G. R. No. L-22394. July 09, 1966
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. ALBINO CHING, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLEE.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
On
January 5, 1961, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VIII,
then presided over by Hon. Juan P. Enriquez, Judge, rendered a decision
granting petitioner’s application in this case to be naturalized as
Filipino citizen. Over two (2) years later, or on May 30, 1963,
petitioner filed a motion praying that a date be set for the reception
of evidence regarding compliance by him with the requirements of
Republic Act No. 530, as a condition precedent to the taking of the
oath of allegiance and the issuance of the corresponding certificate of
naturalization. This motion was set for hearing on Hay 18, 1963. Prior
thereto, Judge Enriquez had been promoted to the Court of Appeals and
Judge Manuel F. Barcelona had succeeded him as Judge of said Branch VIII
of the Court of First Instance of Manila. By virtue of Administrative
Order No. 28, dated February 15, 1963, the Secretary of Justice had
authorized Branch II of said court, presided over by Hon. Jose N.
Leuterio, Judge, to hear all cases pertaining to said Branch VIII[1]
– including the one at bar – during May, 1963. Acting on said motion of
appellant, Judge Leuterio issued, therefore, on May 18, 1963, an order
setting the hearing of this case for the reception of petitioner’s
evidence on June 8, 1963.
The Office of the Solicitor General
alleges that its representative was not present when this order was
issued and that appellant’s counsel informed him that the case had been
transferred to Branch VI, presided over by Hon. Gaudencio Cloribel,
Judge, to which both proceeded on the same date, and before which
petitioner’s testimony was introduced in evidence. The version given by
petitioner, in his brief, is that he, “with the conformity of the
representative of the Office of the Solicitor General, was able to have
said motion transferred and heard before” said Branch VI. What
petitioner said, however, in a motion filed on May 28, 1963, is that he
had “talked with Judge Gaudencio Cloribel and asked the latter if he
would be willing to receive petitioner’s evidence in connection with
his oath-taking as a Filipino citizen and to which said Judge agreed.”
Petitioner further alleged, in said motion, that inasmuch as said
evidence had already been introduced before Judge Cloribel, it would be
vest that “said Judge be also allowed to handle the oath-taking of the
petitioner” herein. Forthwith, Judge Leuterio denied the motion, upon the ground that he had “no power or authority” to grant the relief therein prayed for.
This
notwithstanding, on May 29, 1963, appellant filed an before Branch VI
an “urgent petition” praying, for the same reasons given in his motion
of May 28, 1963, that he be allowed to take his oath before said Branch
VI. Thereupon, Judge Cloribel issued an order finding that petitioner
had complied with the provisions of Republic Act No. 530 and
administered his oath of allegiance. The next day, May 30, 1963,
another order was entered by Judge Leuterio setting aside and
nullifying said order of Judge Cloribel of May 29, 1963, and
petitioner’s aforementioned oath of allegiance, as well as “all the
proceedings had before Branch VI”, for the following reasons:
“Administrative
Order No. 28 of 1963 of the Secretary of Justice had not conferred any
power or authority upon Branch VI of this Court to act on any case
pending before Branch VIII. That authority was conferred upon Branch
II. It is the opinion, therefore, of the Judge of Branch II, that the
Honorable Judge of Branch VI has no authority to act on any matter
pending in the Court of Branch VIII and that any action of the
Honorable Judge of Branch VI in this case is a nullity and had been
rendered without authority. The Judge of this Branch knows of no rule
or practice which would authorize any Judge of thfe Court to take
cognizance of any case pending in another branch without the authority
of the Honorable Secretary of Justice, or without the case first having
been raffled, or, at the least, without the consent of the Judge
concerned. In fact, the assignment of cases to the different branches
of this Court Is made by raffle, and in public, to the end that there
may be a fair and Impartial distribution of cases, and to prevent the
parties from selecting judges. The importance of this procedure was
recognized by the Supreme Court, when, in Section 7 of Rule 23 of the
Revised Rules of Court, it provided that:“Sec. 7. Assignment of Cases. – In the assignment of cases
to the different branches of a Court of First Instance, or their
transfer from one branch to another whether by raffle or otherwise, the
parties or their counsel shall be given written notice sufficiently in
advance so that they may be present therein if they so desire.”
