JOEL GARGANERA, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE ENRIQUE JOCSON, RESPONDENT.

All the above entitled cases were consolidated and originally
assigned for investigation to Associate Justice Felipe B. Kalalo, Court of
Appeals. They were, however,
subsequently re-assigned to Associate Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, also of the Court of Appeals, on July 21,
1990 in anticipation of Justice Kalalo’s compulsory retirement shortly to take
place.^[1]

After issues were duly joined upon the filing of the comment or
answer of the respondents in each of the cases, and such other pleadings as
were required or admitted by the Court, the parties presented their respective
proofs. Reception of evidence in all
the cases, except A.M. No. RTJ­-90-624, was delegated to and done before
Regional Trial Court Judge Jesus V. Ramos, Branch 45, Bacolod City; this, on
request of some of the complainants, to save the parties the time and expense
of having to come to Manila.

The hearings have since been completed and Mr. Justice Mendoza
has since submitted his “Report and Recommendation,” in two parts: the first, on August 7, 1992; the second, on
August 20, 1992. His findings and
conclusions are hereunder summarized.

A.M. No.
RTJ-88-227

1. In A.M. No. RTJ-88-227 (Joel Garganera v. Judge Jocson),
the respondent Judge is charged with gross ignorance of the law, incompetence,
and inefficiency in the performance of official duties in relation to Civil Case No. 4086 entitled “Sally Garganera
v. Spouses Jose and Salvacion Garganera,” in certain special proceedings,
and in Criminal Case No. 292 entitled “People v. Alan Labayen.” The
evidence justifies the following conclusions, to wit:

a.    In Civil Case No. 4086, respondent Judge
Jocson declared defendant spouses in default despite knowledge that they had
filed an answer within the reglementary period, and had adamantly refused to
reconsider that default declaration despite the facts having again been
forcefully brought to his attention. These irregular acts constitute partiality to a party, rather than mere
ignorance of the law.

b.    “On June 30, 1987 he (the respondent Judge)
issued an order ** in a cadastral case, directing the Register of Deeds of
Silay City to register and annotate on TCT Nos. T-7444 and T-7445, covering **
(five [5] lots) all of the Silay Cadastre, certain deeds of sale, even though
the lots were outside his territorial area. * * In another order dated February 4, 1988 ** respondent judge again
directed the Register of Deeds to register and annotate a deed of sale and
power of attorney on the same titles pertaining to the same lots. * * * (R)espondent judge crossed jurisdictional
boundaries ** a third time when in Special Proceedings No. 435 he again issued
an order dated June 20, 1988 ** directing the Register of Deeds of Silay City
to change and substitute the name of the deceased Isidro Lopez in several TCT’s
with the names of his legal heirs. The
case had been decided by Branch 40 at Silay City and had been terminated, so
that the order issued by respondent judge was not only issued outside his
territory but concerned a case previously decided by another branch of the
RTC. * * .“

“The
actuations of respondent judge constitute gross misconduct.”

c.    In a rape case, Criminal Case No. 292, People
v. Alan Labayen, respondent judge rendered judgment
finding the accused guilty and sentenced him to 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6
years, 1 month and 10 days of imprisonment, after appreciating as mitigating
circumstances, the following:

“(1) youthfulness;

(2) lack
of intent to commit so grave a wrong;

(3) overly
liberal parental direction;

(4) low
degree of comprehension of his social responsibility; and

(5) that
the victim being left alone most of the time by her mother by reason of work.”

The penalty imposed by Judge Jocson is “contrary to art. 63, par. 1
of the Revised Penal Code which provides
that where a single indivisible penalty is prescribed, it shall be applied regardless
of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed * * .”

