MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. ZOILO HILARIO, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Manila Railroad versus Hilario

The Case

This is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition brought by the Manila Railroad Company and its train driver, Andres Garcia, against Judge Zoilo Hilario of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. The petitioners ask the Supreme Court to stop the Tarlac court from taking cognizance of a damages suit arising from a train collision that killed Emilia de la Cruz, the wife and mother of the plaintiffs. The case matters because it draws a clean line between two ideas students often blur: venue and jurisdiction. It also teaches how a trial judge should treat the allegations of a complaint when ruling on a motion to dismiss grounded on improper venue.

Procedural History

The plaintiffs sued the Manila Railroad Company and Andres Garcia for damages in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground of improper venue, pointing to the complaint's own allegations: that the plaintiffs resided in Nueva Ecija, that the Railroad's main office was in Manila, and that the other defendant resided in Manila. The motion was denied. The defendants then filed this certiorari and prohibition proceeding in the Supreme Court, alleging lack of jurisdiction and, in the alternative, grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for failure to make out a case for either remedy.

Facts

A collision occurred between a train of the Manila Railroad Company, driven by Andres Garcia, and the truck in which Emilia de la Cruz was riding. Emilia de la Cruz died, and her surviving family sued the Railroad and Garcia for damages for personal injuries in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac.

The complaint alleged that the plaintiffs resided in Nueva Ecija, that the Railroad's main office was in Manila, and that the other defendant resided in Manila. On those allegations the defendants moved to dismiss for improper venue.

Immediately after the motion to dismiss was filed, the plaintiffs amended their complaint on January 6, 1959, alleging that one of them, Fortunato Pano, was a resident of Paniqui, Tarlac. On January 10, 1959, the respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss, holding it not well taken. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners submitted certificates signed by the Chief of Police and the Mayor of Paniqui stating that Fortunato Pano was not a resident of that town.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Tarlac may take cognizance of the case where the amended complaint alleges that one of the plaintiffs resides in Tarlac.
• Whether or not the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion in accepting that allegation of residence at face value for the purpose of denying the motion to dismiss.
• Whether or not the certificates of the Chief of Police and the Mayor of Paniqui may be considered by the Supreme Court to defeat the allegation of residence.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, on venue of personal actions, provides:

Civil actions in the Courts of First Instance may be commenced and tried in the province where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.

This is the provision the Court invokes: because one plaintiff was alleged to reside in Tarlac, the plaintiff's election of venue there was prima facie proper.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that under the Rules, there being an allegation that one of the plaintiffs was a resident of Tarlac, the court of that province could not, at that stage, be prohibited from taking cognizance of the litigation. The plaintiff's election of venue was supported by the face of the amended complaint.

On the second issue, the Court stressed that the question here is venue, not jurisdiction. There being an affirmative allegation before the judge that one of the plaintiffs resided in Paniqui, Tarlac, the trial judge could not certainly be charged with abuse of discretion for having accepted such allegation prima facie for the purposes of denying the motion to dismiss. This was especially so because, at that time, the official certificates had not been shown to him.

On the third issue, the Court held that the certificates signed by the Chief of Police and the Mayor of Paniqui should be exhibited to the trial court as evidence, if and when the defendants take their turn to present their side of the controversy. The Court added that such certificates are not conclusive. The trial judge's remarks on the residence of a railroad company, though not totally acceptable, were noted as having some bearing on the matter of discretion.

Doctrine

First, venue is not jurisdiction. A defect in venue does not deprive the court of authority to act; it is a ground for a motion to dismiss that the defendant must properly raise and prove.

Second, for purposes of resolving a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue, the trial court may accept as true, prima facie, the allegation in the complaint that the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides in the province where the action was filed. Under Section 1 of Rule 5, the plaintiff may elect to commence the action where he or any of the plaintiffs resides.

Third, evidence offered to contradict that allegation, such as the certificates of local officials, must be presented to the trial court in due course and is not conclusive. Certiorari and prohibition will not lie to correct a mere error in venue, absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed, the Supreme Court holding that the petitioners failed to make out a case for certiorari or prohibition, without costs.

Remember This

Memorize the line: the question here is venue, not jurisdiction, and an allegation of a plaintiff's residence in the complaint is enough, prima facie, to sustain the plaintiff's election of venue against a motion to dismiss. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between venue and jurisdiction and the standard for certiorari and prohibition against interlocutory orders on venue.