ERNESTO RIEGO, CLAUDIO VILLAPA, SR., TEODORO ABA, PRISCILLA ASIS, TOMASA CIPRIANO, TEODY VENZON, GAUDENCIO JUAN, RAFAEL PACLABARE, VICTOR PUDDAO, FELICISIMO REYES, ERNESTO LOPEZ…

Leachon versus Riego

The Case

This is an administrative case filed with the Office of the Court Administrator against Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Junior, Presiding Judge of a Regional Trial Court branch in Quezon City. Fifteen complainants charged him with manifest partiality, knowingly rendering an unjust and oppressive order, and misconduct, arising from an injunction case pending in his sala. The case matters because it draws the line between a judge's erroneous judgment, which is corrected only by appeal, and a judge's continuing to act after he has lost jurisdiction, which is a proper ground for administrative sanction. It also teaches the requisites for execution pending appeal under the Rules of Court.

Procedural History

The complainants filed a complaint for injunction with a prayer for a temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, and the case was raffled to the sala of the respondent judge. After hearing, he denied the preliminary injunction, dismissed the complaint, and ordered the demolition of the complainants' houses, deferring execution until after the Christmas season. The complainants filed a notice of appeal, and the Court of Appeals gave due course to it and directed the trial court to transmit the records for review. The respondent judge nonetheless granted the defendants' motion for execution pending appeal. The complainants then questioned that order by certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which issued a temporary restraining order and later rendered a decision finding that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion and permanently enjoining the implementation of the order. The complainants filed this administrative case on the same day that decision was promulgated, and the Office of the Court Administrator referred it to the Supreme Court for appropriate action.

Facts

On the first of December, 1995, the complainants filed a complaint for injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, to stop Claudine Borlongan and others from summarily demolishing their houses. The case was raffled to the sala of the respondent judge. The defendants filed an opposition with a motion to dismiss, and a hearing on the preliminary injunction was held on the fifth of December, 1995.

Three days later, the respondent judge issued an order denying the preliminary injunction and dismissing the complaint. He further ordered the demolition of the complainants' houses, but in deference to the Christmas season he deferred its execution until the first of January, 1996. The complainants filed their notice of appeal, and the Court of Appeals gave due course to it and directed the trial court to transmit the records for review. On the twenty-seventh of December, 1995, the trial court's sheriff served on the complainants' counsel a motion for execution pending appeal set for hearing two days later, which did not comply with the three-day notice rule. The complainants filed their opposition, contending that the respondent judge had lost jurisdiction with the perfection of the appeal. When counsel appeared on the date set for hearing, he was informed that the respondent judge had already issued an order of even date granting the motion.

The complainants questioned that order by certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which issued a temporary restraining order on the second of January, 1996. On the twenty-fourth of January, 1996, a writ of execution was issued by the respondent judge's officer in charge and implemented the same day without notice to the complainants or their counsel. On the fifteenth of February, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision finding that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion and permanently enjoining the implementation of the order. The demolition and eviction were nonetheless completed on the twenty-ninth of January, 1996.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge may be held administratively liable for manifest partiality, knowingly rendering an unjust and oppressive order, and misconduct, in dismissing the complaint for injunction.
• Whether or not the respondent judge may be administratively sanctioned for issuing an order of execution pending appeal after the complainants had perfected their appeal and after the trial court had been ordered to transmit the records to the appellate court.
• Whether or not the respondent judge may be held liable for entertaining litigants inside his office under suspicious circumstances.

Applicable Provisions

Section 4 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which the respondent judge invoked to justify execution pending appeal, provides:

Section 4. Order of execution pending appeal. Execution pending appeal may be allowed in the discretion of the court, on motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party, and on such terms and conditions as may be just.

This provision bears on the case because the respondent judge relied on it, yet the Court found that he had already lost jurisdiction to act on the motion, and that he failed to require a bond to support the application.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the respondent judge may not be disciplined for his dismissal of the complaint. Although the Court of Appeals found that he abused his discretion, it was not satisfactorily shown that he acted in bad faith, with malice, or in wilful disregard of a litigant's right. The Court explained that not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his official duties makes him liable, and that in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity do not always amount to misconduct although such acts may be erroneous. A judge may not be disciplined for an error of judgment unless there is proof that the error was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. Here, the respondent judge relied in good faith on the final rulings in two previous cases involving the same parties and subject matter, believing that the third case was a mere reiteration of issues already laid to rest.

On the second issue, the Court held that the respondent judge merits administrative sanction. Although his order dismissing the complaint was timely appealed, he proceeded to issue an order directing the execution of his appealed order, which eventually resulted in the demolition of the complainants' houses. On top of this, he did not require a bond to support the application for a writ of execution. The Court ruled that under the circumstances, the respondent judge had lost jurisdiction to entertain the motion for execution after the perfection of the appeal and after the lower court had been ordered to transmit the records to the appellate court for review. His precipitate action resulted in legal complications and hardship on the part of the complainants.

On the third issue, the Court dismissed the charge that he entertained litigants in his office under suspicious circumstances for lack of basis and merit.

Doctrine

A judge may not be disciplined for an error of judgment unless there is proof that the error was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity do not always amount to misconduct although such acts may be erroneous. However, a judge who continues to act on a motion for execution pending appeal after the perfection of the appeal, and after the trial court has been ordered to transmit the records to the appellate court, acts without jurisdiction and may be administratively sanctioned. Execution pending appeal under Section 4 of Rule 39 requires a motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party, and the court may impose such terms and conditions as may be just, including a bond.

Disposition

The Court reprimanded Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Junior, for continuing to act in the injunction case when he had lost jurisdiction over it, and dismissed the remaining charge for lack of merit.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a judge is not disciplined for a mere error of judgment absent bad faith, but he is sanctioned for continuing to act after he has lost jurisdiction. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between an erroneous order, correctable by appeal, and the act of issuing execution pending appeal after the appeal has been perfected.