G.R. No. L-29948. November 26, 1970
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RICARDO PAGKALIWAGAN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for murder rendered on October 30, 1968 by the Court of
First Instance of Quezon.
The information of July 17, 1967 charged the herein
defendant-appellant and one Reynaldo de las Alas
alias “Hapon,” with the crime of murder for
the killing of Aniano Cabaña on May 18, 1967 in
Barrio Pantoc, Sariaya, Quezon, alleging that they conspired together “with
evident premeditation and treachery, taking advantage of their superior
strength as aggravating circumstance” in inflicting upon the deceased
several mortal stab wounds which caused his death. As defendant Reynaldo de las
Alas had not been apprehended and was at large, the trial court ordered motu proprio on August 23, 1967 a separate trial for
the herein defendant-appellant, after his not-guilty plea. After the hearings held on October 30, 1967,
January 29, 1968 and September 23 and 24, 1968, the trial court rendered its
judgment finding the defendant-appellant guilty as charged and sentencing him
“to suffer life imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs of the offended party
in the amount of P6,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency in view of the nature of the penalty
imposed, with the accessories of the law, and to pay the costs of the
proceeding.”
The evidence of three prosecution witnesses given credence by the
trial court as against the defense was thus summarized in its decision: “From their evidence, the prosecution
would want to show to the court that on May 18, 1967, at about five o’clock in
the afternoon, the deceased Aniano Cabaña and his
companion Segundo Balsomo were walking home from
Barrio Limbon, Sariaya, Quezon, where they attended the barrio fiesta, taking the
route of the railroad track. While these
two were thus walking home they met on the way Reynaldo de las
Alas and Ricardo Pagkaliwagan who were also walking
home in the same direction where they were going, also coming from the barrio
fiesta of Limbon.
So that all of these four walked home following the railroad track one
after the other, with Segundo Balsomo first, followed
by Reynaldo de las Alas; then came Aniano Cabaña, followed by Ricardo Pagkaliwagan;
that while these four were thus walking, Aniano
Cabaña stabbed Reynaldo de las Alas, who was in front
of him, at the back and that made Reynaldo de las
Alas tell Segundo Balsomo that his companion
(referring to Aniano Cabaña) is a traitor, at the
same time he (Reynaldo) drew his own knife to stab Aniano
Cabaña and at that juncture Segundo Balsomo shouted
to Cabaña, telling the latter to run away which he did and Reynaldo de las Alas, together with Ricardo Pagkaliwagan,
gave chase to Aniano Cabaña, that on
overtaking Aniano Cabaña, Reynaldo de las Alas stabbed Cabaña
while Ricardo Pagkaliwagan, who was armed with
bolo, stood by the side of Aniano Cabaña while the
latter was being stabbed by Reynaldo de las Alas,
after which the two ran away passing by the house of Clemente
de Chavez who was then the barrio lieutenant of Barrio Pantoc,
Sariaya, where the incident happened.”[1]
The trial court arrived at its conclusion “that the theory
of the prosecution is nearer the truth if not the actual truth of what
transpired” in this wise:
“This is so because the evidence for the prosecution has
satisfactorily established that after Aniano Cabaña
stabbed Reynaldo de las Alas on the back while
Segundo Balsomo, Reynaldo de las
Alas, Aniano Cabaña and Ricardo Pagkaliwagan
were walking home from Barrio Limbon, Aniano Cabaña ran away chased by Reynaldo de las Alas and Ricardo Pagkaliwagan. This is proved by the testimony of the
prosecution witness Segundo Balsomo, corroborated by
defense witness Crispulo Camo,
with the exception of the fact that Camo did not
mention the presence of the accused Ricardo Pagkaliwagan.
“The evidence of the prosecution has also satisfactorily
established that Aniano Cabaña, who was chased by
Reynaldo de las Alas and Ricardo Pagkaliwagan,
was actually stabbed to death by Reynaldo de las Alas
in the presence of Ricardo Pagkaliwagan who was
holding a bolo, apparently standing as guard to prevent anyone from helping Aniano Cabaña who was being stabbed to death by Reynaldo de
las Alas. This
fact was testified to by eyewitness Pepito Soria and corroborated by Clemente
de Chavez.”
