G.R. No. L-16986. April 30, 1964

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, CRISTETA GENABE, OFFENDED PARTY AND APPELLANT, VS. SABAS SAYON, ET AL., DEFENDANT AND APPELLEES.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions April 30, 1964 MAKALINTAL, J.:
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MAKALINTAL, J.:


On 21 May 1957 the Provincial Fiscal of Davao filed an information in
the Court of First Instance of the same province against herein
appellees Sabas Sayon, Dalmacio Capin, Marcelino Isable and Candido
Legan, charging them with the crime of theft under Article 808, in
relation to paragraph 4, Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code. The
offense consisted of having cut and carried away abaca plants belonging
to complainant Cristeta Genabe, valued at P90.00. In view of the
penalty provided for (arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional
in its minimum period) the case could be filed with the Municipal Court
of the City of Davao or directly with the Court of First Instance. A
motion to quash was presented on the ground that the Provincial Fiscal
of Davao had no authority to initiate and file the information since
the alleged crime was committed within the territorial limits of the
City and therefore it developed exclusively upon the City Attorney to
investigate the same and initiate the prosecution.

The Court
of First Instance, by order of 18 June 1958, sustained the motion and
dismissed the information. The case is before us on appeal by the
Solicitor General from the order of dismissal.

The charter of the City of Davao (Commonwealth Act No. 51, as amended) provides:

“SEC. 19. The City Attorney—There shall be a City Attorney who shall be
the chief legal adviser of the City, and who shall have the following
general powers and duties:

* * * * * * *

(e) He shall have charge of the prosecution of all crimes and
misdemeanors and violation of city ordinances triable in the Municipal
Court. The Provincial Fiscal of Davao shall have charge of all
prosecutions of crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of city ordinances
appealed to, or brought before, the Court of First Instance of Davao.

(f) He shall investigate all charges of crimes, misdemeanors, and
violations of city ordinances and prepare the necessary complaints
against the persons accused, and discharge all other duties in respect
to criminal prosecutions enjoined upon provincial fiscals generally.

(g) He may conduct investigations in respect to crimes, misdemeanors,
and violation of ordinances and for this purpose may, by subpoena,
summon witnesses to appear and testify under oath before him, and the
attendance of an absent of recalcitrant witness may be enforced by
application to the Municipal Court or the Court of First Instance of
the Province of Davao.”

It should be noted
that there is a delimination of authority between the City Attorney and
the Provincial Fiscal Under paragraph (e): to the first is assigned the
prosecution of all crimes, etc., triable in the Municipal Court; and to
the latter, that of all crimes, etc., appealed to or brought before the
Court of First Instance. The provision, of course, refers to offenses
committed in the city itself and not elsewhere in the province.

The lower court ruled, and appellees here now maintain, (1) that the
investigation of crimes, misdemeanors and violation of city ordinances
(committed within the limits of the City of Davao) and the preparation
of complaints with respect thereto are conferred exclusively on the
City Attorney; and (2) that the Provincial Fiscal, not being a city
official, cannot exercise such power under his general authority given
by Republic Act No. 732.[*]

We believe it is sufficiently demonstrable that if the Provincial
Fiscal is to have charge of the prosecution of offenses committed in
the City of Davao and triable in the Court of First Instance, he should
be deemed vested with the power to make the necessary preliminary
investigations and to file the corresponding informations. To deny him
that power is to hobble him unduly in the exercise of his duty to
prosecute and to make the findings and conclusions of the City Attorney
conclusive upon him. Prosecution does not begin with the trial of a
case after it is filed in court; it includes the process of
investigation leading to the formal charge.

The restrictive construction given by appellees to the power of the
Provincial Fiscal would imply that a criminal case arising in the City
of Davao and triable in the Court of First Instance may come under its
cognizance only after preliminary investigation conducted by the
municipal court of the city upon an information filed with it by the
City Attorney; and that neither the Provincial Fiscal nor the Court of
First Instance itself may conduct such investigation in the exercise of
the authority given to them by Republic Act No. 732 and by Section 4 of
Rule 108, respectively. This result could not have been the intention
of Congress in precisely stating that ths Provincial Fiscal should have
charge of prosecution of such cases and thus making him responsible
therefore. That responsibility connotes discretion to determine whether
an information should or should not be filed at all—a discretion that
cannot be exercised if the City Attorney is held to have the exclusive
power to investigate and decide for or against proceeding further with
the prosecution.

On the legal issue decisive of this appeal we find for appellant and
hold that the order of dismissal issued by the lower court should be
set aside. Reference may be made, however, to some circumstances which,
we believe should be looked into more closely at the trial. This
case—for theft of abaca worth only P90.00—was first investigated by the
Assistant City Attorney of Davao in 1955. It was then dropped by him
after an ocular inspection of the abaca plantation where the offense
was alleged to have been committed. The complainant then appealed to
the Provincial Fiscal, who at the time was City Attorney ex-oficio for
the city of Davao. He reversed the findings of the assistant Provincial
Fiscal and filed a criminal case with the Municipal Court of the City
of Davao. After eight postponements of the hearing (before arraignment
of the accused) the Court issued an order of provisional dismissal. The
case was subsequently reinvestigated by a special counsel in the City
Attorney’s office, but he did not file an information on the ground
that there was no evidence of animus lucrandi
on the part of the accused. The private prosecutor representing the
complainant lodged another complaint directly with the Provincial
Fiscal, who filed the case directly in the Court of First Instance. It
was once more dismissed upon motion of the Assistant Provincial Fiscal
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Soon thereafter the Provincial
Fiscal himself took a hand and filed the information, which was again
dismissed, from which order of dismissal the present appeal has been
taken.

The order appealed from is set aside, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings. No special pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and Regala, JJ., concur.


[*]
R.A. No. 732 authorizes the Provincial Fiscal to conduct investigation
of any crime or misdemeanor and to have the necessary information or
complaint prepared or made against persons charged with the commission
of the crime. If the offense charged falls within the original
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, the Provincial Fiscal may
himself conduct the preliminary investigation and file the information
directly with said court.