PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN RELOVA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BATANGAS, SECOND BRANCH, AND MANUE…

In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, the
People of the Philippines seek to set aside the orders of the respondent Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in Criminal Case No. 266, dated 12
August 1976 and 8 November 1976, respectively, quashing an information for theft
filed against private respondent Manuel Opulencia on the ground of double
jeopardy and denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

On 1
February 1975, members of the Batangas City Police together with personnel of
the Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a
city judge of Batangas City, searched and examined the premises of the Opulencia
Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and operated by the private respondent
Manuel Opulencia.  The police discovered that electric wiring, devices and
contraptions had been installed, without the necessary authority from the city
government, and “architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building”^[1] owned by the private respondent.  These
electric devices and contraptions were, in the allegation of the petitioner
“designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current
consumption in the electric meter of the said electric [ice and cold storage]
plant.”^[2] During the subsequent
investigation, Manuel Opulencia admitted in a written statement that he had
caused the installation of the electrical devices “in order to lower or decrease
the readings of his electric meter”.^[3]

On 24 November 1975, an Assistant
City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the City Court of Batangas City an
information against Manuel Opulencia for violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of
1974, Batangas City.  A violation of this ordinance was, under its terms,
punishable by a fine “ranging from Five Pesos (P5.00) to Fifty Pesos (P50.00) or
imprisonment, which shall not exceed thirty (30) days, or both, at the
discretion of the court”.^[4] This
information read as follows:

“The undersigned, Assistant City Fiscal, accuses Manuel Opulencia y
Lat of violation of Sec. 3 (b) in relation to Sec. 6 (d) and Sec. 10 Article II,
Title IV of ordinance No. 1, S. 1974, with damage to the City Government of
Batangas, and penalized by the said ordinance, committed as follows:

That
from November, 1974 to February, 1975 at Batangas City, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above­ named accused, with intent
to defraud the City Government of Batangas, without proper authorization from
any lawful and/or permit from the proper authorities, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make unauthorized installations of electric
wirings and devices to lower or decrease the consumption of electric fluid at
the Opulencia Ice Plant situated at Kumintang, Ibaba, this city and as a result
of such unauthorized installations of electric wirings and devices made by the
accused, the City Government of Batangas was damaged and prejudiced in the total
amount of FORTY ONE THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P41,062.16)
Philippine currency, covering the period from November 1974 to February, 1975,
to the damage and prejudice of the City Government of Batangas in the
aforestated amount of P41,062.16, Philippine currency.”

The accused Manuel Opulencia pleaded not guilty to the above information.  On
2 February 1976, he filed a motion to dismiss the information upon the grounds
that the crime there charged had already prescribed and that the civil indemnity
there sought to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the Batangas City
Court to award.  In an order dated 6 April 1976, the Batangas City Court granted
the motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription, it appearing that the
offense charged was a light felony which prescribes two months from the time of
discovery thereof, and it appearing further that the information was filed by
the fiscal more than nine months after discovery of the offense charged in
February 1975.

Fourteen (14) days later, on 20 April 1976, the Acting
City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, Branch II, another information against Manuel Opulencia, this time for
theft of electric power under Article 308 in relation to Article 309, paragraph
(1), of the Revised Penal Code.  This information read as follows:

“The undersigned Acting City Fiscal accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat
of the crime of theft, defined and penalized by Article 308, in relation to
Article 309, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as
follows:

That on, during, and between the month of November, 1974, and
the 21st day of February, 1975, at Kumintang, Ibaba, Batangas City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the Batangas
Electric Light System, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, steal and appropriate electric current valued in the total amount of FORTY
ONE THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P41,062.16) Philippine
currency, to the damage and prejudice of the said Batangas Electric Light
System, owned and operated by the City Government of Batangas, in the
aforementioned sum of P41,062.16.”

The above information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 266 before the Court
of First Instance of Batangas, Branch II.  Before he could be arraigned thereon,
Manuel Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash, dated 5 May 1976, alleging that he had
been previously acquitted of the offense charged in the second information and
that the filing thereof was violative of his constitutional right against double
jeopardy.  By Order dated 16 August 1976, the respondent Judge granted the
accused’s Motion to Quash and ordered the case dismissed.  The gist of this
Order is set forth in the following paragraphs:

    “The only question
here is whether the dismissal of the first case can be properly pleaded by the
accused in the motion to quash.

