RESTITUTO M. SIBAL, PETITIONER, VS. GREGORIO T. LANTIN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH VII, THE SPOUSES LORENZO & INOCENCIA …

Restituto M. Sibal
seeks a writ of “certiorari and/or
prohibition,” with preliminary injunction, to restrain respon­dent Gregorio
T. Lantin, as Judge of the Court of First Ins­tance of
Manila, Branch VII, from enforcing, during the pendency of this
case, an order issued by him on January 31, 1963, in Civil Case No. 52866 of
said court – hereinafter re­ferred to as CFI Case No. 52866 – and, after due hearing, to
reverse or annul said order, to make the writ of preliminary injunction
permanent, as well as to recover costs, and to secure “such further relief
as may be in consonance with jus­tice and equity.”

The events leading to the institution of the present case are
these:  On September 5, 1955, a deed,
entitled “Contract of Transfer of Management”, was executed by Valleson, Inc. – hereinafter referred to as Valleson – represented by its President and General
Manager, Lorenzo Valdez, as Transferor, and Restituto
Sibal, as Transferee, as well as Mariano Guison, as owner of the “Angela Building”, located at
No. 323 Carriedo Street, Manila – part of which is
occupied by Valleson – whereby the latter ceded,
conveyed and transferred to Sibal “the wholesale
and retail acts and activities of disposing and selling to the
consuming public the commercial items” of Valleson,
“from September 5, 1955 to September 4, 1962,” in consideration of
the sum of P2,000 a month to be paid by Sibal.  It was further stipulated in the contract
that Sibal would “have full and complete freedom
to run the wholesale and retail busi­ness”
during said period, “without any interference from anybody”; that he
would “honor and respect all present subsisting contracts or their last
expired contracts, of all the concession­aires with x x Valleson”
and would “not collect from them, in any form, any charge of goodwill and
rate of commission except the one existing in their present contracts” or
“remove them from the premises except for just and reasonable causes as
pro­vided for in their respective contracts”; and that Sibal
would pay Guison the sum of P3,400 a month, “as
rental of the Angela Building”.

On the same date,^[1]
Sibal and Guison executed
another contract – hereinafter referred to as the first contract – whereby Guison leased to Sibal “the
total space presently occupied by Valleson,”
from “September 1955 to September 1962 x x to be renewed only upon agreement of
both parties.”  On March 1, 1962, Guison and Sibal executed another
contract of lease – here­inafter referred to as the second contract – whereby Guison leased the Angela Building to Sibal “for a term of
ten (10) years beginning September 2, 1962,” at a “monthly rental of
P4,000.” It would seem that, soon thereafter, Sibal
notified the former concessionaires and sublessees of
Valleson, who, Sibal con­tends,
had become his sublessees, to vacate the spaces sub­leased
to them and that, otherwise, proceedings for their eject­ment
would be instituted.

Presently, or on or about September 4, 1962, Valleson
commenced Civil Case No. 51476, of the Court of First Instance of Manila –
hereinafter referred to as CFI Case No. 51476 – against Guison
and Sibal.  It
was alleged in the complaint there­in that, although the first contract of
lease purports to have been signed by Sibal in his
personal capacity, he, in fact, acted therein as Valleson’s
representative, and that, pursuant to said contract, the same was, upon its
expiration, to be renewed under the same terms and conditions specified
therein.  Valleson
prayed, therefore, that a writ of preliminary injunction or a restraining
order be issued directing Guison and Sibal to refrain from interfering with Valleson’s
possession of the Angela Build­ing, and that, after hearing, judgment be
rendered declaring that Valleson has the right to
renew the contract of lease with Guison, for another
period of seven (7) years, under the same terms and conditions specified in the
first contract of lease and ordering Guison and Sibal to pay damages, as well as granting such other relief
as may be just and equitable.  Forthwith
– on September 4, 1962 – said Court, presided over by Honorable
Gregorio T. Lantin, Judge, issued the writ of
preliminary in­junction prayed for by Valleson.

Subsequently, or on November
5, 1962, Sibal instituted, in the municipal court of Manila, the
following unlawful detainer cases, namely:  Case No. 103384, against Benjamin and Patricia Manio;
Case No. 103385, against Dominga Hernandez; Case No.
103386, against Belen Neis; and Case No. 103387,
against Aug­usto and Natalia
Valdes.  The defendants in these four (4)
cases were former sublessees of Valleson,
and alleged sublessees of Sibal.  On December 12, 1962, the latter filed, in the same court, similar cases, to
wit:  Case No. 104595, against Alfonso
and Narcisa Domingo; and Case No. 104596, against
Lorenzo and lnocencia Valdez.  These two (2) sets of defendants are
identically situated as the defendants in Cases Nos. 103384 to 103387, in
relation to Valleson and Sibal.

