GUALBERTO V. MAGNO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. MONTANO A. ORTIZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF AGUSAN, THE CLERK OF COURT, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF AGUS…

Magno versus Ortiz

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed with the Supreme Court by Gualberto V. Magno, an intervenor in a cadastral land case, against Judge Montano A. Ortiz of the Court of First Instance of Agusan, the Clerk of Court, and the adverse party Rogaciano Suazo. Magno asks the Court to annul the trial judge's orders declaring the judgment final and executory and directing its execution, and to compel the approval of his record on appeal. The case matters because it fixes the rule on the effect of a motion for reconsideration or new trial that carries no notice of hearing: such a motion is a mere scrap of paper that does not stop the clock on the period to appeal, and the court's own later notice cannot cure the defect once the judgment has already become final.

Procedural History

In the Court of First Instance of Agusan, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff Rogaciano Suazo in a cadastral land case, declaring him owner of the lot. Magno, the intervenor, filed a motion for reconsideration without a notice of hearing. The trial judge later caused a notice of hearing to be served on the parties, heard the motion, and then denied it while allowing execution of the judgment. Magno moved to reconsider the order of execution; that motion was also denied. Magno then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court, and the Court issued a preliminary injunction restraining execution. The Supreme Court resolved the petition on the merits, denying it.

Facts

On October 31, 1963, the Court of First Instance of Agusan rendered judgment in a cadastral case in favor of Rogaciano Suazo, declaring him owner of a lot in Butuan City by virtue of a 1941 decision of the Cadastral Court of Agusan. Gualberto V. Magno, who intervened claiming the same land as a purchaser from the defendant, received a copy of the judgment on December 12, 1963.

On January 11 of the following year, the thirtieth day from his receipt of the copy, Magno filed by registered mail a motion for reconsideration. The motion contained no notice of hearing. On January 27, the respondent judge on his own initiative caused a notice to be served on all parties setting the motion for hearing on February 8, 1964. On that same day, Suazo moved for a writ of execution on the ground that the judgment had already become final, since neither the defendants nor the intervenor had appealed within the reglementary period.

The motion for execution and the motion for reconsideration were heard on February 1 and February 8, 1964, respectively. On March 9, the judge issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration and allowing execution; Magno received it on March 17 and promptly filed a notice of appeal, a cash appeal bond, and a record on appeal. His motion to reconsider the portion of the order allowing execution was denied on March 31, 1964. Hence this petition.

Issues

• Whether or not a motion for reconsideration filed without a notice of hearing, but later set for hearing by the court itself, suspended the period for appeal.
• Whether or not the notice of hearing issued by the respondent judge cured the defect of the motion and prevented the judgment from becoming final.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, on motions for new trial, provides:

A written notice of a motion for new trial shall be served by the movant on the adverse party, stating the time and place of the hearing thereof, and without proof of service of such notice the motion shall not be acted upon by the court.

This is the governing rule because the Court treated the motion for reconsideration as in fact a motion for new trial, and it places the duty of notice on the movant, not on the court.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the motion did not suspend the period for appeal. The trial court correctly treated the motion for reconsideration as a motion for new trial, since its grounds amounted to an assertion that the decision was contrary to law, a ground for new trial. The applicable rule requires the movant to serve written notice of hearing on the adverse party, and without proof of such service the motion shall not be acted upon. The cases cited by the petitioner were distinguished: in each of them there was either a notice given by the moving party or special circumstances, whereas here there was absolutely no notice at all.

On the second issue, the Court held that the judge's own notice did not cure the defect. The duty to give notice devolves upon the movant, not upon the court. And even granting the court authority to issue the notice on its own, the notice came too late: the motion was filed on the thirtieth day from notice of the decision, but the notice of hearing was issued sixteen days thereafter. Since a defective motion does not toll the running of the period for appeal, the judgment had already become final when the notice was issued.

Doctrine

A motion for reconsideration or new trial that lacks a notice of hearing is a mere scrap of paper; it does not interrupt the period to appeal, and the judgment becomes final and executory upon the lapse of that period. The duty to serve the notice of hearing rests on the movant, not on the court, and the court's subsequent notice cannot cure the defect once finality has set in. This rule is anchored on Section 2 of Rule 37, which requires proof of service of the notice before the court may act on the motion.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the petition, lifted the preliminary injunction, and ordered the petitioner to pay the costs.

Remember This

Memorize the line: a motion without a notice of hearing is a mere scrap of paper that does not toll the period for appeal, and the court cannot cure it after the judgment has become final. Examiners use this case to test the requisites of a valid motion for new trial or reconsideration and the point at which a judgment becomes final and executory.