    In the first paragraph of the earlier
information, it alleges that the prosecution “accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of
violation of Sec. 3(b) in relation to Sec. 6(d) and Sec. 10 Article II, Title IV
of Ordinance No. 1, s. 1974, with damage to the City Government of Batangas,
etc.” (underlining supplied).  The first case, as it appears, was not
simply one of illegal electrical connections.  It also covered an amount of
P41,062.16 which the accused, in effect, allegedly with intent to defraud,
deprived the city government of Batangas If the charge had meant illegal
electric installations only, it could have alleged illegal connections which
were done at one instance on a particular date between November, 1974, to
February 21, 1975.  But as the information states “that from November, 1974
to February 1975 at Batangas City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to defraud 
the City Government of Batangas, without proper authorization from any
lawful and/or permit from the proper authorities, did then and there 
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make  unauthorized installations of
electric wirings and  devices, etc.” (underline supplied), it was meant to
include the P41,062.16 which the accused had, in effect, defrauded the city
government.  The information could not have meant that from November 1974 to 21
February 1975, he had daily committed unlawful installations.

When, therefore, he was arraigned and he faced the indictment before
the City Court, he had already been exposed, or he felt he was exposed to
consequences of what allegedly happened between November 1974 to February 21,
1975 which had allegedly resulted in defrauding the City of Batangas in the
amount of P41,062.16.” (Emphases and parentheses in the original)

A Motion for Reconsideration of the above-quoted Order filed by the
petitioner was denied by the respondent Judge in an Order dated 18 November
1976.

On 1 December 1976, the present Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus was filed in this Court by the Acting City Fiscal of
Batangas City on behalf of the People.

The basic premise of the
petitioner’s position is that the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is protection against a second or later jeopardy of conviction for the
same offense.  The petitioner stresses that the first information filed
before the City Court of Batangas City was one for unlawful or unauthorized
installation of electrical wiring and devices, acts which were in violation of
an ordinance of the City Government of Batangas.  Only two elements are needed
to constitute an offense under this City Ordinance:  (1) that there was such an
installation; and (2) no authority therefor had been obtained from the
Superintendent of the Batangas City Electrical System or the District Engineer. 
The petitioner urges that the relevant terms of the City Ordinance — which read
as follows:

    “Section 3 —  Connection and Installation:

(a)  
x x x

(b)  The work and installation in the houses and building and their
connection with the Electrical System shall be done either by the employee of
the system duly authorized by its Superintendent or by persons adept in the
matter duly authorized by the District Engineer.  Applicants for electrical
service permitting the works of installation or connection with the system to be
undertaken by the persons not duly authorized therefor shall be considered
guilty of violation of the ordinance.”

would show that:

“The principal purpose for (sic) such a provision is to ensure that
electrical installations on residences or buildings be done by persons duly
authorized or adept in the matter, to avoid fires and accidents due to faulty
electrical wirings.  It is primarily a regulatory measure and not intended to
punish or curb theft of electric fluid which is already covered by the Revised
Penal Code.”^[5]

The gist of the offense under the City Ordinance, the petitioner’s argument
continues, is the installing of electric wiring and devices without authority
from the proper officials of the city government.  To constitute an offense
under the city ordinance, it is not essential to establish any mens rea on the
part of the offender generally speaking, nor, more specifically, an intent to
appropriate and steal electric fluid.

In contrast, the petitioner goes
on, the offense of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code filed
before the Court of First Instance of Batangas in Criminal Case No. 266 has
quite different essential elements.  These elements are:

“1. That personal property be taken;

2.  That the personal
property (taken) belongs to another;

3.  That the taking be done with
intent of gain;

4.  That the taking be done without the consent of the
owner; and

5.  That the taking be accomplished without violence against
or intimidation of persons or force upon things.”^[6]

The petitioner also alleges, correctly, in our view, that theft of
electricity can be effected even without illegal or unauthorized installations
of any kind by, for instance, any of the following means:

“1.  Turning back the dials of the electric meter;

2.  Fixing
the electric meter in such a manner that it will not register the actual
electrical consumption;

3.  Under-reading of electrical consumption;
and

4.  By tightening the screw of the rotary blade to slow down the
rotation of the same.”^[7]

The petitioner concludes that:

