G.R. No. L-32657. September 01, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JOSE S. RODRIGUEZ, NICASIO YATCO AND ANDRES O. REYES, AS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AND MEMBERS OF A COMPOSITE SP…
NOCON, J.:
The People filed this petition for certiorari to annul the
resolution dated September 22, 1970 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
07797-CR which granted the third motion for reconsideration of private
respondent Cesar Dean and acquitted him of the crime of homicide, on the ground
that respondent court (1) acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in acting upon said motion for reconsideration;
and (2) acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction for its failure to
require petitioner to answer said motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows: Private respondent Cesar Dean was found guilty of the crime of
homicide for the death of Leopoldo Boroc by the Court of First Instance of
Samar. Appreciating the mitigating
circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the victim and lack of
intention to commit so grave a wrong in favor of private respondent, he was
sentenced to suffer on indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, and to indemnify the heirs of Leopoldo Boroc in the amount of
P6,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs.
Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
rendered its decision on September 3, 1969[1]
affirming the judgment of conviction, but modified the penalty imposed on
private respondent to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of Leopoldo Boroc the amount of P12,000.00.
On November 21, 1969, private respondent filed an ex parte motion
for reconsideration on the ground that the evidence on record failed to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals denied the same on December 6, 1969.
On December 15, 1969, private respondent filed an ex parte motion
for leave of court to file a second motion for reconsideration, with the second
motion for reconsideration attached thereto. Without acting upon the motion for leave, the court considered the
motion for reconsideration, but a unanimous decision could not be reached. Consequently, then Presiding Justice
Salvador V. Esguerra appointed one other Justice[2] and
himself to sit temporarily with the members of the division, thus forming a
division of five Justices.[3] On
July 17, 1970, the Court of Appeals, acting though the division of five, denied
the second motion for reconsideration by a vote of three to two.[4]
On July 24, 1970, private respondent filed an ex parte motion for leave and
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was granted by
the Court of Appeals on August 13, 1970, by a vote of three to two. Meanwhile, on August 5, 1970, petitioner
filed his third motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals, by a vote of three to one, promulgated the
questioned resolution dated September
22, 1970 granting the third motion for reconsideration and acquitting private
respondents.[5]
Justice Jose M. Mendoza, the ponente
of the original decision, did not sign the said resolution since he
retired on August 21, 1970. However,
the questioned resolution stated that:
On August 19, 1970, Mr. Justice Jose M. Mendoza voted to deny the
instant motion for reconsideration as “The [sic] grounds stated in the
Third Motion for Reconsideration have been fully discussed in our resolution of
the second motion for reconsideration, dated July 17, 1970.[6]
The Solicitor
General contended that the Court of
Appeals acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in acting favorably
on the third motion for reconsideration, since the same was pro forma and that the appellate court did
not follow the procedure laid down in Section 15, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court.
We find the
petition unmeritorious.
The Solicitor General argued that the Court of Appeals erred in
considering the third motion for reconsideration since the same was pro
forma. The Solicitor General
pointed out that Justice Mendoza stated in the questioned resolution that the
arguments raised in the third motion for reconsideration were fully discussed
in the resolution denying the second motion for reconsideration.
We do not agree. A motion
for reconsideration is deemed pro forma when the same does not specify
the findings or conclusions in the judgment which are not supported by the
evidence or which are contrary to law, making express reference to the
pertinent evidence or legal provisions, as expressly required in the third
paragraph of Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court.[7]
Though the motion for reconsideration may be a repetition of the issues already
passed upon by the trial court, the same is immaterial because what is
essential is the compliance with the requirements of the Rules.[8]
An examination of the third motion for reconsideration[9]
reveals the same not to be pro forma since it made specific references
to the evidence in compliance with Section 2 of Rule 37.
Neither do We agree with the Solicitor General’s contention that,
in view of Section 15, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court,[10]
the third motion for reconsideration should have first been submitted to the
original division of three justices, and that recourse to a division of five
should only be made when the division fails to reach a unanimous vote.
