CENON VILLANUEVA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE VS. BARBER WILHELMSEN LINE, ET AL., DEFENDANTS. MANILA PORT SERVICE AND MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, INC., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

An appeal, taken by defendants Manila Port Service and Manila Railroad Co.,
Inc., from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the dispositive
part of which reads;

“In view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiif, Cenon Villanueva, ordering the defendants, Manila Port Service and/or
Manila Railroad Company to pay, jointly and severally, to said plaintiff the sum
of P1,179.96, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the
complaint until fully paid, plus the further sum of P300.00 as attorney’s fees
and the costs of the suit.”

“The complaint as against the defendants, Barber-Wilhelmsen Line and
Macondray & Co., Inc., is dismissed without costs.”

Plaintiff Cenon Villanueva was the consignee of two (2) bales of rayon
remnants marked “Milco”, discharged from SS/Torreador, which arrived at the Port
of Manila on June 14, 1957. The shipment was covered by a bill of lading issued
in New York, by defendant Barber-Wilhehnsen Line (the true name of which is
Barber Steamship Line)- hereinafter referred to as the carrier-as owner and/or
operator of said vessel. Defendant Maeondray & Co. Inc.-hereinafter referred
to as the ship agent-is the agent in Manila of said carrier. Although placed by
the carrier and the ship agent into the custody of the Manila Port
Service-hereinafter referred to as the port service-a subsidiary of appellant
Manila Railroad Co.- hereinafter referred to as the arrastre operator as the
sole arrastre operator for the port of Manila, “complete and in good condition”,
the goods were delivered to Villanueva with a shortage of 262 pounds, more or
less, valued at P879.96, for which he filed a provisional claim on July 8, 1957.
The port service rejected the claim upon the ground that it had been filed more
than fifteen (15) days after June 15, 1957, date of the discharge of the goods
from the carrying vessel, or beyond the period, stipulated in paragraph 15 of
the Management Contract between the Manila Port Service and the Bureau of
Customs, as one of the conditions for the validity of a claim for loss, damage,
misdelivery or nondelivery of goods, which was incorporated by reference and
substantially reproduced in the gate pass, as well as in the permit used by the
consignee to take delivery of the merchandise above referred to. The pertinent
part of said paragraph 15 reads:

“* * * in any event the Contractor shall be relieved and released of any and
all responsibility or liability for loss, damage, misdelivery, and/or
non-delivery of goods, unless suit in the Court of proper jurisdiction is
brought within a period of one (1) year from the date of discharge of the goods,
or from the date when the claim for the value of such goods has been rejected or
denied by the CONTRACTOR, provided tluit such claim shall have been filed
with the CONTRACTOR within fifteen (15) days from the date of
discharge of the last package from the carrying vessel. * *
*.”

Maintaining that he was not bound by the provisions of said contract, on
March 25, 1958, plaintiff instituted this action against the carrier, the ship
agent, the port service and the arrastre operator, for the recovery of said sum
of P879.96, plus P300.00, by way of attorney’s fees, in addition to expenses of
litigation.

In their answer, the carrier and the ship agent claimed full discharge from
responsibility upon the aforementioned delivery of the goods to the port
service, whereas the latter and the arrastre operator invoked the aforementioned
paragraph 15 of the management contract. Subsequently, the case was submitted
upon a stipulation of facts, incorporating those already adverted to, for
determination, as the “only issue” between the parties, of the question “whether
or not the 15-day period within which to file claim for shortage or damage to
merchandise” as stipulated in the aforementioned contract, is binding upon the
consignee and bars the present action. Although holding that the carrier and the
ship agent were not responsible for plaintiff’s loss, the Court of First
Instance of Manila resolved the aforementioned issue in the negative, and,
accordingly, rendered judgment as above stated. Hence this appeal.

The question whether the above-quoted paragraph of the management contract is
binding to a consignee, who, though not a party thereto, has taken delivery of
the goods upon presentation of a pass and a delivery permit making reference of
said paragraph and reproducing substantially the provisions thereof, as one of
the conditions of said pass and delivery permit, has already been settled in
several decisions of this Court. In Northern Motors, Inc. vs. Prince
Line, (107 Phil., 253) we said:

“Even therefore, if appellant was rot a signatory to said Management
Contract, it legally became a party thereto when it through its broker, the
Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. obtained the delivery permit and gate pass in the
above manner prescribed by law and, making use of them, demanded front appellee
the delivery of the 33 cases, pursuant to appellees undertaking in virtue of the
very same Management Contract. Again, it became bound when it brought
court action against appellee, also by virtue of the latter’s obligations as the
arrastre contractor under the same Management Contract, for the purpose of
recovering the reasonable value of the missing cme of auto spare parts and
accessories. Under the circumstances, as the trial court aptly observed;
‘Plaintiff should not take advantage of the Management Contract when it suite
him to do so and reject its provisions when it thinks otherwise/ The principle
is the same or similar to that involved in the case of Mendoza vs.
Philippine Air Lines (90 Phil., 836), wherein it was held that-

“* * * even if the LVN Pictures Inc. as consignor of its own initiative and
acting independently of Mendoza for the time being, made nevertheless, when
he, Mendoza appeared at the Pili Air Port armed with the copy of the Air Way
Bill (Exh. 1) demanding the delivery of the shipment to him,
he thereby made himself a party to the contract of transportation. * *
*

“* * * His demand for the delivery of the can of film taf him at the Pili Air
Port maybe regarded as a notice of his acceptance of the stipulation of the
delivery in his favor contained in the contract of carriage, such demand being
one for the fulfillment of the contract of carriage and delivery. In this case
he also made himself a party to the contract, or at least has come to court
to enforce it. His cause of action must necessarily be founded on its
breach.’ (Italics supplied.)”

This view was reiterated in Tomas Grocery vs. Delgado Brothers, (105
Phil., 549; 56 Off. Gaz., [27] 4422), Bernabe vs. Delgado Brothers,
(107 Phil., 287), Bernabe vs. Delgado Brothers, (107 Phil., 679),
Delgado Brothers vs. Li Yao & Co., (107 Phil., 839), Sun Brothers
vs. Manila Port Service, (107 Phil., 988), and Juan Ysmael & Co.,
Inc. vs. United States lines Co., L-14384 (April 30, 1960).

Some other issues may have been raised in this case, such as, for instance,
the sufficiency of the period available to the consignee for the filing of his
claim, but the record before us does not show the date on which he was notified
that he could take delivery of the goods. More important still, both parties
submitted the case in the lower court for determination of only one question,
namely: whether the provision of paragraph 15 of the Management Contract between
the Manila Port Service and the Bureau of Customs is binding upon the consignee,
he not being a party to such contract and not having signed it. Inasmuch as the
j urisdiction of the lower court was thus limited to such question, the
authority of this Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, cannot
extend to any other issue.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the
defendants-appellants are, accordingly, absolved from the complaint, with costs
against the plaintiff-appellee. It is so ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Judgment reversed.