Moreover, “respondent judge considered certain circumstances as mitigating
even if they are not so under art. 13 **
(e.g.,) ‘(1) youthfulness (sic); (2) overly liberal parental direction
and (3) victim being left alone most of the time by her mother by reason of work.’ These circumstances are not even
analogous or similar in nature to those considered in pars. 1 to 9 of art. 13
of the Revised Penal Code as mitigating circumstances. Neither can ‘the circumstances of low degree
of comprehension of social responsibilities’ be appreciated as mitigating
because the law is clear that the alternative circumstances of degree of
instruction and education are not mitigating in crimes against chastity like
rape (People v. Lopez, 107 Phil. 1039 [1960]; United States v. Gamilla, 39
Phil. 234).

Again, as pointed out by
the Court of Appeals which reversed respodent judge’s decision, said “decision
of conviction appealed from, a three page, double-spaced judgment, contains no
statement of fact and the law on this it is based ** (and) the decretal portion is flawed, to say
the least, as it imposes upon the accused a very ambiguous sentence.”

Upon the foregoing facts, the respondent judge is “guilty of
partiality in the decision of a case, gross misconduct, and gross ignorance of
the law ** .”

A.M. No.
RTJ-90-624

2. The next administrative case against Judge Jocson, A.M. No.
RTJ-90-624, was initiated by a complaint filed by Atty. Alejandro M. Mejorada,
Jr. in relation to acts done in Special Proceeding No. 4236, “Intestate
Estate of the late Auxillador Regalado; Manuel Regalado as Judicial Administrator.”

In this special proceeding, respondent judge rendered three
orders (dated February 21, 1990, March 2, 1990 and March 7, 1990) requiring the
release of the balance of P300,000.00 of a sugar crop loan granted by the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) to
the estate of Auxillador Regalado (for the year, 1989-1990). These orders were however annulled by the
Court of Appeals on PNB’s petition
for certiorari, which ruled that the judge had acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the challenged orders without first conducting a hearing
on the merits of the motion for the release of the balance of the crop loans.

On the same day that the PNB filed its petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals, March 9, 1990, respondent judge ordered the arrest
and detention of two officials of the bank as well as of its counsel, Atty.
Alejandro M. Mejorada, Jr. The stated
reason was that they were defying his orders for the immediate release of the
crop loans. Only Atty. Mejorada was
arrested. He was taken into custody at
10:15 in the morning of March 9, 1990, and was not released until 6:30 P.M. of
the same day.

Now, the records show that in no less than two motions
filed by Atty. Mejorada for the lifting of the respondent’s three (3) orders
for release of the balance of the crop loans, said counsel had fully set out
reasons for the Bank’s inability to effect the release — the (borrower) estate had not complied
with the conditions of the Credit Agreement and the loan policy — which
reasons the Court of Appeals had subsequently ruled to be justified. Moreover, respondent judge knew that Atty.
Mejorada, being merely the legal officer of the PNB Branch at Bacolod, had no
authority to cause release of the balance of the crop loan. Finally, even assuming fault on Atty.
Mejorada’s part, he is liable not for direct contempt, which is summarily
punishable, but for constructive contempt, which requires notice and hearing
before the imposition of any sanction. Atty. Mejorada was accorded no such prior notice and hearing before his
arrest and detention for a few hours were commanded and effected.

These facts establish respondent judge’s gross misconduct.

A.M. No.
RTJ-88-270

3. In the third administrative case, A.M. No. RTJ-88-270,
commenced on complaint of Harding P. Velez, respondent judge is charged with
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act in relation to two criminal actions against Timmy Estrera
y Pabon arising from the fatal shooting of Joseph Irving Velez: one (Case No. 305) for murder, and the other
(Case No. 5343), for illegal possession of firearms. Respondent judge acquitted Timmy Estrera of the crime of illegal
possession of firearms for lack of evidence, and in the murder case, convicted
him of the lesser offense of homicide thru simple negligence.

Harding P. Velez, the victim’s father, claims he was shown by
respondent’s Court Interpreter, John Barredo, two (2) decisions: one, sentencing Estrera to life
imprisonment, and another, sentencing him to imprisonment of from 6 to 8 years,
although neither decision was ever released, that eventually promulgated being,
as aforesaid, the judgment convicting Estrera of homicide thru simple
negligence. Harding P. Velez strongly
insinuates that these acts, and recorded postponements of the promulgation of
judgment, were done by the judge in the process of negotiating with the family
of the accused Estrera for a satisfactory consideration for a light sentence in
the murder case, and for acquittal in the illegal possession case.

