ALMARIO LICUDAN, PETITIONER, VS. REMEGIO L. ALEJANDRO, RESPONDENT.

Licudan versus Alejandro

The Case

This is the case of Licudan versus Alejandro, a petition for review on certiorari brought under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Remegio Alejandro sued Almario Licudan for unlawful detainer before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Pililla-Jalajala in Rizal, and the question that travels all the way to the Supreme Court is deceptively simple: did the complaint allege enough to make out unlawful detainer by tolerance, and did the lower courts therefore have jurisdiction to eject the occupant? The case matters because it restates, in clean and quotable form, the rule that the allegations of the complaint determine the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court, and it explains how tolerance works as a ground for ejectment.

Procedural History

Alejandro filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with damages before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Pililla-Jalajala. That court rendered judgment in favor of Alejandro, ordering Licudan and all persons claiming rights under him to vacate the portion of the land covered by the transfer certificate of title, to remove all improvements, to surrender possession peacefully, to pay reasonable rentals of 500 pesos per month computed from the date of the last demand, and to pay 20,000 pesos representing attorney's fees and costs of suit.

Licudan appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Morong in Rizal, Branch 78. That court, in a decision dated February 26, 2003, affirmed the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court in its entirety. Licudan then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 42, assigning three errors: that the Regional Trial Court erred in affirming the order to vacate, in affirming the award of reasonable rentals, and in affirming the decision without considering that the case had not gone through barangay conciliation and mediation.

Facts

Remegio Alejandro is the registered owner of a lot on Naval Street, Barangay Malaya, Pililla, Rizal, as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title Number M-21781 issued to him on December 12, 1984. In 1985, Alejandro allowed Almario Licudan to occupy the lot without paying any rentals. The complaint alleged that this possession was by mere tolerance, the occupant having been allowed through Alejandro's mother, Luz Alejandro.

In 2001, Alejandro needed the property for his personal use. He verbally demanded that Licudan vacate and gave him three months to do so. Licudan refused. Alejandro then sent a letter through counsel demanding that Licudan vacate within 30 days from receipt. Licudan still refused.

Alejandro filed the complaint for unlawful detainer with damages. Licudan's defense was that he had inherited the land from his parents, Salvador Licudan and Florencia Mendoza, who had occupied it for more than fifty years. The trial court found that he offered no evidence to prove this claim. The complaint was filed within one year from the time the written demand was received by Licudan.

Issues

• Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Morong in Rizal, Branch 78, erred in affirming the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
• Whether or not the Municipal Circuit Trial Court had jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case, the same being determined by the allegations of the complaint.
• Whether or not the complaint sufficiently alleged unlawful detainer by tolerance, with the action filed within one year from the written demand.
• Whether or not Licudan's claim of inheritance from his parents was substantiated by evidence.

Applicable Provisions

The decision applies the settled rule that the allegations of the complaint determine the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court, and it treats tolerance as a ground for unlawful detainer. The decision quotes the allegation of the complaint itself, which reads:

sometime in the year 1985, defendant was allowed and tolerated by the herein plaintiff thru the latter's mother Luz L. Alejandro, to possess and occupy a portion of the subject land.

This allegation is what anchors the case in unlawful detainer by tolerance, because tolerance must be present from the start of the possession sought to be recovered.

The decision also quotes with approval the pronouncement of the Regional Trial Court of Morong in Rizal, Branch 78:

The fact stands that the plaintiff is the registered owner of Transfer Certificate of Title No. M-21781 and admittedly tolerated the occupation of his property through his mother. It is basic that from the time the plaintiff demanded for the defendant to vacate the premises, the tolerance ceased. The right to file this action is available and jurisdiction is well within the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) that heard the case.

This passage supplies the operative rule: tolerance ceases upon demand, and from that moment the occupant's possession becomes unlawful and ejectment may be filed.

Ruling

The Court found the petition bereft of merit and resolved the issues against Licudan.

On jurisdiction, the Court held that the nature of the action is determined from the facts averred in the complaint as constituting the cause of action. The settled principle is that the allegations of the complaint determine the nature of the action and consequently the jurisdiction of the courts. This rule applies whether or not the complainant is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted, because that is a matter resolved only after and as a result of the trial.

On tolerance, the Court held that tolerance as a ground for unlawful detainer must be present from the start of the possession sought to be recovered. The complaint clearly alleged that Licudan's possession by mere tolerance started in 1985, and it clearly alleged that the complaint was filed within one year from the time the written demand of counsel was received by Licudan and the latter still failed to vacate despite the demand.

On the reliance on Deveza versus Montecillo, the Court held it misplaced. In that case there was no allegation that the petitioners were deprived of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, which would bring the case within forcible entry, nor any allegation that the respondent withheld possession after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied. In fact, in that case the petitioners admitted that the respondent had been in possession for more than one year prior to the institution of the complaint. The facts there did not meet the requirement for unlawful detainer or forcible entry.

On the claim of inheritance, the Court gave it no weight because, as the trial court correctly observed, Licudan did not adduce any evidence to prove it. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under the Rules.

The Court then stated the governing rule: an unlawful detainer case contemplates a situation where the possession by the defendant of the property in dispute was originally lawful, but becomes unlawful by the termination of the right to possess said property by virtue of a contract, express or implied. Where possession by the defendant is at the tolerance of the plaintiff, the defendant is bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, and if he fails to do so, a case for ejectment may be instituted against him.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, the allegations of the complaint determine the nature of the action and consequently the jurisdiction of the courts; this holds whether or not the complainant is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted. Second, tolerance as a ground for unlawful detainer must be present from the start of the possession sought to be recovered. Third, where possession is by tolerance, the defendant is bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand, and failure to do so makes the possession unlawful and opens the door to ejectment. Fourth, an unlawful detainer case contemplates possession that was originally lawful but became unlawful by the termination of the right to possess by virtue of a contract, express or implied. Fifth, bare allegations unsubstantiated by evidence are not equivalent to proof.

Disposition

The petition for review was denied for lack of merit, and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Morong in Rizal, Branch 78, dated February 26, 2003, affirming in its entirety the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Pililla-Jalajala, was affirmed. Alejandro won.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the allegations of the complaint determine the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court, and tolerance must be present from the start of possession. Examiners use this case to test unlawful detainer by tolerance, the one-year period counted from the written demand, and the rule that bare allegations are not proof.