VICENTA A. CANLAS, COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. VALERIANO DEL VALLE, RESPONDENT.

Canlas versus Del Valle

The Case

This is an administrative case filed by Vicenta A. Canlas against Judge Valeriano del Valle of the Court of Agrarian Relations. The complainant charges the respondent judge with serious misconduct in office for having sat and acted as vacation judge in an agrarian case in which his own son, Attorney Edilberto del Valle, was an attorney of record for the adverse party. The case matters because it is the classic illustration of the rule on disqualification of judges by reason of relationship to counsel, and of the duty of a judge to inhibit himself even when no party objects.

Procedural History

The complainant filed the administrative complaint against the respondent judge. The respondent filed his answer in due course, disclaiming awareness that his son was counsel for the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court designated Justice Manuel P. Barcelona of the Court of Appeals to conduct the investigation and receive the evidence, and he filed his report and recommendation. The case then came before the Supreme Court as an original administrative proceeding against a judge of the Court of Agrarian Relations.

Facts

The respondent judge was the duly appointed judge of the Court of Agrarian Relations assigned to Legaspi City, but he was detailed on vacation duty at Catbalogan, Samar, from May 1 to June 1, 1968, during the absence of the regular judge, Judge Gregorio L. Venturanza. Because indigent litigants from Catarman could not afford to travel to Catbalogan, the respondent instructed the clerk of court to set hearings in Catarman. One of the cases scheduled for pre-trial there was an agrarian case for reinstatement and reliquidation with damages, prepared and signed by the respondent's son, Attorney Edilberto del Valle, as counsel for the plaintiffs, so that his name appeared on the cover of the record as counsel for the petitioners.

At the first pre-trial, the plaintiffs appeared without their counsel of record, while the defendants appeared with their counsel, who moved for dismissal because the plaintiffs' counsel was absent. The respondent judge, having been informed that Attorney del Valle was the plaintiffs' lawyer, reset the pre-trial. At the rescheduled pre-trial, the plaintiffs appeared with another lawyer, Attorney Socrates Desales, who filed a written motion to declare the defendants in default because no answer had been filed. The defendants' counsel opposed the motion, claiming that an answer had already been filed and mailed to the plaintiffs' counsel. The respondent judge nevertheless granted the motion for default, stating that the records did not show that the answer had been filed or served.

Shortly thereafter the respondent returned to his permanent station, and the further proceedings were continued before the regular judge, Judge Venturanza, who received the plaintiffs' evidence and rendered a decision in their favor, ordering the defendants to reinstate the plaintiffs as tenants and to pay damages and attorney's fees. More than a year later, the complainant, the principal defendant in the agrarian case, filed this administrative complaint, charging the respondent with violation of the rule on disqualification of judges for not having inhibited himself notwithstanding that his son was an attorney of record for the adverse party.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge should have inhibited himself from sitting and acting in the agrarian case because his son was an attorney of record for the plaintiffs.
• Whether or not the respondent judge is administratively liable for serious misconduct in office for having acted in the case despite that disqualification.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides:

No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

This is the very provision the respondent is charged with violating, since it disqualifies a judge from sitting where he is related to counsel within the fourth degree of consanguinity.

Section 2 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides:

If it be claimed that an official is disqualified from sitting as above provided, the party objecting to his competency may, in writing, file with the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor, and the official shall thereupon proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the question of his disqualification.

This is the remedy the complainant failed to avail of, and her failure is considered in mitigation of the respondent's fault.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the respondent judge was aware and had been informed that his son was an attorney of record for the plaintiffs, notwithstanding his disclaimers. He should therefore have inhibited himself from sitting and acting in the case, by virtue of the injunction in Section 1 of Rule 137, having in mind its salutary object of dispelling any possible doubt from litigants and the public as to the courts being free from bias or extraneous influence. While it was another lawyer and not his son who appeared as counsel before him, his son nevertheless continued as counsel of record, and the disqualification remained in effect. It would have been otherwise had his son properly filed his withdrawal as counsel with the required consent or that of the court.

On the second issue, the Court found the respondent judge at fault but tempered his liability with mitigating circumstances. His son no longer appeared in the subsequent proceedings, which were handled by another counsel. The resolution declaring the defendants in default was fully warranted by the records, and any other judge would have most likely granted the motion for default anyway. The complainant never challenged the default order or the adverse decision before the appellate courts. Finally, the complainant herself contributed to the act complained of by failing to avail of the remedy of timely objecting to the respondent's sitting and filing a motion for his inhibition. The Court stressed that the respondent should have exercised more care and paid heed to the prohibitory provisions of Section 1 of Rule 137, and should have caused to be made of record his son's withdrawal as counsel or the parties' lack of objection to his sitting.

Doctrine

A judge is disqualified from sitting in any case in which he is related to counsel within the fourth degree of consanguinity, computed according to the rules of the civil law, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. The disqualification continues for as long as the counsel of record remains such, even if another lawyer appears in court in his stead; it is lifted only by a proper withdrawal of counsel with the required consent or that of the court. The rule's object is to dispel any possible doubt from litigants and the public as to the courts being free from bias or extraneous influence. A party who fails to timely object to the judge's competency and to file a motion for inhibition may be said to have contributed to the very act complained of, which mitigates the judge's fault.

Disposition

The respondent judge was admonished to exercise more care in the future in complying with the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 137 on disqualification of judges.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that a judge related to counsel within the fourth degree is disqualified, and the disqualification remains as long as that counsel remains counsel of record, even if another lawyer appears in court. Examiners like to use this case on the disqualification of judges by relationship to counsel, and on the effect of a party's failure to object to the judge's competency.