G.R. No. L-27465. August 31, 1971
SERAFIN BORRES LOYOLA AND JOSE DIAZ DESLATE, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION), NELLY BORRES LOYOLA, AND GAMBY BORRES LOYOLA, ASSISTED BY HER GUAR…
MAKASIAR, J.:
Petitioners Serafin Borres
Loyola and Jose Diaz Deslate pray for the reversal of
the resolution promulgated on December
22, 1966 by the Third Division of the Court of Appeals, which
dismissed their appeal from the Court of First Instance for having been perfected
out of time.
By way of factual background, herein private respondents Nelly Borres Loyola and Gamby Borres Loyola (minor), assisted by guardian ad-litem Julieta B. Declaro filed on October 25, 1950 in the Court of First
Instance of Capiz an action for reivindicacion,
recovery of possession of two lots and annulment of contract with damages
against herein petitioners which was docketed as Civil Case No. V-603 in the Court of First Instance of Capiz
(pp. 2-10, rec. on appeal).
On November 14, 1950,
herein petitioners as defendants in the said Civil Case filed their Answer (pp.
15-18, rec. on appeal), to which herein private respondents as plaintiffs filed
a reply on November 25, 1950
(pp. 18-22, rec. on appeal). On August 1, 1963, herein petitioners
filed a motion to admit their amended Answer attached thereto (pp. 39-44, rec.
on appeal), which amended Answer was admitted by the trial court in an order
dated August 5, 1963 (pp.
46-48, rec.).
On June 2, 1964,
over thirteen (13) years later, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
herein private respondents (pp. 48-90, rec. on appeal).
On June 11, 1964,
herein private respondents filed a motion for an amendment of said decision and
for execution pending appeal (pp. 90-110, rec. on appeal), to which herein
petitioners filed an opposition on June
30, 1964 (pp. 110-113, rec. on appeal).
In an order dated July 14, 1964, the trial court denied the
motion of herein private respondents to amend the decision but granted the
motion for execution pending appeal upon filing by said respondents a bond in
the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) on the special grounds “that
the decision involves a substantial amount, an accumulated damages now reaching
a high figure, without any security to insure the right of the plaintiffs”
and “that defendants herein, as can be gleaned from the decision, have
demonstrably been actuated by bad faith, and an appeal would obviously tend to
prolong the inequity suffered from their hands by the plaintiffs” (pp.
114-115, rec. on appeal).
On July 15, 1964,
herein petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision (pp.
116-134, rec. on appeal). THE MOTION
DOES NOT STATE THE DATE OF THEIR RECEIPT OF A COPY OF THE DECISION.
On August 4, 1964,
herein petitioners likewise filed a motion to fix supersedeas
bond to stay execution pending appeal (p. 135, rec. on appeal).
On August 7, 1964,
herein private respondents filed an opposition to the motions for
reconsideration and for the fixing of the supersedeas
bond (pp. 136-139, rec. on appeal).
In an order dated August 12, 1964, the trial court denied herein
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of its decision but permitted them to
file supersedeas bond in the amount of Thirty Thousand
Pesos (P30,000.00) to stay execution pending appeal (pp. 139-140, rec. on
appeal).
On August 20, 1964, herein petitioners filed their notice on
appeal, WITHOUT INDICATING THE DATE THEY RECEIVED A COPY OF THE ORDER DATED
AUGUST 12, 1964 DENYING THEIR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE DECISION. On the same day, they filed an urgent ex parte motion for extension of time to file record on
appeal because the records of the case are quite voluminous, adding that they
had already filed and presented their appeal bond and notice of appeal (pp.
141-142, rec. on appeal), which was granted on August 21, 1964 (p. 142, rec.
on appeal), on which day herein petitioners submitted their record on appeal
and appeal bond for approval and elevation to the Court of Appeals together
with the evidence (p. 143, rec. on appeal).
In an order dated September 16, 1964, the lower court approved
the record on appeal and directed the clerk of court to give due course to the
appeal, but disapproved the supersedeas bond filed by
the defendants therein because it did not bear the signatures and
acknowledgment of the principals and it was without sufficient collateral to
guarantee the solvency of the sureties (pp. 144-145, rec. on appeal).
