G.R. No. L-21062. February 28, 1969
FLORENCIO CABONITALLA, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. AMADO SANTIAGO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH V OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PANGASINAN, LUDOVICO ESTRAD…
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Original action for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction, as well as mandamus, to set aside several
orders of respondent Hon. Amado A. Santiago, as Judge
of First Instance of Pangasinan, to restrain him from
enforcing said orders, to compel him to restore petitioners herein – numbering
302 – to their status quo (ante) and to allow them to
present evidence in support of some motions filed by them.
The property involved in this case is a land of about 451 hectares,
situated in the Municipality of Alcala, Pangasinan,
and originally belonging to Cristina Gonzales Schenkel,
who had inherited it from her deceased father.
Mrs. Schenkel had mortgaged the land to the
now defunct Agricultural Bank, which, upon non-payment of the debt thus
guaranteed, caused the mortgage to be foreclosed. At the public auction held therefor, the land was on November 28, 1922, sold to the Government, as its highest
bidder, in whom title to the property was vested on November 28, 1923, no redemption having been
made within the statutory period.
Before the date last mentioned, or on October 8, 1923, Mrs. Schenkel
filed a lease application for said property, but the Director of Lands –
hereinafter referred to as the Director – advised her that, being married to E.
A. Schenkel, a Swiss citizen, she was not qualified therefor. Thereupon,
Mrs. Schenkel organized the Cristina Gonzales Inc. –
hereinafter referred to as the Corporation – to which she assigned her rights
in and to said property. On December 29, 1923, the Corporation
applied for a lease thereon, which was objected to by ninety-three (93) former
tenants – hereinafter referred to as the Tenants – of Mrs. Schenkel. This notwithstanding, after a bidding
participated in by said tenants, the Secretary of Agriculture – hereinafter
referred to as the Secretary – awarded the lease to the Corporation and granted
thereto a provisional permit to occupy the land.
The Tenants, accordingly, sued the Corporation, the Secretary and
the Director, in Civil Case No. 4969 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan – hereinafter referred to as the Lower Court –
which, in due course, rendered judgment annulling the aforementioned award,
declaring the Tenants
“entitled to have the lease of the land as the highest bidders,” and
directing “the land officials to execute the lease to them.” On
September 3, 1930, this Court, in G. R. No. 32243[1], affirmed the decision of the Lower
Court as regards the annulment of the lease to the Corporation, but, reversed
said decision insofar as it awarded the lease to the Tenants, and remanded the
case to the “land officials for x x x
further proceedings”, upon the theory that the nullity of the award
to the Corporation did not necessarily render it mandatory to grant the lease
to the Tenants, unless the latter first complied with the provisions of Act No.
3219.
Before the rendition of our decision in G. R. No. 32243, or on July 10, 1929, the Secretary allowed
Mrs. Schenkel to repurchase the land, pursuant to Act
No. 3514, despite the opposition thereto of said Tenants. Owing, however, to the default of Mrs. Schenkel in the payment of some installments, the deed of
sale in her favor was cancelled on August
5, 1932.
A little over a year later, or on November 8, 1933, the Tenants organized Pindangan Agricultural Co., Inc. – hereinafter referred to
as Pindangan – which filed lease application No. 109
covering the property in question. Two
(2) days later, or on November 10,
1933, Mrs. Schenkel, in turn, applied for
its purchase. This application was
granted and on December 7, 1936,
a second deed of sale was, accordingly, executed in her favor. Pindangan objected
thereto, but the Secretary did not heed the objection and, on December 24, 1936, rejected the
lease application of Pindangan, as well as ordered
its members to vacate the premises. Pindangan instituted, therefore, Civil Case No. 7421 of the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, against Mrs. Schenkel, to annul said deed of sale, upon the theory that,
being a Swiss citizen by marriage, she could not acquire public agricultural lands. The trial court rendered judgment for Pindangan, which, on April 30, 1949, was affirmed by this Courts.2
When Pindangan sought to take possession
of the land, those holding the same opposed it.