While admitting that he indeed drew up the first two (2)
decisions, respondent asserts that those decisions were sham, and he had
prepared them only to entrap his interpreter John Barredo whom he suspected of
“leaking” decisions to litigants for a fee. In fact, the judge filed an administrative case against Barredo — A.M.
No. P-87-124 (Judge Jocson v. John
Barredo), which he however later withdrew “on the ground that he had
lost interest in the case and for humanitarian reasons.” The judge also admits
that he had really postponed the promulgation of judgment twice, but alleges
that he had had done so on meritorious grounds.

The evidence does not satisfactorily establish Harding P. Velez’s
accusations of venality on the judge’s part, or that the latter had knowingly
rendered an unjust judgment, “in the sense that it is contrary to law or the
evidence, and ** made with consicous and deliberate intent to do an injustice
or ** inspired by some corrupt
motive or reprehensible purpose to set those who are guilty free.”

Nonetheless, respondent judge acted irregularly in “leaking a
decision, although it was sham and ** failing to pursue the administrative
complaint he had filed against his court employee by withdrawing the
complaint.” Court orders and “processes should never be trifled with, lest
their integrity is impaired.” And if, as respondent judge said in his
administrative complaint against John Barredo, the latter was guilty of
malfeasance and misfeasance — i.e., dishonesty, serious misconduct, receiving
money by leaking information concerning pending cases, habitual drunkenness,
inefficiency, immorality, and incompetence/ — “the withdrawal of complaint
against Barredo was nothing less than toleration by the judge of official wrong
doing.”

A.M. No.
P-87-124

4. Notwithstanding the respondent judge’s withdrawal of his
complaint in A.M. No. P-87-124 (Hon. Enrique T. Jocson v. John
Barredo), supra, investigation of Barredo’s alleged misconduct, therein
involved, should be pursued.

A.M. No. RTJ-88-269

5. In his complaint in A.M. No. RTJ-88-269, Berito C. Jalandoon,
Sr. inter alia charges that respondent judge: (a) is a homosexual; (b) had bribed employees in his
staff, including John Barredo, to cause them to execute certain papers in
connection with the administrative case against Barredo (just mentioned) and a
criminal case brought against him (the judge) in the Office of the Ombudsman by
Harding P. Velez; (c) had degraded himself by filing an administrative case
against John Barredo when he could simply have dismissed him; (d) is a
congenital liar; (e) had falsified official documents by signing Barredo’s
daily time records for the time when he was accusing Barredo of tardiness and
absenteeism.

While the complainant’s evidence fails in the main to prove the
charges specified against the respondent judge, such facts as have thereby been
adequately established nonetheless suffice to show the impropriety of the
judge’s request to “his office staff to ‘note and confirm’ the contents of his
pleading in a court case * * * ; (the signatures of the employees) were
superfluous and only succeeded in degrading the position of respondent judge.”
Also shown by said facts is the impropriety, already mentioned, of the judge’s
forbearance to pursue his complaint against John Barredo for absenteeism,
laziness and inefficiency.

A.M. No.
RTJ-88-267

6. Gross ignorance of the law, incompetence, grave abuse of
discretion and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct are imputed to Judge
Jocson in A.M. No. RTJ-88-267, begun by complaint of several individuals. The complaint sets forth fourteen (14)
causes of action against respondent Judge. The fifth and fourteenth causes are the same as those in A.M.
RTJ-88-270 (Velez v. Jocson) and A.M. No. RTJ-88-227 (Garganera
v. Jocson), already dealt with, supra.