“The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of
Batangas City] is not the same as theft of electricity [under the
Revised Penal Code]; that the second offense is not an attempt  to
commit the first or a frustration thereof and that the second offense
is not necessarily  included in the offense charged in the first 
information“.^[8]

The above arguments made by the petitioner are of course correct.  This is
clear both from the express terms of the constitutional provision involved —
which reads as follows:

“No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense.  If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act.” (Emphasis supplied; Article IV (22), 1973
Constitution)^[9]

and from our case law on this point.^[10] The basic difficulty with the
petitioner’s position is that it must be examined, not under the terms of the
first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather under
the second sentence of the same section.  The first sentence of Article IV
(22) sets forth the general rule:  the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is
different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although
both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of
acts.  The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the
general proposition:  the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is
available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different
from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the
Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same
act or set of acts.  This was made clear sometime ago in Yap vs.
Lutero.^[11]

In Yap,
petitioner Manuel Yap was charged in Criminal Case No. 16054 of the Municipal
Court of Iloilo City, with violation of Article 14 of Ordinance No. 22, Series
of 1951, in relation to Ordinance No. 15, Series of 1954, of the City of
Iloilo.  The information charged him with having “wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously drive[n] and operate[d]” an automobile —”recklessly and without
reasonable caution thereby endangering other vehicles and pedestrians passing in
said street.” Three months later, Yap was again charged in Criminal Case No.
16443 of the same Municipal Court, this time with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence.  The information charged him with violation of the
Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992 as amended by Republic Act No. 587)
committed by driving and operating an automobile in a reckless and negligent
manner and as a result thereof inflicting injuries upon an unfortunate
pedestrian.  Yap moved to quash the second information upon the ground that it
placed him twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same act.  This motion was
denied by the respondent municipal judge.  Meantime, another municipal judge had
acquitted Yap in Criminal Case No 16054.  Yap then instituted a petition for
certiorari in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo to set aside the
order of the respondent municipal judge.  The Court of First Instance of Iloilo
having reversed the respondent municipal judge and having directed him to desist
from continuing with Criminal Case No. 16443, the respondent Judge brought the
case to the Supreme Court for review on appeal.  In affirming the decision
appealed from and holding that the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy was available to petitioner Yap, then Associate Justice and later Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion wrote:

“To begin with, the crime of damage to property through reckless
driving — with which Diaz stood charged in the court of first instance — is a
violation of the Revised Penal Code (third paragraph of Article 365), not the
Automobile Law (Act No. 3992, as amended by Republic Act No. 587).  Hence, Diaz
was not twice accused of a violation of the same law.  Secondly,
reckless driving and certain crimes committed through reckless driving are
punishable under different provisions of said Automobile Law.  Hence —
from the view point of Criminal Law, as distinguished from political or
Constitutional Law — they constitute, strictly, different offenses, although
under certain conditions, one offense may include the other, and accordingly,
once placed in jeopardy for one, the plea of double jeopardy may be in order as
regards the other, as in the Diaz case.  (Emphases in the original)

Thirdly, our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double jeopardy.  The
first sentence of clause 20, section 1, Article III of the Constitution, ordains
that” no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense.” (Emphasis in the original) The second sentence of said clause
provides that “if an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act”.  Thus, the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense, whereas the second contemplates double jeopardy of
punishment for the same act.  Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment of the same act, provided that he is charged with
different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not included in, or
does not include, the crime charged in the other case.  The second sentence
applies, even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that
one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of a
statute.  If the two charges are based on one and the same  act, conviction or
acquittal under either the law  or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under
the  other.^[12] Incidentally, such
conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.  So long as jeopardy has attached
under one of the informations charging said offense, the defense may be availed
of in the other case involving the same offense, even if there has been neither
conviction nor acquittal in either case.

The issue in the case at bar hinges, therefore, on whether or not, under the
information in case No. 16443, petitioner could — if he failed to plead double
jeopardy — be convicted of the same act charged in case No. 16054, in which he
has already been acquitted.  The information in case No. 16054 alleges,
substantially, that on the date and in the place therein stated, petitioner
herein had wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously driven and operated “recklessly
and without reasonable caution” an automobile described in said information. 
Upon the other hand, the information in case No. 16443, similarly states that,
on the same date and in the same place, petitioner drove and operated the
aforementioned automobile in a “reckless and negligent manner at an excessive
rate of speed and in violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992),
as amended by Republic Act No. 587, and existing city ordinances”.  Thus, if the
theories mentioned in the second information were not established by the
evidence, petitioner could be convicted in case No. 16443 of the very same
violation of municipal ordinance charged in case No. 16054, unless he pleaded
double jeopardy.