Hence, on or about August 2, 1948, Pindangan
filed Civil Case No. 10394 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan3 against seven (7) persons4 named in
the complaint therein5 – who
allegedly refused to recognize Pindangan’s possessory rights, and to pay the rental for the areas
respectively held by them – to restrain them from “invading the premises
of the land” in question “or any portion thereof and from molesting,
disturbing or in any wise interfering” with Pindangan’s
alleged “possession and enjoyment thereof.” As prayed for in said
pleading, on August 16, 1948,
the lower court ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to
this effect, which writ was issued on August
17, 1948. On or about October 25, 1948, Pindangan filed an “amendatory complaint”6 including therein twenty-one (21) additional
defendants.7
Sometime later, or on July 9,
1949, Pindangan filed, with the Bureau of
Lands, a sales application covering the land in question, either as a
supplement or as an alternative to its lease application No. 109. The aforementioned sales application was,
however, denied by the Director, on October 4, 1949, because of a report of
District Land Officer Pedro Yu Asensi, dated October
5, 1948, stating that a majority of the actual occupants of the land were not
stockholders of Pindangan and that the few
stockholders who remained in the land had lost faith in the organization and
its officers, as well as repudiated their membership therein, and, consequently,
recommending that the land be subdivided into as many lots as there are actual
occupants thereof – and there were 178
of them named in the list attached to said report – and then sold to them. The Secretary sustained the action taken by
the Director, and, accordingly, rejected, on April 22, 1955, Pindangan’s claim
to a preferential right to either purchase or lease the disputed property.
Meanwhile, its occupants
had filed individual sales applications for the portions respectively held by
them and were given preferential permits to occupy the same. Prior thereto, or on August 15, 1950, Pindangan had amended its complaint in said case No. 10394,
to include, as defendants therein, the Secretary, the Director, and the
District Land Officer, as well as Emeterio de los Santos, Marcelo de los
Santos, Severo Pascual and Dionisio Tadeo. In the amended complaint Pindangan
prayed that judgment be rendered: (1)
directing that its lease application No. 109, as well as its sales application
dated July 9, 1949, be given due course, and that its preferential right to
acquire the land either by lease or by purchase, be recognized; and (2)
nullifying the action of the land officials in rejecting said
applications. On February
28, 1958, the Court
of First Instance rendered judgment in said case No. 10394, the dispositive part of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
“a. Rendering without effect that various resolutions
of the official defendants mentioned in plaintiff’s. Amended Complaint as regards its Lease
Application No. 109 and Sales Application of July 9, 1949, as well as all
applications filed by and provisional permits granted to the other defendants
covering portions of the land in controversy, including those whose names
appear in Exhibits ‘1’ and ‘1-a’ of the defendants;
“b. Ordering and directing the Director of Lands
and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to execute forthwith in
favor of the plaintiff corporation the necessary documents of lease of the land
in controversy for the maximum period allowed by the law and for the annual
rental of P2,946.00, or if it so desires, the necessary documents of definite
sale of the said land for the total sum of P51,157.23 (which is the bigger sum
of the two sums mentioned herein), in full or in installments as the Public
Land Act permits;
“c. The Director of Lands and the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources are hereby ordered and directed to give the
due course, in accordance with law, to plaintiff’s Lease Application No. 109
and Sales Application of July 9, 1949,
mentioned in its Amended Complaint, and thereafter to recognize and give
effect, as provided for in the law, to the preferential right of plaintiff
corporation to acquire the said land
either by lease or by purchase, at its option.
“d. Condemning the defendants Jose P. Dans, Placido L. Mapa and Pedro U. Asensi as well
as all the other defendants mentioned in plaintiff’s Amended Complaint dated October 15, 1950, jointly and
severally, to pay to the plaintiff corporation, by way of damages, the sum of
P8,000.00, besides the costs of suit.
