BISHOP MARTIN P. BASAÑES, PETITIONER, VS. PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENT CHURCH, RESPONDENT.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions July 27, 2010 EIGHTEENTH DIVISION DIY, J.:


DIY, J.:


Before the Court is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure filed by Bishop Martin P. Besañes (hereafter, “petitioner”) against the Philippine Independent Church (hereafter, “respondent”), assailing the Decision[2] dated July 27, 2010 of Branch 62, Regional Trial Court of Bago City (hereafter, “court a quo”) in Civil Case No. 1656.

The antecedents are as follows:

The instant case originated from a Complaint[3] for Unlawful Detainer filed by respondent against Fr. Ramon Dolloza[4] before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Valladolid-San Enrique-Pulupandan, Valladolid, Negros Occidental.

Respondent, in its complaint, claimed that it is a religious corporation which owned a portion of a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 1204 covered by Original Certificate of Title No. RO-12808 (666). This portion of land (hereafter, “subject lot”) has an area of 248 square meters, more or less. Sometime in 1903, Catalino Riego[5] donated the subject land to respondent. The donation was formalized by the heirs of Catalino Riego when they executed the Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Donation on October 24, 2001. Respondent erected therein a church and a convent. Fr. Ramon Dolloza was a member of the faction of respondent. On account of a signed document by the members of the faction who submitted themselves to the legitimate authority of respondent, Fr. Dolloza and his predecessors were allowed by then Diocesan Bishop, Rev. Tiples, Jr., to remain as co-parish priest of St. Felomena in Pulupandan, Negros Occidental.

On October 1, 2003, a demand was made on Fr. Dolloza to vacate the premises of the church which proved futile. Hence, the filing of the unlawful detainer case.

On the other hand, Fr. Dolloza in his Answer[6] contended that the complaint states no cause of action and that the MCTC had no jurisdiction over it. He claimed that he is not the proper party to the case. He alleged that respondent is not the owner of the subject lot because the alleged heirs who executed the Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Donation, which was pending litigation, were the illegitimate children of Catalino Riego, while the legitimate children are members of the Philippine Independent Catholic Church, who would later execute a Deed of Donation in the latter’s favor. Moreover, it was posited by Fr. Dolloza that respondent is not a registered corporation while the Philippine Independent Catholic Church of which he was a member, is a registered corporation. Fr. Dolloza asserted that the church site was established by the Philippine Independent Catholic Church way back before the Second World War and was never possessed by respondent.

Upon the the death of Fr. Dolloza, Msgr. Martin Basañes (hereafter, “petitioner”) substituted as defendant in the original case.

On January 4, 2010, the MCTC of Valladolid-San Enrique-Pulupandan rendered a Decision[7] in favor of respondent. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff, as follows:

  1. Ordering defendant and/or Bishop Martin Basañes and all other persons claiming rights under him to vacate the premises of the subject lot, the church and the convent of the Philippine Independent Church in Pulupandan, Negros Occidental.
  2. No pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the court a quo which issued the assailed Decision.[8] The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, we find no cogent reason to modify or reverse the Decision of the Court a quo. As such, the same is hereby AFFIRMED.

APPEAL DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Unfazed, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[9] But the same was denied by the court a quo via an Order[10] dated December 5, 2010.

Hence, this Petition for Review[11] wherein petitioner raises the following assignment of errors:

I

THAT THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT A QUO, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT A QUO IN BELIEVING THAT THE CHURCH WAS CONSTRUCTED AT PULUPANDAN, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, DURING THE EARLY 1900’S WITHOUT SUPPORT OR EVIDENCE FROM PLAINTIFF AS AGAINST THE DECLARATION OF THE LEGITIMATE HEIRS OF CATALINO REIGO IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

II
THAT THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT A QUO WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT A QUO IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE DEED OF DONATION OF THE LEGITIMATE HEIRS OF CATALINO REIGO VIZ-A-VIZ [SIC] THE DONATION OF THE LEGITIMATE HEIRS ON THE 200 SQUARE METER LOT PORTION WHERE THE CHURCH IS SITUATED.

III
THAT THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT A QUO, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN AFFIRMING A DECISION OF THE HONORABLE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT VALLADOLID-PULUPANDAN A QUO IN DECIDING THAT THE MERE AFFIXING OF SIGNATURE BY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT MARTIN P. BASAÑES IN THE SO CALLED JOINT STATEMENT FOR RECONCILIATION AND UNITY IMMEDIATELY AND AUTOMATICALLY EMPOWERED PLANTIFF-APPELLEE TO ACQUIRE POSSESSION OVER THE STRUCTURE/CHURCH CONSTRUCTED ON A 200 SQUARE METER PORTION OF LOT NO. 1204 BY THE REIGO FAMILY THRU MILDRED YANSON ALAVA, LEGITIMATE GRAND DAUGHTER-DONOR.

