G.R. No. L-23635. August 31, 1966
TEODORO M. CASTRO, AS INTERNAL REVENUE DIRECTOR FOR SOUTHERN LUZON, PETITIONER, VS. RUFINO G. HECHANOVA, AS SECRETARY OF FINANCE, BENJAMIN N. TABIOS, AS COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL…
BARRERA, J.:
commenced by Teodoro M. Castro, a Civil Service employee with more than
33 years of service in the government and at the time holding the
position of Internal Revenue Regional Director I (R-53), assigned to
the Southern Luzon District (No. 7) with office at San Pablo City,
wherein he contests the legality and constitutionality of Internal
Revenue Travel Assignment Order No. 100-64 of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, dated August 14, 1964, which reads:
“TRAVEL ASSIGNMENT ORDER NO. 100-64
“The exigencies of the revenue service so requiring
and pursuant to Section 12 of the National Internal Revenue Code, the
following personnel are hereby relieved of their present duties and
directed to report to their new assignments as indicated hereunder
opposite their respective names:
“Before
leaving for their new assignments, the personnel concerned must first
comply with the requirements of Field Circular No. V-25 regarding
inventory of pending papers, correspondence and other property
responsibilities in their possession.“This Order takes effect immediately upon its approval.
“(Sgd.) BENJAMIN N. TABIOS
Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Petitioner, whose request for reconsideration of the aforesaid
travel assignment order was denied by both the respondents Commissioner
of Internal Revenue and Secretary of Finance, contends, among other
things, that his assignment from “field” to “desk” work without the
corresponding appointment to the latter position, amounts to removal
without just cause; and that, if he were to be given another assignment
at all, it should properly be as Regional Director of Quezon City,
which would actually be a promotion for him.
For their part, respondents allege that the assignment was merely
temporary and was effected pursuant to Section 12 of the National
Internal Revenue Code; that such temporary transfer of petitioner
(whose position as Regional Director carries Wapco Range 53) to
discharge the functions of Revenue Operations head (with Wapco Range
57) in the central office is actually a promotion in rank, because the
latter position has higher duties-classification under the Wapco
rating. Thus, the temporary designation is not violative of the
Constitution or of the Civil Service Law and rules.
There seems to be no controversy as to the fact that the respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue had been issuing orders effecting
transfers of internal revenue officials and employees, but this, it is
claimed, is only temporary in nature and is done in the interest of the
service, as authorized by Section 12 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Considering the nature of this proceeding, we are in no position to
pass upon the motive for such movement of personnel, or to determine
whether the transfer of petitioner Castro from a regional office to
another executive post in the central office was caused by his lack of
“political backer or patron”, as claimed by him, or actually part of
respondent Commissioner’s administrative program designed avowedly to
improve the service of the agency. The only issue this case presents
for resolution is whether the ordered assignment of petitioner against
his will, to a position other than that to which he was duly appointed,
constitutes removal without cause and, consequently, violates the
constitutional principle of security of tenure for government employees.
Under the law, respondents, as the administrative heads of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, not only have administrative supervision
and control over the same,[1] but are also specifically empowered to assign revenue personnel to other duties, thus:
“SEC. 12. ASSIGNMENT OF INTERNAL REVENUE AGENTS AND OTHER EMPLOYEES TO OTHER DUTIES.–The
Collector of Internal Revenue may, with the approval of the Secretary
of Finance, assign internal revenue agents and other officers and
employees of the Bureau of Internal Revenue without change in their
official character or salary to such special duties connected with the
administration of the revenue laws as the best interest of the service
may require.” (National Internal Revenue Code.)
Petitioner, however, contends that for the exercise of the foregoing
authority to be valid, the assignment of personnel should involve the
performance of some “special duties” and should not result in any
change in the official character of their positions and salaries. In
assailing the validity of the travel assignment order in question,
petitioner claims that being a regional director, to discharge the
functions of Revenue Operations-head cannot be considered as
performance of a special duty.
The term “special duties” mentioned in the law, evidently is here
being equated by the petitioner with work requiring the use of some
special talent or knowledge. It may be pointed out, however, that the
title of Section 12 of the Revenue Law mentions the assignment of
revenue employees to “other duties”, and the body thereof refers to
“such special duties connected with the administration of the revenue
law.” To our mind, the “special duties” mentioned in the law refer not
to a “special” or extraordinary or different undertaking, but to
functions or work other than, or not related to, those regularly
discharged by the employee concerned. In other words, to the employee
reassigned or detailed to another post, the performance of work other
than those he was regularly doing, constitutes the doing of “special
duties”, which supports the view that the designation is not permanent
but merely temporary. And, there is nothing wrong, legally or
personnel-wise, in the aforequoted provision, giving to the office
administrator or supervisor, the authority to formulate a personnel
program designed to improve the service and to carry out the same,
utilizing approved techniques or methods in personnel management, to
the end that the abilities of the employees may be harnessed to promote
optimum public service. Of course, it must be realized that the
exercise of this authority may be abused or carried out to serve some
other purposes, as so charged in this case. But, as it was once said,
“the possibility of abuse is not an argument against the concession of
power, as there is no power that is not susceptible of abuse.”[2]
This is not to say that the constitutional guarantees to the
employee are to be discarded. We adhere by the right of a civil service
employee to security of employment, as embodied in the constitutional
provision on his non-removal or suspension except for cause.[3]
However, hand in hand with our zeal to protect individual right, must
go our realization of the purpose of government: to render efficient
service to the public, to the community. As we are resolved to continue
to uphold the principles recognizing the political and civil rights of
a person, so should we too give proper attention to the cause of sound
and progressive public administration. Administrative regulations or
policies designed to further or promote efficient, responsive public
service, where they are not otherwise arbitrary or violative of any
existing law, must be upheld. The government employee, on the other
hand, has in the Revised Civil Service Law [4]
and rules, a potent instrument which, properly availed of and put to
good use, can improve his conditions and afford sufficient protection
against abuses.
In connection with the instant case, while temporary transfers or
re-assignments under Section 12 of the Tax Code, if effected to improve
the service of that agency, may be considered lawful, the same must
conform also to the directive embodied in Administrative Order No. 42,
series of 1937, [5] which in part provides:
“2. Whenever the Head of any Department or
dependency of the National Government deems it necessary for the good
of the service to assign any officer or employee outside of the Bureau
or Office where he is regularly employed, or to perform within the same
Bureau or Office a kind of work which is different from that for which
the position he occupies has been provided, the said Head of Department
or dependency shall issue an order stating the necessity for such
special assignment and a copy of the order shall be furnished to the
Budget Office, but no such special assignment shall be made for more
than thirty days without the approval of the President.”
Although the disputed travel order No. 100-64 did not specify the
duration for such special designation or assignment of petitioner, this
order, therefore, is understood to be subject to the foregoing
administrative order.
WHEREFORE, and finding that the travel assignment order in
question, issued pursuant to Section 12 of the National Internal
Revenue Code and in the lawful exercise of respondents’ administrative
authority, did not violate any of petitioner’s existing rights, its
validity is hereby sustained, subject to the provisions of
Administrative Order No. 42, series of 1937. The petition is dismissed,
without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, JP, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.
Regala, J., on leave.
[1] Sec. 79(c), Revised Administrative Code.
[2] Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 177; see also Garcia v. Lejano, G.R. No. L-12220, Aug. 8, 1960.
[3] Sec. 4, Art. XII, Philippine Constitution.
[4] Republic Act 2260.
[5] There is no showing that this presidential directive has been superseded, or withdrawn, or ceased to be effective.