G.R. No. L-953. September 18, 1947
EL PUEBLO DE FILIPINAS, QUERELLANTE Y APELADO, CONTRA PEDRO MARCAIDA, ACUSADO Y APELANTE.
PABLO, J.:
por el delito de traicion, despues de la vista correspondiente, a la pena de
reclusion perpetua con las accesorias prescritas por la ley, y al pago de una
multa de P10,000 y las costas del juicio. El apelante seƱala tres errores en que
incurrio, segun el, el Tribunal del Pueblo. 1.Ā° Al declarar que la cuidadania y
lealtad del acusado estaban suficientemente probados; 2.Ā° Al dar credito al
testimonio de los testigos de la acusacion; y 3.Ā° Al declarar culpable al
acusado del cargo No. 3.
La defensa contiende que las pruebas obrantes en autos no prueban la
ciudadania filipina y alianza del acusado al gobierno del Commonwealth. La
transcripcion de las notas taquigraficas dice que el acusado es natural de Lopez
(a native of Lopez). La defensa alega que el testigo declaro en Tagalog
diciendo: “Taga Lopez” y no dijo “ay panganak sa Lopez.” No aparece tal cosa en
el expediente. Si fuese cierto, es extraƱo que el abogado no haya pedido al
Juzgado que ordenase al taquigrafo que hiciera constar asi en sus notas. Cuando
una parte no esta conforme con la traduccion de una declaracion de un testigo
debe pedir que se haga constar en autos no solamente la traduccion sino tambien
la declaracion original traducida; en su defecto, se presumira correcta la
traduccion del interprete oficial.
Pero aun admitiendoādice la defensaāque el acusado fuese natural de Lopez,
provincia de Quezon, su ciudadania filipina no esta debidamente probada. En
apoyo de esta contencion invoca el articulo IV de la Constitucion, que entro en
vigor el 15 de noviembre de 1935. (Articulo XVI, seccion 6, Constitucion.) La
vista de esta causa tuvo lugar el 15 de julio de 1946. Si el acusado ha nacido,
por ejemplo, un dia despues que entro en vigor la Constitucion, en el dia de la
vista no tendria mas que diez aƱos y ocho meses de edad, y entonces cometio el
delito a la edad de unos nueve aƱos. Aunque no consta en autos la fecha de su
nacimiento, estamos seguros sin embargo que no era un niƱo de tal edad cuando
entro en vista. No le hubiera querellado el fiscal de un delito tan grave.
Indudablemente, nacio antes y no despues de entrar en vigor la Constitucion. No
puede acogerse, por tanto, a sus disposiciones.
El articulo 2 de la Ley Jones aprobada por el Congreso el 29 de agosto de
1916, dispone asi: “Que todos los habitantes de las Islas Filipinas que el once
de abril de mil ochocientos noventa y nueve eran subditos espaƱoles y que a la
sazon residian en dichas Islas, y sus hijos nacidos con posterioridad a aquella
fecha, seran considerados y tenidos como ciudadanos de las Islas Filipinas,
exceptuandose a aquellos que hayan preferido conservar su lealtad a la Corona de
EspaƱa, de acuerdo con las disposiciones del Tratado de Paz entre los Estados
Unidos y EspaƱa, firmado en Paris el diez de diciembre de mil ochocientos
noventa y ocho, y con excepcion de aquellos otros que despues de dicha fecha se
hayan hecho ciudadanos de algun otro pais: * * *.”
El articulo 4 de la ley constitutiva de Filipinas de 1.Ā° de julio de 1902, es
del tenor siguiente: “Todos los habitantes de las Islas Filipinas que residan en
ellas y que el once de abril de mil ochocientos noventa y nueve eran subditos
espaƱoles residentes en dichas Islas y sus hijos nacidos con posterioridad a
aquella fecha, seran considerados y tenidos como ciudadanos de las Islas
Filipinas y como tales con derecho a la proteccion de los Estados Unidos,
exceptuandose aquellos que hayan elegido conservar su lealtad a la Corona de
EspaƱa, de acuerdo con las disposiciones del Tratado de Paz entre los Estados
Unidos y EspaƱa firmado en Paris el diez de diciembre de mil ochocientos noventa
y ocho.”
