EDUARDO TUASON, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT VS. LUZON STEVEDORING CO., INC., AND JULIAN RAMOS, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

Tuason versus Luzon Stevedoring

The Case

This is a civil action for the recovery of damages arising from a vehicular collision. Eduardo Tuason, the plaintiff, sued the Luzon Stevedoring Company and its driver, Julian Ramos, to recover actual and compensatory damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees, on the theory that the company's truck-trailer, driven recklessly and negligently, struck his car. The defendants denied liability and countered that the collision was caused by the plaintiff's own reckless and negligent driving. The case matters to the reviewee because it is a compact illustration of how the Supreme Court treats findings of fact on credibility, of the burden of proving negligence and the proximate cause of an injury, and of the rule that evidence, to be believed, must not only come from a credible source but must itself be credible.

Procedural History

Eduardo Tuason filed his complaint for damages with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After trial, that court rendered its decision on January 9, 1958, finding the plaintiff solely and wholly responsible for the collision and absolving the defendants from any liability, dismissing the plaintiff's claims with costs against him. The plaintiff appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which reviewed the record and affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Facts

Early in the morning of April 13, 1953, Eduardo Tuason left Baguio City in a new Packard car with three passengers. He passed the Kennon Road checkpoint at three o'clock in the morning and the Camp 6 toll gate twenty-four minutes later. He stopped at a gasoline station in a town in Tarlac for about fifteen to twenty minutes to fill his tank, then continued toward Manila. At about the same time, Julian Ramos, an employee of the Luzon Stevedoring Company, left the company compound at Guagua, Pampanga, driving one of its truck-trailers for Manaoag, Pangasinan, with a mechanic and a laborer aboard. The truck developed engine trouble in Bamban, Tarlac, and the mechanic spent about twenty-five to thirty minutes cleaning the carburetor and the gasoline line before they proceeded.

At around five ten in the morning, about seventy-five meters south of the bridge at Barrio Cut-Cut in Capas, Tarlac, the Packard car and the truck-trailer collided. The plaintiff's left leg was pinned by the door of his car, and after he was extricated he was taken to a clinic at Capas and later to the National Orthopedic Hospital in Manila. His companions were also injured and taken to the clinic.

Almost three years later, on February 22, 1956, the plaintiff filed his complaint for damages. The defendants denied liability, alleged that the truck was travelling at low speed with lights on along the right side of the road when it was hit by the plaintiff's recklessly driven car, and pleaded that the criminal information against Julian Ramos had been dismissed. The company added that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its driver. At trial, the court found the plaintiff's evidence contradictory and unworthy of belief, found that he was travelling at very high speed on the wrong side of the road, and found that the truck-trailer was moving at moderate speed and was almost at a stop before the collision.

Issues

• Whether or not the findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility of the witnesses and on the manner of the collision should be sustained on appeal.
• Whether or not the plaintiff Eduardo Tuason was the proximate cause of the collision by driving at excessive speed on the wrong lane.
• Whether or not the defendants, the driver Julian Ramos and the Luzon Stevedoring Company, are liable for damages to the plaintiff.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote any statutory provision in its text. It rests on the settled rules on negligence, proximate cause, and the weight and credibility of evidence, which the Court applies without quoting a codal article.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court sustained the findings of the trial court. The issue being one of credibility, the question of which testimony should be given more credence is best left to the trial judge, who had the advantage of hearing the parties testify and of observing their demeanor on the witness stand. The Court went over the record and found no reason to reject the findings below. It noted that the plaintiff himself contradicted himself in some particulars and admitted that he was in extreme pain and must have been unconscious after the collision, so that he could not have observed the details of the accident. His companion Manuel de Leon was unclear on the important details an eyewitness would normally recall, and the trial court found him to have been in a state of shock. The witness Alberto Yandan had given a sworn statement to the police on the day of the collision that differed from his testimony in court, and no explanation was offered for the omission. The witness Pedro Mallari stayed at the scene only five minutes yet claimed to have seen facts that could not have happened in that time, and his account of the plaintiff's leg being pinned by the bumper was belied by the fact that the plaintiff still had the use of both legs. The chief of police, Salvador Baun, gave long delayed and evasive answers, and the Court was convinced he was suppressing the true facts, including the skid marks showing that the car had swerved from the middle of the road to the left lane facing south. On this point the Court laid down the standard: "Evidence, to be worthy of credit, must not only proceed from a credible source, but must, in addition, be credible itself. And by this is meant that it shall be natural, reasonable and probable as to make it easy to believe."

On the second issue, the Court held that the plaintiff was the proximate cause of the accident. The evidence showed that the truck-trailer covered the distance of 50.89 kilometers from Guagua to Cut-Cut bridge in two hours and ten minutes, and after deducting thirty minutes for the engine trouble, travelled at an average speed of thirty kilometers per hour. The plaintiff, on the other hand, drove 144.22 kilometers from Baguio City to Cut-Cut bridge in two hours and ten minutes, and after deducting the time spent loading gasoline, travelled the distance in one hour and fifty minutes. From these undisputed facts the Court found it evident that the plaintiff drove at great speed and in excess of the speed limits along the national highway. The Court also rejected the claim that the ten-ton truck was travelling at sixty kilometers per hour, since the car would then have been sent flying or pushed back, and no such indications appeared on the road. The skid marks at the scene were those of the Packard car, not of the truck. The truck-trailer was on the right lane facing north with its right front wheel on the shoulder, while the Packard car was on the left lane going south.

On the third issue, the Court held that the defendants were not liable. Since the plaintiff was the proximate cause of the accident, there was no valid reason to disturb the decision denying his claim for damages. The Court also observed that the complaint was filed only after the lapse of almost three years from the date of the accident, which in itself was indicative of the weakness of the plaintiff's cause of action.

Doctrine

First, findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight on appeal, because the trial judge had the advantage of hearing the parties testify and of observing their demeanor on the witness stand. Second, evidence, to be worthy of credit, must not only proceed from a credible source but must itself be credible, meaning that it must be natural, reasonable, and probable so as to make it easy to believe. Third, the proximate cause of an injury is the cause that, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and the party who is the proximate cause of the collision bears the consequences and cannot recover damages from the other. Fourth, a plaintiff who drives at excessive speed and on the wrong lane of the highway is guilty of negligence and cannot shift the loss to a defendant who exercised due care.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision appealed from, absolving the defendants from liability and dismissing the plaintiff's claim for damages, with costs against the plaintiff-appellant.

Remember This

Memorize the line that evidence, to be worthy of credit, must not only proceed from a credible source but must itself be credible, meaning natural, reasonable, and probable. Examiners use this case to test the weight given to trial court findings on credibility and the rule that the proximate cause of a collision, here the speeding driver on the wrong lane, bears his own loss.