It is clear, therefore, that the lower court has not
erred eventually sustaining the theory of petitioner herein.”

Put a little differently, where the offenses charged are penalized either by
different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important
inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charged:  the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only
where an identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent
offenses charged.  In contrast, where one offense is charged under a municipal
ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to
the identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed
and which are alleged to have given rise to the two offenses:  the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the
acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal
ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense
charged under a statute.

The question may be raised why one rule should
exist where two offenses under two different sections of the same statute or
under different statutes are charged, and another rule for the situation where
one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance and another offense under a
national statute.  If the second sentence of the double jeopardy provision had
not been written into the Constitution, conviction or acquittal under a
municipal ordinance would never constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act under a national statute.  An offense penalized by municipal ordinance
is, by definition, different from an offense under a statute.  The two offenses
would never constitute the same offense having been promulgated by different
rule-making authorities — though one be subordinate to the other — and the plea
of double jeopardy would never lie.  The discussions during the 1934-1935
Constitutional Convention show that the second sentence was inserted precisely
for the purpose of extending the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy to a situation which would not otherwise be covered by the first
sentence.^[13]

The question of
identity or lack of identity of offenses is addressed by examining the essential
elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are set out in
the respective legislative definitions of the offenses involved.  The question
of identity of the acts which are claimed to have generated liability both under
a municipal ordinance and a national statute must be addressed, in the first
instance, by examining the location of such acts in time and space.  When the
acts of the accused as set out in the two informations are so related to each
other in time and space as to be reasonably regarded as having taken place on
the same occasion and where those acts have been moved by one and the same, or a
continuing, intent or voluntary design or negligence, such acts may be
appropriately characterized as an integral whole capable of giving rise to penal
liability simultaneously under different legal enactments (a municipal ordinance
and a national statute).

In Yap, the Court regarded the offense
of reckless driving under the Iloilo City Ordinance and serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence under the Revised Motor Vehicle Law as
derived from the same act or sets of acts — that is, the operation of an
automobile in a reckless manner.  The additional technical element of serious
physical injuries related to the physical consequences of the operation of the
automobile by the accused, i.e., the impact of the automobile upon the
body of the offended party.  Clearly, such consequence occurred in the same
occasion that the accused operated the automobile (recklessly).  The moral
element of negligence permeated the acts of the accused throughout that
occasion.

In the instant case, the relevant acts took place within the
same time frame:  from November 1974 to February 1975.  During this period, the
accused Manuel Opulencia installed or permitted the installation of electrical
wiring and devices in his ice plant without obtaining the necessary permit or
authorization from the municipal authorities.  The accused conceded that he
effected or permitted such unauthorized installation for the very purpose of
reducing his electric power bill.  This corrupt intent was thus present from the
very moment that such unauthorized installation began.  The immediate physical
effect of the unauthorized installation was the inward flow of electric current
into Opulencia’s ice plant without the corresponding recording thereof in his
electric meter.  In other words, the “taking” of electric current was integral
with the unauthorized installation of electric wiring and devices.

It is
perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not
to be understood with absolute literalness.  The identity of offenses that must
be shown need not be absolute identity:  the first and second offenses may be
regarded as the “same offense” where the second offense necessarily includes the
first offense or is necessarily included in such first offense or where the
second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof.^[14] Thus, for the constitutional plea of
double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements constituting the
first offense need be present in the technical definition of the second
offense.  The law here seeks to prevent harrassment of an accused person by
multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another are
nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical
elements.  As Associate Justice and later Chief Justice Ricardo Paras cautioned
in People vs. del Carmen, et al., 88 Phil. 51 (1951):

“While the rule against double jeopardy prohibits prosecution for
the same offense, it seems elementary that an accused should be shielded against
being prosecuted for several offenses made out from a single act. 
Otherwise, an unlawful act or omission may give rise to  several
prosecutions depending upon the ability of the prosecuting officer to imagine or
concoct as  many offenses as can be justified by said act or omission, by simply
adding or subtracting essential elements.  Under the theory of appellant, the
crime of rape may be converted into a crime of coercion, by merely alleging that
by force and intimidation the accused prevented the offended girl from remaining
a virgin.” (88 Phil. at 53; emphases supplied)

By the same token, acts of a person which physically occur on the same
occasion and are infused by a common intent or design or negligence and
therefore form a moral unity, should not be segmented and sliced, as it were, to
produce as many different acts as there are offenses under municipal ordinances
or statutes that an enterprising prosecutor can find.

