PHILIPPINE EDUCATION CO., INC., PETITIONER VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND UNION OF PHILIPPINE EDUCATION EMPLOYEES (NLU), RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations rendered on July 27, 1953 in Cases Nos. 791-V and 791-V(?) which
declares the strike staged by the members of the Union of Philippine Education
Employees on January 16, 1953 legal while, on the other hand, it declares the
lay-off made by the Philippine Education Co., Inc. of nineteen (19) of its
employees discriminatory and unjust and, as a consequence, it orders said
company to reinstate said employees, with the exception of three (3), with
payment of their salaries during their separation.

The two cases above adverted to in reality constitute only ose which arose
from the lay-off by the company of nineteen (19) employees belonging to the
Union of Philippine Education Employees and protest against said lay-off the
union staged a strike on January 16, 1953. The two cases were heard together but
only one decision was rendered therein.

The two cases are merely incidents to several previous cases between the same
parties which have not yet been terminated;, One of said oases which was filed
by the union on August 9, 1950 involves the dismissal of Jacinto Fabron and
Juanito Carangdang, president and secretary, respectively, of the union which
caused the members of said union to strike on August 10, 1950 [Case No.
489-V(1)]. After due hearing the court found the dismissal unwarranted and the
strike legal, but while it ordered the reinstatement of Fabroa and Carangdag,
the court refused to decree the payment of their back salaries, and it was from
that portion of the decision that they appealed to this Court. On March 31,
1952, this decision was affirmed (G.R. No. L-4423). In connection with that
case, in order to settle the strike declared by the union, the parties reached
an agreement, which was made the basis of an order of the court on August 14,
1950, which contains, among others, the following stipulation:

“That during the pendency of this case, the laborers shall not declare a
strike and the respondent company, on the other hand, shall not dismiss, lay-off
or suspend any of its employees without just cause and the express authority of
the Court x x x.”

Another incident which arose prior to the one involved in the instant two
cases is that which relates to a petition of the company for authority to reduce
its personnel by 50% on the ground that the volume of its business was greatly
impaired due to the imposition of the import and exchange controls by the
government. This case has not yet been finally terminated as the same is still
pending hearing before the court a quo. But on October 30, 1951, a
peremptory order was issued by the court authorizing the company to lay off some
of its daily paid employees numbering thirty (30) whose names were taken from a
list submitted by the company itself. This incident is herein mentioned because
of its direct bearing on the issues raised in the two cases under
consideration.

The issues rosed by the parties filed in the two cases which formed the basis
of the decision of the court are: (1) is the action of the company in laying-off
nineteen of its employees justified?; and (2) is the strike declared by the
union legal?

With regard to the first issue, the court found that the lay-off of the
nineteen employees, with the exception of the three, was discriminatory and
unjust, and with regard to the second, it found it to be legal, and, as a
consequence, it ordered the reinstatement with back pay of the sixteen (16)
employees whose names were mentioned in the decision. It is from this decision
that the company interposed the present petition for review.

One of the points raised by the petitioning company is the finding of the
court a quo that the lay-off made by said company of nineteen of its
employees was discriminatory and unjust and done in bad faith because it did so
in violation of its order of August 14, 1950 which provides that no employee
shall be dismissed without previous authority of the court. The company contends
that this finding is unwarranted because the order adverted to had ceased to
have force and effect because the case in which it was issued has already been
finally decided on March 31, 1952 (G, R. No. L-4423).

This contention is not devoid of merit for it indeed appears that when the
lay-off of the nineteen employees of tho company was declared on January 15,
1953, the case wherein the order of August 14, 1950 was entered had already been
finally terminated and it stands to reason that the same lost its force when the
case that gave it life was finally decided by this Court.

But we find that that was not the only reason why the lay-off was considered
unwarranted and unjust but because it was made in disregard of the order of the
court a quo of October 30, 1951 in relation to the company’s petition for
authority to lay off 50% of its employees filed way back in August, 1950 (Case
No. 789-V(2). It should be stated that in that case the company submitted a list
of employees it wanted to lay off out of which the court approved thirty who
were being paid on a daily basis and, on that account, were considered as
temporary employees. While that order was merely temporary because negotiations
were still going on as regards the manner to be followed in the selection, of
the employees to be eliminated in view of the substantial decrease in the volume
of business of the Company, the company proceeded to decree the elimination of
the nineteen employees herein involved, not only without previous authority of
the court, but even in disregard of said order which at that time was considered
as the basis or pattern to be followed in the elimination of future employees in
the absence of a better arrangement as a result of which the members of
respondent union struck on January 16, 1953. Indeed, as the court a quo found,
out of the nineteen persons laid-off by the company, only eight were taken from
among those for whose lay-off the company had asked for authority from the court
and only one from the thirty authorized by the court to be laid off. The court
also found,- and this fact was found of great weight – that, like in the
previous cases of dismissals or lay-offs, almost all of the victims are union
men, or to be more specific, out of the nineteen laid-off employees, eighteen
are members of the union and only one is not. And in effecting the elimination
of said employees the management did not even take up the matter with the union
officers.