There is nothing in Section 15, Rule 124 to support the Solicitor
General’s position. It would be
superfluous to submit the third
motion for reconsideration to the original division since there was already no
unanimity on the second motion for reconsideration, and to do so would
unnecessarily delay the case. Moreover,
once a division of five is formed, it retains the sole authority to decide all
matters pertaining to the case until the same is terminated and the records
thereof remanded to the court of origin.
The Solicitor General asserted that the questioned resolution was
null and void since the third motion for reconsideration was not collectively
deliberated upon by the division and that the resolution was promulgated after
the retirement of Justice Mendoza. The
Solicitor General also assailed the validity of the resolution on the ground
that the prosecution was not given an opportunity to oppose the third motion
for reconsideration.
We do not find the resolution in question null and void. First of all, there is nothing in the record
which would indicate that the division did not collectively deliberate upon the
third motion for reconsideration.
Secondly, the fact that Justice Mendoza retired prior to the
promulgation of the questioned resolution did not render the same null and
void. Section 12 of Rule 124 provides:
SEC. 12. Quorum of the
court. — x x x. In the event that the three Justices do not
reach a unanimous vote, the presiding Justice shall designate two Justices from
among the other members of the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a
division of five Justices, and the concurrence of a majority of such
division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a judgment.[11]
Inasmuch as Justice Mendoza was not part
of the majority, having voted along with Presiding Justice Esguerra to deny the
motion for reconsideration, his vote was not necessary in order for the
questioned resolution to be promulgated.
Finally, Section 15, Rule 124 does not require that notice be
given to the People of the filing of a motion for reconsideration since the
same is allowed to be filed ex
parte. Neither do the Rules require
the Court of Appeals to allow the People to file an opposition thereto. At any rate, the People are not deprived of
their day in court since the matters that may be raised in the motion for
reconsideration will undoubtedly be a reiteration of the appellant’s brief,
which the People had a chance to refute. However, it should be noted that the rule regarding motions for
reconsideration is different under the amended 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
in that under the 1964 Rules of Court, the motion may be filed ex parte,[12] while under the 1985 Amended
Rules, copies of the motion for reconsideration have to be served on the
adverse party.[13]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. Cost de officio.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla and Regalado,
JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), in
the result.
Melo, J.,
no part.
[1]
Third Division: Justice Jose M.
Mendoza, ponente; Justices
Jose S. Rodriguez and Nicasio A. Yatco, concurring. Rollo, p.
31.
[2]
Justice Andres Reyes.
[3]
See Rule 124, sec. 12.
[4]
Justice Mendoza, ponente; Presiding Justice Esguerra and Justice
Rodriguez, concurring. Justices Yatco
and Reyes, dissenting. Rollo, p.
55.
[5]
Justice Yatco, ponente; Justices Rodriguez and Reyes, concurring. Presiding Justice Esguerra, dissenting. Rollo, p. 24.
[6]
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated Sept. 22, 1970, p. 7.
[7]
Cruz vs. Villaluz, L-41684, 88 SCRA 506 (1979).
[8]
Id., p. 511.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 55-73.
[10]
Said section provides:
SEC. 15. Re-hearing or
reconsideration. — Application
for a re-hearing or
reconsideration shall be made ex
parte on motion setting forth the grounds on which they are made,
and filed within fifteen (15) days
after notice of the decision of the court. No oral argument therein shall be allowed. If re-hearing is granted, the cause shall be
re-reheard in conformity with the requirement to the first hearing. The mittimus shall be stayed during the
pendency of a motion for a re-hearing or reconsideration. More than one motion for re-hearing or
reconsideration shall not he filed in any case without express leave of court.
[11]
Emphasis supplied.
[12]
Sec. 15, Rule 124.
[13]
Sec. 16, Rule 124, Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:
SEC. 16. Rehearing or reconsideration. — Motion for a rehearing or reconsideration shall be made within
fifteen (15) days after notice of the decision of the court, with copies served
upon the adverse party, setting forth the grounds on which they are made. The mittimus shall be stayed during the
pendency of a motion for rehearing or reconsideration. No party shall be allowed to file a second motion for rehearing
or reconsideration of a final judgment
or order.