It is obvious from the foregoing recitation of the trial court
that the appellant’s co-accused, Alas, who has remained at large, chased and
stabbed the deceased Cabaña to death because of the deceased’s treacherous act
of first having stabbed Alas in the back as they were walking along the
railroad track; that appellant had no actual or direct participation in the
killing; and that no evidence to prove conspiracy between him and Alas had been
adduced.
The trial court, however, inferred conspiracy from “the act
of the accused . . . in helping Reynaldo de las Alas
chase the deceased Aniano Cabaña and that his act of
standing by the side of Reynaldo de las Alas with a
bolo in hand while Reynaldo de las Alas was stabbing
to death Aniano Cabaña” and thus rationalized
its guilty verdict against appellant:
“While it is true that the prosecution did not adduce evidence
to prove conspiracy and to establish the fact that the accused Ricardo Pagkliwagan laid a hand on the deceased Aniano
Cabaña, the evidence for the prosecution is complete with proof to
satisfactorily establish and convince the court that the accused Ricardo Pagkaliwagan is a co-principal by separate and independent
act. Conspiracy can be inferred and
proven by the acts of the accused and in the instant case, the act of
the accused Ricardo Pagkaliwagan in helping Reynaldo
de las Alas chase the deceased Aniano
Cabaña and that his act of standing by the side of Reynaldo de las Alas with a bolo in hand while Reynaldo de las Alas was stabbing to death Aniano
Cabaña, leaves no doubt that conspiracy between the accused Reynaldo
de las Alas and Ricardo Pagkaliwagan
exists, considering that the accused Reynaldo de las
Alas was chasing the deceased Aniano Cabaña with a
knife with the intent to stab the deceased.
‘While it is true that the evidence for the prosecution failed
to establish the fact of actual and direct participation of the accused Ricardo
Pagkaliwagan in the stabbing to death of the deceased
Aniano Cabaña, nevertheless the prosecution
established that he stood guard by the side of Reynaldo de las Alas while the latter was stabbing to death Aniano Cabaña, and the accused Ricardo Pagkaliwagan
while standing by the side of the killer was holding a bolo, apparently to
prevent anybody from helping Aniano Cabaña while his
co-accused Reynaldo de las Alas was stabbing the deceased
Cabaña.
“In order to warrant the conviction as principal in the crime of
murder, it is not necessary that the defendant should have taken an active part
and material part in its commission, but such conviction will also be sustained
if it appears that the defendant willingly stayed with those who actually committed
the crime and voluntarily present from the time it was committed until it was
consummated. As in this case, the
accused Ricardo Pagkaliwagan, like an intrepid
gladiator, stood by the side of his co-accused Reynaldo de las
Alas while the latter was stabbing to death Aninano
Cabaña on the railroad track. Lastly,
the crime committed by the accused is murder because of the fact that the
deceased Aniano Cabaña was drunk and was lying on the
railroad track when he was stabbed to death, besides the presence of superior
strength it being two accused as against one drunken person who is the deceased
in this case.”[2]
On appeal, counsel de-oficio[3] Fortunato de Leon has discharged his task with commendable
zeal and submitted a detailed and exhaustive 65-page brief printed at his own
expense, which has truly aided the Court in its review of the record. Atty. de Leon has marshalled
seven assigned errors against the judgment of conviction, principally, that
the trial court erred in finding the appellant guilty of murder by conspiracy,
notwithstanding that no evidence thereof had been adduced by the prosecution,
simply on the basis of purely circumstantial evidence entirely consistent with
the appellant’s innocence but which the Court held against the appellant “on
mere suspicion, inferences and opinion which have no basis and foundation on
fact of record.”
The Court finds the appeal well taken.