El acusado se llama Pedro Marcaida. Por su nombre y apellido, puede ser
filipino, espaƱol o sudamericano. No hay prueba de que era residente de
Filipinas y subdito espaƱol el 11 de abril de 1899. Si era residente y no era
subdito espaƱol no podia adquirir la ciudadania filipina porque continuaria
siendo extranjero.
Si era subdito espaƱol y residia en las Islas Filipinas el 11 de abril de
1899, automaticamente se hizo ciudadano fiilipino a menos que haya optado por
conservar la ciudadania espaƱola; pero como no hay pruebas en tal sentido, la
presuncion es que el es filipino.
Si nacio despues del 11 de abril de 1899 de padres que eran subditos
espaƱoles seguiria la nacionalidad de aquellos: espaƱol, si sus padres han
querido conservar su lealtad a la Corona de EspaƱa, y filipino, si optaron por
perderla. No hay prueba presentada en un sentido u otro: puede ser entonces
espaƱol o filipino.
Si nacio despues del 11 de abril de 1899 de padres filipinos es filipino.
Puede suceder que fuese descendiente de un sudamericano que se haya
establecido en la provincia de Quezon despues de la firma del Tratado de Paris;
si su padre no quiso acogerse a las disposiciones de la ley de naturalizacion,
entonces el acusado es extranjero: sigue la nacionalidad de su padre.
Si es descendiente de un ciudadano espaƱol que haya comenzado a residir en
Filipinas despues del Tratado de Paris, continuaria siendo espaƱol a menos que
se haya naturalizado. Tampoco hay pruebas en este sentido: entonces es espaƱol,
extranjero.
Paz Chua Uang por el mero hecho de haber nacido en Filipinas no fue declarada
filipina porque no era subdita espaƱola o hija de un subdito espaƱol el 11 de
abril de 1899. (Chua contra Secretario del Trabajo, 68 Phil., 649.) Esta
doctrina ha revocado implicitamente la de Roa contra Administrador
Insular de Aduanas (23 Jur. Fil., 321) y otras posteriores. (VaƱo contra
Administrador Insular de Aduanas, 23 Jur. Fil., 491; Estados Unidos
contra Ong Tianse, 29 Jur. Fil., 352; Estados Unidos contra Ang,
36 Jur. Fil., 915; Go Julian contra Gobierno de las Islas Filipinas, 45
Jur. Fil., 301; Haw contra Administrador Insular de Aduanas, 59 Jur.
Fil., 646.) En el asunto de Torres y Gallofin contra Tan Chim se adopto
otra vez la teoria sentada en el asunto de Roa, pero el Tribunal estaba dividido
en la proporcion de cuatro por tres. El actual Presidente del Tribunal y el
Magistrado Imperial eran disidentes. El magistrado Villareal opinaba que el
simple nacimiento en Filipinas no le hace a uno ciudadano filipino; pero
concurrio en la parte dispositiva porque la doctrina de Roa se estuvo aplicando
por mas de 20 aƱos. El principio de stare decisis es la razon principal
que movio a la mayoria a volver a adoptar la teoria de Roa. En su disidencia, el
actual Presidente del Tribunal decia:
“The majority says nothing in support of the correctness of the Roa ruling,
and seeks simply to justify its continued observance upon the fact that it ‘had
been adhered to and accepted for more than 20 years before the adoption of the
Constitution,’ and that ‘not only this Court but also inferior courts had
consistently and invariably followed it; the executive and administrative
agencies of the Government had theretofore abided by it; and the general public
had acquiesced in it.’ I do not yield to this judicial policy. If we induced the
Government and the public to follow and accept an error for some time, it does
not seem to be a good policy to continue inducing them to follow and accept the
same error once discovered. The rule of stare decisis does not apply to
the extent of perpetuating an error (15 C. J., p. 918.) It is the duty of every
court to examine its own decisions without fear and to revise them without
reluctance (Baker vs. Lorillard, 4 N. Y., 257.) As was well said in a
case, ‘I hold it to be the duty of this court freely to examine its own
decisions, and, when satisfied that it has fallen into a mistake, to correct the
error by overruling its own decision. An acknowledged error must be more
venerable and more inveterate than it can be made by any single decision before
it can claim impunity upon the principle of stare decisis.’ (Leavitt
vs. Blatchaford, 17 N. Y., 521, 523.) ‘Precedents are to be regarded as
the great storehouse of experience; not always to be followed, but to be looked
to as beacon lights in the progress of judicial investigation.’ (Per Bartley, C.