On November 14, 1964, the defendants filed a motion for the
approval of their supersedeas bond to stay execution
pending appeal (p. 145, rec. on appeal), which supersedeas
bond was approved on November 24, 1964 by the court provided the same is
registered in the Register of Deeds of Capiz within
thirty (30) days from notice thereof (pp. 149-150, rec. on appeal), despite
plaintiffs’ opposition thereto (pp. 146-149, rec. on appeal).
When private respondents herein noted that the
petitioners-appellants did not do anything to prosecute their appeal from the time
their record on appeal and supersedeas bond were
approved respectively on September 16, 1964 and November 23, 1964, counsel for
herein private respondents examined the records of the case and for the first
time discovered that, from his viewpoint, petitioners’ appeal was filed out of
time.
So, on March 14, 1966,
plaintiffs in said Civil Case, now herein private respondents, filed an urgent
motion to dismiss appeal and for immediate execution (pp. 150-154, rec. on
appeal) on the following grounds:
“(1) That the Decision dated June 2, 1964 subject matter of this appeal was
deposited at the Roxas
City post office on June 4, 1964, for service to Atty. Venicio Escolin, defendants’
counsel, by registered mail.
“(2) That the first notice of the registered mail
containing said decision was delivered to the residence of Atty. Venicio Escolin and received in
his behalf by Irena Acurante on June 4, 1964,
but Atty. Escolin actually claimed the registered
mail containing the Decision at the Roxas City post
office on June 16, 1964, after the second notice of said registered mail
was received on his behalf of Atty. Escolin by the
same Irena Acurante.
“(3) That on June 11, 1964, plaintiffs filed a motion for
reconsideration and for execution of Decision pending appeal, which was duly
served on Atty. Venicio Escolin
on June 15, 1964.
“(4) That on July 15, 1964, Atty. Venicio Escolin filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision
in behalf of the defendants, which motion was denied by order of this Honorable
Court dated August 12, 1964.
“(5) That on August 13, 1964, a copy of said order
was sent to Atty. Escolin by registered mail by the
Office of the Clerk of Court, and the first registry notice of said mail was
delivered to the residence of Atty. Escolin on August
14, 1964, who claimed said mail by virtue of said first registry notice on
August 20, 1964, at the Roxas City post office.
“(6) That on August 20, 1964, Atty. Escolin
filed his notice of appeal and appeal bond at the same time asking for an
extension of ten (10) days within which to file his record on appeal, which he
actually filed on August 21, 1964.
“(7) That prior to August 20, 1964, Atty. Escolin
did not ask for any extension of time within which to perfect his appeal, and
the time within which he may perfect his appeal as provided by the Rules of
Court has already long expired on August
20, 1964. As a matter of
fact said period has already expired before he filed his motion for
reconsideration on July 15, 1964
(counted from June 9, 1964,
when defendants were presumed to have received a copy of the Decision after
Irena Acurante received on June 4, 1964 the final registry notice).
“A R G U M E N T S
“Section 8, Rule 13 of the new Rules of Court, provides: ‘Service by registered mail is complete upon actual
receipt by the addressee; but if he fails to claim from the post office within
five (5) days from the date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall
take effect at the expiration of such time.’
“In the case at bar, the first notice of the postmaster
pertaining to the registered letter containing the Decision was served at the
residence of Atty. Escolin on June 4, 1964.
In accordance with the above cited provision of the Rules of Court,
service of the Decision now appealed from to Atty. Escolin,
was complete on June 9, 1964, and therefore his time within which to perfect
his appeal began on June 10, 1964, and expired on July 10, 1964.” (pp. 150-153, rec. on appeal).
Defendants therein filed on March 19, 1966 their opposition to
said motion on the ground that: (1) the
trial court had no more jurisdiction to pass upon the plaintiffs’ motion for
the reason that the trial court had already approved defendants’ record on
appeal in its order dated September 16, 1964 and what remains to be done is merely
the clerical chore on the part of the clerk of court to transmit the records to
the appellate court citing Valdez vs. Jusgado;[1]
(2) the five-day period mentioned in Section 8 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court
refers to a case wherein the registered mail was never claimed by the
addressee, and not when the registered mail was actually received by the
addressee, as in the instant case, in which case service is deemed completed
upon actual receipt; and (3) the identity of the person of Irena Acurante, who allegedly received the registered notice on
behalf of counsel for the defendants, is unknown to said counsel, that such
person has never lived in his residence nor employed by him, much less
authorized by him to receive any registered matter on his behalf (pp. 154-156,
rec. on appeal).