“e. Declaring permanent the writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued in this case which is hereby extended to all
persons not duly authorized by the plaintiff corporation to enter into the
land in question, their agents, attorneys and other persons acting in their behalf
and in their representation, and condemning all the said defendants all such
persons acting in their behalf and for their account to perpetual silence as to
plaintiff’s right of possession and enjoyment of the said land.”
The defendants in that case appealed from said judgment to the
Supreme Court, in which the appeal was docketed as Case G. R. No. L-14591. During the pendency
of this appeal, or on June 18, 1958,
the Lower Court, presided
over by Hon. Amado S. Santiago, Judge, ordered, on
motion of Pindangan, the execution of paragraph (e)
of the above-quoted dispositive part of its
decision. Alleging that, in acting as it
did, Judge Santiago had abused his discretion and exceeded his jurisdiction,
the defendants in Case No. 10394 filed original Case G. R. No. L-14180 of this
Court, against Judge Santiago and Pindangan, to annul
the writ of execution issued pendente lite. After
appropriate proceedings in G.R. No. L-14591, on April 25, 1962, We reversed said decision of Judge
Santiago. On May 31, 1962, decision was rendered in G.R. No. L-14180
granting the writ therein prayed for, annulling the order of partial execution
issued by Judge Santiago on June 18,
1958.
It appears that, meanwhile, or on November 25, 1958, Pindangan had filed, with the lower court, a motion to
declare Ludovico Estrada, Fernando Estrada, Benjamin
Estrada and Albino Mabalot guilty of contempt, upon
the ground that they had entered several portions of the property in question
and cultivated the same despite warnings to the contrary of Pindangan’s agents, in
violation, allegedly, of said order of June
18, 1958. Ludovico Estrada, et al. maintained, however, that the
lower court had no authority to entertain said motion, in view of the appeal
already pending in the Supreme Court and because two (2) of those sought to be
dealt with for contempt were not parties in the case. Acting upon
Pindangan’s motion, Judge Santiago issued the
corresponding order to show cause. A
reconsideration thereof having been denied, Ludovico
Estrada, et al. brought original Case G. R. No. L-15655 of this Court, against
Judge Santiago and Pindangan, to annul the orders of
Judge Santiago complained of, and
to restrain further proceedings for contempt.
In view of our decisions in G.R. Nos. L-14591 and L-14180, reversing the
appealed judgment in Case No. 10394, and annulling the order for the execution
of part thereof, this Court, on March 29, 1963, rendered judgment in said Case G.R.
No. L-15655, holding that the
petitioners therein cannot be dealt with for contempt of court, and,
accordingly, making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction previously
issued therein.
While these proceedings
were taking place, or on November 28, 1962, those who claimed to have been
ejected from the land in question by virtue of the order of Judge Santiago,
dated June 18, 1958, for the partial execution of his decision in Case No.
10394, moved therein to be restored to their former landholdings. Overruling the opposition thereto filed by Pindangan, the Lower Court – then presided over by Hon. Angel P. Bacani, Judge – granted said motion, in an order dated December
28, 1962, the
pertinent part of which we quote:
“WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered, in the interest of justice
and equity, that all the non-official defendants be restored to the possession
and enjoyment of the land occupied by them previous to the decision of February
28, 1958 and the order of this Court dated June 18, 1958, thereby restoring the
parties to the same condition or situation they were in before the filing of
the action.
“For the effective and peaceful implementation and enforcement
of this order, the following, as recommended by defendants’ counsel, are hereby
appointed special sheriffs, to wit:
“1. Franklin
D. Estrada 7. Marcelino Cabotaje
2. Gavino Cabotaje
8. Albino Mabalot
3. Juanita Hernando 9. Jaime Domingo
4. Anastacio
Torres 10. Guillermo Cabotaje
5. Camilo Galleno
11. Esteban Dingle
6. Fernando Estrada 12. Pedro Quines
jointly with and subject to the authority
and direction of the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan,
and with the assistance of the Philippine Constabulary of the same province,
thru the provincial Commander and any number of the men of the latter necessary
to carry out this order, all of whom
are hereby ordered to execute the same.”
