is much less than what the latter is asking for or that the interest she claims to have been added to the principal obligation is unconscionable and usurious? To add, if the respondent would file a case against petitioner Margie Juarez, would this give power to the respondent over her or put her under the respondent’s control? Definitely, it would not. In other words, there is nothing from this alleged threat that would engender a well-grounded fear of imminent and serious injury to person or property of petitioner Margie Juarez to destroy her volition and restraint her free will during the execution of the subject amicable settlement. “The last paragraph of Article 1335 of the New Civil Code states that a threat to enforce one’s claim, through competent authority, if the claim is just or legal, does not vitiate consent.”[17]
More importantly, if, indeed, petitioner Margie Juarez was forced to sign the subject amicable settlement she should have, within the period provided for in the Revised Katarungang Pambararangay Law, repudiated the same via a petition with the proper court. As earlier discussed, petitioner Margie Juarez did not. Thus, she is now estopped from challenging the validity of the subject amicable settlement. Under the doctrine of estoppel, “whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing to be true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it.”[18] Relatedly,
“The essential elements of estoppel are: (1) conduct amounting to false representation or concealment of material facts or at least calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; (2) intent, or at least expectation, that this conduct shall be acted upon by, or at least influence, the other party; and, (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts.”[19]
In this instance, it is undisputed that petitioner Margie Juarez had in fact signed the subject amicable settlement on 10 March 2010 and the barangay captain of Barangay Poblacion, Toledo City, served as witness to its execution, knowing fully well the nature of the settlement she was entering into.
By and large, petitioner Margie Juarez’ omission to repudiate the subject amicable settlement within the period provided for by law is, in effect, tantamount to her ratification of the provisions therein and renunciation of her right to interpose the defense of intimidation offered to her by our laws.
For another. The object of the subject amicable settlement is to settle the obligation of petitioner Margie Juarez with the respondent without resort to the court.
And for another. The consideration of the subject amicable settlement is P400,000.00.
The petitioner-spouses contend that they originally owed the respondent P235,000.00; less the the payments already made, left a balance of P141,000.00. They continued that their obligation ballooned to P400,00.00 because the respondent, instead of deducting from the principal obligation the payments already made, added these payments to the remaining obligation as interest plus another round of interest at a usurious, unconscionable rate. That, on this circumstance, alone, the consideration stipulated in the subject amicable settlement void ab initio for being contrary to morals and public policy, hence, cannot serve as consideration under the law.
Again, we are not swayed by the petitioner-spouses’ contention.
Aside from the self-serving declaration of petitioner Margie Juarez, nary any evidence was proffered to substantiate the petitioner-spouses’ allegation that the respondent suggested to her that the payments she made be converted as interest on the principal obligation. In fact, the pertinent portion of the subject amicable settlement does not say anything about interest to be imposed on the remaining balance of the principal obligation.
Moreover, by the express terms of the subject amicable settlement, petitioner Margie Juarez bound herself to the consideration stipulated therein. If she really wanted to, petitioner Margie Juarez could have suggested that the settlement amount be broken down or made more detailed before she signed it. She did not explain why she did not make such a suggestion when she could have. In fact, there is nothing in the records to even suggest that she was prevented from doing so.
| Re: | petitioner Renante’s liability under the subject amicable settlement |
It is worthy to note that in the complaint, the respondent alleged that the proceeds of the loan obtained by petitioner Margie Juarez redounded to the benefit of the latter’s family. To this, the petitioner-spouses counters that the money was used in petitioner Margie Juarez’ business.
The petitioner-spouses’ argument is specious.
Onset, the loan is a personal one. Whether the proceeds thereof were used solely for the business of petitioner Margie Juarez is of no moment because what is important is that the proceeds will certainly redound to the benefit of her family. Instructive on this matter is Ayala Investment & Devt. Corp. v. CA,[20] wherein the Supreme Court made the following conclusions vis-a-vis its earlier rulings in the cases cited by the parties therein, viz –
(A) (B)
From the foregoing disquisitions, we find that the decisions subject of our review are in accordance with the law and the facts of the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, the Decision dated 12 November 2012 of the Regional Trial Court , 7th Judicial Region, Br. 29, Toledo City in Civil Case No. T-2503, which affirmed in toto the decision dated 12 April 2012 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Toledo City, is, as it is hereby, AFFIRMED.
With the costs against Spouses Renante and Margie Juarez.
SO ORDERED.
Lagura-Yap, M.B., and Lopez, J.Y., JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 15-18.
[2] Rollo, pp. 34-37.
[3] Rollo, p. 3.
[4] Rollo, pp. 39-43.
[5] On the first page of the MTCC decision, Rollo, p. 29.
[6] Rollo, pp. 29-33.
[7] Rollo, p. 33.
[8] Rollo, pp. 31-33.
[9] Rollo, pp. 15-18.
[10] Rollo, p. 18.
[11] On the first page of the MTCC decision, Rollo, p. 29.
[12 ]Teodoro I. Chavez v. Hon. Court of Appeals and Jacinto S. Trillana, G.R. No. 159411, March 18, 2005.
[13] Central Cement Corporation (now Union Cement Corporation) v. Mines Adjudication Board and Rock & Ore Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 173562, January 22, 2008.
[14] Berman Memorial Park, Inc.,* et. al. v. Francisco Cheng, G.R. No. 154630, May 6, 2005. (In substitution of Iloilo Memorial Park. [x x x ])
[15] Article 1332 of the New Civil Code.
[16] St. Michael Academy, et. al. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et. al., G.R. No. 119512, July 13, 1998. Citing Guatson International Travel and Tours, Inc. v. NLRC, 230 SCRA 815 [1994].
[17] Development Bank of the Philippines v. Bonita O. Perez and Alfredo Perez, G.R. No. 148541. November 11, 2004.
[18] Section 2 (a), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.
[19] Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 367 Phil. 508 (1999).
[20] Ayala Investment & Development Corporation and Abelardo Magsajo v. Court of Appeals and Spouses Alfredo & Encarnacion Ching, G.R. No. 118305, February 12, 1998.