Re First and
Ninth Causes of Action

In several cadastral cases, involving
petitions for registration and annotations of encumbrances affecting titles to
lands in Silay City and La Carlota City, in Negros Occidental, and for the
issuance of owners’ duplicate certificates of title, the respondent judge –

a)  acted
on the petitions notwithstanding that except for two, the petitions had been
submitted directly to the judge and not filed with the receiving section of the
respondent’s court, had consequently not been entered in the docket book, had
not been accompanied by payment of the requisite fees (subsequently and tardily
required to be paid by the judge), and had not been raffled in accordance with
normal procedure;

b)   granted all the petitions and ordered the
Registrars of Deeds to register and annotate the relevant transactions on the
corresponding certificates of title “without the necessity of presenting the
owner’s duplicate copies;”

c)   acted on and granted the petitions
notwithstanding that the lands involved lay outside his territorial
jurisdiction as defined in Administrative Order No. 7, Series of 1983 of this
Court in relation to Batas Pambansa Bilang 129; and

d)   omitted
to keep copies of the orders he issued and petitions he disposed of.

In refutation of the charges, respondent judge states that he
found the petitions on his desk and assumed they had passed through official
channels (although they bore none of the usual notations indicating this fact);
he had acted for the parties’ convenience, many of the petitioners being
residents of Bacolod, and the location of the property being, after all, merely
a matter of venue; that, anyway, the petitions involved “noncontentious” and
voluntary transactions and no objections were thereafter voiced against the
orders in question by any interested party; and other judges were doing the
same things. These attempts to justify
his acts are unavaiing. They are
unacceptable. They cannot alter the
conclusion that the Judge has acted in violation of the law,^[2]
and applicable precedent^[3] and
rules.^[4]

Re Second Cause
of Action

In Criminal Cases Numbered 990 and 1160, entitled “People v.
Jose Daquipil, et al.,” respondent Judge is charged with having granted bail (pending appeal)
to the accused despite the fact that he had convicted them of murder and
sentenced each of them to reclusion perpetua, and despite the
objection of Assistant Provincial Fiscal Bartolome Fañunal, who had precisely
pointed out that the defendants were no longer entitled to bail in the
premises.

The respondent’s defense to this charge is that he reconsidered
his order and directed arrest of Jose Daquipil on May 15, 1987 and Garet
Daquipil on October 13, 1988. The
defense is no defense at all, of course. There was no justification for the grant of bail on appeal in the first
place. In so granting bail, he was
either partial to the accused or grossly ignorant of the law.

Re Third Cause
of Action

In Criminal Case No. 998 (People
v. Bajar), respondent judge rendered judgment convicting the accused
of homicide and sentencing him to suffer a prison term of 4 years, 2 months and
1 day to 6 years, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of
P12,000.00. In favor of the accused the
Judge appreciated the mitigating circumstances of: (a) lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong; (b) low degree
of instruction (sic); and (c) voluntary surrender.

The decision does not state clearly and distinctly the facts on
which it is based, as required by the Constitution and the Rules of Court. The judge considered that the accused had no
intention to commit so grave a wrong despite the fact that the latter had
inflicted several wounds on the victim sufficient to produce death. He considered lack of instruction as mitigating
despite case law to the contrary. He
considered that the accused had surrendered voluntarily when the evidence
showed otherwise. He thus exhibited
“gross ignorance of the law and settled principles, ** a shabby mental attitude
toward the judicial function.”

Re Fourth Cause
of Action

The accusations as regards Civil Case No. 420 (Villarosa v. Lupo and
San Miguel Corp.) have not been proven. The errors ascribed to the respondent do not
“constitute grounds for disciplinary action but, if at all, only for appealing
his decision. The fact is that his
decision was not appealed. ** .“

Re Sixth Cause
of Action

In this cause of action,
the respondent is faulted with having issued two orders in a civil case: the first, dated August 25, 1987,^[5]
dismissing a petition for relief from
judgment, and the second, dated October 16, 1987,^[6]
denying due course to the appeal taken from the dismissal of said petition for
relief on the stated ground that the same was unappealable. The Court of Appeals later declared both
orders null and void: the first,
because issued without prior hearing as required by Section 6, Rule 38 of the
Rules of Court, and the second, because under Section 2, Rule 41, an order
denying a petition for relief is appealable.