It is true that “an employer has a right to select his employees and to
decide when to engage them”, or “he has a right under the law to fall freedom in
employing any person free to accept any employment from him and this, except as
restricted by a valid statute or a valid contract, at a wage and under
conditions agreeable to them”, and that, “he may refuse to employ whomever he
may wish, irrespective of his motive, and x x x has the right to prescribe the
terms upon which he will consent to the relationship, and to have them fairly
understood and expressed in advance.” (31 Am. Jur., Section 9, p. 837.) To all
this we agree with counsel for the company, But what we say is that this right
has its limitations after the relation of labor and capital has been
established. Once this relationship is established, labor has some rights to
protect. Thus, it has been held that “The right to labor is a constitutional as
well as a statutory right. Every man has a natural right to the fruits of his
own industry. A man who has been employed to undertake certain labor and has put
into it his time and effort is entitled to be protected. The right of a person
to his labor is deemed to be property within the meaning of constitutional
garantee. That is his means of livelihood. He cannot be deprived of his labor or
work without due process of law.” (Philippine Movie Pictures Workers’
Association v. Premiere Productions, Inc. G. R. No. L-5621, March 25,
1953.) This is what the court a quo has done. It merely saw to it that
the right of the laid-off employees be protected and be not the subject of
discrimination. As a proof that the court a quo acted carefully and
justly is its finding that three of the laid-off employees deserve alimination..
We find that the court a quo did not abuse its discretion in acting on
the matter.

Another point raised by counsel is the finding that the strike staged by the
union on January 16, 1953 is legal in spite of the fact that the union knew full
well that the company was in financial difficulties and in carrying out the
strike some of its members resorted to acts of violence upon non-striking
members merely because they refused to join the strike.

In determining whan a strike should be declared legal or otherwise, this
Court laid down the following ruling:

“In cases not falling within the prohibition against strikes, the legality or
illegality of a strike depends upon the purpose for which it is maintained, and,
second, upon the means employed in carrying it on. Thus, if the purppse which
the laborers intend to accomplish by means of a strike is trivial, unreasonable
or unjust (as in the case of the National Labor Union, Inc. vs.
Philippine Match Company, supra), or if in carrying on the strike the strikers
should commit violence or cause injuries to persons or damage to property (as in
the case of National Labor Union, Inc. vs. Manila Gas Corporation, 40
Off. Gaz. 37), the strike, although not prohibited by injunction, may be
declared by the court illegal with the adverse consequences to the strikers.”
(Luzon Marine Department Union vs. Roldan, et al., G.R. No. L-2660, May
30, 1950.)

Was the purpose for which the union struck trivial, unreasonable or
unjust?

The court a quo did not find it so. It found that the union staged a walk-out
because it believed, rightly or wrongly, that the lay-off of the nineteen
employees was illegal as being in violation of an order of the court which
prohibited the lay-off of any employee without previous authority from the
court. It likewise believed that said employees were the victims of
discrimination simply because most of them were members of the union, and
considering that the management violated a court order which in its opinion was
still valid and in force the members of the union resorted to the only means
allowed to them by law: strike. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion,
as the court a quo found, that the members of the union struck not for
a trivial purpose but for one which they honestly believed was necessary to
protect their interest.

It is true that some of the strikers resorted to violence in an effort to
make the strike effective and accomplish the purpose for which it was declared,
but considering that the acts of violence were merely isolated and were
committed by some members without the knowledge or sanction of the officers of
the union, the court a quo was right in concluding that the union
should not be blamed therefor and that only those who have committed them should
suffer the consequences of their own acts. We agree with tide finding of the
court a quo.

Wherefore, the portion of the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,
without pronouncement as to costs.

Pablo, Bengzon, Labrador, Concepcion, and J.B.L. Reyes,
JJ., concur.

Montemayor, J., concur in the result.

Reyes, J., in the result.