1. As indicated above, the
trial court, in the face of the admitted void of evidence to prove conspiracy
and that appellant had any actual and direct participation in the killing,
relied simply on two links which it considered as a sufficient chain of circumstantial
evidence to warrant the appellant’s conviction as principal in the crime of
murder. These two links were: (a) That appellant helped Alas chase the
deceased Cabaña, after Cabaña had first treacherously stabbed Alas in the back,
based on the testimony of prosecution witness Segundo Balsomo,
and (b) That appellant stood by the side of Alas with a bolo in hand while Alas
was stabbing the deceased to death as testified by another prosecution witness Pepito Soria. As will presently be shown, the Court finds
these circumstances, assuming them to be proven, insufficient to sustain a
conviction for conspiracy. Furthermore,
they fail to satisfy the test for accepting circumstantial evidence as proof
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt – that the series of circumstances duly proved
must be consistent with each other and that each and every circumstance must be
consistent with the accused’s guilt and inconsistent
with his innocence.[4]
2. To start with, these two
circumstances are insufficient to sustain a conviction for conspiracy since
“evidence of actual cooperation, rather than mere cognizance, acquiescence
or approval of an unlawful act is required.”[5]
Then, the circumstance of appellant’s having allegedly helped Alas chase the
deceased is utterly inconsistent with the other circumstance that when Alas
caught up with the deceased and was stabbing him to death, the appellant merely
stood by the side with a bolo, holding it not in an aggressive stance but
merely “downwards.”[6]
These two circumstances cannot then be deemed to be convincing and conclusive
of appellant’s guilt nor inconsistent with his innocence.
According to the prosecution’s evidence furthermore, appellant
was walking behind the deceased Cabaña when Cabaña first stabbed Alas, who was
in front of him, in the back without any previous provocation, argument,
commotion or grudge. If indeed, a
conspiracy existed between Alas and appellant to kill Cabaña, then it is
inexplicable why appellant did not then and there act and attack Cabaña. The fact of record, however, is that the
trial court’s finding that appellant in fact helped Alas chase the deceased
Cabaña after the latter’s sudden attack on Alas cannot itself be said to be a
proven fact. The only testimonial
evidence on this is Balsomo’s. And in answer to the trial court’s own
questions after his examination by the parties’ counsels, this witness testified
that “what I saw at the time was that when Ricardo de las
Alas was chasing Cabaña I saw Ricardo Pagkaliwagan
chasing also, but I don’t know whether he was chasing Cabaña or de las Alas.”[7]
3. The second and other
link of circumstance as relied upon by the trial court was the appellant’s act
of “standing by the side of Reynaldo de las Alas
with a bolo in hand while Reynaldo de las Alas was
stabbing to death Aniano Cabaña.” The precise
testimony of Soria, the only prosecution witness as
to the actual commission of the crime, was that Alas was “standing on the
railway” stabbing Cabaña “many times”, while appellant was
“two meters” from them, as expressly noted on the record by
the trial court, holding a bolo “downwards.”[8]
This witness further testified as to the conversation between Alas and Cabaña at
their fight that Alas said to Cabaña ‘Sigi, laban (Go ahead, fight).”[9]
The evidence, therefore does not bear out the trial court’s conclusion that
appellant stood by the side of Alas as Alas stabbed Cabaña to death. And there is not the least bit of evidence to
warrant or justify the trial court’s bare and extrapolated conclusion that
appellant “stood guard by the side of Alas while the latter was
stabbing to death Aniano Cabaña ..
apparently to prevent anybody from helping Aniano
Cabaña” and that appellant “like an intrepid gladiator, stood
by the side of his co-accused Alas while the latter was stabbing to death Aniano Cabaña on the railroad track.”[10]
The trial court’s statement that appellant stood guard to prevent
anybody from helping the deceased was based on mere unwarranted assumption and
speculation, since according to the prosecution’s evidence itself, there was
nobody else but the three of them, viz, the two
protagonists and Soria, Balsomo,
according to his own testimony, had run away when Alas after having been
stabbed in the back by Cabaña chased the latter and did not even know about the
killing, while Soria merely chanced upon the scene
afterwards and immediately turned back and went home because he was afraid.[11]
Needless to say, the trial court in ruling that “In order to warrant the
conviction as principal in the crime of murder, it is not necessary that the
defendant should have taken an active part and material part in is commission,
but such conviction will also be sustained if it appears that the defendant
willingly stayed with those who actually committed the crime and voluntarily
present from the time it was committed until it was consummated” makes a
grossly erroneous statement that cannot receive the Court’s sanction.
