ELISEO GUEVARA, JESUS GUEVARA, ELENA GUEVARA, VERONICA GUEVARA, MARGARITA GUEVARA, PEREGRINO GUEVARA, MARIA GUEVARA, EUGELIA GUEVARA, PETRA EVANGELISTA, FOR HERSELF AND AS GUARD…

For the satisfaction of a final judgment for damages rendered by
the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City, Branch IV) in its Civil Case No. Q-2171 (Bernabe Flores, et
al. vs. Petra Evangelista, et al.), the
judgment creditors caused the levy on execution of a parcel of land more par­ticularly
described as follows:

“A PARCEL OF LAND, located at Rizal Street, Barrio of Bayanbayanan, Marikina,
Rizal.  Bounded
on the North by property of Natalia
Gregorio; on the South Callejon; on the East Rizal St., and on the West by Marikina
River, with an area of 439.37 square meters, more or less, with an as­sessed
value of P880.00 together with all the improvements thereon with an as­sessed
value of P1,800.00, with a total assessed value of
P2,680.00, covered by Tax Declaration No. 10252.”

then declared
for taxation purposes in the names of the judgment debtors, namely:  Petra Evangelista and her children Nita,
Priscilla, Ernesto, Amalia and Carmen, all surnamed
Guevara.  These judgment debtors are the
widow and children, respectively, of the deceased David Guevara, whose negligence, as found by the trial court in civil case
No. Q-2171, caused the death and injury of several
persons.

The provincial sheriff of Rizal
scheduled the auction sale of the property levied upon on February 25, 1963.  But prior thereto the brothers and sisters of
the deceased David Guevara, together with the judgment debtors, sought to
prevent the sale at public auction by staking third-party claims, asserting
rights of ownership by way of inheritance over a ten-eleventh portion of the
parcel of land levied upon and
one-half of the value of the house situated thereon.  On account, however, of an indemnity bond
posted by Bernabe Flores, one of the judgment
creditors, the provincial sheriff of Rizal proceeded
with the auction sale, at which said Bernabe Flores
was the successful bidder.  Im­mediately
thereafter Bernabe Flores assigned his right as such
purchaser to Maximo Calalang,
the judgment creditors own counsel.

The judgment debtors in civil case No.
Q-2171 having failed to redeem the property within the one-year period for redemption, the provincial sheriff
of Rizal executed in favor of Bernabe
Flores an “Officer’s Deed of Absolute Sale” dated January 4, 1965.  Thereafter Bernabe
Flores moved in the court below for a writ of possession directing the judgment
debtors “to vacate the above-described property or relinquish possession
of the same to Bernabe Flores, his heirs,
representatives and assigns.” This was opposed by the judgment debtors,
who pointed out that the parcel of land sold at the execution sale was owned
and possessed by the third-party
claimants who had filed their claim with the provincial sheriff
and, in fact, had earlier brought the corresponding action in court (Civil Case
No. 7720, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Br. X) to
vindicate the same.  The opposition was
overruled; the court a quo granted the writ of possession prayed for and accordingly directed the
pro­vincial sheriff of Rizal to place Bernabe Flores and/or his representative in possession of
the property.  But the pro­vincial
sheriff of Rizal was unable to enforce the writ of
possession due to the resistance of the third-party claimants, who had
meanwhile taken possession by virtue of their claim of ownership over the same.

In an order dated March
23, 1965, the lower court served notice upon the third-party
claimants to vacate the premises in question on or before March 31, 1965, on pain of being punished for
contempt.  Soon thereafter they and the
judgment debtors came to this Court on the instant petition for prohibition
with preliminary injunction, principally to prevent enforcement of the
aforementioned “writ of possession”. 
On March 31, 1965
this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction asked for, enjoining
respondents . . .” from enforcing the order of March 23, 1965, in Civil Case No. Q-2171 (Bernabe Flores, et al. vs. Petra Evangelista, et al.) of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the purpose of preserving the rights of the
parties to the case, until further orders from this Court.”

The issue here is whether
or not under the facts the third-party claimants’ assertion of ownership over a
portion of the land sold on execution may defeat the purchaser’s right to have
possession of the same after the expiration of the one-year redemption period
allowed by law.

Section 35 of Rule 39
provides:  “(I)f
no redemption be made within twelve (12) months after the sale, the purchaser
or his assignee is entitled to a conveyance and possession of
the property (sold on execution);. . .” This, of course, is on the
assumption that the property belonged to the judgment debtor or to one who
claims under him as his successor after the execution.

“. . . As the
purchaser in the present case has x x x already received
the definitive deed of sale and become the owner of the property bought, he
should be entitled to its possession and
cannot be excluded therefrom by one, who, according
to the same complaint, merely claims to be a ‘successor in interest of the judgment
debtor’, unless it is adjudged that this
alleged successor has a better right to the property than the purchaser.  Such adjudication, however would at this
stage of the proceedings be premature and without basis.” (Belleza vs. Zan­daga, et al., 98
Phil. 702)

Would such right to possession be defeated by the fact that a
third party, not privy to the judgment debtor, claims to be the owner of the
same property?  It has been held that
“where a parcel levied upon execution is oc­cupied by a party other than a
judgment debtor, the pro­cedure is for the court to order a hearing to
determine the nature of said adverse possession” (Saavedra,
et al. vs. Siari Valley Estates, Inc., et al., 106
Phil. 432, 436; see also Omaña vs. Gatulayao, 73 Phil. 66; Gozon vs.
De la Rosa, 77 Phil. 919; Santiago vs. Sheriff of Manila, 77 Phil. 740).  Such a hearing, however, was not necessary in
this case for two reasons:  (1) The third party-claimants
here were not in possession of the disputed land when it was sold at
public auction on February 25, 1963,
pursuant to the writ of execution.  By
the judgment-debtors’ own admission in their opposition to the motion for a
writ of possession, the third-party claimants occupied the said land only after
they had commenced Civil Case No. 7720 on June 10, 1963.  They were not in possession when they filed
their third-party claim on February
13, 1963.  (2) When the land
was levied upon and when it was sold on execution it was declared for taxation
in the names of the judgment debtors, who were the ones then in posses­sion.  Quite obviously the third-party claimants’
belated move to take possession was designed to defeat the purchaser’s right to
the same in accordance with the pro­vision of Section 35 of Rule 39, by virtue
of the definite deed of sale in his favor, which may be defeated and set aside
only by an adverse final adjudication against him of the third parties’ claim
of ownership.

The said claim is not
foreclosed by the writ of possession issued by the lower court, being
precisely the subject of litigation in Civil Case No. 7720 of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal.  Since the issuance of such writ was proper,
the court a quo acted within its jurisdiction when it poised the
threat of contempt against any willful defiance thereof by the third-party
claimants.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed and the writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued is dissolved.  Costs against petitioners.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee, Villamor,
and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., reserves the filing of a dissenting opinion.