After the defendants filed their opposition to the motion to
dismiss their appeal, plaintiffs presented evidence both oral and documentary
in support of their motion to dismiss appeal; while the defendants presented
only oral evidence in support of their opposition thereto.
However, before the plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss appeal could be
resolved by the trial court, defendants filed on April 11, 1966 a motion to
amend their record on appeal by including as part thereof a sworn statement
executed by Atty. Venicio Escolin
on the same day, April 11, 1966 (pp. 157-159, rec. on appeal), which states:
“That the defendants’ appeal has been filed within the period
fixed by the Rules of Court —
“(1) On June
16, 1964, he received the notice of the decision rendered by this
Court;
“(2) On July
15, 1964, he filed the defendants’ Motion of Reconsideration of
the said decision;
“(3) On August
20, 1964, he received the notice of the Court’s Order denying the
motion for reconsideration;
“(4) On August
20, 1964, he filed the notice of appeal and appeal bond;
“(5) On August
20, 1964, he also filed a motion for 10-day extension to file
record on appeal which was granted;
“(6) On August 21, 1964,
he filed the record on appeal” (p. 158, rec. on appeal).
On April 13, 1966, plaintiffs filed their opposition to
defendants’ motion for inclusion of their counsel’s sworn statement on the
ground that the same was presented about one year, eight months and thirty (30)
days after the record on appeal was submitted for approval and about one year,
seven months, fifteen (15) days after said record on appeal was approved on
September 16, 1964 and after one year, nine months, twenty-one (21) days after
defendants’ period for perfecting an appeal expired on July 10, 1964; that the
period for perfecting an appeal can never be extended nor relief granted in
case of failure to proceed in time, unless an application for extension of time
for perfecting such an appeal is filed within the reglementary
period; and that failure of the record on appeal to show on its face that the
appeal was perfected within the reglementary period
is a fatal defect. In the same
opposition, plaintiffs in said civil case filed their rejoinder (should be
supplement) to plaintiffs’ memorandum, alleging among others that contrary to
the claim of defendants’ counsel, Irena Acurante, who
received the registered mail for defendants’ counsel, was already of age
because she voted in the 1963 and 1965 elections in Precinct 24 of Roxas City according to the certificate of the municipal
treasurer of Roxas City; that Atty. Escolin, defendants’ counsel, admits in his memorandum that
Irena Acurante is his laundrywoman, although she goes
to his house only twice or thrice a week; that Irena Acurante
received about one hundred (100) registry notices for the years 1964-65 from
the mailman for and in behalf of Atty. Escolin at the
latter’s residence, which Atty. Venicio Escolin and his wife, Atty. Rebecca Escolin,
presented to the post office to claim the corresponding letters stated in said
registry notices (pp. 164-171, rec. on appeal).
In an order dated May 12, 1966 (pp. 173-184, rec. on appeal),
which defendants’ counsel claimed to have received on May 16, 1966, the trial
court denied the motion to dismiss appeal, admitted the sworn statement of
defendants’ counsel containing the dates purporting to show that the record on
appeal was perfected on time, and directed the defendants to so amend the
record on appeal as to include the subsequent pleadings filed by the plaintiffs
from March 14, 1966 and the said order of May 12, 1966, reasoning thus:
“The fact that Atty. Escolin lost no
time in claiming the mail matter in question upon learning that the within
decision had been rendered vided (sic) in the light of the other facts and circumstances
alluded to above, tends to persuade the impartial mind to the belief that his
inaction, now under inquiry, was not wittingly due to negligence on his part,
unless the Court should resort to a naked literal interpretation of the rule
disregarding the doctrine of liberal construction designed to promote the
interest of substantial justice. xx xx xx
“As an adjunct to the incident at hand, counsel for defendants
filed a motion (Record, p. 638) attaching thereto a sworn statement containing
certain data tending to show that the within appeal was perfected within season
(Record, 639), in a belated compliance with the requirement of the rule that
the record on appeal should contain such data as would show upon its face that the
appeal was perfected on time (Rule 41, Section 6, RC). This move of counsel for defendants is
objected to by counsel for plaintiffs on the ground that the long delay in the
transmittal of the record of this case to the appellate court amounts to loss of
interest on the part of said defendants.
