🎧 Case Brief Lecture

AZUCENA CINCO TABAO AND JESUSA CINCO ACOSTA, COMPLAINANTS, VS. JUDGE ENRIQUE C. ASIS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BR. 10, ABUYOG, LEYTE, RESPONDENT.

A.M. No. RTJ-95-1330. January 30, 1996 January 30, 1996

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Tabao versus Asis

The Case

This is an administrative complaint filed with the Supreme Court by the sisters Azucena Cinco Tabao and Jesusa Cinco Acosta against Judge Enrique C. Asis, then the Municipal Trial Court in Cities judge of Tacloban City, Branch 1. The complainants charge him with gross irregularity in the performance of his duties, violation of Supreme Court circulars and regulations, and abuse of authority and conduct unbecoming of a judge. The case matters because it fixes the line between a judge's official power to administer oaths and the prohibited private practice of law, and it tells every barangay and municipal judge exactly when, and how narrowly, they may act as notaries public.

Procedural History

The complainants filed a sworn letter-complaint directly with the Supreme Court, which is the proper forum for administrative discipline of judges and justices. The respondent judge filed his comment admitting that he notarized the documents but invoking charity as his excuse. The matter was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator, where Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo P. Abesamis found the respondent liable and recommended a fine equivalent to one month's salary, while noting without action the complainants' prayer to annul the Special Power of Attorney because that relief does not fall within the purview of an administrative proceeding. The case then reached the Supreme Court as an original administrative action, and the Court, through Justice Bellosillo, rendered its decision.

Facts

The complainants' aunt, Mariquita M. Cinco-Jocson, owned a parcel of land in Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Number 21184. A Special Power of Attorney was prepared authorizing another aunt, Cirila Cinco-Caintic, to sell that lot for one million pesos. At the time of the intended sale, Mariquita was confined at Saint Paul's Hospital in Tacloban City.

Both the Special Power of Attorney and an Affidavit of Consciousness executed by Mariquita's physician, Doctor Belen Chiquillo Diamante, had already been notarized on the third of June 1992 by Notary Public Flaviano V. Caintic. One month and twenty days later, on the twenty-third of July 1992, the respondent judge notarized the very same two documents a second time.

In his comment, the respondent admitted the second notarization but claimed he did it only as a gesture of Christian charity and brotherly love for people in need, since the proceeds of the sale would pay for Mariquita's medical expenses, and that he received no payment for it. The Court found this explanation impossible to accept, since the documents had already been notarized and there was no need for a second notarization. The Court also noted the finding that the respondent not only notarized private documents concerning private interests but even acted as private counsel to safeguard Mariquita's interest at the request of Cirila.

Issues

  • Whether or not the respondent judge is administratively liable for notarizing private documents and acting as private counsel.
  • Whether or not a municipal judge may notarize private documents as a notary public ex officio.
  • Whether or not the excuse of Christian charity and the alleged bad motive of the complainants affect the respondent's liability.

Applicable Provisions

Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients.

This is the core prohibition, promulgated under the Court's constitutional power to regulate the practice of law, and it bars a judge from acting as private counsel.

Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

A judge shall not engage in the private practice of law.

This reinforces the statutory prohibition as a matter of judicial ethics.

Section N, Chapter VIII of the Manual for Clerks of Court provides:

Officers authorized to administer oaths, with the exception of notaries public, municipal judges and clerks of court, are not obliged to administer oaths or execute certificates save in matters of official business; and with the exception of notaries public, the officer performing the service in those matters shall charge no fee, unless specifically authorized by law.

This confines a municipal judge's oath-administering power to matters related to his official functions, so he cannot notarize private documents such as the Special Power of Attorney and the Affidavit of Consciousness.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held the respondent administratively liable. The prohibition on private practice rests on public policy, because the rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law are inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretions and privileges of a judge. The rule obliges judicial officers to give full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevents them from extending special favors for their own private interests, and assures the public of impartiality. The Court found that the respondent not only notarized private documents concerning private interests but even acted as private counsel to safeguard Mariquita's interest.

On the second issue, the Court held that municipal judges may not engage in notarial work except as notaries public ex officio, and even then may only notarize documents connected with the exercise of their official functions. They may not undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of private documents, contracts and other acts of conveyance bearing no relation to their functions, except in far-flung municipalities with neither lawyers nor notaries public. Even in that exception, two conditions must be met: all notarial fees charged must be for the account of the Government and turned over to the municipal treasurer, and a certification must be made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in the municipality or circuit. The Court noted that the City of Tacloban abounds with notaries public, so the respondent cannot qualify as an exception.

On the third issue, the Court held that acting in the spirit of Christian charity is not a valid excuse for acting as private counsel and notary public, and that the complainants' alleged motives of vengeance and personal gain are immaterial. The Court also observed that a notarized document executed by a party alone, and not by two or more parties executing in different places, does not need to be notarized twice, and the respondent's unexplained second notarization defied logic and reason.

Doctrine

A judge may not engage in the private practice of law or give professional advice to clients, as Section 35 of Rule 138 commands, and this prohibition is echoed in Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. A municipal judge may act as a notary public only ex officio and only for documents connected with his official functions; he may not prepare or acknowledge private documents, contracts and conveyances unrelated to his judicial duties. The lone exception is for far-flung municipalities without lawyers or notaries public, and even there the notarial fees must accrue to the Government and the document must carry a certification of the absence of any lawyer or notary public. Charity is no defense, and the motive of the complainant is irrelevant to administrative liability.

Disposition

The Court found Judge Enrique C. Asis administratively liable as charged and fined him ten thousand pesos, with a warning that the commission of the same or similar act will warrant a more severe sanction.

Remember This

Memorize the line that a municipal judge may notarize only as a notary public ex officio and only for documents connected with his official functions, with the far-flung municipality exception carrying its two conditions. Examiners use this case to test the prohibition on private practice by judges and the limits of a municipal judge's notarial authority.