P/SUPT. MANUEL P. BARCENA, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE HENRICK F. GINGOYON, RESPONDENT.

Barcena versus Gingoyon

The Case

This is an administrative disciplinary case. Complainant Manuel Barcena, then a police superintendent, filed a verified letter-complaint before the Office of the Chief Justice against Judge Henrick Gingoyon, presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117. The complaint charged the judge with gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority, and bias and partiality, arising from his handling of two criminal drug cases and of the motor vehicles seized in connection with them. The case matters because it fixes the standard of judicial competence: a judge who gives due course to a prosecution appeal from a judgment of acquittal commits gross ignorance of the law, because that appeal would place the accused twice in jeopardy.

Procedural History

The complaint was filed with the Office of the Chief Justice. The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that the matter be investigated, and the Supreme Court referred the case to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador for investigation, report, and recommendation. Justice De Guia-Salvador found no proof of bad faith, malice, or corrupt motive, and recommended dismissal of the charge of gross ignorance of the law; she likewise found no grave abuse of authority and no manifest bias or partiality. The Office of the Court Administrator disagreed in part and recommended that the judge be reprimanded for gross ignorance of the law, and that the complaint be treated as an administrative complaint against Sheriff Reynaldo Mulat. The case was resolved by the Supreme Court as an administrative matter, and the Court agreed with the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator.

Facts

On August 25, 1998, complainant, then Chief of the Regional Drug Enforcement Office of the PNP-NCRPO, and his men conducted a buy-bust operation in Pasay City. They arrested and charged two persons with violations of Republic Act Number 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, in two criminal cases. Two vehicles were also seized: a 1998 Mitsubishi Lancer registered to one John Chua, and a 1995 Nissan Sentra registered to a certain Willy Quintos, both allegedly used in the commission of the crime.

The criminal cases were raffled to Branch 116 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City and jointly tried by respondent as pairing judge. On December 7, 1998, respondent granted the accused's demurrer to evidence. Despite the resulting judgment of acquittal, on December 11, 1998, he issued an order giving due course to the prosecution's notice of appeal. He also placed custody of the cars with Sheriffs Leoncio Gutierrez, Junior, and Reynaldo Mulat, and ordered complainant to turn over the cars to them even though the records had been elevated to the Court of Appeals. On January 3, 2000, he denied a motion for the release of the vehicles filed by counsel for the accused on behalf of the registered owners.

On March 25, 2000, complainant, by then Chief of Police of Bacoor, Cavite, chanced upon the Lancer parked in a vacant lot in Soldiers Hills IV Subdivision in Molino, Bacoor, and learned from residents that Sheriff Mulat had been using it for eight months. When Sheriff Mulat could not produce registration papers or authority to use the car, complainant had it towed to the station. Sheriff Mulat reported the incident on March 27, 2000, and on the same day respondent issued an order requiring complainant and his men to show cause why they should not be cited for contempt for towing a vehicle in custodia legis, and directed that copies be sent to the Ombudsman, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government, the Chief of the Philippine National Police, and the National Police Commission for possible administrative or criminal prosecution.

Issues

• Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for giving due course to the prosecution's notice of appeal from a judgment of acquittal.
• Whether or not respondent is guilty of grave abuse of authority for allowing Sheriff Mulat to keep and use the seized vehicle in his own place of storage.
• Whether or not respondent is guilty of bias and partiality in issuing the show cause order and furnishing copies to the Ombudsman, the Department of the Interior and Local Government, the Chief of the Philippine National Police, and the National Police Commission.

Applicable Provisions

Section 21 of the Bill of Rights provides:

No person shall be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.

This is the constitutional guarantee that a prosecution appeal from a judgment of acquittal would violate, and it is the basis for the finding of gross ignorance of the law.

Section D, paragraph 4, Chapter VII of the Manual for Clerks of Court provides:

All exhibits used as evidence and turned over to the court and before the case/s involving such evidence shall have been terminated shall be under the custody and safekeeping of the Clerk of Court.

This provision governs the custody of court exhibits and shows that the vehicle should not have been placed in the personal storage of a sheriff.

Section 10 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, in effect at the time the offense was committed, provides:

Section 10. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is found culpable of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed: Dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits, except accrued leaves, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office including a government-owned or controlled corporation; Suspension for three months without salary and benefits; or A fine of not less than 20,000 pesos but not more than 40,000 pesos.

This is the provision under which the Court imposed the fine of 20,000 pesos.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the law. When a demurrer to evidence is sustained, the dismissal, being on the merits, is equivalent to an acquittal, and the prosecution cannot appeal because that would place the accused in double jeopardy. The Court acknowledged the settled exceptions, namely, where the State is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, where the dismissal is purely capricious or devoid of reason, or where there is a lack of proper notice and an absolute lack of opportunity to be heard, but found that none of these exceptional circumstances was present. The proper recourse was a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Respondent's claim of judicial activism was a mere afterthought, and his reasoning that the notice of appeal was filed within the reglementary period had no basis in law. The Court stressed that when the law is clear and basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it, and anything less constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

On the second issue, the Court held that respondent should not have ordered the transfer of possession of the car to Sheriff Mulat for storage in his own place, since the proper place of storage is a bonded warehouse and the law places exhibits under the custody of the Clerk of Court. In doing so, he stirred suspicions that judicial administrators were appropriating valuable court exhibits for personal use, and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge to avoid not only impropriety but even the mere appearance of impropriety. Nevertheless, because there was no evidence that respondent allowed the illegal use of the car, or that Sheriff Mulat had been using it, the Court could not declare that any impropriety on this matter had been committed. The charges against Sheriff Mulat had been investigated separately and dismissed for lack of evidence, and complainant showed nothing irregular in respondent's continued exercise of jurisdiction over the vehicles in custodia legis, since the trial court never lost jurisdiction over the case, the appeal being contrary to law. The Court reminded that in administrative proceedings the burden of proof rests on the complainant, and if the complainant fails in this, the charge must be dismissed.

On the third issue, the Court held that there was no factual support for the charge of bias and partiality. The mere fact that respondent immediately acted on Sheriff Mulat's report by issuing the show cause order and furnishing copies to the Ombudsman, the Department of the Interior and Local Government, the Chief of the Philippine National Police, and the National Police Commission did not indicate bias and partiality against complainant. Mere suspicion that a judge was partial is not enough.

Doctrine

A judge commits gross ignorance of the law when he gives due course to a prosecution appeal from a judgment of acquittal. When a demurrer to evidence is sustained, the dismissal is on the merits and is equivalent to an acquittal; the prosecution cannot appeal, because to do so would violate the guarantee that no person shall be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The exceptions are where the State is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, where the dismissal is purely capricious or devoid of reason, or where there is a lack of proper notice and an absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. Absent these, the proper remedy is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. When the law is clear and basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it. Court exhibits must remain under the custody and safekeeping of the Clerk of Court, and the proper place of storage is a bonded warehouse; a judge must avoid not only impropriety but even the mere appearance of impropriety. In administrative proceedings, the burden of proof rests on the complainant, and mere suspicion of partiality is not enough.

Disposition

Respondent Judge Henrick Gingoyon was found liable for gross ignorance of the law and ordered to pay a fine of 20,000 pesos, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar violation would be dealt with more severely, and he was admonished to exercise due care in the performance of his duties and to be more careful in issuing orders involving court exhibits.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a sustained demurrer to evidence is an acquittal on the merits, so a prosecution appeal from it is barred by double jeopardy and a judge who gives it due course is grossly ignorant of the law. Examiners use this case to test the double jeopardy exceptions and the administrative liability of judges, and to distinguish the proper remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 from a prohibited appeal.