It remains to point out that the dismissal by the Batangas City Court of
the information for violation of the Batangas City Ordinance upon the ground
that such offense had already prescribed, amounts to an acquittal of the accused
of that offense.  Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, “prescription of
the crime” is one of the grounds for “total extinction of criminal liability”. 
Under the Rules of Court, an order sustaining a motion to quash based on
prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense.^[15]

It is not without reluctance that
we deny the people’s petition for certiorari and
mandamus in this case.  It is difficult to summon any empathy for a
businessman who would make or enlarge his profit by stealing from the
community.  Manuel Opulencia is able to escape criminal punishment because an
Assistant City Fiscal by inadvertence or otherwise chose to file an information
for an offense which he should have known had already prescribed.  We are,
however, compelled by the fundamental law to hold the protection of the right
against double jeopardy available even to the private respondent in this
case.

The civil liability aspects of this case are another matter. 
Because no reservation of the right to file a separate civil action was made by
the Batangas City electric light system, the civil action for recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged was impliedly instituted with the
criminal action both before the City Court of Batangas City and the Court of
First Instance of Batangas.  The extinction of criminal liability whether by
prescription or by the bar of double jeopardy does not carry with it the
extinction of civil liability arising from the offense charged.  In the present
case, as we noted earlier,^[16] accused
Manuel Opulencia freely admitted during the police investigation having stolen
electric current through the installation and use of unauthorized electrical
connections or devices.  While the accused pleaded not guilty before the City
Court of Batangas City, he did not deny having appropriated electric power. 
However, there is no evidence in the record as to the amount or value of the
electric power appropriated by Manuel Opulencia, the criminal informations
having been dismissed both by the City Court and by the Court of First Instance
(from which dismissals the Batangas City electric light system could not have
appealed^[17]) before trial could begin. 
Accordingly, the related civil action which has not been waived expressly or
impliedly, should be remanded to the Court of First Instance of Batangas City
for reception of evidence on the amount or value of the electric power
appropriated and converted by Manuel Opulencia and rendition of judgment
conformably with such evidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition
for certiorari and mandamus is DENIED.  Let the civil
action for related civil liability be remanded to the Court of First Instance of
Batangas City for further proceedings as indicated above.  No pronouncement as
to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gancayco, and
Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., took no part, having been a member of the law offices
representing respondents, until his appointment to the Supreme
Court.

^[1] Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus, dated 27 November 1976, p. 2.

^[2] Id.

^[3] Id.; and Annex “A” of the
Petition.

^[4] Order dated 6 April
1976 of Acting City Judge Aguileo S. de Villa, City Court, Branch I, Batangas
City, Criminal Case No. 2385.

^[5]
Memorandum for the Petitioner dated 16 April 1977, pp. 13-14.

^[6] Memorandum for the Petitioner dated 16
April 1977, p. 14, citing Reyes, Revised Penal Code [1971] p.
584.

^[7] Memorandum for Petitioner
dated 16 April 1977, p. 15.

^[8]
Id., p. 16; emphases in the original; brackets supplied.

^[9] The above paragraph is taken
verbatim from Article III (20) of the 1935 Constitution and is carried
over, again verbatim, in Article III (21) of the proposed Constitution adopted
by the Constitutional Commission of 1986.  The Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902
had provided that “no person for the same offense shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment —” (Sec. 5, 1 Phil. Anno. Laws ^[1956] 51).  This provision of the Philippine
Bill was carried over in identical words in the Jones Law of August 29, 1916
(Sec. 3, ibid, 105).

