PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. NOEL ORONAN, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
MACALINO, J:
The Case
Assailed in this appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court is the Judgment[1] (“Assailed Judgment”) dated August 7, 2012 0f the Regional Trial Court (“RTC”) of XXX[2], Branch 60, in Criminal Case No. IR-4878 for violation of Sec. 5(b), Art. III of Republic Act No. 7610 (“R.A. 7610”), otherwise known as the “Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.” The fallo of the Assailed Judgment reads:
“WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused NOEL ORONAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of child abuse defined and penalized under Sec. 5, (b), Article III, Republic Act No. 7610. Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 15 years, 6 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum; and to pay [AAA] civil indemnity of P50,000.00, moral damages of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.”[3]
The Facts
In an Information[4] dated March 1, 1999, Accused-Appellant Noel Oronan (“Accused-Appellant”) was charged with violation of Sec. 5(b), Art. III of R.A. 7610, committed as follows:
“That on or about the 21st day of October 1998 at around 7:00 o’clock in the evening inside the ‘bahay kubo’ in Barangay 1, XXX, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of sexual abuse with one [AAA], a 15-year olds (sic) through insidious machination or influence by inducing her to engage and in fact she did engage in sexual intercourse with him inside the ‘bahay kubo’ owned by his father, to the damage and prejudice of said [AAA] in such amount as may be proved in court.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW. ”
When arraigned on April 26, 1999, Accused-Appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.[5]
At the pre-trial held on May 19, 1999, Accused-Appellant offered to marry AAA, to which the latter’s parents objected. The parties stipulated on the following: (1) the identity of the parties; (2) that on October 21, 1998, Accused-Appellant and AAA were in a balayan or small hut in Barangay 1, XXX; and (3) that on the same day, at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening, Accused-Appellant and AAA were with the latter’s classmate, YYY, and the latter’s boyfriend, ZZZ, inside the balayan in Barangay 1, XXX.[6]
During trial, the prosecution offered the testimonies of the city health officer of XXX; AAA’s grandmother, GGG; AAA’s mother, MMM; a former barangay kagawad of XXX; and AAA herself. The prosecution presented its version of the story in this wise:
Around 10:00 a.m. of October 21, 1998, YYY fetched fifteen (15) year-old[7] AAA in her house in WWW, a town near XXX, to take an alleged special examination in school.[8] At that time, MMM was in the market.[9] GGG, who lives nearby, dissuaded the two from going out since there was a typhoon, but they did not heed her advice.[10]
AAA was surprised to see twenty-three (23) year-old Accused-Appellant near the gate of her house. She had known him for only a week as he is a cousin of ZZZ.[11] Accused-Appellant followed AAA and YYY when they boarded a jeepney bound for XXX.[12]
Upon reaching the school, however, AAA and YYY did not alight from the jeepney. Instead, AAA, YYY and Accused-Appellant alighted at an outpost in XXX. Thereafter, they rode a tricycle going to the balayan, which is a small hut owned by Accused-Appellant’s father.[13]
ZZZ was at the balayan when the three arrived. YYY then told AAA to just go home in the afternoon. After the four had eaten, YYY, ZZZ and Accused-Appellant took a dip at the NIA irrigation, which is only 40-50 meters from the balayan. AAA was left at the balayan because she had no extra clothes.[14]
Around 4:00 p.m. of the same day, AAA expressed her desire to go home. She was thus told by YYY, ZZZ and Accused-Appellant to wait for a tricycle. But since AAA found no tricycle due to the typhoon, she was constrained to stay at the balayan.[15]
When evening came, AAA and Accused-Appellant slept on one bed at the right side of the balayan. On another bed at the left side were YYY and ZZZ. The balayan had no dividing wall but the lights were switched off.[16] Taking advantage of this setting, Accused-Appellant began to remove AAA’ shorts and panty, followed by her shirt and bra. Accused-Appellant then removed his pants and brief and placed himself on top of AAA, who tried to push him with her hands and feet. After embracing AAA and covering her mouth with his left hand, Accused-Appellant inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina.[17]
As Accused-Appellant prevailed upon her, AAA felt pain and could do nothing but cry. Accused-Appellant then assured AAA that he will marry her.[18]
AAA helplessly cried until the morning of the following day, October 22, 1998. She could not leave the balayan because it had no window and was locked.[19]
Meanwhile, MMM went to the school and YYY’s house to search for AAA. According to YYY’s mother, AAA and YYY are possibly with ZZZ in Barangay 1, XXX.[20]
On October 23, 1998, MMM found AAA at the balayan with YYY, ZZZ, Accused-Appellant and the latter’s father. MMM blamed Accused-Appellant’s father for tolerating AAA to stay at the balayan considering that she was still a minor and could have been brought home using their trimobile.[21]
Bringing AAA along, MMM decided to go to the house of a barangay kagawad in XXX to report the incident.[22] Because MMM did not want the matter to be settled as suggested by the barangay kagawad, she and AAA proceeded to the police station in XXX[23], where AAA executed her Sworn Statement[24]. AAA likewise submitted herself to a medical examination before the city health officer of XXX.