On the other hand, this Branch, in the exercise of its authority
conferred upon it by Administrative Order 28 of the Secretary of
Justice had fixed the date of the hearing; and this Court not having
set aside or modified the order, no Judge of this Court except the
Judge of Branch VIII, in the opinion of this Court, can act and advance
the hearing, even with the consent of a Judge of another branch of this
Court. Courtesy, at the least, to a coordinate branch of this court
demands that a Judge of one branch should not act without authority
upon a case pending before another branch, especially on matters
affecting the merits of this case. If the order of Branch VI were
allowed to remain, then it would destroy the practice so meticulously
followed by this Court of assigning cases by raffle and in public, and
confusion will be the concommitant result for what is there to prevent
a judge of one branch from hearing a case pending in another branch, or
even setting aside a decision or an order entered by another branch?
“The Court wishes to call the attention of the Solicitor
General to the actuations of the Solicitor in charge of this case. The
Solicitor concerned should have known or ought to know that all cases
pertaining to Branch VIII are to be heard in Branch IX. This,
notwithstanding, the Solicitor had accommodated the petitioner and
consented to the hearing of this case in Branch VI notwithstanding that
this Court had set the case for hearing on June 8, and had denied a
motion of the petitioner to authorize Branch VI to hear this case and
to allow the petitioner to take his oath. The Solicitor in charge, it
appears, had agreed expressly or impliedly to the taking of oath of
allegiance by the petitioner on the same date that the order showing
compliance with Republic Act 530 had been entered. Considering that in
the opinion of the Judge of this Branch the oath of allegiance may not
be taken until the period of appeal had expired, the fact that
petitioner had been allowed to take his oath under Republic Act 530
shows that the Solicitor in charge had consented to the taking of the
oath of allegiance and thereby waived the right of appeal. This, in the
opinion of the Court, is irregular.”
The record shows that subsequently, or on July 6, 1963, the parties
appeared before Branch VIII, presided over by Judge Barcelona, and
petitioner introduced his documentary evidence in support of the motion
for his oath-taking. When the hearing was resumed on July 20, 1963,
petitioner took the witness stand. After his testimony in chief and his
cross-examination by a representative of the Solicitor General, Judge
Barcelona asked him several questions, which elicited the following
facts, namely:
- That, according to said documentary evidence, appellant has
criminal records for 1) speeding and driving with a delinquent license
on March 19, 1956; 2) reckless driving and driving on the wrong lane on
August 17, 1956; and 3) driving without headlight on January 22, 1958,
for each of which he had been fined; - That on June 25, 1956, he had been charged in the Office of
the City Fiscal of Manila with damage to property through reckless
imprudence, although the charge was later dropped by the Assistant
Fiscal who investigated it; and - That, at the hearing of his petition for naturalization before
Judge Enriquez, on December 23, 1960, he denied being the same person
accused and convicted and fined in the criminal cases above referred to
and even denied falsely that he knew how to drive a motor vehicle.
Thereupon, Judge Barcelona asked him to explain, if he could, these
discrepancies between his testimony on December 23, 1960 and that given
by him on July 20, 1963, and warned him that he could, if he wanted to,
refuse to answer the question upon the ground that it would incriminate
him. After consulting his counsel, appellant refused to answer. Then
said counsel asked for a continuance to study the “proper step” to
“take in view of the development”. Accordingly, Judge Barcelona ordered
that the hearing of the case be continued to August 24, 1963.
On that date, petitioner’s counsel appeared before the Court and
asked that the hearing be, once more, postponed to another date, upon
the ground that petitioner “had gone to Surigao yesterday”. Judge
Barcelona considered this move as “clearly designed to delay the
disposition” of petitioner’s motion to take his oath of allegiance,
and, consequently, issued the appealed order dismissing said motion. On
September 23, 1963, petitioner moved for a reconsideration of said
order, alleging that his departure for Surigao on August 23, 1963 was
due to the sudden illness of his father-in-law, and that the
aforementioned inconsistencies in his testimony “could be due to the fact that petitioner could have misunderstood the question in his earlier testimony”.