J., in Leavitt vs. Morrow, 6 Ohio St., 71, 78.) Their ‘authority must
often yield to the force of reason, and to the paramount demands of justice as
well as to the decencies of civilized society, and the law ought to speak with a
voice responsive to these demands.’ (Norton vs. Randolph, 176 Ala., 381,
383, 58 S. 283.)” (Torres y Gallofin contra Tan Chim, 69 Phil.,
518.)
En los asuntos de Tan Chong contra Secretario del Trabajo, p. 249,
ante, y Lam Swee Sang contra Commonwealth de Filipinas, p. 249,
ante, hemos declarado definitivamente abandonada esta teoria y adoptado
la de Chua contra Secretario del Trabajo. La razon es sencilla. La teoria
de jus soli en Estados Unidos es absoluta: el simple nacimiento en
America, aun de padres extranjeros, hace a uno ciudadano americano segun su
constitucion y la decision en United States vs. Wong Kim Ark (169 U. S.,
649). La constitucion americana nunca entro en vigor en Filipinas. La teoria de
jus soli en Filipinas de acuerdo con la ley de 1.Ā° de julio de 1902,
aprobada por el Congreso Americano que, segun el Tratado de Paris, es el que ha
de determinar la condicion politica de los habitantes de Filipinas, es
condicional: que el nacido en Filipinas es considerado ciudadano filipino si era
residente y subdito espaƱol o hijo de un residente y subdito espaƱol en 11 de
abril de 1899. Si era extranjero o hijo de un extranjero en aquella fecha no
puede ser ciudadano filipino.
El acusado pues, de acuerdo con las pruebas obrantes en autos, puede ser
filipino o extranjero.
Bajo la ley de traicion No. 292 de la Comision Civil, todo residente en
Filipinas que, debiendo fidelidad a los Estados Unidos o al Gobierno de las
Islas Filipinas, les hiciere guerra o formare causa comun con sus enemigos
ayudandoles y socorriendoles dentro o fuera de dichas Islas, cometia el delito
de traicion. El articulo 1.Ā° de esta ley es una simple transplantacion de las
dispocisiones del Codigo Criminal Americano que es del tenor siguiente:
“Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or
adhere to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or
elsewhere, is guilty of treason.” (Sec. 1, Crim. Code; R. S., sec. 5331; Mar. 4,
1909, c. 321, sec. 1, 35 Stat., 1088.)
“Treason against the United States,” dice la Constitucion Americana, “shall
consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their Enemies,
giving them aid and comfort.” (Section 3 [1], Article III.)
En America tanto los extranjeros como los nacionales pueden cometer el delito
de traicion. Los extranjeros deben lealtad al gobierno de America durante el
tiempo de su residencia. (Carlisle vs. U. S., 21 Law. ed., 426; Raditch
vs. Hutchins, 24 Law. ed., 409.) Los ingleses sostienen la misma teoria.