In compliance with this order, a writ of execution was issued on
January 31, 1963; but the next day, petitioners herein, numbering 302, moved to
reconsider said order upon the ground that they were not parties in Civil Case
No. 10394, although they actually held portions of the property in question
long before said case had been filed, and that, accordingly, they are not bound
by the judgment therein rendered. Upon
the other hand, the main defendants in said case filed their opposition,
alleging that, not being parties in the case, the movants
had no legal standing therein; that they could not intervene in that case, judgment
having already been rendered therein; and that petitioners were mere agents or
representatives of Pindangan and, hence, bound by the
judgment aforementioned.
By this time, the situation had, seemingly, become so muddled
that, on January 7, 1963, Homobono G. Queyquep, Deputy Sheriff of Pangasinan,
filed an ex-parte motion for clarification, stating
that, except as regards the seven (7) original defendants in case No. 10394 –
the area held by each one of whom was described in the complaint – he was in no
position to know the extent of the landholdings of the other private defendants
therein; that even said original defendants were claiming areas bigger than
those described in the complaint; and that
he had, also, found, on the land in question, standing crops and/or planters
and actual occupants who claimed not to be agents, tenants or members of Pindangan, and refused to vacate the premises, upon the
ground that they are not parties in the case and that there is no order directing them to give up their
possession. Queyquep
prayed, therefore, that the respective landholdings of the defendants
be specified, to avoid confusion as well as trouble, and that, meanwhile, the
writ of execution be suspended. In an order
dated January 19, 1963, said Judge Bacani denied the
aforementioned motions for reconsideration and clarification – the first, for
lack of legal standing of petitioners herein, and, the second, upon the ground
that “the order of execution already issued is by itself clear enough to
guide” the sheriff.
On January 25, 1963, petitioners herein sought a reconsideration
of said order of January 19, 1963, followed, the next day, by a petition
praying that they be allowed to present evidence on the nature and extent of
their respective possession, but this petition and said motion for
reconsideration were, on March
11, 1963, denied by Judge Santiago.
Hence, the present action for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary
mandatory and preventive injunction, as well as mandamus – filed by 302
petitioners against Judge Santiago, and the defendants in case No. 10394, as
well as the Provincial Sheriff and the Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan, the Special Sheriffs appointed in connection
with the enforcement of the order of January 18, 1958 and the members of the
Constabulary designated to assist them – to annul said orders of January 19 and
March 11, 1963, to restrain the enforcement of the orders complained of and to
compel respondent Judge Santiago to entertain petitioners’ motions dated. January 4 and 26, 1963 and hold hearings for
the reception of evidence in support of said motions.
On July 28, 1966,
the private respondents in the case at bar filed a motion to declare
seventy-one (71) of the petitioners herein guilty of contempt, for having
allegedly disturbed the possession of the lots held by the movants
and destroyed the crops standing therein.
These allegations having been traversed by the petitioners, Hon. Marcelo Bobadilla, Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
Branch VI, was commissioned to receive evidence thereon. Accordingly, Judge Bobadilla
held hearings and received evidence, both testimonial and documentary, which
have been forwarded to this Court.