4. The State, in its brief,
consequently disagreed with the trial court’s finding of murder “since it
appears from the evidence that the victim was not lying prostrate on the
railroad track when assaulted. As
testified by prosecution witness Segundo Balsomo,
after hearing the accused Reynaldo de las Alas say,
“Napakataksil naman ang kasama mo,” he saw the
victim holding a balisong and Reynaldo himself
wounded on the back pulling out a balisong and
opening it, whereupon the fight ensued (pp. 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 20, 21, t.s.n.). The offense
committed, is, therefore, homicide and not murder.”
The Court finds regrettably that both the State’s brief as well
as the trial court’s decision were deficient in two vital particulars in that
(a) both merely assumed unwarrantedly contrary to the evidence the existence of
a conspiracy and (b) both accepted as gospel truth the prosecution version
despite its inadequacy and many inconsistencies and did not even discuss, much
less state any reason, for rejecting appellant’s own version of the incident.
Thus, the State’s brief states with respect to the alleged
conspiracy that “(F)rom the proven fact that
after the victim was stabbed by Reynaldo, the appellant who was armed with a gulukan joined his co-defendant in pursuing and
attacking the victim, who sustained 14 wounds, some caused by a sharp pointed
instrument and others by a balisong or gulukan (Exhibit B, supra, pp. 25, 26, 27,
28, t. s. n.), there can be no doubt that the appellant had participated directly
either as a co-principal or co-conspirator in killing the victim.” From
this gratuitous premise, the State contends that “Conspiracy having been
proved, it is of no moment that the appellant did not participate in the actual
killing, for once conspiracy is shown, the act of one
is the act of all.”
As already shown above, there is no evidence of record to justify
the State’s bare statement that appellant “joined his co-defendant in pursuing
and attacking the victim.” The State in citing the 14 wounds sustained by
Cabaña “some by a sharp pointed instrument and others by a balisong or gulukan”
apparently would attribute these wounds to both Alas and appellant — contrary
to its own evidence that appellant did not participate in the actual
killing. The trial court itself made no
such finding in its decision.
Furthermore, the State did not accurately state its own evidence which
was that all the deceased’s incised wounds, specified one by one by the municipal
health officer, Dr. G. Rodriguez, in testifying on his necropsy report,
Exhibit B, were inflicted by “a sharp pointed instrument”, i.e.
“by a balisong or gulukan“,[12]
and not, as the State would insinuate now, that the wounds were inflicted by
two different weapons.
5. Neither the trial court
nor the State discussed appellant’s testimony on his own behalf, the substance
of which may thus be briefly stated: that on the day in question, he had not
gone to the barrio fiesta at Limbon but was at his
home in Talaan taking care of his children, when his
neighbor, Alas, arrived alone and asked to be accompanied to the hospital
because he (Alas) was wounded (by Cabaña); on their way to the hospital, they
met Balsomo and Cabaña who was holding a balisong and these two shouted at them and
approached them; that Alas then drew his knife also, and as appellant tried to
pacify the protagonists, Balsomo boxed him saying
“Let them alone, because he (Cabaña) was the one who stabbed Alas”;
that appellant fell on his back some six meters away and “when (appellant)
stood up (he) saw Segundo Balsomo holding Aniano Cabaña while Alas was stabbing him;” and that
as Cabaña was falling down, Balsomo approached him
(appellant) in a threatening manner and he ran away and went home.[13]
This version of appellant, which flatly accuses the accuser Balsomo, who claimed in his testimony to have run away from
fear after Alas chased the deceased – not to his own home but to the home of
his brother-in-law, where, according to his own affidavit, he slept until the
police woke him up at 10:00 P. M. to investigate him for the killing[14]
– stands unrefuted on the record. Worse, the trial court, by some inversive process, concluded simply because appellant, a
simple farmer, answered candidly on cross-examination that he knew of no reason
why Balsomo would testify against him, that Balsomo had no reason to concoct his testimony and must
have told the truth — notwithstanding that per appellant’s unrefuted
testimony, Balsomo had directly helped Alas in the
killing by holding the deceased and would thus have every reason to exculpate
himself and shift the blame to an other.
