LEONARD GLENN FRANCIS, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE JAIME M. GURAY, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PARANAQUE CITY BRANCH 260 AND MORENA DE JESUS,…

Francis versus Guray

The Case

This is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, brought by Leonard Glenn Francis against Judge Jaime M. Guray, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 260, and against Morena de Jesus. Francis asks the Supreme Court to annul and set aside two orders of the trial court that refused to dismiss a petition for custody of children and habeas corpus filed against him. The case matters because it is a clean teaching vehicle on how a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant through service of summons, and on why substituted service is extraordinary, strict, and easily struck down when the sheriff's return is thin.

Procedural History

Morena de Jesus filed with the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City a petition for custody of children and habeas corpus, with a prayer for support pendente lite, against Leonard Glenn Francis. Francis was served with summons through substituted service at the office of Glenn Maritime Philippines Incorporated. He then filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the trial court had not acquired jurisdiction over him because he is a foreigner residing abroad, and that any writ issued would be enforceable only within the National Capital Region and not in Singapore. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in its order dated October 7, 2010, holding that the summons was properly served under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Francis moved for reconsideration, insisting that he is not a resident as defined under Philippine law and that, in any event, there was no proper substituted service on him. The trial court denied the motion in its order dated November 15, 2010. Francis then went up to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, and that petition is the case now before us.

Facts

Morena de Jesus and Leonard Glenn Francis, a businessman, met in Singapore while she was doing her on-the-job training, and they lived together in a unit at the Grand Shang Tower in Makati City. She gave birth to two children. Sometime in December 2009, they went to Singapore and stayed at the Orchard Park Sweets Hotel.

In April 2010, Francis convinced her to entrust the children to him and to return to the Philippines for a short visit, and he gave her a roundtrip ticket. When she returned to the Philippines, she learned that their unit at the Grand Shang Tower had been vacated and the lease terminated. She called Francis, but he refused to communicate with her and prevented her from seeing the children. Her return ticket to Singapore was cancelled.

In July 2010, she filed the petition for custody and habeas corpus. Summons was served through substituted service at the office of Glenn Maritime Philippines Incorporated, received and acknowledged by Anabelle Bacas, an administrative assistant who claimed to be authorized to receive court process. The sheriff's return stated that on July 19, 2010, service was made at that office through Bacas, described as a person of suitable age and discretion who signed to acknowledge receipt.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Leonard Glenn Francis through the substituted service of summons made at the office of Glenn Maritime Philippines Incorporated.
• Whether or not the trial court gravely abused its discretion in taking cognizance of a case involving a non-resident foreigner in a personal action over the custody of minor children residing abroad.

Applicable Provisions

Section 7, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the provision the trial court relied on, provides:

Section 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

This is the rule whose requirements the Court measures the sheriff's return against, and it is the provision under which the trial court claimed the service was valid.

Section 8 of the old Revised Rules of Court, which the Court treats as the applicable text in this case, provides:

Section 8. Substituted service. If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

The Court breaks this section down into the requirements for a valid substituted service, and it is on these requirements that the case turns.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled that there was no proper substituted service, and therefore the trial court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of Francis. The Court began from the settled rule that jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant's voluntary appearance in court, and that where there is no valid service, any judgment of a court without jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void. In an action strictly in personam, personal service is the preferred mode. Substituted service is permitted, but it is extraordinary in character and in derogation of the usual method of service, so it must faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed requirements.

The Court then examined the sheriff's return and found it wanting. A meticulous scrutiny of the return revealed the absence of material data on serious efforts to serve the summons on Francis in person. There was no indication that the sheriff made several attempts to serve the summons personally. And the administrative assistant who received the summons is not a competent person as defined under the Manotoc doctrine, which requires that the person on whom substituted service is made at the office or regular place of business be the one managing the office or business, such as the president or manager, with sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects of inaction. The Court thus held that there was no proper substituted service.

Having so ruled, the Court said it no longer saw the need to discuss the other issues in the petition, including the argument that the trial court should not have taken cognizance of a case against a non-resident foreigner.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired either by a valid service of summons or by the defendant's voluntary appearance. Absent either, any judgment is null and void. Second, in an action strictly in personam, personal service is the preferred mode, and substituted service is extraordinary and in derogation of the usual method, so it must strictly comply with the requirements of the Rules. Third, for substituted service at the defendant's office or regular place of business under Section 7, Rule 14, the copies must be left with a competent person in charge — one who manages the office or business, such as the president or manager, and who has sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects of inaction. An administrative assistant who merely claims to be authorized does not satisfy this. Fourth, the sheriff's return must narrate in detail the efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons personal service failed, including the dates and times of attempts and the inquiries made; a bare return will not justify substituted service. Fifth, the remedy where service is invalid is not dismissal of the complaint but the issuance of alias summons, following the teaching of Richard Teh versus Court of Appeals.

Disposition

The petition was granted; the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 260 dated October 7, 2010 and November 15, 2010 were annulled and set aside, and the case was referred back to the same court for the issuance of alias summons and a copy of the petition for custody upon Leonard Glenn Francis, and for the continuation of the proceedings with dispatch.

Remember This

Memorize this line: substituted service is extraordinary and in derogation of the usual method of service, so it must strictly comply with the Rules, and service on an administrative assistant is not service on a competent person in charge. Examiners use this case to test the requirements of substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14, the contents of the sheriff's return, and the rule that invalid service means no jurisdiction over the person, with alias summons as the cure.