Inquiry conducted by the Court, however, revealed that such delay has
been caused mainly by lack of copies of the numerous documentary exhibits which
are required under the rule to be retained in the trial court upon transmittal
of the record on appeal to the appellate court (Rule 41, Section 11, RC). Under this
condition, it would be unfair to deprive defendants of the right to
appeal.” (Pp. 175-183, rec. on appeal)
despite its
finding that
“The record discloses that on June 4,
1964, notice of the within decision was sent through the mails by Deputy Clerk
of Court Antonio Amosin to counsel for the defendants
herein, Atty. Venicio Escolin,
as evidenced by the Registry Receipt for Letter No. 1280 (Exhibit A). On the same date of June 4, 1964, the first Registry Notice No. 7053
made by the post office on said letter No. 1280, covered by Exhibit A, was
delivered by the Roxas
City post office letter carrier
Oscar Aguiling at the residence of Atty. Venicio Escolin, and said first
Registry Notice was received by one Irena Acurante
(Exhibit D). On June 11, 1964, a second registry notice on said
Letter No. 1280 was delivered by the same mail carrier at the residence of
Atty. Escolin which was, again, received by Irena Acurante (Exhibit D).
On June 16, 1964,
Atty. Escolin personally came to the post office and
claimed Letter No. 1280 (Exhibit A-1).
“Inasmuch as the date of first notice herein is June 4, 1964, and the mail was not
claimed pursuant to said notice, the service in question should be deemed
complete upon the expiration of five days from said date or on the 9th of June,
xx xx.
“Evidence tend to establish the fact
that the first registry notice covering aforementioned Letter No. 1280 was
delivered by the mail carrier Oscar Aguiling to Irena
Acurante.
Atty. Escolin identified Acurante
as a daughter of his family laundry woman who frequented his house to help her
mother whenever there was any laundering to do.
He denied having authorized her to receive deliveries of mail matters
for him. All these representations made
by Atty. Escolin may be true. But the record of the local post office
reveals that scores of registry notices during the years 1964 and 1965,
intended for Atty. Escolin, had been delivered by the
mail carrier Aguiling to Irena Acurante
(Exhibits D, D-1). This fact will not
exempt Atty. Escolin from the charge that, even if he
did not expressly authorize said Irena Acurante, he
at least had been tolerating her in this regard, and to such an extent as to
amount to his having positively authorized her.
“It is the insistence of Atty. Escolin
that the first registry notice sent by the postmaster on the oft-mentioned
letter No. 1280 did not actually reach his hands. So that he could not
acquire knowledge, on the basis of said notice, of the mail matter in the post
office waiting for him. Thus, as
the evidence shows the notice in question was delivered to Irena Acurante, but there is no showing as to what was done with
that notice after Irena Acurante received it. Of the scores of notice received by Acurante, only this particular notice on Letter No. 1280
has caused so much trouble. It could
have been misplaced so that it failed to reach the hands of the
addressee.”
Accordingly, the defendants submitted on May 30, 1966 their amended record on appeal (pp.
184-185, rec. on appeal), which, despite plaintiffs’ opposition, was approved
by the court which directed the clerk of court to expedite giving due course to
the appeal, in an order dated June 21,
1966 (pp. 187-188, rec. on appeal).
The clerk of court thereafter certified the said amended record
on appeal on September 5, 1966
(p. 189, rec.).
