RAQUEL G. DY BUNCIO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. RODRIGO S. CASPILLO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 24 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CABANATUAN CITY, AND ANGELITO G…
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Dy Buncio versus Caspillo
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, filed by Raquel G. Dy Buncio against Judge Rodrigo S. Caspillo, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, and against Angelito G. Bernardo. The petitioner asks the Supreme Court to nullify two orders of the trial court that denied her motion to dismiss a complaint for cancellation and recovery of titles. The case matters because it is a clean teaching vehicle on two classic remedial questions: what it means for a complaint to state a cause of action, and when the Statute of Frauds may be raised at the earliest stage of the proceedings.
Procedural History
Angelito G. Bernardo sued Raquel G. Dy Buncio before Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City in a civil case for cancellation and recovery of titles. The petitioner moved to dismiss on three grounds: that the complaint states no cause of action, that the claim is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, and that the complaint lacks a valid certification against forum shopping. The trial court denied the motion and gave the defendant fifteen days from notice to file her answer. The petitioner moved for reconsideration, and the trial court denied that motion as well. The petitioner then filed an answer ex abundanti cautela, that is, an answer filed out of abundant caution to preserve her position. Still aggrieved, she went directly to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari under Rule 65, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction, and the Court resolved the petition on the merits.
Facts
Luz de Guzman died intestate in March 1983, leaving two parcels of land in Cabanatuan City, one of about 300,730 square meters covered by a transfer certificate of title and another of about 146,997 square meters covered by a separate title. Her compulsory heirs included her sisters Gloria, Remigia, and Leonila, the children of her deceased brother Peregrin, the respondent Angelito G. Bernardo as the surviving heir of her deceased sister Enrica, and the petitioner Raquel G. Dy Buncio as the daughter of her deceased brother Luis.
In December 2002, the respondent filed a complaint alleging that he had called the heirs to a meeting and that it was agreed he would undertake the improvement and development of the property, including administrative services, hauling of gravel and filling materials, hiring of geodetic engineers, and the titling of the partitioned property, in exchange for ten percent of the total hectarage as administrative costs, to be divided and deducted equally from the shares of the co-heirs. He claimed that despite demands, the petitioner refused to deliver to him titles covering more or less 8,000 square meters as payment for those costs. He also alleged that the subdivision agreement among the heirs did not conform to the true agreement and that the signatures thereon were forged and falsified, and that the other heirs refused to pay him for his administrative services.
The petitioner moved to dismiss, arguing that the complaint states no cause of action, that the claim is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, and that the certification against forum shopping was defective. She pointed out that she was sued merely as a niece of the decedent, not as a representative of the estate, that the complaint did not allege she attended the meeting or agreed to answer for the administrative fees, that the other heirs were not impleaded, and that the titles sought to be cancelled were not even issued in her name. The trial court denied the motion and the reconsideration, holding that her arguments were evidentiary in nature and could be raised as defenses at trial. Hence the petition.
Issues
- Whether or not the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it states no cause of action.
- Whether or not the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the claim is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.
Applicable Provisions
Article 1403 of the Civil Code provides:
ARTICLE 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified: xxx xxx xxx (2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some note or memorandum, thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents: xxx xxx xxx (b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another; xxx xxx xxx
This is the provision the petitioner invoked, and the Court measured the complaint against its text to see whether the action fell within the Statute of Frauds.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the complaint does state a cause of action. The test is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer, and a motion to dismiss on this ground hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations. Only the facts alleged in the complaint are considered, and only ultimate facts, not legal conclusions or evidentiary facts. The Court examined the complaint for the three essential requisites of a cause of action: the legal right of the plaintiff, the correlative obligation of the defendant, and the act or omission of the defendant in violation of that right. All three are present: the respondent's right to collect ten percent of the total area as administrative costs, the petitioner's obligation to deliver her proportional share of that payment, and her refusal to deliver the land as agreed. If proven, the petitioner would be liable to deliver the titles representing her fractional share.
On the second issue, the Court held that the Statute of Frauds does not bar the complaint on its face. The petitioner relied on the special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another, but the Court found no showing on the face of the complaint that the action involves an undertaking by the petitioner to answer for the share or debt of her co-heirs. The petitioner's remaining arguments, that she was sued only as a niece, that she was not alleged to have attended the meeting or agreed to be liable, that the other heirs were not impleaded, and that the titles were not issued in her name, are evidentiary in nature. As the trial court correctly held, they may be used as defenses in a trial on the merits.
Doctrine
First, the sufficiency of a complaint is tested solely by its allegations. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged, and the question is whether the court could render a valid judgment upon those facts in accordance with the prayer. Second, a cause of action exists when the complaint alleges the plaintiff's legal right, the defendant's correlative obligation, and the defendant's act or omission violating that right. Third, the Statute of Frauds under Article 1403 of the Civil Code is a defense that must appear from the face of the complaint to justify dismissal at the outset; where the matters invoked are evidentiary, they are properly raised and threshed out at trial.
Disposition
The petition was denied, the assailed orders of the trial court stand, and the respondent may proceed to prove his case at trial.
Remember This
Memorize the rule that a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations, so the test is whether a valid judgment could be rendered on those facts and the prayer. Examiners use this case to test the three requisites of a cause of action and the procedural limits of the Statute of Frauds as a ground for dismissal.