CLAUDIO DEGOLLACION, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. LI CHUI ALIAS ONG PONG, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

Claudio Degollacion is appealing the order of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu in Civil Case No. R-4024, dismissing his complaint on the ground of
prescription.

The facts in this case are not controverted. In the month of September, 1949,
plaintiff-appellant Degollacion was an employee of Chua Leh in his istore and in
his soap factory at Talisay, Cebu. On September 29 of that year, plaintiff, his
employer Chua Leh, and Filemon Legaspina were riding in Leh’s delivery truck
S-1325 to deliver soap to customers. On the way home, within the town of Carcar,
Cebu, and while said delivery truck was stopping on the correct side of the road
to allow the “Bisaya” truck T-16969, owned by Li Chui alias Ong Pong, and driven
by his employee, Telesforo Sagayno, to pass, the latter truck bumped the
delivery truck from behind, causing it to fall into a precipice with its three
passengers. As a result, the delivery truck waa demolished, its cargo scattered
in all directions, and the occupants suffered physical injuries.

On December 13, 1949, Sagayno, the driver of Ong Pong, was charged in the
Justice of the Peace Court of Carcar, Cebu, in Criminal Case No. 304, with less
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. After trial, he was found
guilty and sentenced to suffer one month and twenty days imprisonment, with
coata. He appealed the decision to the Court of First Instance of Cebu where,
after repeated postponements at his instance, the case was on February 16, 1954,
dismissed without prejudice. The dismissal was due to the alleged failure of
Chua. Leh, one of the witnesses for the prosecution, to appear on the date of
the last hearing set.

On May 14, 1955, after failing to have the criminal case reinstated through
the Fiscal’s Office, plaintiff-appellant Degollacion filed the present civil
action for damages against defendant-appellee Li Chui alias Ong Pong, employer
of the driver, Sagayno. Acting upon a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the plaintiff’s cause of action had already prescribed, the trial
court on July 25, 1955, dismissed the complaint without pronouncement as to
costs. This is the order of dismissal being appealed directly to us, involving
as it does only questions of law.

The theory underlying the motion to dismiss as well as the order of dismissal
is that the period of prescription of four years within which to enforce the
right to damages for physical injuries suffered, began to run from the date of
the accident on September 29, 1949, and consequently, when the present action
was filed in 1955, the period of prescription had already run out. Appellee
contended that the civil action for damages is separate from the criminal
action, and so, the filing of the criminal charge in the Justice of the Peace
Court in 1949 against Sagayno for less serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, did not interrupt the running of the period of
prescription. We find this theory untenable. Rule 107 (a) of the Rules of Court
provides thus:

* * * “(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives
the civil action or reserves his right to institute it
separately.”

Inasmuch as the offended party in the criminal case (Degollacion) neither
expressly waived the civil action nor reserved his right to institute it
separately, then the said civil action for recovery of civil liability was
deemed impliedly instituted with the said criminal case. Under Article 1973 of
the Old Civil Code and Article 1155 of the New Civil Code, the institution of
said criminal action interrupted the running of the period of prescription
during the time that the case was pending in court. The period again continued
to run when the said criminal action was dismissed in 1954. It is therefore
clear that considering this interruption, comprising the period from December
13, 1949 to February 16, 1954, the period of four years, starting from September
29, 1949, had not yet expired.

We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points raised by appellee.

In view of the foregoing, the appealed order of dismissal is reversed and
this case is hereby remanded for further proceedings. With costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.