The plaintiffs-appellees filed with the
Court of Appeals a motion to dismiss appeal dated October 6, 1966 on the ground
that the appeal was not perfected within the reglementary
period; that the original record on appeal failed to show on its face that the
appeal was perfected within the reglementary period,
which defect cannot be corrected after the lapse of the said period; and that
the failure of the clerk of court to certify to the appellate court the amended
record on appeal within ten (10) days after its approval (Section 11, Rule 41,
Revised Rules of Court) and failure on the part of the appellant to see to it that
such a duty is complied with by the clerk of court, constitute abandonment of
the appeal or failure to prosecute the same, citing Maria Pacheco vda. de Miras,
et. al. vs. Honorable Perfecto Quicho,2 Government vs. Abrion,
et. al.,3 and Section 1(b) of Rule 51
in conjunction with section 3, Rule 48, Rules of Court (Annex B, pp. 23-30,
rec.). The defendants-appellants filed
their opposition dated November 28,
1966 to the motion to dismiss appeal (Annex D, pp. 33-34, rec.).
The Third Division of the Court of Appeals in its resolution
dated December 22, 1966
dismissed the appeal after finding that:
“It is noted that the original record on appeal does not show
when defendants-appellants received copy of the decision rendered by the trial
court nor the date when they received the order denying his motion for
reconsideration of July 14, 1964. It further appears that the record on appeal
was approved by order of September 16, 1964 and that it was only on April 11,
1966 when defendants’ counsel filed a sworn manifestation showing the omitted
dates necessary for inclusion in the record on appeal as required under the
Revised Rules of Court (Rule 41, Section 6) that the record on appeal shall
include ‘such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time.’ Over
plaintiffs’ objection, the trial court by order dated May 10, 1966 admitted the sworn statement
mentioned above and accordingly ordered its inclusion in the amended record on
appeal.
“The record shows that copy of the decision was served upon defendants
by registered mail and the first notice dated June 4, 1964 and the second
notice dated June 11, 1964 were received at counsel’s residence by Sena Acurato of sufficient
discretion who went to said house three days a week to help her mother wash clothes;
that although counsel denied having authorized her to receive mail matters for
him during the years 1964 and 1965, she received scores of registry notices for
and in behalf of Atty. Escolin, and he never
complained on account of this except in this case; that the registered letter
was actually received by counsel on June 16, 1964.
“Under the facts and the law, service becomes complete on June 9, 1964 (Gorospe
vs. Court of Appeals, L-11443, September 30, 1959; Pielago
vs. Generosa, 73 Phil. 654; Islas
vs. Platon, 47 Phil. 162; Palisoc
vs. Locsin, 57 Phil. 322; Yangco
vs. Milan, 67 Phil. 761). It follows
that defendants’ motion for reconsideration filed on July 15, 1964 was filed 6 days late since the
decision became final on July 9, 1964. The appeal was manifestly perfected out of
time.
“There is another consideration that leads to the same
conclusion. Section 11, Rule 41 of the
Revised Rules of Court imposes a mandatory duty upon the clerk and the trial
court to transmit to the appellate court the record on appeal within 10 days
after its approval (Alliance Insurance & Surety Co. vs. Tan, 52 O.G.
7634). It was accordingly held by the
Supreme Court that after the lapse of 10 days from the approval of the record
on appeal, the trial court can no longer order its amendment (Gosiengfiao vs. Yatco, L-16676,
January 22, 1961). The Yatco case followed Director of Prisons vs. Teodoro, L-2043, July 30, 1955; and Calingo
vs. Tan, L-10366, May 31, 1957; and the rule has been reiterated in
Commissioner of Immigration vs. Romero, L-19782, January 31, 1964; Santos Cuenca vs. Yatco, CA-G.R. No.
35166-R, August 24, 1965 and Mariano Cabiao vs. Court
of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, L-18454, August 22, 1966.
“Under the foregoing authorities, it seems that the trial
court had no authority to order amendment of the record on appeal 20 months
after its approval. This is more so when
it is considered that the omitted dates sought to be included belatedly in the
original record affect jurisdiction, for unless appeal is perfected on time,
appellate court acquires no jurisdiction over the appealed case and has power
only to dismiss the appeal (Espartero vs. Ladaw, 49 O.G. 1429).
The sworn statement regarding the missing dates filed by appellants’
counsel 19 months after approval of the record on appeal cannot restore the
jurisdiction which has been lost (Government vs. Antonio, L-23736, Res. October
19, 1965; Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Santos, et. al., L-26387,
Res. September 27, 1966).” (Pp. 47-49, rec.).