The Medical Certificate[25] dated October 26, 1998 issued to AAA by the city health officer of XXX yielded the following findings:
“1) Complete, healed laceration of the hymen with sharp coaptible borders and without congestion at 10 o’clock.
2) Test tube with a diameter of ¾ inch easily entered the vagina.”
According to the city health officer of XXX, a blunt instrument such as a penis could have caused the laceration in AAA’s hymen, and that it could have been inserted several times into AAA’s vagina.[26]
After the prosecution’s formal offer of evidence, Accused-Appellant, through his own testimony and those of his neighbor and vegetable buyer, professed his innocence in this wise:
Accused-Appellant met AAA through a common friend. He and AAA liked each other and soon became lovers. Being a tricycle driver, Accused-Appellant often roamed around places or stayed at the balayan with AAA when her teacher is absent.[27] Accused-Appellant’s neighbor and vegetable buyer supported his testimony that AAA used to frequent the balayan.[28]
Accused-Appellant asserted that he and AAA have been lovers for ten (10) months before the incident subject matter of this case. According to him, AAA and YYY went to the balayan out of their own volition on October 21, 1998.[29] Before sunset of the same day, Accused-Appellant even told AAA to go home but the latter insisted on staying. He denied having forced himself upon AAA because it was she who suggested that they live together as live-in partners.[30]
When Accused-Appellant had rested his case, AAA again took the witness stand for her rebuttal testimony, wherein she admitted having gone to the balayan twice with YYY and another classmate before the incident, but denied being a sweetheart of Accused-Appellant since they only talked twice from the time they were introduced to each other.[31]
In the Assailed Judgment dated August 7, 2012, the RTC convicted Accused-Appellant of the crime charged and rejected the latter’s defenses that he and AAA were sweethearts and that their sexual congress was consensual, reasoning as follows:
“[AAA] was not only clear and straightforward in her positive assertion that the sexual act of the accused on the night of October 21, 1998 was against her will. She never wavered in her testimony that the accused molested her. She even burst into tears whenever she was asked about the sexual assault. There is nothing on record that would reveal, clearly and convincingly, some ill-motive on her part to trump up this serious criminal charge against the accused.
x x x
The presence of the accused from the time the private complainant was fetched at the latter’s house to the time the jeepney did not stop at the private complainant’s school, the disembarking at the outpost and the flagging of the trimobile by the accused to go to the balayan where he resides, the lack of initiative (on account of the typhoon despite owning a trimobile) on the part of the accused to bring the private complainant to the latter’s house, and finally the fact that the accused allowed the private complainant to stay for two (2) days at the balayan, taken together and if correlated to what he did to private complainant on the night of October 21, 1998 despite the latter’s minority, collectively reveal, either in cahoots with [YYY] and [ZZZ] or not, a lustful design.
x x x
x x x The court does not find the lack of bodily injuries in [AAA] as conclusive proof of her consent or voluntariness. The place is relatively secluded and the accused, or the latter’s family, owns the place. These are circumstances enough to stifle the nerve of a female minor in the environment.
Another point of argument raised by the accused is the seeming incredibility of the testimony of the private complainant that despite the presence and proximity of [YYY] and [ZZZ] who were sleeping just on the nearby bed, these two (2) did not hear her cries of resistance to the sexual abuse.
The Supreme Court has held a number of times that rape (or sexual abuse) can be committed even in places where people congregate x x x. Lust is no respecter of time and place.”[32] (Boldfacing supplied)
Aggrieved, Accused-Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal[33] dated April 10, 2012, which was given due course by the RTC in an Order[34] dated August 15, 2012.
