ANSELMA PENDON, SANTIAGO PENISTAN, ET AL. PETITIONERS, VS. HON. JOSE R. CABATUANDO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, SEVENTH REGIONAL DISTR…

Original action for certiorari, to set aside a
decision and a resolution of the Court of Agrarian Relations, and to restrain
the issuance of the corresponding writ of execution.

The record shows that Anselma Pendon is the owner of a tract of land, of about 3.5
hectares, situated in Balocot, Tambulig,
Zamboanga del Sur, which Blas Trabasas had begun to cultivate in November 1960, as her
tenant.  Alleging that, on November 17, 1961, she had
arbitrarily ejected him from said land, without just cause,
on December 18, 1961, Trabasas filed, with the Court of Agrarian Relations, 9th
Regional District, Cotabato
City, through Atty. Ramon P. Mabanag, CAR Case No. 30, Zamboanga
del Sur, against Mrs. Pendon,
for reinstatement as her tenant, reliquidation of
their accounts and damages.  On or about
June 8, 1962, Trabasas, then represented by Atty. Edilberto LT. Coronado, of the TCU, Tenancy Mediation
Commission, amended his petition to include as defendants the alleged new
tenants of Mrs. Pendon, namely, Santiago and Dominador Penistan and Maximo Orencio.  In the answer to the
original petition and, later, to the amended Petition, Mrs. Pendon,
in the. former, and, together with the other defendants, in the latter,
alleged that Trabasas had voluntarily abandoned the
land in dispute  that Santiago Penistan is working, not on said land, but on another land;
and that Dominador Penistan
is not her tenant, but merely helped his brother Santiago Penistan.
A counterclaim for damages was, also, set up in the answers to said petitions.

The issues having been joined, on September 20, 1962 the case was set for hearing on October
17 of the same year, at the “Sala of the Justice
of the Peace Court of Molave, Zamboanga
del Sur“.  Upon receipt of notice thereof, Atty. Exaltacion A. Navarro, of said Tenancy Mediation
Commission, acting as counsel for Trabasas moved for
postponement of the hearing to November 6, 1962, upon the ground that she could
not be at Molave, Zamboanga
del Sur on October 17, 1962, because the next day she
had to be at Dumanjug, Cebu,
to attend the hearing of CAR Case No. 415Cebu, which had been set for hearing
earlier.  Copy of said motion for
postponement was served upon Atty. Benjamin S. Rallon,
counsel for Mrs. Pendon and her aforementioned
codefendants, who, together with Mrs. Pendon, are
hereinafter referred to as petitioners.

The latter allege under oath that Atty. Navarro, moreover,
informed Atty. Rallon that the hearing scheduled for
October 17 would definitely be postponed, because owing to said CAR Case No.
415 Cebu, to be heard in Dumanjug,
Cebu, she (Atty. Navarro) could not Possibly be in Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, on said date; that, relying upon said motion for
postponement and the assurance thus given by Atty. Navarro, herein petitioners
and their counsel not appear at the premises of the justice of the Peace Court
of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, until November 6, 1962; that, to their surprise, Trabasas, his counsel, and the CAR Commissioner or Judge
did not show up; and that, upon his return to Cebu
City, where he resides and has his office, on November 11, 1962, Atty. Rallon was informed by CAR Commissioner Alinsug
that he (Alinsug) had heard Case No. 30 at Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, on October 17, 1962, Trabasas
and his counsel, Atty. Mabanag, having been present
then.

Thereupon, or on November
15, 1962, Mrs. Pendon filed a motion to
set aside the proceedings thus held on October 17, upon the ground that she had
not attended the same for the reasons already adverted to.  This, notwithstanding, on December 24, 1962,
Mrs. Pendon received copy of the decision of Judge
Jose R. Cabatuando of the Court of Agrarian
Relations, commanding her to reinstate Trabasas as
her tenant, ordering her codefendants to vacate the landholding in question,
should they be in possession thereof, sen­tencing her (Mrs. Pendor)
to pay to Trabasas the sums specified in said
decision, and dismissing the counterclaim of petitioners herein.

On January 4, 1963, the latter filed a motion for reconsideration
and new trial, which was denied in a CAR resolution date February 15, 1963,
notice of which was served upon the petitioners on March 12, 1963 Soon
thereafter, or on April 2, 1963, petitioners commenced the present action for
certiorari against Judge Cabatuando and Trabasas, to annul the aforementioned decision and the
resolution denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and new trial, and
to restrain the execution of said decision, upon the ground that respondent
judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of
jurisdiction, in rendering said decision and in issuing the aforementioned
resolution.

Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that petitioners’ predicament
is due to their own counsel, for having allegedly relied upon the motion for
postponement of Atty. Navarro and the assurance said to have been given by her,
to the effect that the hearing scheduled for October 17 would definitely be
postponed, for no order granting said motion had been issued, apart from the
fact that petitioners had a plain, adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary
course of law, which was to appeal from said decision and resolution.