These acts betray respondent’s gross ignorance of fundamental
legal precepts, and his omission to apply himself diligently to the study of
the law as enjoined by Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Re Seventh Cause
of Action

In Bar Matter No. 399, commenced by complaint filed by respondent
judge against complainant Romeo B. Esuerte, it appears that both the latter and
the judge had employed intemperate language against each other, not in keeping
with the dignity of the legal profession.^[7]

Re Eighth Cause
of Action

In Civil Case No. 4364, Ngo Chen v. Municipality of Manapla
and Rodolfo Miraflores, respondent Judge promulgated three (3) orders,
viz.: (1) order of November 20, 1987,
declaring the defendants in default and authorizing reception of evidence
against them ex parte before the Officer-in-Charge of his branch (No.
47); (2) order of June 8, 1988, denying due course to defendant Municipality’s
notice of appeal; and (3) order of June 20, 1988, ranting execution despite the
municipality’s objection and filing by it of a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals. The orders
were invalidated and set aside by the Court of Appeals because issued in
violation of settled legal principles, and with grave abuse of discretion. Respondent judge’s aforesaid orders
constitute acts of oppression.

Re Tenth Cause
of Action

The transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing on
August 8, 1988 of Civil Case No. 1665, entitled Pailano v. Pailano,
“cannot fail to impress anyone reading it that respondent judge (did) indeed
browbeat the (plaintiff’s) witness even as he practically monopolized the
period of cross-examination, disregarding the admonition to members of the
bench that undue interference, impatience or severe attitude towards the
witnesses, who are excited or terrified by the unusuala circumstances of a
trial, may tend to prevent the
proper presentation of the case or the ascertainment of the truth (People v.
Catindihan, 97 SCRA 196 [1980]) ** (and that) a judge should exercise great
care and patience in conducting a case and intervene only sparingly in the
examination of witnesses. (People v.
Ibasan, Sr., 129 SCRA 695 [1985]).”

Re Eleventh and
Twelfth Causes of Action

In Special Proceeding No. 3832 (for the guardianship of Celia
Mapa Vda. de Feria), it appears that respondent judge issued two (2)
orders. One, dated September 9, 1987,
directed complainant Jose Angodong, counsel for the guardian, to pay a fine of
P300.00 for interchanging the name of the petitioner in the guardianship
proceeding and that of the ward. The
other, dated May 17, 1987, directed the judicial guardian to reimburse some
expenses included in his statement of income and expenses. In Civil Case No. 4885, the judge issued an
order annulling the winning bid in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale on motion
of the provincial sheriff, without giving the winning bidder an opportunity to
be heard.

The complainant’s evidence anent these causes of action fails to
disclose any misconduct on the respondent’s part. The remedy against any errors in the orders is, of course,
judicial rather than administrative.

Re Thirteenth
Cause of Action.

In Civil Case No. 2567, Barbasa v. Filinvest Finance and
Leasing Corp., BPI Credit Corp. and the Provincial Sheriff of Negros
Occiddental, respondent judge issued two orders directing execution of the
decision against BPI-Bacolod Branch although the latter was, allegedly, not a
party to the case. The proofs fail to
reveal any clear impropriety on the respondent’s part, despite the fact that
the orders were afterwards declared null and void by the Court of Appeals,
since the nullification was “not for the reason that respondent judge had erred
in addressing execution to a third party but because the case had already been
appealed and respondent judge had lost jurisdiction over it.”

7. A.M. No.
RTJ-88-267

While the charges of corrupt practice, ignorance of the law,
incompetence, bribery, arbitrariness, and conduct unbecoming a judge, levelled
against respondent judge by Atty. Gregorio G. Tronco in this administrative
case, have not been adequately established by the evidence, the record however
shows still another infraction of the rules by respondent judge: he appointed a regular administrator of an
intestate estate without the publication and hearing prescribed by law.

