IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF TAN TEN KOC TO BE ADMITTED CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. TAN TEN KOC, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR AND APPE…

This is an appeal taken by the Solicitor General from the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Samar granting the petition of Tan
Ten Koc to be admitted a citizen of the Philippines.

The evidence adduced by petitioner’s testimony in the court below tends to show the following:

Petitioner Tan Ten Koc is a Chinese citizen. He came to the
Philippines in 1927 and landed in Manila. After two weeks stay in the
city, he proceeded to Catbalogan, Samar where he has been residing
since then. Prior to 1945, he was employed as a salesman at the Tan
Jioco Store in Catbalogan, starting off with a salary of P40 a month,
gradually increasing until finally he was given P80.00 a month. In
1945, however, he established a store of his own in the same town.

It also appears from the evidence that in 1936, petitioner married
Tan Ting Chun, also a Chinese citizen, and out of their union were born
12 children, the oldest having been born on April 23, 1937, and the
youngest on February 4, 1960. All of petitioner’s children went to
schools recognized by the government, but two of them stopped schooling
because one got married and the other allegedly became sick.

Further, petitioner testified that during his stay in the
Philippines, he has not been convicted of any crime and that he has
conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner in Ms relations
with the constituted government as well as with the community in which
he is living; that he believes in the principles underlying the
Philippine Constitution; that he has mingled socially with the
Filipinos and has evinced a sincere desire to learn embrace their
customs, traditions and ideals; that he is not opposed to organized
governments; and that he does not believe, in polygamy and has only one
wife

In compliance with the requirements of the Naturalization Law, the
petitioner presented two witnesses testified as to his character and
eligibility for citizenship. After hearing, the lower court granted the
petition. In this appeal, the Solicitor General assigns the following
errors:

1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
   NOTICE AND PUBLICATION REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW HAS NOT BEEN COMPLIED
   WITH IN THE CASE AT BAR.
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT PETITIONER HAS NO LUCRATIVE OCCUPATION.
3. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT EXEMPTED FROM MAKING A DECLARATION OF INTENTION.

The record shows that notice of the petition for naturalization was
published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the “Nueva Era”.
But the Solicitor General contends that such a publication did not meet
the requirements of the Naturalization Law because the said newspaper
does not have a nationwide circulation, much less a general circulation
in Samar, considering that it is a Spanish newspaper.

Section 9 of Commonwealth Act 473 provides:

“‘Immediately upon the filing of the petition, it shall be the duty
oi the clerk of the court to publish the same at petitioner’s expense,
once a week for three consecutive weeks, m the Official Gazette, and in one of the newspapers of general circulation in the province where the petitioner resides,
and to have copies of said petition and a general notice of the hearing
posted in a public and conspicuous place in his office or in the
building where said office is located, setting forth in such notice the
name, birthplace and residence of the petitioner, the date and place of
his arrival in the Philippines, the names of the witnesses whom the
petitioner proposes to introduce in support of his petition, and the
date of the hearing of the petition, which hearing shall not be held
within the six months from the date of the last publication of the
notice, * * * (Italics supplied.).

The law requires that the newspaper in which the petition for
naturalization is to be published must be of general circulation in the
province where petitioner resides. While, in the instant case, there is
an affidavit executed by the Editor of the Nueva Era to the effect that
the said newspaper is of general circulation in the Philippines, this
statement is not sufficient proof that there has been compliance with
the law. Positive evidence must be presented to prove that the Nueva
Era is of general circulation in Samar, and it is incumbent upon
petitioner to present such evidence.

The purpose of the law in requiring publication of the notice is to
inform these officers and the public in general of the filing of such a
petition in order that the public officers and private citizens
supposed to be acquainted with the petitioner may furnish the Solicitor
General or the provincial fiscal with such necessary information and
evidence as there may be against the petitioner (Anti-Chinese League,
of the Phil, us. Alfonso Felix, etc., et al., G. R. No. L-998, February
20, 1947, 77 Phil. 1012). Considering then that the Nueva Era is
published in Spanish and not in English or in the dialect of Samar,
which are more commonly used in petitioner’s province of residence, and
that there has been no positive and direct proof that it is generally
circulated in said province, the publication made therein may not be
taken as having served the objecting of the law.

Anent the second error, there is no question that the annual income
of petitioner which amounts to only P4000 is not lucrative, with his
wife and twelve children to support. In an earlier case (Koa Gui vs.
Republic, G. R. No. L-13717, July 31, 1962), this Court did not
consider as sufficient annual income the amount of P5,980 where the
petitioner for naturalization was married with three children.

In his last assignment of errors, the Solicitor General questions
the propriety of petitioner’s exemption from making a declaration of
intention. Commonwealth Act 535, amending section 6 of the Revised
Naturalization Law, provides that persons born in the Philippines who
have received primary and secondary education and resided here for
thirty years need not file a declaration of intention to become
citizens in order to be eligible for naturalization. The said residence
requirement, however, must be construed in conjunction with another
requirement that petitioner must have given primary and secondary
education to all his children in schools recognized by the
government. (Sec. 1, Commonwealth Act 525) It has been held that this
wise and farsighted provision of the Naturalization Law is one of the
tests of applicant’s bona fide intention to become a citizen.
It is to forestall and prevent aliens and their minor children from
becoming citizens of this country without knowing its institutions and
the duties of citizenship that it entails (Kiap vs. Republic, 91 Phil.,
784).

Since two of petitioner’s children in the case at bar stopped
schooling, allegedly by reasons of marriage and illness, respectively,
and petitioner did not present satisfactory proof that it was
absolutely necessary for both their children to stop studying,
especially the one who got married, said petitioner should not have
been given the benefit of exemption, for failure to comply with the
requirements. In Lee Choo vs. Republic, 106 Phil, 755, where one of the
applicant’s children stopped studying, it was said: “The reason
advanced that she (the child) was not able to complete her studies
because she got married is not only unsatisfactory but betrays the
sincerity of petitioner in embracing our citizenship. (See also Yu Soon
Seng vs. Republic, 105 Phil., 558).

From the foregoing, it is thus evident that the lower court erred in granting Philippine citizenship to petitioner-appellee.

We have observed that some judges of the Courts of First Instance
seem to have not been following the repeated pronouncements of this
Court regarding application involving naturalization cases. It is well
to bear in mind that, as stated in several cases decided by this Court
as well as the U.S. Supreme Court, the right of an alien to become a
citizen by naturalization is a statutory one and therefore the
applicant must comply strictly with the requirements prescribed in the
statute.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed. Petition is dismissed, with costs against the petitioner-appellee.

Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepción, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., concur.