(De Jager vs. Attorney Genenral of Natal, 8 Ann. Cas., 76.) No es
necesario ser ciudadano americano para que pueda cometer el delito de traicion.
Pero el Codigo Penal Revisado ha excluido a los extranjeros, solamente los
nacionales pueden cometerlo. El articulo 114 dice asi: “El que, debiendo
fidelidad a los Estados Unidos o al Gobierno de las Islas Filipinas, sin ser
de nacionalidad extranjera, les hiciere la guerra o formare causa comun con
sus enemigos, ayudandoles o socorriendoles dentro o fuera de dichas Islas, sera
castigado con las penas de reclusion temporal a muerte y multa que no exceda de
veinte mil pesos.” La orden ejecutiva No. 44, reconociendo que no era posible
bajo el Codigo Penal Revisado castigar por el delito de traicion a los
extranjeros residentes en Filipinas que han ayudado a los enemigos, enmendo el
articulo 114, aƱadiendo un parrafo del tenor siguiente: “Likewise, any alien,
residing in the Philippine Islands, who commits acts of treason as defined in
paragraph 1 of this article shall be punished by prision mayor to death
and shall pay a fine not to exceed 20,000 pesos.” (Executive Order No. 44, May
31, 1945.)
Si el acusado es filipino, debe lealtad al Gobierno del Commonwealth y debe
ser condenado por traicion; pero si es extranjero no puede ser castigado por
actos cometidos por el antes de la enmienda del articulo 114 del Codigo Penal
Revisado. Como las pruebas no establecen de una manera clara que el acusado es
filipino, no puede ser responsable criminalmente del delito de traicion.
Se revoca la sentencia apelada. Se ordena su inmediata libertad con las
costas de oficio.
Moran, Pres., y Briones, M., estan conformes.
BENGZON, M.:
Conforme con el resultado.
CONCURRING
PERFECTO, J.:
Charged in the People’s Court with the crime of treason on four counts,
appellant was found guilty only on count No. 3 and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay a fine
of P10,000 and the costs.
No evidence was presented by the defense. The prosecution presented the
testimonies of four witnesses.
- Illuminada Zurbano, 40 years, widow, residing at Lopez, Tayabas, testified
that she knows appellant as a “Japanese soldier,” because “he was always
carrying a revolver while going around our town, and he used to arrest
guerrillas and took them to the garrison.” On April 13, 1944, appellant was in
the company of San Juan “and they arrested my brother Epimaco Zurbano, in front
of the Cine and they took my brother to the garrison.” The witness brought food
to her brother from April 13 to the 23d. After that she was told by the Japanese
that her brother was no longer in the garrison. Since then she did not hear
anything from her brother. When he made the arrest, appellant “was in civilian
clothing, but always carried a revolver around his waist.” There was an
organization in Lopez known as “Yoin,” founded by San Juan and appellant. The
members of the organization “used to go around the houses of the guerrillas and
watched them.” The witness saw the arrest because “we were in the theater
looking at the people going out. I was outside the theater. Outside the
building.” There were many people; around eighty. The arrest was made about 7
o’clock in the evening. There were lights. Besides Lamberto San Juan, Alejandro
Enguanso was also in the company of appellant. The witness did not know whether
the weapon carried by appellant was a revolver or a pistol because “it was
hidden.” When the arrest was made, the witness was at about twelve meters away
from appellant. The witness was accompanied by Mariano Catan. She said: “My
companion was Mariano Catan,” her brother-in-law. The witness does not know
where the “Yoin” was organized. “What I know was that he came to our place
together with other people to organize it.” Epimaco was 23 years old, a
guerrillero under General Gaudencio Vera. The witness was at the place
because the moon “was then bright” and “we were having a walk.” - Marianito Catan, 34 years, married, merchant, testified that “I remember
that on April 13, 1944, while I was in front of the Cine in Lopez, Tayabas, my