Before the institution of
the last two (2) cases, or on November 10, 1962, Valleson
moved, in CFI Case No. 51476, that Sibal be dealt with for contempt of Court, for having filed
the first four (4) unlawful detainer cases –
hereinafter referred to as ejectment cases – notwithstanding the writ of
preliminary injunction, issued on September 4, 1962, but the motion was, on
December 13, 1962, denied by Judge Lantin.

Meanwhile, or on November
12, 1962, the
defendants in ejectment cases Nos. 103384 to 103387 had filed
motions to dismiss the same, based upon the pendency
of said CFI Case No. 51476.  These
motions were, on December 3, 1962, denied by Honorable W. L. Cornejo, Judge of the Municipal Court of Manila, for lack
of merit.  Judge Cornejo,
likewise, ordered said cases set for hearing on December 17, 1962.  A
petition, filed by the defendants in
said cases Nos. 103384 to 103387, which was joined by the defendants in cases
Nos. 104595 to 104596 – all of them hereinafter referred to collectively as sublessees – for the reconsideration of said order of
December 3, 1962, was denied in an order of Judge Cornejo,
dated December 22, 1962, which, moreover, reset the six (6) cases for hearing on Jan­uary
8, 1963.

Soon later, or on January
15, 1963, the sublessees filed their respective
answers in the ejectment cases, alleging inter
alia, that their sublessor
is Valleson, not Sibal,
that said cases raise the very same issues involved in CFI Case No. 51476, and that, for this
reason, Sibal “does not have any right”
against them.  Furthermore, the sublessees set up a counterclaim for expenses of
litigation.

Then, or on or about January 22, 1963, the sublessees
commenced CFI Case No. 52866 against Judge Cornejo
and Sibal, to restrain the former from “further
proceedings” in the ejectment cases, and to
annul the “proceedings already had therein”, upon the ground that
said Judge had acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
taking cogni­zance of the ejectment cases and setting
them for hearing, despite the pendency of CFI Case
No. 51476.  On January 26, 1963, the sublessees
filed, in said CFI Case No. 52866, an “urgent motion for a writ of
preliminary injunction” or a “simple res­training order, directing x x Judge Cornejo to desist, during the pendency”
of said case, “from hearing and/or taking any further proceedings” in
the ejectment cases. 
By an order, dated January 31,
1963, Judge Lantin authorized the
issuance of said writ of preliminary injunction, upon the filing of a bond in
the sum of P5,000.  Said writ was,
accordingly, issued on February 1, 1968.

Thereupon, Sibal instituted the present
action, against Judge Lantin and the sublessees, to annul said order of January 31, 1963, and
suspend the enforcement thereof, during the pendency
of this case.  Upon the filing of the
petition here­in, we issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining Judge Lantin from enforcing his aforementioned order of Jan­uary 31, 1963.  On motion of respondents herein and upon the
filing of the corresponding counter-bond, said writ of prelimi­nary injunction
was, however, dissolved on July 8, 1963.

The issue in this case is
whether or not Judge Lantin had acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in issuing, in CFI Case
No. 52866, his order of January 31, 1963, authorizing the issuance of a
writ of preli­minary injunction restraining Judge Cornejo from hearing and taking
further proceedings in the ejectment cases.  The answer is in the affirmative.

Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides:

” x x x Grounds
for issuance of preliminary injunction. – A preliminary injunction may be
granted at any time after the commencement of the action and before judgment
when it is esta­blished:

“(a) That the plaintiff is entitled to the re­lief demanded,
and the whole or part of such re­lief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the acts complained of, or in the performance of an act or acts,
either for a limited period or perpetually;

“(b) That the commission or continuance of some act complained
of during the litigation or the non-performance thereof would probably work injustice
to the plaintiff; or

“(c) That the defendant is doing, threatens, or is about to
do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of
the plaintiff’s rights respecting the subject of the action, and tending to
render the judgment in­effectual.”

Thus, one of the prerequisites for the possession of authority to
grant a writ of preliminary injunction, is that “the plaintiff is entitled
to the relief demanded.” The relief sought in CFI Case No. 52866 was a
“writ of certiorari and/or
prohibition” ordering Judge Cornejo “to
desist from further proceedings” in the ejectment
cases “and declaring null and void proceedings already taken
therein.” The petition for such relief was premised upon the allegation
that Judge Cornejo had “acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the ejectment
cases and in setting them for hearing on the merits,” because:  (a) “in his answer in Civil Case No.
51476 x x Sibal had already set forth his counterclaim for
rentals”; and (b) the “ejectment cases
should be held in abeyance until the resolution of the question x x x” raised in CFI Case No.
51476, which is said to be “prejudicial”.

In this connection, it should be noted that CFI Case No. 52866 is
one for certiorari and/or prohibition; that either writ must be denied unless
respondent judge has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction^[2];
and that Cases Nos. 103384 to 103387 and 104595 to 104596 are admittedly
unlawful detainer cases, which are within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the muni­cipal court^[3].  Hence, the latter had the authority and the duty to hear and
decide said cases, and no other court could do so.