The record shows that, in view of the denial of the motion for
clarification, dated January 7, 1962,
of deputy sheriff Queyquep, the latter decided to put
in possession of the litigated property the 178 persons named in the list
attached to the report of the District Land Officer to the Director, dated October 5, 19488. For this purpose, Queyquep
conferred with said 178 persons, who agreed that he would deliver said property
to the private defendants in Case No. 10394, as their representatives, who
would, in turn, distribute the land among them (the aforementioned 178
persons). It appears that, in the
process of carrying out this arrangement, 216 occupants of said property were
allegedly ousted therefrom, in view of which the
persons thus ejected, together with others who are still in possession of their
respective landholdings, commenced the present action. Subsequently, seventy?one (71) of the
herein petitioners, accompanied by the Mayor and the Chief of Police of Alcala, Pangasinan, were said to
have forcibly entered the lots held by some of the private defendants in case
No. 19394. As a consequence, three (3)
criminal complaints for malicious mischief were filed against some of the
alleged intruders. One (1) of said complaints
was dismissed for failure of the prosecution to establish defendant’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The other two
(2) complaints were provisionally dismissed, for failure of the complainants to
amend their respective complaints within the period granted therefor.
The right of the lower court to order that the private defendants
in case No. 10394 be reinstated in the possession of the lots from which they
were ejected in view of the writ
of execution issued, on January 3, 1963 – in compliance with the order of Judge
Bacani dated December 28, 1962 – is indubitable, for
Section 5 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:
” x x Effect of reversal of executed judgment. – Where the judgment executed is reversed
totally or partially on appeal, the trial court, on motion, after the case is
remanded to it, may issue such orders of restitution as equity and justice may
warrant under the circumstances.”
In fact, there have been several cases in which such reinstatement
has been ordered, upon reversal of the decision appealed from9. The issue
in the present case arose from the fact that the sheriff was constrained to
reinstate, not only the defendants whose respective landholdings were described
with particularity in the complaint, but, also, those whose landholdings were
not so described, and that he even went further, by trying to deliver
practically the entire property in dispute to the private defendants in said
case No. 10394, for redistribution by the latter among the 178 persons named
in the list of the District Land Officer annexed to his aforementioned report
of October 5, 1948. As a consequence,
many of the petitioners herein were seemingly ousted from said land, despite their claim to the effect that they are
not parties in, said case and, hence, not bound by the decision therein
rendered; despite their allegation to the effect that they has been in possession of their respective
landholdings long before the institution of that case; and despite their offer
to introduce evidence on the nature and extent of their respective possession,
which offer was rejected by Judge Santiago.
The lower court erred in not heeding this plea of petitioners’
herein, upon the ground that, not being parties in said case No. 10394, they
have no legal standing therein. Indeed,
it has been uniformly held that in an action in personam
– as case No. 10394 is – a person, other than the judgment debtor, who occupies
a land levied on execution therein, is entitled to be heard to justify his
possession10, for the simple reason that
decisions in actions in personam, bind the
parties therein and their successors in interest, but not
strangers. Thus, commenting on Section
49(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, former Chief Justice Moran had this to
say:
“Subdivision (b) refers to judgments in personam
which are binding upon the
parties and their successors in interest but not upon strangers. There may be, however, cases where the
supposed stranger may be claimed to be a mere privy to any of the parties to the
action, or his bona fide possession may be disputed, or such possession may
have been taken in connivance with the defeated
litigant with a view to frustrating the judgment. In any of these events, the proper procedure
would be to order a hearing on the matter of such possession and to deny
or accede to the enforcement of the judgment as the finding may warrant.”11
Plata v. Yatco12 is
relevant to the question before us. That
case involved a wife who had mortgaged her paraphernal
property, with the intervention of her husband.
The mortgage was later foreclosed and the property sold to the
mortgagee, as the highest bidder.
Thereafter, the mortgagee-buyer filed an illegal detainer
case against the husband and secured judgment against him. When the judgment was sought to be executed
and the wife resisted it, upon the ground that she was not a party in the
illegal detainer case, she was dealt with for
contempt of court. On application for a
writ of certiorari, we granted the same, holding that:
” x x x as she
was not made a party defendant in the eviction suit , the petitioner wife could
validly ignore the judgment of eviction against her husband, and it was not
contempt of court for her to do so, because the writ of execution was not
lawful against her. (Chanco
vs. Madrilejos, 9 Phil. 356; Jose Realty v. Galao, et al., 76 Phil. 201; Segarro
v. Maronilla, L-14428, July 26, 1960; Weigall v. Shuster, 11 Phil. 340).”