brother (Epimaco Zurbano) was arrested by the accused.” The arrest was made by
appellant and Lamberto San Juan. The witness did not ask why. “I simply followed
my brother and then went home and reported the case to my parents.” His brother
was taken to the Japanese garrison, and since his arrest on April 13, the
witness has not heard of his brother. The witness did not hear about the
organization known as “Yoin.” Epimaco Zurbano “is my brother-in-law.” He was
arrested at 7 o’clock p.m. “in front of the cine” and, answering the question
whether he was “the only person present” when the arrest took place, said: “I
was the only one there. I was then taking a walk.” Only Lamberto San Juan and
appellant were the persons who arrested Epimaco, and the witness was sure that
there was “no other.” The witness was about ten meters away from them. About
half an hour elapsed from the moment of the arrest to the time the witness
reported the incident to his parents. Lamberto San Juan was carrying an exposed
revolver on his right hip. It had a shell handle. Appellant was also carrying a
revolver “on his right hip,” also visible because “it was outside the polo
shirt.” Appellant was wearing a polo shirt.Iluminada Zurbano said that appellant was carrying his revolver “on his left
hip” and was covered by his “camisa china,” and that Alejandro Enguanso “was
always with” Lamberto San Juan and appellant.On re-direct examination, Marianito Catan emphasized that he was the only one
who was present at the place of the arrest, adding: “I am sure of that. I was
the only one who was in front of the cine.” No one entered the cine. “A polo
shirt is different from a camisa china.” The witness knows Alejandro Enguanso
who was not in the company of Lamberto San Juan and appellant. Answering also
questions from one judge, the witness repeated that he did not see his
sister-in-law Iluminada Zurbano in the place of the arrest. - Domingo Villasoto, 34, married, farmer, testified that he knows appellant
because the same arrested his father Sixto Targa on August 12, 1944, because
they suspected him of being a guerrilla. “We took food to him (to his father),
but after one month we did not know where he was taken. He did not return any
more.” The witness heard about the “Yoin” which is the “same as Ganap soldiers
of the Japanese.” Sixto Targa was the father-in-law of the witness. The arrest
of Sixto Targa took place at 3 o’clock in the afternoon. Appellant was
accompanied by four companions, but he was the only one who went up the house.
They were all Ganaps. Those present at his arrest were Pastora Targa,
wife of the witness, Porfirio Targa, his brother-in-law and his wife, Flora
Salvacion, and Silveria Abmes, wife of Sixto. The witness did not try to follow
his father-in-law after his arrest. - Luisa de Mondragon.āThe testimony of this witness was vigorously objected to
by the defense, because she is not mentioned in the information as one of the
witnesses for the prosecution. The lower court allowed her to testify, and she
testified that she is 48 years old, widow, and that at about 7 o’clock of April
13, 1944, “I came from the house of the mayor because I was looking for my
husband” who was missing because the Japanese took him. She saw appellant in
Real Street watching for people. Epimaco Zurbano was looking around Real Street.
Appellant arrested him. Appellant was accompanied by Enguanso and another
person. The witness knows Pio Tabien, Dominador Argosina, jr., Mamerto Canlar,
Felipe Marquez and Miguel Marquez. All of them were arrested and killed by the
Japanese “on orders of these people.” When appellant arrested Epimaco Zurbano at
about 7 o’clock on April 13, 1944, he was accompanied by Pablo Cortes and Benito
Villaruz besides Enguanso. They were only four and no more. Appellant was
wearing a white camisa china. “He had a revolver behind his body covered
by his camisa.” At the time of the arrest of Epimaco there were many
people, but the witness recognized only Enguanso and appellant.