IV
THAT THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT A QUO, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN FAILING TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE SEPARATE PERSONALITY OF A PARISH PRIEST AND THE PARISHIONERS AS REPRESENTED BY THE PARISH COUNCIL AS A POLICY MAKING BODY AND THAT THE PARISH PRIEST IS ONLY A SPIRITUAL STEWARD AND CANNOT BIND THE PROPERTY OF HIS PARISH.

V
THAT THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT A QUO, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE WEIGHT AND IMPORTANCE ON THE SPLIT ALLEGED RECONCILIATION [SIC] OF THE PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENT CHURCH AND ENTIRELY DISREGARDING THE RIGHTS OF THE PARISHIONERS WHO ACTUALLY OWN THE PROPERTY.

The pivotal issue is who between the parties has the better right to possess the subject lot together with the church and the convent erected therein.

Petitioner, in his Memorandum,[12] claims that the church was constructed by the Riego family sometime in 1980, headed by their granddaughter Mildred Yanson Alava (hereafter, “Alava”) for the exclusive use of their congregation and members of the Aglipayan Church to which they belong. Since then, it had been in the possession of said members, and that respondent never possessed the same. In fact, Alava executed an affidavit to attest to the same. Petitioner questions the Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Donation executed by the alleged heirs of Catalino Riego and Juana Jacinto considering that Catalino Riego was married to Francisca Escaro. It was further posited that said document was never annotated to OCT No. 12808 (666). Petitioner asserts that Lot 1204 (of which the subject lot was a portion) is owned by Catalino Riego and Francisca Escaro as borne out by the Decision of Branch 62, Regional Trial Court of Bago City in Cad Case No. 1 LRC (GLRO) Rec. No. 25 for Reconstitution of Title. Petitioner alleges ownership over the subject lot with the Deed of Donation executed by the heirs of Catalino Riego married to Francisca Escaro in favor of the Philippine Independent Catholic Church Diocese of Negros Occidental, Inc. Petitioner contends that although he signed the Joint Statement for Reconciliation and Unity, nothing therein shows that the church shall be automatically turned over to respondent. Moreover, petitioner has actually no authority to make such turnover because he is not the owner but merely the administrator of the church. Besides, it is posited that said Joint Statement is not a contract but merely a proposal and was repudiated by Fr. Basañes. Petitioner further alleges that said Joint Statement is not self-executory considering that the dispositive portion thereof shows that there is still process and transition to be done.

Respondent, in its Memorandum,[13] counters that the subject church and convent were built in the early 1900’s when the Aglipayan Church was still united and under the leadership of the Obispo Maximo. The lot and its improvements belong to the mainstream church, the respondent. Respondent claims that petitioner is a leader of Philippine Independent Catholic Church Diocese of Negros Occidental, Inc., which is separate and distinct from respondent. Respondent further asserts that petitioner left the faction formerly headed by Msgr. Macario Ga and formed his own faction in 2003 and calls it the Philippine Independent Catholic Church Diocese of Negros Occidental, Inc. Respondent contends that petitioner is bound by the Joint Statement when he signed and endorsed the same. Petitioner’s act of signing the Joint Statement, signified that he would follow one church which is respondent Philippine Independent Church or the Iglesia Filipina Independiente. Lastly, respondent alleges that because petitioner signed the Joint Statement, he was permitted to continue possession of the subject lot. And since Fr. Dolloza violated the conditions set forth for him to be a co-parish priest in operating the Parish of St. Filomena, it was decided that he be ousted from said church located on the subject lot owned by respondent. Respondent alleges that petitioner has appropriated the church for his own use and his faction, the Philippine Independent Catholic Church Diocese of Negros Occidental, Inc.

The Ruling of the Court
There are three (3) kinds of actions available to recover possession of real property, namely: (a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion reivindicatoria.

Accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding, which may either be for forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), is a summary action for the recovery of physical possession where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year. Such action should be brought before the proper inferior court.[14]

In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threat, or stealth; whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied.[15] The two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de facto possession; while in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is originally legal but it has become illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.[16]

Notably, Article 434 of the Civil Code provides that “[i]n an action to recover (ownership), the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant’s claim.” In other words, in order to recover possession, a person must prove: (1) the identity of the land claimed, and (2) his title.[17] Similarly, in an ejectment case such as the case at bar, the plaintiff has the burden to prove the identity of the land subject of the complaint and his title thereof.

In the instant case, the identity of the subject land is not an issue. Both parties are claiming the portion of Lot 1204 where the subject church and convent stand. Hence, the streamlined issue now before the Court is the determination of who has better right to possess the subject lot, the church, and convent.

Here, both parties are claiming ownership over the properties.

Where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to determine who between the parties has the better right to possess the property. However, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to that of possession, adjudication of the ownership issue is not final and binding, but only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property.[18]

With respect to petitioner, he hinges the ownership of the Philippine Independent Catholic Church Diocese of Negros Occidental, Inc. over the subject lot on the basis of the donation made by the alleged legitimate heirs of Catalino Riego with Francisca Escaro. He further claims that the church and convent were constructed by its members, headed by their granddaughter Alava.