In its resolution dated March
16, 1967, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals denied the
motion of defendants-appellants for the reconsideration of its resolution
dismissing the appeal (Annex G, p. 66, rec.).
Now said defendants-appellants file this petition before Us for review on certiorari of the resolution of the Court
of Appeals dismissing their appeal.
The resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing petitioners’
appeal should be sustained for failure on the part of the petitioners to
prosecute their appeal seasonably.
Pursuant to paragraph (c) of Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of
Court, the Court of Appeals may dismiss the appeal for “failure of the
appellant to prosecute his appeal under section 3 of Rule 46,” which
provides that if the record on appeal is not received by the Court of Appeals
within thirty (30) days after the approval thereof, the appellee
may, upon notice to the appellant, move the court to grant an order directing
the clerk of the lower court to transmit the record on appeal or to declare the
same abandoned for failure to prosecute.
It is conceded that the original record on appeal was approved by the
trial court on September 16, 1964. Until April 11, 1966 or a period of about one
year and seven months from September 16, 1964, the petitioners herein as
defendants-appellants, did not do anything — such as filing a motion — to
compel the clerk of the trial court to comply with his duty under Section 11 of
Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court to transmit to the appellate court the
original record on appeal within ten (10) days after its approval. Petitioners deliberately did not make any
such move because for over three decades now they have been in possession and
enjoying the fruits of the two parcels in litigation. The undue delay of the
transmittal of the record on appeal to the Court of Appeals compelled counsel
for herein private respondents in March, 1966 to examine the records to
ascertain the reason for the delay.
The contention of herein petitioners that under the aforesaid
Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Court, herein private respondents
never filed any motion before the Court of Appeals to require the clerk of the
trial court to transmit the record on appeal, prior to their motion to dismiss
the appeal before the respondent Court of Appeals on October 6, 1966 and that
they did not even invoke said ground in their motion filed on March 14, 1966
with the trial court for the dismissal of the appeal which was predicated
solely on the appeal having been perfected out of time and not on failure to
prosecute appeal, is devoid of merit; because said section 3 of Rule 46 does
not impose on the appellees, herein private
respondents, the duty to file such a motion to require the clerk of the trial
court to transmit the record on appeal to the Court of Appeals. On the contrary, said section 3 of Rule 46
authorizes herein private respondents as appellees to
file, as an alternative remedy, a motion with the Court of Appeals to declare
the appeal abandoned for failure to prosecute, when the record on appeal is not
received by the Court of Appeals within thirty (30) days after its approval by
the trial court. And this motion to
dismiss appeal for failure to prosecute was filed on October 6, 1966 with the Court of Appeals by
herein private respondents as appellees.
Likewise untenable is the reliance of herein petitioners on the
conclusion of the trial Judge that the long delay was justified by the lack of
copies of the numerous documentary exhibits required to be retained in the
trial court upon transmittal of the record on appeal to the appellate court
under Section 11 of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court; because it will not
take a month to make copies of said documentary exhibits. And there is no showing that herein
petitioners exerted efforts to urge the clerk of the trial court to expedite
the preparation of such copies.
While the clerk of the trial court has the duty to transmit the
record on appeal to the appellate court within ten (10) days after its approval
together with a certified copy of the minutes of the proceeding, order of
approval, certificate of correctness and the original documentary evidence
referred to therein under Section 11 of Rule 41, it is equally the
responsibility of herein petitioners as appellants to compel the clerk of court
to perform his duty, and if necessary, by court order or by invoking the
contempt powers of the court. Thus, in
the 1968 case of Fagtanac, et.
al. vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.,4
WE enunciated:
“A rule long familiar to practitioners in this jurisdiction is
that it is the duty of the appellant to prosecute his appeal with reasonable
diligence. He cannot simply fold his
arms and say that it is the duty of the Clerk of Court of First Instance under
the provisions of Section 11, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, to transmit the
record on appeal to the appellate court.
It is appellant’s duty to make the Clerk act and, if necessary, procure
a court order to compel him to act. He
cannot idly sit by and wait till this is done.