The sublessees argue that the issues
therein are, also, raised in CFI Case No. 51476, which was filed before the ejectment cases, and that a determination of the issue in
CFI Case No. 51476 is a “prejudicial” question.  This pretense is untenable, both as to its
premise and as to the conclusion drawn therefrom.  Indeed:

(1) The parties in CFI Case No. 51476 are Valleson,
on the one hand, and Sibal and Guison, on the other.  The sublessees are not parties therein, in much the same
way as Valleson is not a party in the ejectment cases.

(2) The issue in CFI Case No. 51476 is:  To whom did Guison
lease the Angela Building
under the first contract of lease, to Sibal or
to Valleson? 
The issue in the ejectment cases is:  who subleased portions of said
building to the sublessees – was it Sibal or Valleson?  Guison is
absolutely alien to this issue. 
CFI Case No. 51476 deals with the lease, whereas
the ejectment cases are concerned with the subleases.

(3) Not being parties in CFI Case No. 51476, whatever may be the
decision therein rendered would not bind the sublesees.

(4) The right of Sibal to eject the sublessees does not de­pend
necessarily upon his being Guison’s lessee.  Even a usurper – as regards the owner of land
– may seek the ejectment of those who, having
obtained possession thereof by agreement with the former, refuse to surrender
it to him, after the expiration of the term of said agreement.

(5) The defense set up by the sublessees
in the ejectment cases impugns Sibal’s
cause of action, and does not affect the jurisdiction of the
municipal court to hear and decide said cases.

(6) The term of the first contract of lease has admittedly expired, so that, even if Sibal
had made it on behalf of Valleson – which is denied
by and Guidon – Valleson’s
alleged right of lease had already been extinguished.  It is not true that said con­tract gave the
lessee the right to renew it under the same terms and conditions stipulated
therein.  The contract provided that it
was “to be renewed only upon agreement of both
parties,” which means that the lessee could not renew the contract without
the lessor’s consent. 
The record further shows that Valleson and Guison could not agree on said renewal, and that,
accordingly, Guison executed the second contract of
lease in favor of Sibal.

(7) The first and the second contracts of lease appear, on the
face thereof, to have been made by Sibal, in his
own behalf, not in representation of another.  This circumstance is bolstered up by two (2)
facts, namely:  (a) Guison, the lessor, confirms it; and (b) the
first contract was made on September 4,
1955, or coetaneously with the
“Contract of Transfer of Management”,
between Valleson, Sibal
and Guison. 
Thus, the acts performed by the parties at the time of the execution
of said contract of transfer of management bolster up the position taken by Sibal and
Guison in CFI Cases Nos. 51476 and 52866.  In short, the records of both show that Sibal and Guison are prima
facie right, so that, if any abuse
of discretion was committed, it was not by Judge Cornejo,
in setting the ejectment cases for hearing, but by Judge
Lantin, in issuing his order of January 31, 1963,
authorizing the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain Judge Cornejo from proceeding With the hearing and determination
of said ejectment
cases.

Inasmuch as Judge Cornejo had, not only
authority to hear and decide the ejectment cases,
but, also, exclusive jurisdiction therefor,
and there had been no abuse of discretion on his part, in setting those cases
for hearing, it follows necessarily that, prima facie,
the sublessees were not entitled to the writ
of cer­tiorari and/or prohibition applied for in CFI Case No. 52866 and that a
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of juris­diction, had been
committed by respondent Judge Lantin in issu­ing his
order of January 31, 1963, authorizing the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction against Judge Cornejo, and in actually issuing said writ on February 1,
1963.^[4]

WHEREFORE, this writ and said order of January 31, 1963, are hereby declared null and void ab initio, with costs against
respondents herein, except Judge Lantin.  Writ granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Ruiz Castro, Fernando, and Capistrano,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
September 5, 1955.

^[2]
Rule 65, Sections 1 and 2, Rules
of Court; Ma-ao Sugar Central v. Barrios, 79 Phil. 666; Ang Ching Gi v. De Leon, 79
Phil. 580; Ong Sit v. Piccio,
78 Phil. 785; Tarnate v. Daza, 76 Phil. 842; Tayko v.
Capistrano, 53 Phil. 866; Westminster Bank v.
Torres, 57 Phil. 422; Sabado v. Gonzales, 53
Phil. 770; So Chu v. Nepomuceno,
29 Phil. 208; Claudio v. Zandueta, 64 Phil. 812, 817.

^[3]
Sec. 88, Rep. Act No. 296, as amended.

^[4]
Ayo v. Ilao,
L-23293, January 16, 1968;
Angela Estate, Inc. v. CFI of Negros
Occidental, L-27084, July 31, 1968.