On the other hand, respondent leans its ownership thereof on the basis of the donation made by the heirs of Catalino Riego with Juana Jacinto. It asserts that the church and the convent were constructed way back in the early 1900’s by the unified Philippine Independent Church.

Significantly, in civil cases, the burden of proof is on plaintiff to establish his/her case by preponderance of evidence. Although the evidence adduced by plaintiff is stronger than that presented by the defendant, a judgment cannot be entered in favor of the former, if his/her evidence is not sufficient to sustain his/her cause of action.[19]

By preponderance of evidence is meant that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. It refers to the weight, credit and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence”. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.[20]

It is the opinion of the Court that the evidence presented by petitioner is sufficient to establish the right of possession of the Philippine Independent Catholic Church Diocese of Negros Occidental, Inc. over the subject lot and the improvements introduced thereon.

Both parties in the instant case acknowledge that the subject lot was previously owned by Catalino Riego. In fact, Lot 1204 (of which the subject lot was a portion) is still registered under his name in OCT No. 12808 (666). It appears that both parties are claiming that their respective “donors” are heirs of Catalino Riego. No argument or evidence was presented for Us to rule otherwise. Hence, it is correct to assume that all of them, being heirs of Catalino Riego, are, therefore, co-owners of the hereditary properties of the latter before the partition thereof. As ruled by the Supreme Court in Acebedo v. Abesamis,[21] where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs.

Being heirs, they may validly dispose said subject lot based on the Civil Code provision stating that the possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption and from the moment of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance is accepted.[22]

Moreover, it is a fact that in co-ownership, every co-owner has absolute ownership of his undivided interest in the co-owned property and is free to alienate, assign or mortgage his interest except as to purely personal rights. While a co-owner has the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, nevertheless, as a co-owner, he cannot alienate the shares of his other co-owners – nemo dat qui non habet.[23]

Considering that the law recognizes the substantive right of the heirs to dispose of their ideal share in the co-heirship and/co-ownership among the heirs, trite to state that the conveyances made by both donors on their respective pro indiviso shares in the subject lot are valid, being heirs of Catalino Riego and co-owners of the subject lot.

Recall that a donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title to the property from the donor to the donee.[24]

Here, both sets of heirs have donated their pro indiviso shares in the subject lot to the parties in the instant case. In effect, they have effectively transferred their rights thereof to the parties. Clearly, both parties are now co-owners of the subject lot.

In conclusion, respondent has no cause of action against petitioner and the members of the Philippine Independent Catholic Church Diocese of Negros Occidental, Inc. for the purpose of ousting them from the subject lot considering that the Philippine Independent Catholic Church Diocese of Negros Occidental, Inc. is also an owner thereof with a right to possess the subject lot, the church, and the convent introduced thereon. Hence, respondent’s Complaint must be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 27, 2010 of Branch 62, Regional Trial Court of Bago City in Civil Case No. 1656 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of the Philippine Independent Church before the MCTC of Valladolid-San Enrique-Pulupandan, Valladolid, Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 04-001-P is DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

Delos Santos, E.L, (Acting Executive Justice) and Maxino, P.A.A., JJ., concur.


[1] Rollo, p. 3.

[2] Ibid., p. 38.

[3] Ibid., p. 56 (Amended Complaint).

[4] Also referred to in the records as Fr. Ramon Dollosa.

[5] Also referred to in the records as “Catalino Rigo”, “Catalino Reigo”.

[6] Rollo., p. 61.

[7] Ibid., p. 49.

[8] Supra, Note 2.

[9] Rollo, p. 124.

[10] Ibid., p. 138.

[11] Supra, Note 1.

[12] Ibid., p. 381.

[13] Ibid., p. 366.

[14] Corpuz v. Agustin, G.R. No. 183822, January 18, 2012; Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium I [10th rev. ed. 2010], p. 871.

[15] Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

[16] Spouses Valdez v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 132424, May 2, 2006.

[17] Jakosalem v. Barangan, G.R. No. 175025, February 15, 2012, citing Spouses Hutchison v. Buscas, 498 Phil. 257, 262 [2005].

[18] Corpuz v. Agustin, supra Note 14, citing Rivera v. Rivera, 453 Phil 404,412 [2003].

[19] Ong v. Yap, G.R. No. 146797, February 18, 2005, citing Heirs of Anastacio Fabela v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142546, August 9, 2001; United Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124110, April 20, 2001.

[20] Raymundo v. Lunaria, G.R. No. 171036, October 17, 2008, citing Floralde v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123048, August 8, 2000; Ong v. Yap, supra.

[21] G.R. No. 102380 January 18, 1993, citing Mendoza I v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-44664 July 31, 1991; Article 1078 of the Civil Code.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Acabal v. Acabal, G.R. No. 148376, March 31, 2005.

[24] Article 712 of the Civil Code. xxx Ownership and other real rights over property are acquired and transmitted by law, by donation, by testate and intestate succession, and in consequence of certain contracts, by tradition.