He cannot afterwards wash his hands and say that delay in the
transmittal of the record on appeal was not his fault. For, indeed, this duty imposed upon him was
precisely to spur on the slothful.
xx xx x xx x xx x
“But the decisive question is whether this Court should, in
the discharge of its supervisory functions, compel dismissal of the appeals.
“By Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, if the record on
appeal ‘is not received by the Court of Appeals within thirty (30) days after
the approval thereof, the appellee may, upon notice
to the appellant, move the court to grant an order xx xx
to declare the same abandoned for failure to prosecute.’ Section 1, Rule 50,
Rules of Court, provides that an appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals
on its motion or of that of the appellee upon the
ground of ‘(c) Failure of the appellant to prosecute his appeal under Section 3
of Rule 46.’ Reason for this rule is not wanting. A lack of proper regard on the part of a
defeated litigant to have his case promptly submitted to an appellate court for
disposal of his appeal could result in a situation where ‘litigation might
become more intolerable than the wrongs it is intended to redress.’
xx x xx x xx x xx x
“The negligence of private respondents in prosecuting their
appeals in these cases is palpably clear.
Their failure to assist the courts of justice to dispose of these cases
with reasonable dispatch is a sufficient reason to take away from their right to
have the alleged errors in the appealed judgment corrected. They delayed the administration of justice by
their delay in prosecuting their appeals.
And this, in spite of the fact that the civil suit was commenced on June
5, 1951, and the land registration case, on September 14, 1951. In this situation, the spirit of the Rules of
Court forbids that efficacy of the administration of justice be shackled by
appellants’ failure to prosecute the appeals.
The rule in this respect is to be held rigid. Failure of an appellant to so prosecute must
be reckoned against him. It would be a
travesty in the administration of justice if we are to order now the return of
the records to the lower court to complete the records on appeal; to procure
approval of the amended record still to be presented by private respondents in
the land registration case; and thereafter to elevate the cases once again to
the appellate court for resolution of the appeals.
“Delays in litigation have always been a bane in our judicial
system. And we have observed a growing
tendency of defeated suitors and their lawyers to disregard their duties under
the Rules of Court, in the hope that they may stall the final day of
reckoning. These are the considerations
that now impel this Court to make a policy statement that failure to prosecute
will not be countenanced.” (2 Moran, Rules of Court, 1970 Ed. 491-492).
Even as early as 1918, this Court, in the case of Government vs.
Abrion5
ruled that:
“xx x xx If
the clerk fails to perform his legal duty, the appellant has his remedy. But the failure of the clerk to perform his
legal duty is no justification for the appellant’s failure to perform
his. The appellant cannot justify his
failure to comply with the rules of this court, and thus delay the final
conclusion and decision of an appeal, by saying that the fault was that of the
clerk of the lower court.”
The appalling and irritating protraction in the termination of
this case is as intolerable as it is oppressive on the herein private
respondents, who were denied for over thirty (30) years the enjoyment of the
possession and harvest of the property subject matter of the litigation. Herein petitioners have been reaping the
produce of the lands since the father of herein private respondents died on
August 27, 1935. Herein private respondents,
it will be recalled, instituted this case in 1950 and the trial was commenced
only after herein petitioners submitted an amended Answer, which was approved
by the trial court on August 5, 1963 (pp. 46-48, rec.). And the decision was rendered by the trial
court on June 2, 1964, over thirteen (13) years from the filing of the case,
which decision in favor of the herein private respondents could not be executed
for about seven years because of this incident.
WE repeat the warning in the Fagtanac
case, supra, that failure on the part of an appellant to prosecute his appeal
with reasonable diligence will not be countenanced.
There is no need to pass upon the assigned errors, in view of the
foregoing pronouncement.
WHEREFORE, the resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed
and this petition is hereby dismissed, with treble costs against herein
petitioners.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
Barredo, and Villamor, JJ., concur.
[1]
L-2366, April 27, 1951.
2 Decided by the Court of Appeals on
July 15, 1961.
3 3 Phil. 679.
4 L-26922-3, March 21, 1968, 22 SCRA 1227, 1231, 1233-4.
5 38 Phil. 679, 683.