—–

The Court has reviewed the record of these cases and has thereby
satisfied itself that the findings and conclusions of the Investigator just
outlined, are in truth adequately supported by the evidence and are in accord
with applicable legal principles. Said
findings and conclusions are therefore hereby adopted as the Court’s own.

It was said findings and conclusions, already reached by the
Investigator but still being set out and incorporated in his formal “Report and
Recommendation,” that were the basis for the Investigator’s recommendation to
the Court for respondent judge’s suspension from office; and it was, in turn,
on the basis of that recommendation, as well as of the many disturbing reports
being received at the Office of the Court of Administrator of other alleged
acts of misconduct on His Honor’s part, that caused this Court to issue on July
30, 1992 its Resolution placing respondent judge under preventive suspension.

What is exposed by the evidence adduced in these proceedings is
the sad spectacle of a person presiding over a court of law, who is ignorant of
fairly elementary and quite familiar legal principles and administrative
regulations, has a marked penchant for applying unorthodox, even strange
theories and concepts in the adjudication of controversies, exhibits
indifference to, and even disdain for due process and the rule of law, applies
the law whimsically, capriciously, and oppressively, and displays bias and
partiality. These characteristics and
quirks are impermissible in a judge. In
Cabrera v. Pajares,^[8] this
Court ruled that, as it has time and again stressed –

“ * * members of the judiciary should display not only the highest
integrity but must at all times conduct themselves in such a manner as to be
beyond reproach and suspicion. (Quiz
vs. Castaño, 107 SCRA 196; Montemayor vs. Collado, 107 SCRA 258) The Court had
likewise stressed in De la Paz vs. Inutan (64 SCRA 540) that ‘the judge is the
visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. From him, the people draw their will and
awareness to obey the law. They see in
him an intermediary of justice between two conflicting interests * * . Thus, for the judge to return that regard,
he must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to
follow. He should be studiously careful
to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law.’ (See also Fonacier-Abaño
vs. Ancheta, 107 SCRA 538).”

And in Office of the Court
Administrator v. Bartolome, 203 SCRA 337, this Court deemed it proper –

“ *
* to remind our brethren everywhere that judges are the epitome of moral
rectitude in society — even if nobody else is. Judges are not common men and women, whose errors men and women
forgive and time forgets. Judges sit as
the embodiment of the people’s sense of justice, their last recourse where all
other institutions have failed. As
such, they bring stability to society, especially where society is under
stress. They should prove that the
system, after all, works even if the system has, after all, its built-in
weaknesses.”

The different acts of misconduct proven against respondent judge
demonstrate his unfitness to remain in office and to continue to discharge the
functions and duties of a judge, and warrant the imposition on him of the
extreme sanction of dismissal from the service.

WHEREFORE, the respondent, Judge Enrique T. Jocson, is
hereby DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits
and pay and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the government or
any of its agencies or instrumentalities.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin,
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, and Melo, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.

^[1]
Justice Kalalo retired on September 12, 1990

^[2]
B.P. Blg. 129, this Court’s Interim Rules, P.D. No. 1529 (sec. 3),

^[3]
Manchester Development Corp. v. C.A., 149 SCRA 562 (1987); Sun Insurance
Office Ltd. v. Asuncio, 170 SCRA 274 (1989)

^[4]
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 7, Series of 1933, and Circular No. 7,
Sept 23, 1974

^[5]
Exh. VI-D (reconsideration subsequently refused)

^[6]
Exh. VI-I (reconsideration also subsequently refused)

^[7]
The judge described the complainant’s motion for inhibition as “utterly
foolish,” and that the complainant wished only “to get rid of the **
(respondent as Judge) for non-other purpose, an ill-motivated act;” and that
the complainant was “imprudent” for filing pleadings “without the knowledge or
consent of the trial fiscal, or if it is with implied consent of the fiscal
then that fiscal must be a lazy or naive one.”

^[8]
142 SCRA 127, 135