It is apparent, from the foregoing, that respondent Judge committed
a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, in refusing
to entertain petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of January 4, 1963, and
their petition to be allowed to introduce evidence on the nature and extent of
their respective possession.
At this juncture, it is well to remember, however, that the property
involved in this case is now admittedly a public land, and that its actual
occupants have filed individual applications for the purchase of the lot or
lots, respectively held by them. Being
concededly part of the public domain, said lots may be disposed of by the
Director, with the approval of the Secretary, pursuant to our Public Lands
Laws. Said officers may administratively
ascertain who, among the aforementioned applicants are qualified therefor, and, in the affirmative case, determine what lot
or lots should be awarded to them and the term’s the award. It is, moreover, obvious that, considering
the number and condition of the persons involved in the controversy under
consideration, as well as the surrounding circumstances, it would be best, for
the parties concerned and the collectivity, that an earnest effort be made by
the administrative agencies of the Government to settle the issue or facilitate
its solution, and, perhaps, obviate the necessity of protracted proceedings in
the Lower Court to ascertain who were in physical possession of the land in
litigation when the writ of execution, issued pursuant to the order of June 18,
1958, was enforced, and what were the precise boundaries of the area held by
each, from which he was ejected in consequence of said writ and to which he
should now be restored. At any rate, the
Secretary and the Director are parties in case No. 10394 and may render
invaluable assistance in the determination of these questions.
In support of the motion to declare in contempt some of the petitioners
herein, the movants have submitted affidavits to the
effect that, on June 27, 1966, between 7:00 and 11:00 a.m., several persons,
led by petitioner Avelino Aguada
and accompanied by the Mayor and the Chief of Police of Alcala,
Pangasinan; forcibly entered into lots 68 and 69,
subdivision plan I, II-5565-A, Pindangan Estate,
held, respectively, by Marcelo Jimenez and Gregorio Jimenez, and destroyed the
standing crops therein, and that on July 14, 1966, another group of persons,
likewise, under the leadership of Avelino Aguada, took possession of and destroyed the crops in lots
208 and 221, held, respectively, by Saturnino Talbo and Ludovico Estrada. The movants
moreover introduced, before Judge Bobadilla,
evidence to the effect that, after the filing of the motion for contempt, the Aguada group had performed a number of acts of disturbance of the possession of other defendants
herein.
Thus, PC soldier Rodolfo Estrada testified that he investigated
the alleged shooting of one Gavino Cabotaje by Avelino Aguada, on September 8, 1966, and that, having been advised
by his commanding officer not to take
active part in cases involving the Pindangan Estate,
he (Estrada) merely advised Cabotaje to file the
corresponding complaint against the guilty party. There is no evidence, however, that such
complaint has been filed.
Furthermore, Sgt. Manyalinguas Carolino declared that on November 5, 1966, at about 3:00
p.m., Gregorio Jimenez reported to him that Avelino Aguada and fifteen (15) other persons, entered the lot held
by Jimenez and destroyed the crops therein; that on November 9, the same group
entered the lot held by Gavino Cabotaje,
Sr.; and that he (Carolino) investigated these reports
and submitted his findings to the Provincial Fiscal, who had not, as yet, filed
any case against Aguada.
Upon the other hand, the latter denied having committed the acts
imputed to him in the above-mentioned affidavits and referred to by Estrada and
Carolino. Aguada admitted having been charged with malicious mischief
in the municipal court, which dismissed the case, and testified that the acts
involved therein are the very same ones upon which the motion for contempt is
based.
