PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. WILFREDO ROJAS, TEODORO VILLARIN, SOLOMON TOTOY, GREGORIO TUNDAG AND SINFROSO MASONG, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

People versus Rojas

The Case

This is People versus Rojas, a criminal case of triple murder that reached the Supreme Court on automatic review because the trial court imposed the death penalty. Eight men, led by a stranger who came to a barrio selling amulet oil and teaching prayers, went to a copra kiln by the seashore in Digon and killed three girls — the eldest twenty-one, and two sisters aged seven and five. The case matters to a reviewee for four reasons: it shows how conspiracy is proved by circumstantial evidence, it states the rule that the act of one conspirator is the act of all, it distinguishes treachery from the aggravating circumstances of band and dwelling, and it applies the constitutional rights of a person under custodial investigation to an extrajudicial confession.

Procedural History

After investigation, the suspects were charged with murder in three separate informations, and all pleaded not guilty. On motion of the prosecution, over the objection of the other defendants, two of them, Esmael and Estrera, were discharged so they could testify as state witnesses. Every remaining defendant was provided with counsel de oficio. After an extended trial, the trial court rendered its decision on January 27, 1975, convicting all of them and sentencing them to death, except Saturnino Totoy, who was given the lesser penalty because of the mitigating circumstance of minority. All the accused were held solidarily liable for a civil indemnity of 12,000 pesos to the heirs of each of the three victims. Because the penalty imposed was death, the case came to the Supreme Court on automatic review.

Facts

Sometime in January 1973, Wilfredo Rojas arrived in Barrio Talanusa, Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur, from Barrio Tuboran, Malangas. He befriended the other accused, taught them to pray the Our Father, the Hail Mary, and the I Believe, and sold them on credit an amulet oil which he claimed would protect them from injury when rubbed on their bodies. He returned in April for two weeks, and again in May, joining his new friends in drinking wine and reciting the prayers.

On the morning of May 23, 1973, Rojas and his companions went to the church in Talanusa, prayed, rubbed the amulet oil on their bodies, and girded themselves as if preparing for battle. Rojas, Estrera, and Tundag carried firearms and knives; Esmael, Masong, Solomon Totoy, and Saturnino Totoy carried knives; Villarin alone had no weapon. Rojas told them they were going to Digon. After a walk of about half an hour, they reached the seashore and immediately surrounded the copra kiln, trapping the five girls inside. Rojas approached Zenaida Nastae pretending to look for a person named Yoyong. Suddenly Solomon Totoy fired at Dalma, but his gun jammed. Rojas then stabbed Zenaida fatally in the left side, stabbed Canda in the head so that she bled to death, and stabbed the five-year-old Mona twice, in the stomach and in the back. The ears of Zenaida and Mona were severed, though it is not clear by whom or whether before or after death. Rojas then ordered the group to run, and they fled together.

Dalma and her sister Lina escaped by fleeing to the sea and hanging on to a log until the men had left. Dalma, then ten years old, testified and identified the accused. The trial judge found her sincere and straightforward, and found the accounts of the two state witnesses consistent with each other and with hers. The Supreme Court accepted the factual findings of the trial judge, noting his superior competence to observe the witnesses and assess their demeanor.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in finding that there was a conspiracy among the accused.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing upon them collectively the sentence of death.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in considering against them the aggravating circumstances of cuadrilla, dwelling, and evident premeditation.
• Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of Solomon Totoy is invalid for having been taken in violation of the Bill of Rights.

Applicable Provisions

Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code defines conspiracy:

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.

This is the provision under which the Court holds all the accused equally liable as co-principals, since the agreement and the decision to commit the crime were inferred from their joint acts.

Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code defines treachery:

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

This qualifies the killings as murder, and the Court also holds that it absorbs the aggravating circumstance of band.

Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution provides:

Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.

This governs the confession of Solomon Totoy, taken on May 28, 1973, after the ratification of the 1973 Constitution on January 17, 1973, and therefore within the prospective operation of the provision.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that conspiracy was established. While it is desirable that conspiracy be proved by direct evidence, it may be established by circumstantial evidence, and may be inferred where the accused move in concert toward a common purpose. The conduct of the accused before, during, and after the crime showed the agreement: their gathering at the church, the prayers, the anointing with oil, and the girding for combat; their surrounding of the kiln as if by prearrangement; their silence and lack of surprise when Solomon Totoy fired and when Rojas killed; and their running away together at Rojas's order. The Court stressed that it was these acts, and not merely the testimony of the state witnesses, that established the conspiracy.

On the second issue, the Court held that the conspiracy visits equal punishment on all the conspirators, on the legal theory that the act of one is the act of all. Even if some did less than others, their participation added strength to the conspiracy, emboldened the actual killer, and contributed to the success of the common design. In the eyes of the law, each conspirator is a co-principal and equally guilty.

On the third issue, the Court rejected dwelling and band as separate aggravating circumstances. Dwelling was rejected because the tapahan was a separate structure and did not form part of the building where the victims were residing. Band was rejected because cuadrilla is absorbed by treachery, its employment having been consciously adopted to insure the execution of the plot without risk to the criminals. Evident premeditation, however, was correctly appreciated, because the accused had sufficient time between the inception of the plan and its fulfillment to reflect on the crime and desist, yet persisted.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that Solomon Totoy's extrajudicial confession was inadmissible against him. The record did not show that he was informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel. The vague statement in the confession that he had been informed of his rights under the Constitution did not satisfy the constitutional mandate. He was not told he did not have to answer, he was not told he had a right to counsel, and he was neither given a chance to retain counsel de parte nor offered counsel de oficio. Not knowing his right to counsel, he could not have waived it, and any waiver would have needed the assistance of counsel.

Doctrine

First, conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence, and is inferred where the accused move in concert toward a common purpose; the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the crime may show the agreement.

Second, once conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all, and each conspirator is a co-principal equally guilty with the others.

Third, treachery qualifies a killing as murder, and band is absorbed by treachery when the employment of number was consciously adopted to insure the execution of the crime without risk to the offenders.

Fourth, evident premeditation requires proof of the time between the inception of the plan and its fulfillment sufficient for the accused to reflect and desist.

Fifth, a confession taken without a valid informing of the right to remain silent and to counsel is inadmissible, and a waiver of the right to counsel requires the assistance of counsel.

Disposition

The Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, imposed the death penalty on all the accused-appellants for each of the three murders, and increased the civil indemnity for which they are solidarily liable to 30,000 pesos for the heirs of each victim.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that conspiracy may be inferred from the joint acts and design of the accused, and once established, the act of one is the act of all. Examiners use this case to test conspiracy by circumstantial evidence, the absorption of band by treachery, and the requirements for a valid waiver of the right to counsel during custodial investigation.