^[10] The case
Law on this point includes:  Lu Hayco vs. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA
227 (1985); People vs. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166 (1985); People vs.
Militante, 117 SCRA 910 (1982); Flores Jr. vs. Ponce Enrile, 115
SCRA 236 (1982); People vs. Glorin, 80 SCRA 675 (1977); People vs.
Consulta, 70 SCRA 277 (1976); Tacas vs. Cariaso, 72 SCRA 527
(1976); Bustamante vs. Maceren, 48 SCRA 155 (1972); People vs.
Mencias, 46 SCRA 88 (1972); People vs. Doriquez, 24 SCRA 163
(1968); Culanag vs. Director of Prisons, 20 SCRA 1123 (1967);
People vs. Ramos, 2 SCRA 523 (1961); Yap vs. Hon. Lutero, 105
Phil. 1307 (1959); People vs. Opemia, 98 Phil. 698 (1956); People
vs. Alger, 92 Phil. 227 (1953); People vs. del Carmen, 88 Phil. 51
(1951); Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 766 (1950); People vs.
Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851 (1933); People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 82
(1922); Julia vs. Sotto, 2 Phil. 247 (1903).

^[11] G.R. No. L-12669, 30 April 1959. 
Unfortunately, this decision is not reported in full; see 105 Phil. 1307
(1959).

^[12] Emphases
supplied.

^[13] The second sentence
of Article III (22) of the 1935 Constitution was originally introduced by
Delegate Francisco.  The amendment read:

“Si un acto esta penado tanto por una ley general como por una ordenanza
municipal, la absolucion o condena bajo la una sera obice para un procesamiento
ulterior bajo la otra.” (IV Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional
Convention [1966; S.H. Laurel, Ed.], p. 97)

Delegate Jose P. Laurel
speaking in connection with the Francisco amendment said:

“MR. LAUREL. 
Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Convention:  Pardon me if I have to make a
little explanation in connection with this case.  In the case of the United
States vs. Grafton, the Supreme Court of the United States said that a
person accused before a military tribunal and acquitted, cannot again be accused
before a civil court, because to do so will be to place a person twice in
jeopardy.  In that case, Grafton, who was a soldier was accused before the
military court.  This military court acquitted him.  Later on he was again
prosecuted for the same offense before a civil court, and the civil court
convicted him to fourteen years, eight months and one day.  Upon the appeal to
the Supreme Court of the United States, the U.S. Supreme Court set aside the
judgment of the lower court on the ground that Grafton had been placed twice in
jeopardy.

Now, in connection with my statement regarding laws and
municipal ordinances, we have in our jurisprudence quite a number of cases,
particularly the cases of U.S. vs. Joson, U.S. vs. Espiritu Santo and
other cases holding that the conviction under a general law settled power to
prosecution (sic) under a local law, and vice versa, on the ground that
there are two distinct sovereignties and two distinct violations of the
law.  We have, therefore, reached a situation where you have in one case
the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, and the decision of our
Supreme Court in the Philippine Islands.  Now, the theory in the Supreme Court
of the United States in the Grafton case was that when the courts acquitted
Grafton, the acquittal was by the same authority, the authority of the united
States that established the military court.  The civil government was
established by the same authority of the government of the United States, and
consequently — to convict a man already acquitted would be [to] place [him]
twice in jeopardy on the same principle that it was the same authority that
convicted and condemned Grafton.

Now, the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands, and with due apology to the Supreme Court, failed to follow
the logic of the Grafton case and adhered to the practice obtaining in several
states of the Union that in cases where there are two violations, one for a
general law and one against a local law, there is no double jeopardy on the
ground of two distinct sovereignties and two distinct laws.  But there is no
doubt that it would be unjust and should not be allowed.  The objection
and the example given here by the Representative from Cebu that a person may be
influential or may be shrewd enough in case he is accused, for instance, of
gambling, in hurrying to the chief of police and having him accused of violation
of a municipal ordinance in which case, according to him, it will not be
possible to accuse him under a general law, and therefore that will defeat in a
way the administration of justice because that will make the administration of
justice dependent upon the ability and the shrewdness of the person accused of
gambling to hurry to the justice of the peace court.  But I desire to inform the
members of this Convention, in answer to that argument, that in my opinion, it
is preferable that a man should be only accused and convicted once, for
instance, for violation of a municipal ordinance and no longer be prosecuted for
violation of a general law, rather than to permit that same person be convicted,
say one month in the municipal court and then six months in another court for
the same offense.  I [would] rather see a person convicted once in
violation of a municipal offense, rather than to permit the conviction of that
person, one for violation of a municipal ordinance, and one for violation of a
general law for the same offense, in gambling in that case.  If the selection is
made, I would prefer the prosecution of a man under a general law than to permit
his prosecution twice for the same act of gambling.