Judge Barcelona set this motion for hearing on December 7, 1963,
but, on October 16, 1963, petitioner moved for the postponement of said
hearing to any day in March, 1964, upon the ground that he would be
very busy in December attending to his business and the inventory and
closing of his books and that it is necessary “to give the petitioner
sufficient time to prepare for said hearing”. On December 7, 1963,
Judge Barcelona denied this motion for postponement as “obviously
intended merely for delay”, as well as said motion for reconsideration,
for lack of merit.
On January 7, 1964, petitioner filed “his notice of intention to
appeal * * * to the Supreme Court from the Order dated August 24, 1963,
denying his petition to take oath, and from the Order dated December 7,
1963, denying his motion for reconsideration of said Order of August
24, 1963, on the ground that the same are contrary to law”. In his
brief, petitioner now assails : 1) the authority of Judge Leuterio to
annul the proceedings before Judge Cloribel, upon the theory that a
court cannot annul the proceedings before a coordinate court; and 2)
the wisdom of the appealed Orders of Judge Barcelona, upon the ground
that he “should have given a chance to petitioner-appellant to present
his evidence preparatory to take oath”.
As regards the first issue raised by the petitioner, it should be
noted, however, that he has not appealed from the Orders of Judge
Leuterio, so that the same are not subject to review in this appeal.[2]
At any rate, since pursuant to law and the administrative rules and
regulations, the validity of which is not disputed, the case at bar had
been duly assigned by the Secretary of Justice to Branch II of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, presided over by Judge Leuterio,
during May, 1963, it is obvious, not only that the latter had the power
to control, during said month, any and all proceedings in the case,
but, also, that, pursuant to petitioner’s own theory, Judge Cloribel
could not, without the consent of Judge Leuterio, deprive the latter of
his aforementioned authority, which it is his bounden duty to perform,
much less nullify said authority by arrogating the same unto himself
(Judge Cloribel) over the objection of Judge Leuterio, as reflected in
his order of May 28, 1963, denying petitioners motion of that date for
permission to take the oath of allegiance before Judge Cloribel.
With respect to the orders of Judge Barcelona dated August 24 and
December 7, 1963, suffice it to say that motions for postponement are
addressed to the sound discretion of the Court[3]
which, under the circumstances obtaining in this case has not been
abused, but has been wisely exercised, and, hence, should not be
interfered with,[4] especially considering that the purpose of the postponement sought was patently to delay or gain time[5]
Moreover, neither petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of September
23, 1963, which is not verified, nor his brief, contains an offer of
any additional evidence which he would introduce if said motion were
granted. Petitioner’s allegation that he has not been given a chance to
present his evidence is thus absolutely devoid of merit.
WHEREFORE, the Orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioner-appellant. It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
[1] For Judge Barcelona was seemingly on vacation.
[2] De Guzman vs.
Trinidad, et al., 109 Phil., 363; Licup vs. Manila Railroad Co., L-
16196, May 30, 1961; Dominguez vs. De Jesus, L-15089, April 28, 1962;
Tabotabo vs. Tabotabo, L-10909, April 30, 1962; Canite vs. Madrigal
& Co., et al., L-17836, August 30, 1962.
[3] Casilan vs. Gancayco, 104 Phil., 418; Hap Hong Hardware vs. Philippine Milling Co., L-16778, May 28, 1961; Blue Bar Coconut Co. vs. Hilario, L-12699, May 31, 1961; Gutierrez vs. Medel, L-14455, April 26, 1962; Cardenas vs. Camus, l-17191, June 30, 1962; De Casa vs. Reyes, L-18564, August 31, 1962; Acierto vs. Laperal, L-15983, October 31, 1962; Republic vs. Mambulao Lumber Co., L-18942, November 30, 1962; Dayao vs. Lopez, L-17698, December 27, 1962; Philippine National Bank vs. Santos Donasco, L-18638, February 28, 1963.
[4] Cementeno vs. CFI of Iloilo, Branch II, L-9571, April 29, 1957; De los Reyes vs. Capule, 102 Phil., 464; Dayao vs. Lopez, L-17698, December 27, 1962; Acierto vs. Laperal, L-15983, October 31, 1962.
[5] Dayao vs. Lopez, supra.