LETICIA B. BELMONTE, FOR HERSELF AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILDREN, NAMELY, CANDELARIA, DANIEL, FRANCIS, ZENAIDA, AND JERRY, ALL SURNAMED BELMONTE, PETITIONERS, VS. WORKMEN’S …

Belmonte versus Workmen's Compensation Commission

The Case

This is a petition brought by Leticia Belmonte, for herself and in behalf of her minor children Candelaria, Daniel, Francis, Zenaida, and Jerry, all surnamed Belmonte, against the Workmen's Compensation Commission and the Bureau of Posts. The petitioners are the widow and legitimate minor children of the late Eliseo Belmonte, a letter-carrier and acting postmaster of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, who died after suffering a stroke. They seek to reverse the Commission's denial of their claim for death benefits and to restore the award granted by the referee. The case matters because it is a compact illustration of the rule of aggravation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and of the statutory presumption of compensability, which shifts the burden of proof to the employer.

Procedural History

The claim was first heard by Referee Ricardo Jeruta, Junior, who, in a decision dated August 27, 1971, granted the petitioners death compensation of 6,000 pesos, reimbursement of burial expenses of 200 pesos, and attorney's fees of 300 pesos, besides charging 63 pesos against the respondent as administrative fees. On appeal, the respondent Commission reversed and set aside the referee's decision, and it likewise denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration in its resolution. The petitioners then filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court. Because no factual questions were involved and only a single issue of law was raised, the Court resolved to treat the petition as a special civil action, ordered the respondents to file their comments and answers, and considered the case submitted for decision.

Facts

Eliseo Belmonte was employed as a letter-carrier of the Bureau of Posts beginning in 1945, first in a temporary capacity and then permanently from July 1950 until his death on December 24, 1969. He was assigned to the post office of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, where at times he acted as postmaster, or as postmaster and letter-carrier at the same time, whenever there was no regular postmaster. His working hours ran from eight in the morning to twelve noon and from one to five in the afternoon, Monday to Friday, and from eight to one on Saturdays. At the time of his death he was receiving an annual salary of 2,676 pesos.

His duties as letter-carrier included collecting mails from letter-drop boxes, sorting and bundling mails for delivery, making house-to-house delivery, attending the carrier's delivery window, recording delivered and undelivered mails, endorsing undeliverable mails, delivering and receiving mailbags from buses and other conveyances, and sorting mailbags according to destination. When acting as postmaster, he was in charge of the office, accepted for filing and issued money orders and telegraphic transfers and special withdrawals, answered communications, and attended to the complaints of the public. The referee found that the work was of the strenuous type, that the deceased covered mostly by foot the jurisdictional area of the post office, including the town proper and outlying barrios, braving inclement weather to deliver the mails, and that he was graded very satisfactory in efficiency. In December 1969, during the heavy influx of mails, he complained of the volume of work and verbally requested a leave, which was not granted under office policy during the Christmas season.

The medical testimony established that his cerebro-vascular hemorrhage was directly caused by hypertension, not by his work, and that the hypertension was not traceable to the nature of his employment. The stroke occurred on a Sunday while he was inspecting his ricefields, and he died three days later. The Commission reasoned that the illness or stroke occurred when there was a temporary suspension of the employer-employee relationship and while he was doing something personal, and that fatigue and exposure to too much heat could have triggered the stroke.

Issues

• Whether or not the illness of hypertension which caused the deceased's fatal stroke, though not directly caused by his employment nor the result of the nature thereof, was aggravated by his employment of twenty-four years as letter-carrier and acting postmaster, so that the resulting death is compensable.
• Whether or not the respondent employer submitted substantial evidence to overcome the statutory presumption of compensability under Section 44 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act provides:

Section 2. Grounds for compensation. When an employee suffers personal injury from any accident arising out of and in the course of his employment or contracts tuberculosis or other illness directly caused by such employment, or either aggravated by or the result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the person hereinafter specified.

This is the provision under which the Court holds that the aggravation of the deceased's illness by the nature of his work suffices to make his death compensable.

Section 44 of the same Act, as discussed in the decision, provides:

That the claim comes within the provisions of this Act.

This is the statutory presumption that a claim falls within the Act, which stands in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary and shifts the burden of proof to the employer.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled for the petitioners. It was convinced of the correctness of the referee's decision that the illness which cut short the deceased's life at age fifty-five was associated with his long employment and falls within the rule of aggravation under Section 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. All that the Act requires is a showing that the nature of the deceased's work and duties did aggravate his illness. As the Court stressed in Abana versus Quisumbing, it is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development, or acceleration of the illness; it is enough that the employment had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease. The Commission's conjecture that fatigue and exposure to too much heat could have triggered the stroke was, on the contrary, consistent with the twenty-four years during which the deceased covered mostly by foot the whole jurisdictional area of the town.

On the second issue, the Court held that no substantial evidence was submitted or cited by the respondent to overcome the statutory presumption of compensability, reinforced by the deceased's long and dedicated service. Under Section 44, it is presumed that the claim comes within the provisions of the Act, and the burden of proof shifts to the employer, who must adduce substantial evidence to disprove the causal connection.

Doctrine

Under Section 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, an illness need not be directly caused by the employment; it is enough that the illness was aggravated by or the result of the nature of such employment. The employment need not be the sole factor in the growth, development, or acceleration of the illness; it is enough that the employment contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease. Under Section 44, the statutory presumption of compensability operates in favor of the claimant, shifting the burden of proof to the employer, who must overcome it with substantial evidence; mere conjecture will not suffice.

Disposition

The Court vacated and set aside the decision and resolution of the respondent Commission and reinstated and affirmed the referee's decision granting the petitioners' claim for death benefits, without costs.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that it is enough that the employment contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease, for the statutory presumption then shifts the burden to the employer. Examiners use this case to test the rule of aggravation and the Section 44 presumption of compensability in workmen's compensation claims.