It has, also, been established that the acts of disturbance allegedly
committed against the Jimenez brothers resulted in the filing of criminal
complaints for malicious mischief, which were dismissed provisionally for
failure of the complainants to amend said complaints.
Although the dismissal of the criminal complaints aforementioned
does not bar the present proceedings for civil contempt, it is our considered
opinion that the same should, also, be dismissed. Indeed, we note that Marcelo Jimenez and
Gregorio Jimenez, whose possessions were allegedly disturbed by the Aguada group, are not parties in Civil Case No.
10394. Neither are they among the
persons mentioned in the sheriff’s return as having been reinstated in their
former landholdings. The acts for which
they now complain cannot, therefore, be properly dealt with in the present
case.
It is true that among those whose possessions have been allegedly
disturbed by some petitioners herein are Ludovico
Estrada and Gavino Cabotaje,
who are among the private defendants in Case No. 10394. It will be recalled, however, that the
alleged occupants of portions of the land in question have filed with the
Bureau of Lands individual sales applications, which appear to be still
pending action in said office.
Considering that their legal rights to their respective landholdings is
still unsettled, as well as the limited nature of our authority in the present
certiorari proceedings, it is, we believe, preferable that the issues raised by
the motion for contempt under consideration be determined in such separate
proceedings as the parties involved may deem fit to file.
WHEREFORE, without prejudice to the institution of
said proceedings, and to such administrative action as the Director of
Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources may take on the
individual sales applications above referred to, the aforementioned motion to
declare some of the herein petitioners guilty of contempt is hereby denied and
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, as well as
respondent Judge are directed to receive evidence on the nature and extent of
the alleged possession of petitioners herein and to pass upon the issues of
fact and law raised in their motions of January 4 and 26, 1963, without special
pronouncements as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Sanchez, J., did not take part.
[1]
Torres v. Gonzales, Inc., 54 Phil., 851.
2
Pindangan Agricultural Co. vs. Schenkel,
83 Phil., 529.
3
Entitled Pindangan
Agricultural Co., Inc. vs. Estrada.
4
Ludovico Estrada, Marcelino
Cabotaje, Alejandro Valdez, Sulpicio
Sacayanan, Zacarias Cabotaje, Albino Mabalot and
Guillermo Cabotaje.
5
Annex B.
6
Annex C.
7
Ponciano Cabotaje, Esteban
Dingle, Pedro Torres, Jr., Pedro Galleno, Macario Galleno, Santiago Nario, Arcadio Cabero, Simplicio Palapos, Jaime Domingo, Diosdado Cabeso, Pio Cabingas,
Romulo Quines, Jose Dingle,
Tomas Nazareno, Lorenzo Seroma,
Juan Cabonitalla, Basilio
Asuncion, Gavino Cabotaje, Gregorio
Masiglat, Macario Padua,
and Alejandro Espiritu.
8
Exhibit C (Contempt).
9
Molina v. Somes,
24 Phil. 49; Mortera, et al. v. West of Scotland Insurance, 36 Phil. 954; Naredo
v. Yatco, 80 Phil. 220; Hilario
v. Hicks, 40 Phil. 576.
10
Omaña v. Gatulayao,
73 Phil. 66; Saavedra v. Siari Valley Estates, G.R. No. L-12875, Oct. 30, 1959; Santiago v. Sheriff of Manila, 77 Phil. 740.
11
2 Moran on the Rules of Court, 1963,
ed. pp. 320-321; citing Omaña vs. Gatulayao, 73 Phil. 66; Gozon vs.
de la Rosa, 77 Phil. 919; Santiago vs. Sheriff of Manila, et al., 77
Phil. 740; Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
Corp. v. Aldecoa & Co., 30 Phil. 255;
Andres v. Pimental, 21 Phil. 429; Saavedra vs. Siari Valley
Estates, G.R. No. L-12875, Oct. 30, 1959.
12
G.R. No. L-20825, December 28, 1964.