The Issues
In his Brief[35] before this Court, Accused-Appellant now ascribes a lone error to the RTC:
“THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR VIOLATION OF ARTICLE III, SEC. 5 (B) OF R.A. NO. 7610 DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN HIS FAVOR.”[36]
In support of the above assignment of error, Accused-Appellant maintains that the following are indications that AAA was not sexually abused by him: AAA could have easily called for help as YYY and ZZZ were right inside the room where the incident took place; there was no showing of resistance on AAA’s part; AAA did not escape even when she had all the opportunity to do so; and AAA only made general averments of sexual abuse and was highly inconsistent in her account of the incident.
Whereas, Plaintiff-Appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General, counters in its Brief[37] that all the elements of the crime were established by the prosecution and that Accused-Appellant’s sweetheart defense must fail considering that consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Sec. 5, Art. III of R.A. 7610.
The Ruling of this Court
We affirm Accused-Appellant’s conviction.
Accused-Appellant is indicted for violation of Sec. 5(b), Art. III of R.A. 7610, which provides:
“SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. – Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following: x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3 for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be; Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period x x x.”
Thus, the elements of the above crime are the following:
“(1) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
(2) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and
(3) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.”[38]
In the case at bench, the existence of the first and third elements are not disputed by Accused-Appellant. Accused-Appellant does not deny having sexual intercourse with AAA who was then only fifteen (15) years old. He only points out that he employed no coercion or influence on AAA in doing the sexual act because the same was consensual and thus, AAA cannot be deemed to be a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.
We are not persuaded.
As declared by the Supreme Court in People v. Larin[39], Sec. 5, Art. III of R.A. 7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child being abused for profit, but also one in which a child engages in any lascivious conduct through coercion or intimidation. Hence, when a child indulges in sexual intercourse or any lascivious conduct due to the coercion or influence of any adult, the child is deemed to be a “child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.” In this manner, the law is able to act as an effective deterrent to quell all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination against children, prejudicial as they are to their development.[40]
Sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult exists when there is some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended party’s free will.[41] “Influence” is defined under Section 2(g) of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases as the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in or assist another person to engage in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.
As correctly found by the RTC, Accused-Appellant employed coercion when he embraced AAA and covered her mouth with his left hand, preventing her from resisting his advances as well as for crying for help. In this regard, it is worthy to note that even lack of indication of resistance will not imply that the victim has consented to the sexual act, especially when that person was intimidated into submission by the accused, as in this case.[42]
Intimidation was likewise present because Accused-Appellant was eight (8) years older than AAA and the latter was in a place owned by Accused-Appellant’s family. Finally, Accused-Appellant’s promise to marry AAA constitutes influence upon the latter, since it was meant to influence AAA to set aside her reservations and eventually give into having sex with him, with which he succeeded. [43]
Since Accused-Appellant’s acts constitute “coercion” and “influence” within the purview of R.A. 7610, and AAA indulged in sexual intercourse with him because of such coercion and influence, she is deemed as a “child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.” Thus, the prosecution had established the existence of the second element.
Like the RTC, this Court finds no reason to doubt the credibility of AAA. While it is true that AAA made a few inconsistencies in her testimony as to who actually fetched her and if she indeed asked permission to go out from her father who was supposed to be in the market, such inconsistencies do not diminish, let alone impair her credibility. The Supreme Court had held in a long line of cases that inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, when referring only to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect the substance of their declaration, their veracity or the weight of their testimonies. Moreover, they do not impair the credibility of the witnesses where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailants.[44]
Contrary to Accused-Appellant’s stance, AAA did not have all the opportunity to escape from the balayan after the occurrence of the incident. As admitted by Accused-Appellant himself, the balayan had no windows; and as declared by AAA during her testimony, she could not go out of the balayan because the same was locked.
Accused-Appellant cannot also successfully argue that all that AAA provided were mere general statements of abuse. Through her testimony, she relayed that in the evening of October 21, 1998, and while YYY and ZZZ were both sleeping, Accused-Appellant undressed her, then undressed himself; that she tried to kick him using her hands and feet, but he embraced her and covered her mouth with his left hand; and that when she cried as he inserted his penis into her vagina, he assured her that he will marry her. These statements, to the mind of this Court, are not mere general averments of abuse as Accused-Appellant suggests. Even if they were, a victim of sexual abuse cannot be expected to remember every minute detail of her ordeal.[45]
At any rate, it is settled that consent is immaterial in cases involving a violation of Section 5, Article III of R.A. 7610 and thus, Accused-Appellant’s sweetheart defense must be rejected. The rationale behind the rule was expounded by the Supreme Court in Malto v. People[46]:
“For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse with another person.
The language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish “those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.”
Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. It is a malum prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed.
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection.
The harm which results from a child’s bad decision in a sexual encounter may be infinitely more damaging to her than a bad business deal. Thus, the law should protect her from the harmful consequences of her attempts at adult sexual behavior. For this reason, a child should not be deemed to have validly consented to adult sexual activity and to surrender herself in the act of ultimate physical intimacy under a law which seeks to afford her special protection against abuse, exploitation and discrimination. (Otherwise, sexual predators like petitioner will be justified, or even unwittingly tempted by the law, to view her as fair game and vulnerable prey.) In other words, a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse. x x x” (Boldfacing supplied)
Violation of Sec. 5(b), Art. III of R.A. 7610 carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law[47], the minimum term shall be within the range next lower in degree, or a period ranging from 8 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months. The RTC thus correctly imposed on Accused-Appellant the minimum penalty of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor. However, under the same law, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty shall be that which could be properly imposed under the law. In the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the appropriate maximum penalty should be reclusion temporal in its maximum period, ranging from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years. Hence, We modify the RTC’s imposition of the maximum penalty from 15 years, 6 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal.[48]
Lastly, while the RTC correctly awarded PhP50,000.00 as moral damages and another PhP50,000.00 as civil indemnity[49], We delete the award of exemplary damages in AAA’s favor in view of the absence of an aggravating circumstance.[50]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Judgment dated August 7, 2012 0f the Regional Trial Court of XXX, Branch 60, in Criminal Case No. IR-4878 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION imposing the maximum penalty of 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal on Accused-Appellant Noel Oronan and deleting the award of exemplary damages in AAA’s favor. The rest of the Assailed Judgment stands.
SO ORDERED.
Villon (Chairperson) and Corales, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 42-69.
[2] The name of the victim, her personal circumstances and other information which tend to establish or compromise her identity are not disclosed to protect her privacy. Instead, fictitious initials are used in accordance with the Supreme Court’s ruling in People v. Cabalquinto (G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006).
[3] Rollo, p. 69.
[4] Original Records, pp. 1-2.
[5] Id., p. 38.
[6] Id., pp. 42-44.
[7] See the Certification issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar (Original Records, p. 474).
[8] T.S.N., January 19, 2005, p. 4.
[9] T.S.N., February 21, 2001, p. 5.
[10] T.S.N., June 22, 2000, p. 4.
[11] T.S.N., January 19, 2005, p. 7; T.S.N., November 20, 2006, p. 8.
[12] Id., p. 8.
[13] Id., pp. 9-10.
[14] Id., p. 11.
[15] Id., p. 12.
[16] T.S.N., November 20, 2006, p. 14.
[17] T.S.N., June 27, 2006, pp. 4-6.
[18] Id., pp. 7-8.
[19] T.S.N., November 20, 2006, p. 17.
[20] T.S.N., February 21, 2001, p. 7.
[21] Id., p. 8.
[22] T.S.N., September 25, 2002, p. 4.
[23] T.S.N., June 27, 2006, pp. 9-10.
[24] Original Records, p. 14.
[25] Id., p. 15.
[26] T.S.N., February 8, 2000, pp. 7-8.
[27] T.S.N., October 4, 2011, pp. 4-5.
[28] T.S.N., February 26, 2009, p.. 4; T.S.N., March 22, 2011, p. 4.
[29] T.S.N., October 4, 2011, pp. 9 & 16.
[30] Id., pp. 10-11; See also Accused-Appellant’s Counter-Affidavit (Original Records (pp. 8-9).
[31] T.S.N., March 7, 2012, pp. 6 & 10.
[32] Rollo, pp. 63-65.
[33] Original Records, p. 682.
[34] Id., p. 683.
[35] Rollo, pp. 28-41.
[36] Id., p. 30.
[37] Id., pp. 86-101.
[38] Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163866, July 29, 2005.
[39] G.R. No. 128777, October 7, 1998.
[40] Caballo v. People, G.R. No. 198732, June 10, 2013.
[41] People v. Abello, G.R. No. 151952, 25 March 2009.
[42] People v. Pareja, G.R. No. 202122, January 15, 2014.
[43] Supra, at note 40.
[44] People v. De los Reyes, G.R. No. 177357, October 17, 2012.
[45] Rondina v. People, G.R. No. 179059, June 13, 2012.
[46] G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007.
[47] Republic Act No. 4103, as amended.
[48] See People v. Matias, G.R. No. 186469, June 13, 2012.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Supra, at note 46.