6. So many other
circumstances support the presumption of appellant’s innocence and his being
entitled to a verdict of acquittal in the absence of proof showing his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt:[15]
lack of motive or grudge, and lack of any previous altercation or grudge
between the protagonists; non-presentation of the weapon allegedly held by him;
the fact that the deceased himself was the aggressor against Alas; appellant’s
passivity, doing nothing to impede Cabaña upon the latter’s stabbing Alas in
the back, and making no move either to aid Alas, which negates the
prosecution’s theory that appellant acted “in concert” with
Alas. The further overriding
circumstance that the protagonists, as Well as the prosecution witnesses had
been to the barrio fiesta at Limbon, Soria admitting categorically that he was “under the
influence of alcohol”[16]
and Balsomo likewise evasively admitting that
“we drank something, but we were not so drunk”[17]
gives rise to grave doubts that they could have faithfully perceived and
recollected the incidents that led to the senseless killing as they happened on
that fateful afternoon. Indeed,
reviewing the whole record, Attorney de-oficio
de Leon’s submission “that the whole incident was a case of a casual
quarrel by people under the influence of liquor, culminating in violence and
death of the victim” seems just about a fair summing up of the case.
7. It was therefore gross
error for the trial court to render its judgment of conviction on its bare
conclusion that it “observed the witnesses for the prosecution to be
truthful and reliable witnesses considering their demeanor on the witness
stand”, for as shown above, there were a number of circumstances, e. g.
the admitted fact of their being under the influence of alcohol at the time of
the incident that cast grave doubt upon their credibility. And it is difficult to comprehend that the
trial court would consider Balsomo to be
“truthful and reliable”, when at the trial it had expressed its
disbelief and singled out this witness — from among all the witnesses for the
prosecution and defense — to admonish him as to whether he knew the value of
his oath and that if he told a lie he would go to jail.[18]
And while the Court on appeal would normally not disturb the
findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses in view of the
latter’s advantage of observing at first hand their demeanor in giving their
testimony, the Court has consistently held that this rule of appreciation of
evidence “must bow to the superior and immutable rule that the guilt of
the accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, because the law presumes
that a defendant is innocent and this presumption must prevail unless
overturned by competent and credible proof.”[19]
In the case at bar, even if it were to be conceded that the prosecution witnesses
testified credibly and truthfully, the circumstances testified to by them — as
against the admitted absence of conspiracy and actual and direct participation
on the part of appellant — can by no measure be held to have overcome the
presumption of innocence in appellant’s favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed
and set aside. The defendant-appellant
Ricardo Pagkaliwagan is hereby acquitted of the
charge against him with costs de oficio
and his immediate discharge from custody, unless he is held on some other
valid charge, is hereby ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro,
Fernando, Barredo, and
Villamor, JJ., concur.
Dizon and
Makasiar, JJ., on leave.
[1]
Emphasis supplied.
[2]
Emphasis supplied.
[3]
Defendant-appellant was also represented in the proceedings below by counsel de-oficio, Atty. Eulogio Alzaga.
[4] “Sec. 5. Circumstantial evidence,
when sufficient. -- Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:
(a) There is more than one
circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (Rule 133). People vs. Mahlon, 92 Phil. 883 (1953) and cases cited; People vs.
Labita, 99 Phil. 1068 (September 15, 1956); People vs.
Alipis, 14 SCRA 297 (1965).
[5] People vs. Malon, supra,
fn. 4.
[6] T.s.n., pp. 3-4.
[7]
T. s.n., p. 24, emphasis supplied.
[8] T.s.n., pp. 3-4.
[9] T.s.n., p. 6.
[10]
Emphasis furnished.
[11] T.s.n., p. 8.
[12] T.s.n., pp. 25-28; emphasis furnished.
[13] T.s.n., p. 48 et
seq.
[14]
Record, p. 2.
[15] Rule 133, sec. 2.
[16] T.s.n., p. 6.
[17]
Idem, p. 22.
[18] T.s.n., p. 25.
[19]
People vs. Alto, 26 SCRA, 342 (Nov. 29, 1968).