From the foregoing, it appears that, although three witnesses testified as to
the arrest of Epimaco Zurbano effected by appellant to be later brought to the
Japanese garrison, for all legal purposes, it is the same as if no witness had
testified at all. The second witness contradicted the first one on very
important facts related to the arrest, and the third contradicted both the first
and the second. The reciprocal contradictions between them have the effect of
engaging the three witnesses for the prosecution in a veritable three-cornered
fight. A striking characteristic of it is the fact that the first witness is the
sister of Epimaco Zurbano, the arrested person, and the second witness is a
brother-in-law of both, the first witness and the arrested person, and both have
mutually contradicted each other on the following essential facts to their
credibility as witnesses:
(a) As to the presence of about eighty persons at the
scene;
(b) As to whether Mariano or Marianito Catan was, as stated by
Illuminada Zurbano, “my companion;”
(c) As to the presence of
Illuminada Zurbano at the place of the arrest;
(d) As to whether
appellant was wearing camisa china or polo shirt;
(e) As to
whether appellant had his revolver at his left or right hip;
(f) As to
whether said weapon was exposed and visible or not;
(g) As to whether
Alejandro Enguanso was accompanying appellant or was not in the place at the
time of the arrest.
To increase the prosecution’s predicament, comes Luisa de Mondragon, a third
witness in discord, by further belying the first two witnesses when she
testified that appellant was accompanied by Pablo Cortes and Benito Villaruz,
but not by Lamberto San Juan, the one, who, according to the first two
witnesses, was accompanying him.
As a general rule, the testimony of one witness is enough, if truthful or
reasonably credible, to prove the truth of a controverted fact in court. The
special nature of the crime of treason requires that the accused be afforded a
special protection not required in other cases, so as to avoid a miscarriage of
justice. The extreme seriousness of the crime, for which death is one of the
penalties provided by law, and the fact that the crime is committed on abnormal
times, when large portions of the people are undergoing nervous hypertension,
and when small differences may and in mortal enmity, which may wipe out all
scruples in sacrificing the truth, the law requires that, at least, two
witnesses must testify as to overt acts of treason, if the same should be
accepted by the tribunals as legal basis to condemn a person as a traitor.
These two witnesses must equally be truthful and credible. It is not enough
that the testimony of one of them can be relied upon on the existence of the
overt act in controversy, while the other cannot. The requirement of the law is
not complied with because three witnesses or any greater number of them have
testified as to the same overt act if among them there are not two whose
testimonies are believed, by a competent court, beyond all reasonable doubt. In
the present case each and every one of the three witnesses for the prosecution
testified to the effect of belying the testimonies of the other two, in such a
way that it is not possible to accept the testimony of one of them without
rejecting at the same time the testimonies of the other two. Even without the
two-witness rule in treason cases, there is no legal basis to convict appellant
upon the testimony of any one of the three witnesses, as each one is belied by
the other two. Each of them is unreliable under the maxim “falsus in unus,
falsus in omnibus.”
We vote to acquit appellant.
PARAS, J.:
On the merits of the case I agree to the
foregoing concurring opinion.
DISSENTING
TUASON, J., with whom concur FERIA, HILADO,
and PADILLA, JJ.:
The findings of the People’s Court are fully sustained by the testimony of
two or more direct witnesses. The defendant did not introduce any evidence. The
sole ground of the majority decision for reversing the lower court’s judgment is
that the defendant has not been shown to be a Filipino citizen.
I disagree
with this conclusion. Although there is no direct evidence of the defendant’s
citizenship, Luisa de Mondragon testified that she “knew him because he is a
native of Lopez and he is always there.” This testimony has not been denied. “In
the absence of proof to the contrary every man is considered a citizen of the
country in which he resides.” “A man is * * * to be regarded as a citizen of his
native state until it can be shown that he has acquired citizenship elsewhere.
Every person at his birth is presumptively a citizen or a subject of the state
of his nativity, and where his parents were then both subjects of that state,
the presumption is conclusive.” (11 C.J., 786, citing numerous authorities
including decisions of the Federal Supreme Court and lower U.S. courts.)