Upon consideration of all the circumstances obtaining in this
case, we find that petitioners herein have been denied due process and that the
aforementioned decision and resolution are, therefore, null and void.^[1]

It is not denied that Atty. Navarro, on behalf of Trabasas, as plaintiff in CAR Case No. 30, filed a motion
for postponement of the hearing scheduled to take place in Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur, on
October 17, 1962, upon the ground that she had to be in Dumanjug,
Cebu, on October 18, 1962, to attend to CAR Case No.
415 Cebu, which had been set for hearing
earlier.  Atty. Navarro was a member of
the staff of the Tenancy Mediation Commission and, hence, a public Officer,
whose word petitioners’ counsel had no reason to doubt.  In fact, she did not appear at Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, on October 17, 1962.  Atty. Mabanag, who
had signed the original petition of Trabasas, as well
as the latter, were, however, present at Molave, Zamboanga, on said date. 
If Mabanag was then available, the allegations
made in said motion for postponement were, not merely misleading, but, also,
deceptive.  Indeed, it is implied therein
that Trabasas would have no counsel to assist him at
the hearing of CAR Case No. 30 unless the motion was granted, for, otherwise,
it would have been unnecessary to seek its postponement.

At this point, we must not overlook the fact that the CAR had its
share in placing Atty. Rallon in a difficult
situation, because the motion for postponement was filed on October 2 and was
set for hearing on October 6, and, yet, it was not resolved by the court,
although it had sufficient time to do so before October 17; that, in the
language of Justice Tuason:

” x x x While Hodges’ counsel had no right to assume that Atty.
Guerrero’s motion to postponement would be granted, and good practice perhaps
demanded that they should have made an inquiry about the matter, yet the court
was not entirely justified in expecting the claimant’s attorneys to come over
from a distant province for a trial which through no fault Of theirs could not
be carried out as the court knew or ought to have known.  At the least, the court might have promptly
denied the motion for continuance and informed the parties that the hearing
would take place on the date originally set.”2

that Atty. Rallon
is a resident of Cebu City: and that, he was morally
bound to avoid the expenses necessary to make a trip to Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur, for a
hearing he was reasonably justified in believing it was not likely to take
place, especially considering that this was the first postponement sought in
the case; that it was asked by the very plaintiff therein; that it was filed
over two (2) weeks before the scheduled hearing; that the property involved in
the case is a small parcel of land, barely 3.5 hectares: and that his main
client (Mrs. Pendon) does not appear to be
particularly well off financially.

Even though petitioners counsel may not have been entirely
blameless for having accepted on its face value the allegations made and those
implied in the motion for postponement by an officer of the Republic who
represented Trabasas, it was a grave abuse of discre­tion
on the art of respondent Judge, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, to deny
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and new trial, because Trabazas was thereby allowed to profit by and take
advantage of a mistake committed by petitioners’ counsel due to his (Trabasas) aforementioned motion.  This cannot sanctioned or tolerated by courts
of justice without violating the elementary principles of fair play and due
process, which go to the very roots of our legal system, and without impairing
the people’s faith in the inherent validity and soundness thereof or
undermining the very foundation of the Rule of Law.

It is true that petitioners could he appealed from the decision
and the resolution complained of and that, as a general rule, the writ of
certiorari may be availed of to offset one’s failure to appeal,3 In
the case at bar such failure was due, however, to accident and excusable
neglect on the part of petitioners’ counsel.

In This connection it should be noted that copy of the decision
complained of was received by Atty. Rallon on December 24, 1962. Eleven (11) days
later, or on January 4, 1963,
Atty. Rallon filed his motion for reconsideration and
new trial.  Notice of the order of the
lower court denying the motion was received by him on March 12, Having previously consumed 11 of the 15 days he had to
appeal from said decision, Atty. Rallon had 4 days or
up to March 16, 1963,
within which to perfect the appeal. 
Meanwhile, his office in Cebu
was however, destroyed by fire, which, likewise, consumed his records,
including those of CAR Case No. 30.  Upon
the other hand, the CAR records thereof were not available for examination to
Atty. Rallon unless he went to Cotabato
where the records are kept,4 and this he could not do without Ioss of time, which was vital to his client.  So, Atty. Rallon
did the best he could, by filing his notice of appeal as soon as possible, or
on March18, which turned out to be two (2) days late.  Thereafter, he prepared petition in the case
at bar, which he finished on March 25, and air mailed it, together with 11
copies thereof and a P40.20 money order for the filing fees, on March 27, 1963,
to the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, who received, the same on April 2,
1963.

Considering that the aforementioned fortuitous event,5could have had no effect upon
petitioners herein were it not for Trabasas‘
misleading and deceptive motion for postponement, which is the basic cause of
the situation confronting us, we feel that the equities in this case are
sufficient to warrant its exclusion from the operation of the rule adverted to
above, as an exception thereto.

WHEREFORE, the aforementioned decision and resolution of
respondent Judge are hereby declared null and void, without special
pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Sanchez,
Castro, Angeles, Fernando, and
Capistrano, JJ., concur

Dizon, J., did not take part

Zaldivar, J., on official leave, did not take part.

^[1] Dais v. Court of First Instance, 51 Phil. 396; Cavan v. Wislizenus, 48
Phil. 632.)

2
Hodges v. Barrios, 80 Phil. 751, 753.  See also, Siochi v.
Tirona, 99 Phil. 460.

3
Yucuanseh
Drug Co. vs. National Labor G.R. No. L-9909, April 30, 1957; Caisip,
et al. vs. The Honorable Domingo M. Cabañgon., et al., G.R. Nos. L-14684-86, August 26, 1960; Montejo vs. Hon. Domingo M. Cabañgon, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-17977,
May 30, 1962; Santos vs. Lopez Vda. de Cerdeñola, et al., G.R. No.
L-18412, July 31, 1962.

4
Respondents intimate they are in Ozamis
City.

5
The fire.