x x x (IV
Id., pp. 113-115; brackets supplied)

The distinction
between “acts” and “offenses” in the context of the double jeopardy provision
was present in the minds of the delegates to the Convention.  Thus: “MR.
LAUREL.  Mr. President, that has practically been brought up here, because some
of our delegates suggested that the word “act” be incorporated, which would
give rise to difficulties, because one act may constitute different
offenses.  But when we retain the word “offense”, there will be distinct
offenses, and consequently, that may be desirable here to retain what is stated
in the draft, that is, the word “offense”; but as I said, still if we accept in
principle the fact that no person shall be prosecuted twice for violation of a
general offense, or if you give latitude to the Committee as to the form of
expression, we shall be able to arrive at that point where we can present a
proper precept embodying the idea that we shall approve in principle only.  I am
not in a position to say now whether it would be advisable to retain it; I do
not know whether it would be advisable to insert the word “act”, because an act
may constitute several offenses.  It seems to me that it is for the committee to
study properly the draft, and recommend what it thinks best.

MR. JOVEN. 
Does not the gentleman think that such modification is a question of form and
not of substance?

MR. LAUREL.  Well, my suggestion that we approve in
principle the proposition covers this particular case.  That is to say, a person
may not be prosecuted twice in a case where there are two laws, one general law
and one municipal ordinance.  That is to say, in case he is prosecuted under a
general law, that is a part or the consequences of a municipal ordinance, and
vice versa.  That is the idea, the primary idea, and that is our
recommendation.  Now, as to how we should word it, whether we should retain the
draft as it is or we shall modify or amplify that and then incorporate the
amendment suggested by Delegate Francisco, I think it is just a matter of style
and can be entirely left to the Committee on Style.” (IV Id., pp.
116-117)

“SR. FRANCISCO.  Senor Presidente, Caballeros de la convencion, voy a
ser breve.  Yo no estoy conforme con la ultima parte del discurso de mi
distinguido amigo el Delegado por Batangas, Sr. Laurel, al decir que la frase
“en ningun caso se pondra a una persona en peligro de ser condenada dos veces
por el mismo delito”, cubre la enmienda que he presentado.  La razon es muy
sencilla.  Las palabras “mismo delito” no quieren decir un mismo acto.  Esta
cuestion ha sido planteada ante la Corte Suprema.  Al ejecutar un acto penado
bajo una ordenanza municipal y penado bajo una ley general, se presenta una
accion contra el en el juzgado de paz.  Convicto en el juzgado de paz y firme la
sentencia, se presenta otra acusacion contra el en el juzgado de Primera
Instancia por infraccion de una ley general.  El acusado se defiende alegando
que esta en jeopardy, porque ya habia sido condenado por ese mismo acto, y la
Corte Suprema declaro que la teoria del acusado era erronea, porque dice que lo
que la ley prohibe es que se ponqa a uno en peligro de ser condenado por un
mismo delito y no por un mismo acto, y la Corte Suprema declaro, en ese caso
particular, que como quiera que aquel acto estaba penado nor una ordenanza
municipal y por una ley general, se cometen dos delitos; uno contra el municipio
y otro contra el Estado o contra la ley general, de ahi que mi enmienda en el
sentido de que cuando un acusado ha cometido un acto penado por una  ordenanza
municipal y al mismo tiempo por una ley  general, y dicho acusado ya ha sido
convicto por la infraccion procesado ulteriormente bajo otra ley.  Creo, por lo
tanto, que no es cuestion solamente de estilo, sino que es una cuestion
fundamental.” (IV Id, p. 119, emphases supplied)

^[14] Section 9, Rule 117, Revised
Rules of Court.

^[15] Sections.
2(f) and 8, Rule 117, Revised Rules of Court; see Cabral vs. Puno, 70
SCRA 606 (1976).

^[16]
Supra , Note 3.

^[17]
People v. Velez, 77 Phil. 1046 (1946); People v. Maceda, 73
Phil. 679 (1942); People v. Liggayu, et al., 97 Phil. 865 (1955).