AMADO E. DE VERA, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE PEDRO SAMSON C. ANIMAS AND THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF SOUTH COTABATO, RESPONDENTS.

De Vera versus Animas

The Case

This is a petition for the writ of habeas corpus filed by Amado E. de Vera against Judge Pedro Samson C. Animas and the Provincial Warden of South Cotabato. De Vera had been convicted of falsification of public documents and his conviction had become final, yet he sought release from confinement on the ground that he had applied for amnesty under a presidential decree. The case matters because it teaches the limits of the writ of habeas corpus: the writ is broad enough to reach any illegal detention, but it is not the proper vehicle to enforce a claim for amnesty, which belongs to the executive and to the agency the President designates.

Procedural History

De Vera was convicted by the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato in a criminal case for falsification of public documents. His conviction became final because he failed to prosecute his appeal. Before the judgment could be promulgated, he filed a motion to suspend the promulgation, relying on his application for amnesty. Respondent Judge Animas denied the motion and ordered his commitment. De Vera then filed this petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court. The Court granted the writ and set the return and hearing. On the hearing date, the Court granted the Solicitor General an extension to file the return and ordered the temporary commitment of the petitioner to Camp General Aguinaldo. The Solicitor General later filed the return, conceding that the respondents would interpose no objection to allowing the petitioner to take the proper steps to avail himself of amnesty and to the transmittal of the criminal records to the Commission on Elections. The Court then directed the respondent Judge to transmit the records to the Court, and the case became ripe for resolution.

Facts

Amado E. de Vera was convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents, specifically in connection with the tampering of election returns in the November 1967 elections in Polomolok, South Cotabato. His conviction reached finality after he failed to prosecute his appeal.

Before the judgment could be promulgated, de Vera filed a motion for the suspension of the promulgation of judgment, invoking his application for amnesty under Presidential Decree No. 95, which he described as a general amnesty. Respondent Judge Pedro Samson C. Animas denied the motion and ordered his commitment. De Vera then filed this petition for habeas corpus, contending that his confinement was tainted with illegality.

The Supreme Court granted the writ and heard the parties. The Solicitor General, in the return, maintained that the confinement was not illegal because the judgment had become final, but conceded that in light of the policy of liberalism in the recent amnesty decrees, the respondents would not object to allowing the petitioner to take the necessary steps to avail himself of amnesty under Presidential Decree No. 433, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 598, and to the transmittal of the criminal records to the Commission on Elections.

Issues

• Whether or not the writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to secure the release of a convict whose judgment of conviction has become final, on the ground that he has applied for amnesty.
• Whether or not the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in denying the motion to suspend the promulgation of judgment and in ordering the commitment of the petitioner.
• Whether or not the Commission on Elections is the appropriate agency to pass upon the petitioner's application for amnesty.

Applicable Provisions

Presidential Decree No. 95, the amnesty decree invoked by the petitioner, provides:

Presidential Decree No. 95 granting what was referred to in said application as a general amnesty.

This decree is the basis of the petitioner's claim that his confinement is illegal because he is entitled to amnesty.

Presidential Decree No. 433, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 598, provides:

Presidential Decree No. 433 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 598.

These decrees embody the policy of liberalism with respect to amnesty cases and designate the Commission on Elections as the agency to pass upon applications for amnesty.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petition hardly suffices for the grant of the liberty sought. The petitioner admitted that his conviction had reached the stage of finality, so on its face the petition hardly presented a case of illegal deprivation of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus is not the appropriate vehicle for granting the plea to be released from detention based on a claim for amnesty.

On the second issue, the Court held that the respondent Judge was not ousted of jurisdiction and acted in accordance with law. The order of commitment was valid, and the denial of the motion to suspend the promulgation of judgment was proper. The Court noted that this is a case appropriate for the exercise of executive clemency, and there is no question that the petitioner could avail himself of the amnesty issued by the President if he should fall within its terms and in accordance with the procedure prescribed.

On the third issue, the Court held that it is the Commission on Elections which is the appropriate agency designated by the President to pass upon the application for amnesty. While the petition is not the appropriate vehicle for granting the plea, it nonetheless served a useful purpose as a confirmation of the latitudinarian scope of the writ of habeas corpus to assure judicial inquiry into the legality of a detention or restraint.

Doctrine

The writ of habeas corpus is a protean writ of latitudinarian scope. It reaches any illegal detention or restraint of liberty and assures judicial inquiry into the legality of that detention. However, the writ is not the proper remedy to enforce a claim for amnesty. Amnesty is a matter of executive clemency, and the applicant must avail himself of the procedure prescribed by the amnesty decree and submit his application to the agency designated by the President, which in this case is the Commission on Elections. A convict whose judgment has become final cannot use habeas corpus to obtain release on the ground of a pending amnesty application.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed. The records of the criminal case were transmitted to the Commission on Elections to enable it to pass upon the application for clemency, and the temporary commitment of the petitioner in Camp General Aguinaldo stood.

Remember This

Habeas corpus tests the legality of detention, not the merits of an amnesty claim; amnesty belongs to the executive and to the agency the President designates. Examiners use this case to test the scope and limits of the writ of habeas corpus and the distinction between judicial remedies and executive clemency.